This article is a mirror of http://www.peacejam.org/jody/u1c5.html
Written by Jody Williams and Stephen Goose
NOTE: "Stopping the Coward's War" is a chapter from the book To Walk Without Fear.
It was nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that ultimately launched the historic campaign of the 1990s to eliminate antipersonnel landmines (AP mines). Numbed by the horrific impact of the weapon on civilian populations the world over, increasingly voices were raised calling for a ban on the weapon:
A former British sergeant went to Afghanistan in the late 1980s determined to begin agricultural development programs. What he found were so many "seeds of death," AP mines, that viable development was impossible until those mines were removed from the ground. He helped launch one of the first NGO humanitarian mine clearance programs in the world, which went on to help found the ICBL.
In January 1991, after months in refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodia border ministering to landmine victims, a member of the Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children called for a ban on AP mines in testimony before the US Congress.
In September of 1991, Human Rights Watch (Asia Division) and Physicians for Human Rights, after a field mission to the country, issued their landmark work, "The Coward's War: Landmines in Cambodia." They jointly called for a ban on AP mines.
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation had opened its first prosthetics clinic in Cambodia in the summer of 1991. Quickly recognizing that providing prosthetic devices to mine victims without going to the root of the problem was no solution, they joined forces with Medico International of Germany to launch an advocacy campaign to ban landmines.
Fourteen hundred Australian citizens, educated by field workers' stories of life in the Cambodian minefields petitioned their government, in February of 1992, to ban the use and production of AP mines.
After years of providing prosthetic limbs to mine victims in dozens of countries, Handicap International decided to venture for the first time into political advocacy. Issuing "The Coward's War" in French, HI, along with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and PHR, launched its campaign to "Stop the Coward's War" with a petition calling for increased restrictions on mine use. Tens of thousands of French citizens rallied to the call and signed the petition.
Clearly, the understanding of the devastation caused by these indiscriminate killers of civilians was increasing dramatically. But it was not until the formal launching of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in October of 1992, that these new calls for a ban were given a coordinated political focus and direction. The call for a ban was not new, but the political campaign to achieve that goal was.
Efforts to ban AP mines, or at a minimum control their use, had began in the 1970s. At that time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), along with a handful of NGOs, had pressed governments to look at weapons that were indiscriminate or caused superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The impetus of this effort had been the impact on the world's psyche of the war in Vietnam seeing civilians and soldiers alike mutilated for a lifetime by napalm and other weapons of war. One of the weapons of particular concern at that time was the landmine.
Even many soldiers say that they had never thought about the landmine as being much different from any of the array of weapons at their disposal. But it does not take too long to educate soldier and civilian alike that landmines are, in fact, different. Landmines distinguish themselves because once they have been sown and the soldier walks away from the weapon, the landmine cannot discriminate between a combatant or a civilian. While the use of the weapon might be militarily justifiable during the days, weeks, or even months of the battle, once peace is declared the landmine does not recognize that peace. The landmine continues maiming and killing for decades, earning it the moniker the "eternal sentry." It is this long-term humanitarian impact, coupled with its indiscriminate nature, that makes the weapon illegal.
A majority of the conflicts in the last half of this century have been internal conflicts and in many of those wars, landmines have been used in great numbers. This proliferation of use has resulted in a global humanitarian crisis: tens of millions of landmines contaminate approximately 70 countries around the world. As is all too often the case, the majority of those countries are in the developing world and few have the resources to clean up the mess. But the problem extends beyond the mines already in the ground. Current estimates indicate between one and two hundred million mines are stockpiled and ready for use in arsenals around the world.
But the world was unaware of the degree of the landmine epidemic until the end of the Cold War. Largely ignored by governments at that point, the devastating, long-term consequences of landmines were becoming all too apparent to those NGOs who were putting limbs on victims, removing the detritus of war from the ground, providing aid and relief to war-torn societies, and documenting violations of human rights and the laws of war. It was the NGOs, as they tried to help war-torn societies like Cambodia, Afghanistan and Somalia rebuild, who began to educate the public to the degree and scope of the crisis. It was these NGOs who began to describe what they found in these devastated countries: millions and millions of landmines which affected every aspect of peacekeeping and every aspect of post-conflict reconstruction.
It was the NGO community that gained a broad and early understanding of the degree and complexity of landmine contamination. Ultimately, it was their all-too-real experience in various aspects of the landmine problem that compelled these NGOs to come together in an organized effort to achieve a global ban on antipersonnel landmines. The ICBL was formally launched in October of 1992, and it was the field-based expertise of the NGOs that founded the effort that gave their campaign's call for a ban on AP mines its moral authority. Yet, even as the ICBL was launched, few would have ever predicted that within 5 years, an international treaty banning the use, production, trade and stockpiling of AP mines would be signed by over 120 countries in Ottawa, Canada. Fewer still would have envisioned that this citizens' coalition would be widely recognized as the driving engine in the process that led to the achievement of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty, and would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for its efforts.
The Launch of the ICBL
As outlined above, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, NGOs and individual citizens began calling for a ban on AP mines. These scattered calls were united to begin what has been called by many a "model" coalition effort. The ICBL was formally launched after a meeting in the New York office of Human Rights Watch in October 1992. Six NGOs, which had taken a number of individual steps and joined in the direction of a ban campaign, agreed to initiate the International Campaign by issuing a "Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines" and hosting the first NGO-sponsored international landmine conference in May of the next year. These organizations, Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (USA), Medico International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (UK), Physicians for Human Rights (USA) and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (USA) - became the steering committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Jody Williams, of VVAF, its coordinator.
These NGOs, and the more than 1,200 in some 60 countries around the world that have since joined the ICBL, united behind the Campaign's "Joint Call." To the NGOs that initiated the ICBL, the issue was simple and the call was clear: 1) an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines; and 2) increased resources for humanitarian mine clearance and for victim assistance. In order to achieve these goals, the International Campaign recognized that its individual member NGOs would have to work at the national, regional and international levels to build public awareness and create the political will necessary to bring about a landmine ban.
A major strength of the Campaign has always derived from its ability to cut across disciplines to bring together a diverse array of NGOs to work toward a single goal. While united through the Joint Call, the vast coalition has been tremendously flexible in its work. Operating without a "secretariat" - no central office, no bureaucracy - individual NGOs have always been free to pursue the achievement of the Campaign's goals as best fit their own mandate. Thus, for example, US-based NGOs would not try to dictate to African NGOs how to operate, nor would African NGOs try to tell Asian or European colleagues how to move their governments and militaries toward a ban. It was clear that Northern NGOs, with their political culture of NGO/government dialogue, would not engage their governments precisely the same way that NGO partners in emerging democracies would.
Discussion Questions
1. Why has the International Campaign to Ban Landmines been called the "model" coalition effort?
2. What do you think Jody Williams had to do in order to build a coalition of organizations working together to ban landmines?
