International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
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ICBL Critique of Thailand's Article 5 Deadline Extension Request

November 2008

Summary of the Extension Request

Duration of the proposed extension: 9.5 years
Reasons for the proposed extension: The scope of the problem was exaggerated and poorly defined by a landmine impact survey; difficult terrain has slowed clearance; and funding for demining provided by the military was sharply reduced between 2000 and 2006.
Humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension: Ongoing casualties as well as delays in access to agricultural land, forestry, and water.
Other relevant information: Area reduction and technical survey are expected to reduce the area of actual contamination to no more than one-fifth of the LIS estimate.

A. Duration of the proposed extension

Thailand is seeking an extension request of 9.5 years until November 2018. The request claims that by the end of 2008 the area actually requiring clearance should total 528km2 (page 21).

B. Reasons for the proposed extension

Thailand established a National Mine Action Committee in 1998 and the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) in January 1999, two months after signing the treaty and more than a year before it became a State Party. TMAC planned to establish five Humanitarian Mine Action Units and started demining the following year. A Landmine Impact Survey completed by Norwegian People's Aid in 2001 estimated the area of contamination at 2,557km2, mostly along the border with Cambodia, but also on the borders with Laos, Malaysia, and Myanmar. TMAC has received in-kind assistance from foreign governments, led by the US, but finance from national sources accounts for 60% of total demining expenditure, the remaining 40% coming from donor support for demining NGOs.
The request explains the need for an extension by citing the "gross overestimation" of contaminated areas by the LIS which undermined its usefulness as a planning tool, together with difficult terrain, and financial constraints. A decisive factor, however, is that TMAC was placed under the control of the Armed Forces' Supreme Command, depriving it of access to some international donors and leaving it dependent on a military budget which has not given priority to humanitarian demining.
TMAC received funding to set up only four HMAUs, deploying three on the border with Cambodia and one on the border with Laos. The request notes that TMAC's budget fell by more than half from BHT38 million at the start of its operations in 2000 to BHT18 million in 2006. Budget cuts by the Supreme Command in 2005 forced TMAC to cut manpower by half, severely curtailing survey and clearance. Financial constraints over the years have also limited TMAC's ability to employ competent data management staff.
In 2007, TMAC began to address the large estimation of suspected hazardous area through its "locating minefield procedure" (LMP), a system of area reduction based on reviews of existing data and on the ground checks. This system should have brought down the amount of suspected lands from 2,557km2 to 528km2 by the end of 2008.
Thailand's revised request contains some internal data contradictions. For example, the request states at one point that Thailand will have released 1,355km2 of land between 2000 and 2008 (page 15), and in other places that the total given is1611km2 (page 17). The request also lists an average yearly clearance productivity of about 50km2, whereas it only reports clearing a total of 56.1km2 in 2000-2008. This means an annual rate of around 5km2. If one uses the previously reported figures, the annual average would be less than 1km2.
The basis of the data is also not apparent. The amount of land identified in the request as area reduced in 2007 (133.8km2) is nearly double the amount shown in the data TMAC provided to the Landmine Monitor (75.8km2). Moreover, the request shows a total of 55.6km2 of mined area was cleared between 2000 and 2008, of which it says 54.9km2 was cleared between 2003 and 2007. TMAC previously reported it demined a total of 4.5km2 in this period. As much as 90% of the total amount of land released-or 1,421km2-was expected to be released in 2008 alone, an extraordinarily high figure for land release in a single year.
As a result, it is also difficult to determine the basis for the timetable for clearance set out in Thailand's extension request. The request estimated Thailand had 528km2 of "real minefield." At times the request asserts that it will release this land through "traditional landmine clearance method" or "manual clearance method"; in other places the request notes it will be treated through "manual demining, ongoing use of the LMP and other appropriate methods." Despite the low annual clearance rates in past years, the request suggests annual clearance will climb from 43.07km2 in 2009 to 64.71km2 in 2016 before falling back to 63.51km2 in 2018. Achieving these results would therefore only be feasible if achieved through methods other than manual clearance, meaning that TMAC would have to continue to identify large areas to release through the LMP. Thailand notes that much of the remaining suspected area is in forested areas, and that new technologies will need to be developed to survey such areas.
To achieve its predicted level of productivity, TMAC would operate its four HMAUs with 300 deminers per unit supported by mine detection dogs and machines and at an estimated cost of BHT18.5 billion (approximately $524 million at 2008 exchange rates). The basis for these assumptions, however, is also not apparent. The request does not make clear when the sharp increase in personnel that this agenda would entail will occur, nor does it give any evidence to support the assertion financing will be available from the World Bank, the European Union, or other foreign donors. Significant funding has been allocated from the national budget for the current financial year; longer term funding will still be needed to support the demining program.

C. Humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension

TMAC's clearance has concentrated on the Thai-Cambodian border, the location of most mine-affected communities and the densest contamination. Some clearance has occurred on the slightly affected border with Laos, but no HMAU has been active in either survey or clearance on the border with Myanmar because of continuing insecurity and occasional spill-over of fighting between Myanmar government troops and ethnic minority rebel groups. Contamination reported by the LIS on the Malaysian border is believed to be negligible and to have no impact. The request states that the number of casualties has fallen significantly in recent years. Most of the impact is the ability of people to access forests for wood, food, and hunting. The suspected mined areas also hinder access to farmlands, grazing areas and water.

D. Other relevant information

TMAC has sought to be reconstituted as a civilian agency reporting to the Prime Minister's Office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also drawn the government's attention to its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and the necessity for action on this issue. The change would open access to other government funding lines and make TMAC at least more eligible for foreign donor support. Those efforts have stalled largely as a result of the turbulent political environment in the past three years.

E. Conclusions and recommendations

The key factors that have prevented Thailand from far greater progress in clearance operations in the last 10 years, and which may continue to pose an obstacle, are political instability and indifference. The responsibility does not lie with TMAC but with the Armed Forces Supreme Command and successive governments that have not given mine action the support needed to fulfill Thailand's obligations under the treaty. After some two years of debate, the government has yet to reconstitute TMAC as a civilian agency that would make it at least eligible for funding from some international donor agencies that will not fund a military entity. Until that happens, timelines for tackling Thailand's remaining mine contamination remains speculative.
The request lacks clarity in key areas. Data it provides on mine clearance since 2000 is not consistent with the data TMAC has produced each year on the results of its activities, and data provided on the extent of the remaining task is ambiguous and inconsistent.
Thailand should be asked to:
" report on the progress of TMAC's transition to a civilian agency, identifying which government entity will assume authority and responsibility for financing TMAC;
" allocate short- and medium-term budgets, detailing the source and direction of funds; and
" clarify the real extent of the mine-affected area remaining to be cleared, using appropriate land release principles, including technical survey;
" clarify data on demining results; and
" provide more substantive detail to demonstrate the feasibility of the timelines TMAC has suggested for dealing with remaining contamination within the period of the requested extension.