3. As you prepare to undertakee a peace plan/service project for your own community, are there any individuals or organizations you could collaborate with? Why? Why not?
"Stopping the Coward's War" (Con't)
While the ICBL has always pressured for sustained resources for mine clearance and victim assistance, throughout the years leading up to the Mine Ban Treaty, its primary focus was the achievement of an international ban treaty. Campaigners were clear that unless it were possible to eliminate the use, production, trade and stockpiling of AP mines, it would be virtually impossible to stop mine proliferation, clean up the mess and help mine victims reintegrate into society. Thus, with an emphasis on international humanitarian law, the ICBL sought the establishment of a new international norm.
The glue that has held the coalition together and moved it so dramatically toward the achievement of the Mine Ban Treaty has been a commitment to a constant flow of information, both internally among members of the ICBL and to governments and the general public through extensive work with the media and its own materials.
From its earliest days, the ICBL developed strong contacts in the international media, which has been largely supportive of the movement to ban mines. It would be inaccurate to say that there was an overarching ICBL media strategy. The Campaign certainly recognized the critical importance of favorable, and steady coverage of the issue. But it was up to individual members of the Campaign to work with media; fortunately many members of the ICBL have strong media contacts and significant experience getting their point of view heard. And while there might not have been overarching strategies, the ICBL did make concerted use of the media for specific issues and events. (See CCW Review below.)
Many of the first stories to appear were focused on the victim side of the equation and the tremendous difficulties faced by humanitarian deminers the world over, but one by one, major media endorsed the concept of a global ban on AP mines. Prominent media outlets increasingly recognized the compelling story behind the global humanitarian crisis and the "David vs. Goliath" nature of NGOs taking on governments and militaries all over the world to ban a weapon used by nearly all armies for decades. In the face of such a united media consolidating a majority of public opinion to the view that AP mines were horrific and indiscriminate killers of women and children, militaries everywhere were very reluctant to try to justify publicly their "need" for this weapon. Undoubtedly, this media support was invaluable to building global sentiment to eliminate antipersonnel mines.
While various NGOs have carried out their mine-related activities in a variety of ways, they have regularly communicated, through the ICBL's coordinator, political strategies and tactics, campaign activities, and successes and threats to continued success. It has been this overall grasp of the activities within the different countries and the work of the various national ban campaigns that has helped create and maintain the momentum of the ICBL.
Discussion Questions
1. Why do you think that the very first press stories initiated by the ICBL focused on the tragic, personal stories of landmine victims?
2. How do you think the ICBL was able to create the impression in the media that theirs' was a "David versus Goliath" struggle, and that they were clearly the underdog?
3. Why was it important that each organization and region involved in the Campaign was allowed to set their own media strategy?
"Stopping the Coward's War" (Con't)
One of the early communication tools was the LANDMINE UPDATE, a quarterly newsletter written and circulated by the ICBL's coordinator. Followed closely by NGOs and governments alike, the regular UPDATEs helped chronicle activities in the ban movement. The country-by-country reporting in the UPDATEs helped foster the sense of inexorable momentum toward a ban of AP mines. Issues of the UPDATE were supplemented by periodic mailings of packets of materials to national ban campaign coordinators and other important NGO members of the Campaign. These mailings included information important to campaigners, such as UN resolutions, national legislation, organizational resolutions in support of the ban, and significant press on various aspects of the landmine problem.
There has grown something of a mythology that what has made the ICBL so unique has been its reliance on electronic mail. Certainly the ease and speed of communication as a result of technological developments (for example, UPDATE mailings were quickly replaced by email circulation of the newsletter) had a great impact on the ability of civil society from diverse cultures to dialogue and formulate global political strategies, but email alone has not "moved the movement." When the ICBL was not much more than a handful of disparate NGOs, it was clear to the initiators of the Campaign that in order to hold together NGOs of such diverse interest, these organizations would have to feel an immediate and important part of developments within the Campaign.
In the early years of the ICBL, this was achieved by extensive use of the fax machine. The fax was relatively new, it was "exciting." Information arriving almost instantaneously by fax was perceived to be more important - and thus more deserving of immediate response - than regular mail. Thus, it was fax and telephone communication in the early years upon which the ICBL relied for much of its almost daily communications. Even though this was a relatively large expense, in the early years the bulk of NGOs working to ban mines were located in the North, where these costs were not as prohibitive as in the South. It was not until the ICBL was able to broaden its work from largely mine-producing countries to mine-affected countries that its members began to make the shift to electronic communication - a switch that was not fully achieved until late 1995 and early 1996.
Electronic mail has permitted the ICBL to carry out its priority of frequent and timely internal communication to a greater degree than ever before. The lower cost and increased reliability of email versus telephone and fax has been particularly important in facilitating communication with campaigners in developing nations. It has allowed the campaign not only to share information and jointly develop strategies more effectively, but has been crucial to joint planning of major activities and conferences, such as those held in Cambodia in 1995 and Mozambique in 1997.
As important - and many might contend more so - as fax, phone and email to link together the huge coalition has been networking through travel and the building of personal relationships - both within the Campaign and between campaigners and various government and military representatives. Indeed, email has been used relatively little for communications outside of the campaign, and the much remarked upon close cooperation between governments and NGOs during the Ottawa Process was more the result of face-to-face meetings than anything else.
From its very beginning, the ICBL has been built upon networking, both individual and organizational. For example, upon agreeing to help launch a campaign, Williams' first meetings were with HRW, PHR, large religious organizations, UN agencies and the office of Senator Patrick Leahy, who would prove so important to early momentum of the campaign, and to movement within the USA. The first travel abroad in the name of a landmine ban was to the offices of Medico International in Germany and then on to press the case of the campaign at a meeting of the European Network Against the Arms Trade, which brings together arms control groups from all over Europe and was a natural audience for "converts" to the mine ban.
It was these types of meetings, coupled with the annual international meetings sponsored by the ICBL, that helped spur the dramatic growth of the Campaign's membership. Unlike in many coalition efforts, international meetings of the ICBL have never been devoted simply to information sharing. ICBL conference have also included campaign-building workshops and training sessions, along with the development of work plans at regional and international levels. NGOs have always left these important conferences with a clear sense of forward movement outlined in ICBL action plans developed as integral parts of the conferences.
The six founding organizations were among the first to individually recognize the need for a ban on antipersonnel mines. As already noted, this recognition came from their work in the field where they found societies trying to survive, quite literally, in the middle of minefields, minefields supplied largely by the North. A sense of responsibility helped drive them to the launching of the ICBL. These NGOs also recognized that first steps by governments, if they were taken at all, likely would be in those countries with a political culture in which NGOs could put pressure on governments which could result in political action. Thus, in the first few years, much of the work was concentrated on expanding the Campaign throughout North America, Europe and Australia and New Zealand. Not only did their political cultures make progress possible, but many of these countries had been the most significant recent producers and exporters of antipersonnel mines. This provided a powerful opportunity for involving NGOs and raising awareness of the global epidemic and the responsibility of producer states for contributing to the crisis. Significant expansion of the Campaign throughout Asia and Africa did not occur until the ICBL network had been consolidated in the North and political momentum had begun to build.
Discussion Questions
1. What was the role of close communication and immediate information in building the ICBL?
2. Could this collaborative coalition have been created and sustained simply with the use of e-mail? Why or why not?
3. List the different internal communication techniques used to build the ICBL, and then discuss which techniques you would use to build a coalition of supporters for your peace plan/service project.
"Stopping the Coward's War" (Con't)
Pre-Ottawa Political Strategies of the ICBL: The Interplay of National and International Campaign Actions
The ICBL recognized that momentum would be build through national and international initiatives. The logic for early political action was clear - educate the public and public officials about the landmine crisis to change policies nationally and internationally. The NGOs that launched the ICBL were painfully aware that there was only one treaty that attempted to control the use of AP mines - the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). That treaty was a dismal failure, but it did provide a platform for action internationally. The CCW had entered into force in 1983. Any one country could call for a review conference of that treaty ten years after that date.
Thus, the key international strategy of the ICBL was to get any one government to call for the review conference in order to press for amendments to the CCW to ban landmines. When the ICRC had pressured governments in the 1970s to address the problem of landmines, there had been little support for a complete ban of the weapon, and negotiations resulted in the Landmines Protocol to the CCW, which provided for only limited restrictions on certain uses of mines. Given the continuing - and escalating - degree of proliferation of the weapon, with almost across the board disregard for the provisions of the Protocol, it had clearly proven to be an ineffective instrument.
The ICBL was not confident that a review conference would result in a ban, but it did recognize that a process of review would serve as platform from which to educate the public and governments alike and focus attention on the nature and scope of the problem. And, in fact, the international pressure and attention that the ICBL was able to generate during the two and a half years of review raised the stakes so significantly that governments began to vie to be seen as leaders on what the world was increasingly recognizing as a global humanitarian crisis. This growing public awareness had an impact on various national initiatives as well.
The first unilateral initiative in the world was a one-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines by the USA in 1992. The moratorium was subsequently extended several times, and the Clinton Administration in 1997 announced a permanent export ban. The moratorium came about at the initiative of Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman Lane Evans, who worked closely with US NGOs, most notably the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and a consortium of NGOs in Washington that work on arms control issues.
When speaking very candidly about that first export moratorium, some members of the ICBL note that they wish they could claim "strategic brilliance" in pressing for that moratorium. And that they immediately recognized the global impact that such legislation would have. But, that is not exactly the case. NGOs did support the Congressional initiative; but its success was much more the result of Congressional strategy than NGO/grassroots pressure. While the ICBL was immediate in its praise of the success of the legislation, it had not anticipated the tremendous boost to the momentum of the ban movement overall from that one-year moratorium on exports. But impact of that legislation on the early campaign cannot be overstated. The simple fact that the U.S. had just stopped the export of a legal weapon galvanized the imagination of the international community. Politicians in particular began to believe that if the USA could take this step, perhaps significant movement against AP mines was possible. The 1992 USA export moratorium, along with two subsequent USA-sponsored UN resolutions calling for worldwide moratoria, served as the catalysts to other export control initiatives.
The first country to respond to the USA initiative was France. While in Cambodia in February 1993, then-French President Francois Mitterrand announced that his country was making official its "voluntary abstention" of the export of AP mines in place since the mid-1980s. Shortly after that announcement, France - due to intense pressure generated by Handicap International and the French Ban Campaign - also initiated the process which resulted in the review conference of the CCW.
Within a rather short period of time, the export moratorium initiative gathered considerable momentum as more than a dozen countries announced comprehensive export moratoria. This led others to take even more "radical" steps and move beyond simple export limitations on landmines. In June of 1994, the Swedish Parliament, with strong pressure from the national campaign headed by Radda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children) voted that the government "should declare that an international total ban against antipersonnel mines is the only real solution to the humanitarian problem that the use of mines causes. Sweden should therefore propose solutions in order to achieve such a ban." The country subsequently offered an amendment to Protocol II of the CCW which would have banned antipersonnel landmines at the Vienna review conference had there been sufficient support.
In this period, an important victory was the unexpected motion by the Italian Senate on 2 August 1994, which ordered the government to immediately ratify Protocol II of the 1980 Convention; to "immediately activate the necessary legal instruments" to launch a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, to cease production of those mines by Italian companies or companies operating in Italy and support workers in that sector; and to promote demining in countries contaminated with antipersonnel mines.
Movement on the landmine issue by Italy had been seen by many as critical because Italy at that time was considered to be one of the three most significant producers and exporters of landmines in the world.
Then, in a rather surprising development shortly after the Italian initiative, in his address before the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1994, President Clinton called for the "eventual elimination" of landmines. His statement set the stage for a U.S. sponsored resolution that not only urged states to enact export moratoriums, but in its final operative point encouraged "further international efforts to seek solutions to the problems caused by anti-personnel landmines, with a view towards the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines." The combination of Clinton's remarks and the resolution erroneously led many to believe that the US Administration was finally following the lead on the issue shown in the US Congress and was signaling its willingness to move rapidly toward a ban.
The momentum on national fronts continued and in March 1995, Belgium became the first government in the world to unilaterally ban the use, production, trade and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines. Norway followed suit in June, 1995. Senior representatives from both governments have on many occasions cited the pressures from NGOs as the key factor in bringing about their national bans. The tide was turning, although it was sometimes hard to recognize that fact during the international negotiations on AP mines taking place to amend the CCW's Landmine Protocol.
Discussion Questions
1. How was the ICBL able to build momentum for their cause?
2. Notice how every small step made a difference in the campaign to ban landmines, especially when each of these small steps were connected by the campaign's coordinator, Jody Williams? What ideas does this give you about the small steps you need to take to build momentum for peace plan/service project?
"Stopping the Coward's War" (Con't)
Campaign Expansion and Its Political Impact
With the formal launch of the ICBL, its six founding NGOs had committed to hosting the first NGO conference on landmines. Held in London in May, 1993, that meeting was attended by some 70 representatives of approximately 40 NGOs. Just one year later, participation doubled for the Campaign's second conference, held in Geneva. By this time, the ICBL's efforts were receiving important support from UN agencies. The Geneva conference, for example, was co-hosted by UNICEF, which provided all the logistical support, space and support staff for the conference. The early - and continued - involvement by UNICEF was very important in increasing the institutional credibility of the Campaign. Additionally, by taking the political lead within the UN on the issue of a ban, UNICEF helped to spark significant movement within that body which pushed the organization overall toward support for a ban.
The Campaign's second international conference coincided with governmental expert sessions in preparation for the CCW review conference. Clearly, the ICBL had already generated significant momentum, internationally and nationally. In every instance of domestic initiatives outlined above, the various national campaigns that make up the ICBL played pivotal roles, but roles which varied from country to country, a reflection of the overall flexibility of the Campaign. In the US, for example, NGOs worked directly with the staff of Senator Patrick Leahy to develop and move forward pro-ban legislation. Because of the immediate access and support "at the top," the NGOs, while generating a great deal of media attention to the issue, did not work to build extensive grassroots support in the US at that time. In contrast, most European campaigns put a higher priority on directly engaging the public than in working with legislators or other government officials.
Movement by the French government was due primarily to the grassroots pressure developed by Handicap International, which leads the NGO effort in France. In May, 1992, HI had begun a countrywide petition campaign calling for a halt to the "Coward's War," which gathered tens of thousands of signatures in support of the ban movement. Mitterrand is widely viewed to have initiated the CCW review process in response to the demands of the NGOs and the French public and "get them off his back." The French campaign also held numerous meetings with French ministries and conducted a number of seminars at government offices on the issues related to a mine ban in an attempt to move forward French landmine policy.
But probably the most dramatic and unexpected development came about in Italy. The dramatic shift in the Italian government's position in Italy in the summer of 1994 was the result of tremendously creative work by the Italian national campaign, which had been initiated less than a year before. At that time, the national campaign did not seem to hold much promise of growth or impact. Indeed, a meeting in Rome in December 1993 meant to build the Italian campaign had more attendees from outside the country than within. But from its inauspicious start, the Italian campaign blasted into the Italian public's consciousness in June, 1994, by getting the most popular Italian national talk show to begin to devote time every day to the issue of landmines. The series culminated with members of the Italian campaign and the Italian Minister of Defense appearing together on one of the shows where the Minister made the surprising declaration that Italy should ban the use of landmines and end their production.
The Italian campaign was also able to convince the workers' representatives of Valsella Meccanotecnica - one of the world's biggest mine producers, and the trade unions of Brescia, the town where Valsella was located, to issue a press statement indicating that they "agree with and support the campaign to ban landmines. It is mandatory to eliminate the production of every type of antipersonnel mine, including the so-called self-destructing and self-neutralizing mines." Furthermore, the trade unionists asked the Italian government "to take immediate initiatives to stop landmine production and trade, and support all the humanitarian actions in favor of the victims."
Defense Minister Previti followed through with his public declaration, indicating in a letter to Italian pro-ban Senator Ronchi that he had given the "necessary instructions to start the procedure that will bring Italy to the unilateral commitment not to produce and export antipersonnel landmines." And then, on 2 August, the Italian Senate passed Motion No. I - and the government indicated that it was formally undertaking "to observe a unilateral moratorium on the sale of antipersonnel mines to other countries" and was readying "the necessary instruments for stopping production of such devices by Italian companies or companies operating on Italian territory."
But not wanting to rest on this quite unexpected and tremendous success, the Italian campaign pressed its advantage and held three days of activities in Brescia from 23-25 September that year. Events included a concert - to a very unexpected standing room only crowd - to raise money for the campaign, a day-long seminar on landmines, and a march to Castenedolo, the town where Valsella's production facility is located. From a couple of hundred people who began the 17-kilometer march, seemingly out of nowhere, thousands joined their ranks, including four women workers from Valsella, who also spoke at the rally culminating the march. The only four women working at the plant, they alone dared risk retribution from the factory owners. In a very moving display, they stood at the stage holding a banner declaring that in order to feed their own children, they should not have to produce landmines which kill others' children. On the evening of 22 September, in a special session, the town council of Castenedolo had voted unanimously to join the Landmine Campaign. The Italian Campaign has been able to gain the support of municipal governments throughout the country, with more than 160 city councils passing resolutions in support of the ban movement.
As campaigns in the north continued to grow and rack up continued success, ban campaigns began to emerge in the South, including in mine-affected countries. The ICBL recognized that it was time to strengthen and expand these nascent efforts in the South. Early in 1995 the young Cambodia Campaign decided to hold a major conference. After extensive consultations with other members of the ICBL, this grew into the third ICBL international conference, held in Phnom Penh in June, 1995. It would be the first ever landmine conference held in a mine-infested country. It would also be the first major ICBL event jointly planned primarily by email.
In late July 1994, NGOs, the Cambodia Mine Action Center (the national demining organization), and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights had issued a statement to the press in Phnom Penh calling upon the Cambodian government to "declare a total and permanent ban on the import, stockpiling and use of landmines; such a ban should include the destruction of all existing stockpiles of mines." They also called upon the UN Secretary General to "take a new and imaginative initiative" to "completely redraft the 1980 Convention which has proved ineffective in preventing the global spread of landmines, with their devastating toll of death and suffering."
The next month, the NGO Forum on Cambodia together with local and international NGOs launched the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines. That coalition began building public awareness and mobilizing support throughout the country with a massive signature campaign, gathering names at temples, markets, and schools throughout the country. At every public event - any time or any place people would be gathered, the Cambodia Campaign was there. Signatures were also gathered at the annual peace walk, held in late spring of every year, when thousands walk the length of the country to symbolize their cry for a peaceful, united Cambodia.
All of this creativity and excitement helped result in a wildly successful third international conference, with more than 450 participants from over 40 countries. Campaign networking grew dramatically as a result of the Cambodia Conference, new information was exchanged, and plans of action developed. Importantly, six new national campaigns in the South were launched as a direct result of the Conference. Finally, by the end of the Conference, 340,000 Cambodian citizens, including King Sihanouk at a meeting during the conference itself, had added their names to the Cambodian petition, calling for an immediate ban of landmines. This initiative helped spark other signature drives in national campaigns around the world, resulting in a million and a half signatures being gathered for presentation to the delegates of the CCW review conference, which opened only three months later in Vienna, calling upon them to amend that treaty to ban antipersonnel landmines.
The ICBL and the CCW Review Process
As noted, it had been the pressure generated by Handicap International and the French Campaign which compelled the French government to set in motion the process of review of the CCW. It had originally been envisioned as concluding in a three week conference in Vienna, Austria, in September and October of 1995. A series of four governmental sessions had been held in Geneva in 1994 and early 1995 to prepare for the review conference itself. Not permitted inside the rooms where the diplomatic discussions were being held, representatives of the ICBL stood at the doors of every meeting; waiting for breaks and the end of sessions to get their message across to delegates.
Even though the ICBL was laying the groundwork for what would be the ultimate success of a ban treaty, movement by governments toward a ban was not always obvious in Geneva. During the CCW preparatory sessions, the ICBL urged delegates to take an expansive approach to the landmine problem and to make a serious assessment of the real impact of landmines on the ground, in order to then amend the Convention to meaningfully address the problem. However, from beginning to end, the preparatory sessions and the negotiations took a more narrow approach and limited themselves to adjustments of the existing framework of the treaty. It was abundantly clear coming out of those preliminary meetings that the international community simply was not ready to meet its then-stated goal of eliminating landmines through the vehicle of an amended Protocol II.
While not allowed inside the sessions themselves, members of the ICBL still managed to have significant impact on the process. The wealth of factual information on the landmine crisis, coupled with the skill and tenacity of the ICBL reps at all of the meetings, helped strengthen relationships between the Campaign and governments and firmly established the expertise of the NGO community on the landmine problem. This proved critical as the momentum for a ban continued to build. This period of NGO/government interaction helped pave the way for open cooperation between the ICBL and pro-ban governments during the Ottawa process, and to full participation of the Campaign in the meetings culminating in the ban treaty negotiations in Oslo in September of 1997.
It is important to underscore the fact that the Campaign had very low expectations of the CCW review and had quickly seen that not much would be accomplished during the lengthy exercise. Thus, for the ICBL, the review process became one stop along the way to a ban, not an end in itself, but an opportunity for promoting the Campaign's agenda. In this respect, the review conference process was in many ways very valuable in building the global movement to eradicate antipersonnel mines, largely because the Campaign was able to take advantage of the opportunity posed by the review process to educate governments and the wider public to the need for a ban.
The ICBL sent a team of seasoned organizers to Vienna weeks in advance to work with Austrian NGOS in preparation for the review conference. The Campaign planned to hit delegates and the media of the world with a barrage of information about various aspects of the landmine crisis as well as the limited effort to resolve the crisis at the review conference. Its media strategy included regular briefings on issues the Campaign wanted to highlight along with the twice weekly production of the "CCW News," the ICBL newsletter on happenings at the conference. Governments, often publicly voicing pro-ban positions, were not happy to see their very disappointing negotiating stances in print. In particular, the newletter's column, "The Good, The Bad and the Ugly," frequently roused the ire of governments; but it also forced them to try to bring their public statements in line with the realities of their negotiating positions, or vice-versa. Not only did the Campaign give regular briefings to government delegates and the media, but also delegates were invited to explain the position of their governments to campaigners.
The ICBL also carried on other activities inside the conference site, in Vienna and globally in support of its call for a ban. Such activities included the delivery of six tons of shoes to the Austrian Parliament by Pax Christi, UNICEF and Save the Children Austria. The shoes symbolized unneeded shoes by countless present and future mine victims. A similar event was carried out the same weekend in Paris. During the conference, 1.7 million signatures of people from around the world calling for a ban were presented to CCW Review Conference President, Ambassador Johan Molander. The very moving ceremony had mine victims from Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozmabique and the USA deliver the signatures, collected in 53 countries. Simulated minefields and photographic displays were presented in Vienna during the three weeks of the conference.
While the International Campaign had not gone to Vienna with expectations of a ban, neither was there an expectation of such limited changes in the treaty nor the huge step backwards with the changing of the landmine definition. As it became increasingly clear that little of value to the ban movement would emerge from the review of the CCW, the Campaign put tremendous pressure on governments extremely wary of "bad press" on the issue. The ICBL convincingly argued that not only were the negotiations NOT moving toward a ban, but they were, in fact, weakening the already horribly weak Landmine Protocol.
The ICBL's very successful media strategy was keeping the international community informed of proceedings at the conference. The certainty of bearing the brunt of bad press and a public backlash regarding the weak results of the negotiations resulted in deadlock in Vienna, with governments deciding to meet again for two additional sessions of the review conference. The first one week session, in January of 1996, would deal with technical issues related to the treaty and the second two week session would conclude the review of the CCW on 3 May.
The movement to ban antipersonnel mines was quickly overtaking the CCW approach to controlling mines. The new landmines protocol was already largely irrelevant when it was finally agreed to on 3 May 1996. It was clear that many governments agreed to it, recognizing that it would make little difference in the short or long run, but resigned to the notion that it was the best that could be negotiated by consensus at the time. At the opening of the review conference, in Vienna in September 1995, only 14 nations had voiced support for an immediate ban. By the end of the conference, that number had grown to 41. On the final day of the conference alone, five nations declared their support for a ban. But even more important than the numbers, many of these governments began to come together as an identifiable, cohesive bloc and to push for concrete steps to advance a ban domestically, regionally and internationally.
As the deadlock was developing during the Vienna session, members of the ICBL began discussing strategies to continue to build momentum beyond the review conference. A decision that turned out to be of pivotal importance in the next stage of the ban movement was made to put a priority on getting avowedly pro-ban governments to self-identify and work together as a bloc to move beyond the CCW impasse. While campaigners certainly did not envision that there would be much enthusiasm for a new round of international meetings to deal with a landmine treaty when the CCW review ended, it seemed patently clear that the only way to maintain movement would be if the relatively small number of pro-ban states worked together. Additionally, the ICBL began to talk much more seriously about regional work, trying to establish "mine free zones," to create building blocks to a global ban.
When governments reconvened in Geneva in January, the ICBL invited pro-ban states to a meeting to discuss a cooperative way forward. And to the surprise of many, governments came. Eight participated in that first meeting, 14 came to a second meeting held at the beginning of the final negotiating session, and 11 to a third meeting at the end of the review conference. And it was out of this series of meetings that the Canadian government offered to host a governmental meeting in October of 1996, in which pro-ban governments would come together and strategize as to how to move forward a ban agenda.
More than 150 NGO representatives from 20 countries had participated in the final Geneva session. The Campaign was a highly visible presence at that session in the UN and in the city of Geneva itself, just as it had been during the three weeks of Vienna. Campaign activities included a simulated minefield which delegates encountered several times each day in the hall of the UN, a "Wall of Remembrance" with pictures of mine victims and its clock registering another victim every twenty minutes, photographic exhibitions, ban posters on buses, the "Ban Mines" stickers everywhere, another mountain of shoes, demining demonstrations, and culminating in a Campaign vigil at the gates of the UN on the final day of the conference. The Campaign held daily press briefings in the UN building and issued daily press communiques. And at the ICBL's request, the closing plenary began with a minute of silence in remembrance of mine victims, past and future.
As a clear symbol of the growing NGO/government partnership, on the last day of the conference, the ICBL held a joint press conference with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, and the government of Canada, and for all the message was the same: only a ban will do. And as awareness - and thus pressure on governments - grew, many governments began to approach the Campaign about what it would take to be considered a "pro-ban" nation. These states wanted to be invited to the Canadian conference and to be considered part of the ban movement.
Discussion Questions
1. The ICBL approached the CCW review process in Vienna with the anticipation that they would lose the debate. However, they ended up with a strategic victory. How did they accomplish this?
2. What was the importance of using symbols that were very easy for the press and the general public to understand, like the delivery of six tons of shoes to the Parliament Building?
3. As you begin to work on your own peace plan/service project, you may face setbacks or "defeats." What are some ways you can use these setbacks strategically?
"Stopping the Coward's War" (Con't)
The ICBL View of the Ottawa Process
When the Canadian government began floating the idea of hosting a meeting to strategize about a ban, some in the ICBL were skeptical, to say the least; one campaigner remembers wondering if the move was really designed to ensure that momentum for a ban would be sidetracked by more government discussions leading nowhere. But as ICBL leadership worked closely with Canada in the development of the meeting, it was quickly clear that the intention was real: Canada sought to pull together a meeting of pro-ban states that would develop a concrete road map leading to an international ban.
And as the work for the Ottawa conference continued, interest in the meeting grew quickly as well. Planners first had envisioned a relatively small meeting, earlier in the fall of 1996. The view was that it would be considered "wildly" successful if even twenty states participated. But the conference, "Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines: International Strategy Conference," held from October 3-5 was more wildly successful than any had imagined. This historic meeting brought together 50 governments that had pledged support for a total ban on antipersonnel mines, as well as 24 observer states, dozens of NGOs from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, various United Nations agencies, the ICRC and other international organizations.
The Ottawa Conference yielded three concrete results: a final declaration agreed to by the 50 participating governments recognizing the urgent need for a ban on antipersonnel mines; the conference Chairman's Agenda for Action, an outline of actions for reaching a ban rapidly; and the stunning announcement by Canada's Foreign Minister Axworthy that Canada was prepared to hold a treaty-signing conference for a total ban in December 1997.
As host of the meeting, the Foreign Minister gave opening and closing remarks to conference participants. Everyone anticipated the normal congratulatory statement thanking delegates for their hard work and for developing the final declaration and the Agenda for Action. Only a handful were aware of what would come next. As Mr. Axworthy came to the end of his remarks, he rocked the diplomatic community by challenging governments to negotiate a simple and clear treaty banning antipersonnel landmines and return to Ottawa - in the space of one year - to sign the document. He further ruffled diplomatic feathers by clearly stating that Canada planned to work in open partnership with the International Campaign to achieve this goal.
Amid the cheers of the ban campaigners present, the silence of the diplomats was deafening. Even clearly pro-ban states were horrified. Canada had stepped outside of diplomatic process and procedure and put them between a rock and a hard place. They had come to Ottawa to strategize on how best to achieve a ban treaty, and now they had a concrete, and extraordinarily ambitious, time frame in which to do it. The International Campaign stood up and cheered while many diplomats literally hung their heads and wrung their hands.
The conference was also notable for the unprecedentedly high level of cooperation with and involvement by NGOs in both the planning and execution of the conference. Between May and October, members of the Canadian government and the ICBL consulted frequently on nearly every aspect of the organization of the conference, and worked together to insure maximum attendance by governments. The ICBL was given a seat at the table as a full participant in the conference, while those governments unwilling to declare themselves pro-ban sat in the back as observers. Campaigners were actively involved in drafting the precise language of both the final declaration and the action plan, though Mr. Axworthy's announcement took nearly all of them by surprise as well.
This extraordinary level of cooperation continued as between October 1996 and December 1997, the ICBL worked in close partnership with Canada and other pro-ban states of the Ottawa Process to help develop treaty language and to build the political will necessary for a successful treaty signing. It was not clear in the first critical months after that first Ottawa meeting if the Ottawa Process would survive. The Canadian government had to put a lot of diplomatic time, effort, and money into making the process work. Canadian diplomats shuttled the world over, soothing angry governments, reminding them of their own leadership and commitment to a ban "as soon as possible," and working hard to form a core group which was regionally representative and which would "deliver the goods" - an international treaty banning the use, production, trade and stockpiling of AP mines in just over one year's time.
During campaign meetings in Ottawa in October just after the conference and in Brussels in December, the ICBL declared the Ottawa Process to be its highest priority for the year and threw its full weight behind the effort. National campaigns pressed their governments to embrace the challenge and publicly support the Ottawa Process. Once shored up, the momentum appeared to build continuously. As the Process moved forward, the core group of pro- ban governments dedicated to the success of the treaty grew and worked closely with the ICBL. The initial core group included Canada, Norway, Austria, South Africa, Belgium, Mexico, the Philippines, and Germany.
For the core group, the Austrian government developed a draft treaty which became the basis for the negotiations in Oslo in September. Additionally, the ICBL developed its own treaty which, in its view, was the goal to strive for as the international community moved toward the September meeting. Once developed by the ICBL's treaty working group, members of the steering committee, beginning in January 1997 and several times thereafter, took the treaty to New York to meet with government officials at the United Nations and educate them as to the ICBL's views of the essential aspects of a ban treaty to emerge from the negotiating process. The ICBL's ad hoc treaty team pressed strongly throughout the Ottawa process to ensure that the formal Mine Ban Treaty would incorporate as much of the ICBL treaty as possible.
The Ottawa Process was made up of a series of meetings to develop the treaty itself and the political will to sign it. Treaty language was developed at government-sponsored conferences in Vienna, Bonn and Brussels, as well as smaller meetings of the core group and bilateral government consultations. The ICBL's views on treaty language were sought throughout the process, and the ICBL was an active participant in each of the government conferences. Moreover, pro-ban governments, the ICRC and the ICBL each hosted a number of conferences aimed at insuring maximum support for the Ottawa Process and the December treaty-signing.
The Austrian government hosted the first international conference in Vienna from 12-14 February. At that meeting, the essential components of a treaty to ban antipersonnel landmines were laid out. The number of participants at the meeting was much greater than anyone expected, as one hundred eleven countries attended, along with an official delegation of the ICBL, the ICRC, and UN Agencies. While their statements indicated that perhaps half of the governments in attendance were not yet ready to ban the weapon, the widespread participation was evidence of the seriousness with which the Ottawa Process was being taken globally.
Although the ICBL was permitted to make statements to the opening and closing plenary sessions of the conference, it was not permitted to attend the working sessions, due to objections from some governments. Nevertheless, communications between numerous pro ban government representatives and the four ICBL representatives present were nearly constant throughout the conference. With solid work by members of the ban movement in Austria, the ICBL held press conferences at the opening and the close of the meeting. Notably, governments did not call for their own separate media events. Rather, in a conscious effort to emphasize the collaborative nature of the effort, the ICBL press conferences included the Austrian chairman of the conference, as well as representatives from the Canadian and Belgian governments, and the ICRC.
The Vienna conference was followed by a technical meeting held in Bonn in April on verification and compliance measures related to the treaty. As with Vienna, the number of countries which participated - 120 - was unexpected and again showed the continuing development of momentum of the Process. The ICBL's delegation of two was treated as a full participant in the meeting and was able to attend and make interventions at all sessions.
The midway point between the Ottawa challenge and the treaty-signing in December was the June conference hosted by the Belgian government. The centerpiece of this "make or break" conference was a declaration that committed governments to the Ottawa Process, to participating in the Oslo negotiations of a treaty based on the Austrian draft text with a view to signing the treaty in December. Only weeks before the meeting, most observers were estimating that 60 to 75 governments would endorse the Brussels Declaration. By the end of the meeting more than 90 had signed on, and that number subsequently grew to over 100. Among those announcing their support for the ban treaty shortly before or during the conference were major producers, exporters and users of mines, such as France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bosnia and Angola.
The day before the conference opened, the ICBL coordinator joined the Belgian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister at a high profile press conference at the City Hall. The ICBL coordinator was also asked to give one of three keynote speeches to open the conference, along with the Foreign Minister and the head of the Canadian delegation. During her speech, Jody Williams coined the refrain that the ICBL used throughout this meeting and the Oslo negotiations, that the ICBL demanded nothing less than a comprehensive ban treaty with "no exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes." It was picked up as a mantra for many government delegates as well.
Although the Belgian government invited an official ICBL delegation for the conference, it was not permitted to attend meetings the first two days to finalize the Brussels Declaration. As had been the case for mine meetings going back to CCW days, however, there were NGO representatives on many official government delegations, and the campaign's presence and views were strongly felt throughout. The second two days consisted of panels to raise the profile of the pro-ban movement and the issues that must be grappled with to create a truly mine-free world. The conference ended with a joint press conference by the ICBL and the Belgian Foreign Minister.
The Belgian Campaign to Ban Landmines hosted the ICBL's participation at the Brussels Conference. More than 130 NGOs representatives from 40 countries took part. Campaign activities coinciding with the conference included a cycle race from Paris to Brussels with the participation of landmine survivors, the display of a "Giant Jeans" with one leg symbolically shredded, a Public Awareness Day with a demining demonstration, an official presentation of a "landmine victim" outfit for the manneken pis (the famous symbol of Brussels), a simulated minefield government delegates had to cross each day entering the conference, and a variety of displays and exhibits. In addition, the week was observed by communities of faith around the world as International Days of Prayer for Victims of Landmines, with hundreds of individuals and groups in 39 countries sending messages to Brussels.
The success of the Belgian Conference, which virtually guaranteed that an impressively large number of governments would come to Oslo to negotiate a true ban treaty, indicated that momentum was unstoppable at that point. On the negative side, the ICBL felt compelled to issue a press statement criticizing the United States delegation for "testing the waters to see how many holes can be shot in the treaty in order to accommodate US policy." During the Brussels meeting, a senior US official summoned numerous delegations to a hotel for bilateral meetings outside the conference to press them regarding their positions on the treaty, the Ottawa process, and the preferred US option of negotiating any treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The US - while signing the various of pro-ban declarations and showing up at all the meetings - was clearly not of a "like mind" of those governments honestly seeking a ban treaty with no exceptions, reservations or loopholes. The US was pressing for a treaty with an explicit exception for Korea and for its own "smart" mines - a stance that it would take to embarrassing conclusion at the Oslo treaty negotiations.
Discussion Questions
1. Why did it help the campaign to ban landmines when Jody Williams coined the refrain, "No exceptions, no reservations, no loopholes"?
2. How did the ICBL work to gain media attention for their point of view at the Brussels Conference?
3. Why do you think some countries opposed the ban on landmines and lobbied for exceptions? Research their points of view, and then explain to your group/classmates whether you agree with their reservations, or disagree.
"Stopping the Coward's War" (Con't)
ICBL & Building Political Will on the Road to Ottawa
The ICBL, as noted, threw its weight behind the Ottawa Process. In addition to its participation in the government-sponsored, treaty-oriented conferences, the Campaign held its own series of meetings and conferences. Those that had been previously scheduled in order to develop the work of the ICBL added components to contribute to the building of political will for the Ottawa Process. While most ICBL conferences had invited governments to participate in one form or another, the meetings of this period particularly stressed the development of cooperation between NGOs and governments on the road to the ban treaty.
NGO meetings were held in Ottawa and Brussels in 1996, and in Maputo, Tokyo, Stockholm, Sydney, New Dehli, Senegal, and Sanaa in 1997. Other conferences to help build political will were sponsored by the ICRC in Harare in April 1997 and Manila in July 1997, as well as by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and South African government in Kempton Park in May 1997 and by the government of Turkmenistan in Ashgabat in June 1997. Regardless of the sponsor, each of these conferences was characterized by cooperation among the partners in the ban movement - the ICBL, ICRC, and pro-ban governments. Japan
On 6-7 March, the Japanese government hosted the "Tokyo Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines." Attended by 27 countries, the European Union and 10 international organizations (NGOs were only allowed to attend during the opening session), the primary aim of the conference was to discuss mine clearance and victim assistance. But taking advantage of the moment, immediately following the government meeting, the Association to Aid Refugees/Japan and two other NGOs sponsored the "NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines: Towards a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines."
This first such NGO conference in Japan brought together over 200 participants to discuss landmine issues and to strategize on achieving a total ban. The Joint Appeal of the conference called upon all governments to ban antipersonnel mines and to join the Ottawa Process.
While Japan clearly was not in the ban camp, this first NGO conference proved important to moving the Japanese government to sign the treaty. The conference helped to build NGO activity in Japan, including the launching of a Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, and AAR was able to build public awareness through a series of books on the issue, featuring a young rabbit who wanted to see a world free of landmines. The book and its hero "Sunny the Rabbit" have raised significant funds for landmine related work and have become a symbol in Japan of the ban movement. Exhibits of the original artwork of the book are shown throughout the country to raise awareness and funds, and were featured in a landmine exhibit for the Nagano Olympics during its Peace Appeal, which focussed on the ICBL.
Africa
As noted above, as the CCW was winding to a disappointing close in May 1996, the ICBL decided to focus some of its political work toward helping create "mine-free zones" as a way to build regional blocs in support of a ban. Central America declared itself the world's first mine free zone in September 1996 as all six governments in the region committed to no further use, production, trade or stockpiling of the weapon by the year 2000. Caribbean nations forming the CARICOM followed suit in November.
The ICBL identified southern Africa, the SADC states, as a next target, largely because it constituted one of the most mined regions in the world. A "mine-free zone" in Africa was seen as an important next step in building regional blocs, and Africa as a crucial region for the success of the Ottawa Treaty. A key failure for the CCW had been the lack of participation by mine-affected countries and the developing world in general. The ICBL decided to hold its 4th International NGO Conference on Landmines in Africa and sent Elizabeth Bernstein, its key conference organizer to the region in August 1996.
Although initial plans called for the conference to be held in Zimbabwe, it was decided after consultations with campaigners in the region to hold it instead in Mozambique. Organizers believed it to be extremely important that the conference be held in a seriously contaminated country. Additionally, it was felt that by holding the conference in Mozambique, the relatively young national campaign there would be tremendously strengthened through its contributions to preparing the conference and by the international focus brought by the ICBL's fourth conference.
The Mozambique Campaign had been launched in November 1995, with a nationwide signature gathering campaign in support of a ban. The campaign began modestly, as citizens both weary and wary after decades of war were reluctant to promote a campaign not embraced by the government. But, in a prime example of how the landmine campaign has helped to empower civil society, the Mozambique Campaign grew increasingly active and influential, starting a newsletter, taking on a full-time coordinator, lobbying parliamentary committees, and meeting with the foreign minister and speaker of the assembly. The Campaign grew to over 70 organizations and gathered over 100,000 signatures on the petition calling for a total ban. Although the campaign repeatedly petitioned the Mozambican President for a meeting to present the signatures, it was not until the week before the Conference itself that the audience was granted.
During the months of preparation leading up to the conference held February 25-28, 1997, in Maputo, ICBL staff worked not only on conference preparation itself, but also providing capacity building and campaign skills workshops throughout the region to help strengthen and build new African ban campaigns. Indeed, four new campaigns were launched during the course of the planning for the conference, in Zambia in September, Zimbabwe in October, Angola in November, and Somalia in February 1997. Additionally, committed to building campaigns in and networking throughout the South, the ICBL hosted a two-day South-South meeting, just before the opening of the International Conference. People from Africa, Asia and Latin America came together to share information, ideas and plans for the future. The coordinator of the ICBL participated in this important South-South meeting to demonstrate the linkages between these new campaigns and the ICBL overall.
The Maputo conference proved to be a crucial step in the Ottawa Process - not only as an important venue for the vital task of building political will in African governments to support the treaty, but also for solidifying and furthering NGO-government cooperation to reach the goal of the ban treaty by December of the year. The ICBL considered the conference an unqualified success in meeting the goals of expanding the campaign network throughout the continent, moving southern Africa toward becoming a mine-free zone, and increasing support for the Ottawa Treaty.
More than 450 participants from 60 countries listened as Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano opened the conference, titled "Toward a Mine-Free Southern Africa." After four days of strategy sessions and informational workshops, the conference ended with a final declaration endorsing the Ottawa Process and calling on all governments to publicly commit to signing the ban treaty in December.
Attention generated by the conference, along with extensive work by their national campaigns, resulted in decisions by South Africa the week before the conference and Mozambique during the conference to unilaterally ban antipersonnel mines. Government interest in the conference was such that 17 governments addressed the meeting. Malawi and Swaziland used the occasion to announce their support for the Ottawa Process and a December treaty-signing.
Following on the Maputo Conference, the ICRC held a seminar in Harare, Zimbabwe on April 21-23, 1997 in which military and foreign affairs officials from all 12 SADC states called on regional governments to establish a mine-free zone, immediately end all new deployments of antipersonnel mines, and commit to signing the ban treaty in December.
These two conferences helped lay the groundwork for the next meeting in Africa - the Organization of African Unity and the government of South Africa's continent-wide conference on landmines held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 19-21 May. The major objectives of the meeting included developing African cooperation in demining and victim assistance, an African strategic plan of action to respond to the landmine problem, specific recommendations for implementing OAU landmine resolutions and finally, to increase international awareness of the impact of landmines on Africa.
There was significant ICBL involvement, particularly by the national ban campaigns in Africa. The ICBL was asked to deliver a keynote speech, along with South Africa's Vice President and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. A surprising 41 OAU states were present, and Ambassador Selebi of South Africa served as the chair, as he would subsequently for the formal treaty negotiations in Oslo. Zimbabwe became the third SADC state to unilaterally ban antipersonnel mines. Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Guinea-Bissau issued statements for the first time pledging full support of the Ottawa Process. Egypt was the only country to strongly state its opposition, but it felt under enough pressure that it made the declaration that it no longer produced or exported mines, and noted that it was in favor of the eventual elimination of landmines.
On the final day of the meeting, South Africa destroyed 25% of its antipersonnel mine stockpile. Six NGO representatives were invited to fly on the military plane to witness the destruction, which was set off by South Africa's Defense Minister Joe Modise. Later in the day at the close of the conference, Modise said, "Like Archbishop Tutu and the others who have spoken at this conference, I appeal to representatives here today to strive to make our African continent and the whole world an antipersonnel landmine-free zone a safer place for our children and for succeeding generations." The very strong final declaration and action plan emerging from this meeting was forwarded to the June OAU Summit in Harare and helped forge the basis of African-wide strength in maintaining the integrity of the ban treaty during the negotiation session in Oslo later that year.
Eastern & Central Europe and the Baltic States
Directly from the meeting in Kempton Park, ICBL representatives proceeded to Stockholm to take part, from 23-25 May, in a seminar on antipersonnel mines for NGOs and governments from Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltics. The aim of the meeting was to increase awareness of the mine issue and the Ottawa process. Organized by the Swedish UN Association, Swedish Save the Children and the Christian Council of Sweden, the seminar was divided in two parts: firstly an exchange of information in plenary form (23 May), and secondly a workshop (24-25 May) for NGOs.
Eight governments made statements during the first day outlining their APM policy (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia). Romania and Slovenia declared for the first time their intention to take part in the Ottawa process and to sign the ban treaty in December 1997. Croatia repeated its commitment to the Ottawa process, and Poland declared that they had prolonged their export moratorium to an indefinite moratorium on all antipersonnel mine exports.
Some 20 NGOs from 14 Central/Eastern European and Baltic countries took part in the workshop on 24-25 May, as well as representatives from the ICBL and the ICRC. During two working group sessions, the NGOs explored ways of raising the mine issue in their countries, and on the final day drafted country action plans with concrete goals and activities. There was a strong feeling among the participants that the ban issue could move considerably in many countries, with a minimum amount of public pressure.
Immediately following the Stockholm meeting, an ICBL delegation spent one day in Norway (a staunchly pro-ban state) and one day in Helsinki (a strongly anti-ban state), meeting with campaigners, government officials, parliamentarians, and media.
Circling the Globe
Similar meetings were held by NGOs in Australia, India, Senegal, Yemen, and elsewhere in order to build political will. The ICRC held a seminar in the Philippines, in cooperation with the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines. The government of Turkmenistan hosted a ban meeting, with assistance from the Canadian government, and with significant NGO participation. The ICBL attempted to put the ban issue on the agenda of every possible international meeting, whether it be a G-8 meeting in Denver, or the Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in Edinburgh, UK in October, or the Francophonie meeting in Vietnam in November. At the latter two meetings, for example, ICBL members released detailed fact sheets on the landmine positions of each participating government, and put out a press statement praising those which had joined the Ottawa Process and criticizing those that had not.
