International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
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ICBL Critique of Venezuela's Article 5 Deadline Extension Request

November 2008

Summary of the Extension Request

Duration of the proposed extension: 5 years
Reasons for the proposed extension: In the past, Venezuela indicated that it delayed removing the mines because they serve as a defense against infiltration across the border by Colombian guerrillas. In its request, Venezuela states that access to the mined areas for demining and medical evacuations is very difficult, heavy rains prevent demining for much of the year, and purchasing equipment takes time.
Humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension: The Amazonian region where the minefields are located is sparsely populated. The mined areas are well marked and fenced and difficult to access because they are in areas where civilians are not allowed. Other relevant information: Venezuela has made no effort to clear mines from its 13 minefields since it signed the Mine Ban Treaty and no mine clearance capacity has been developed. Venezuela is requesting an extension on an operational plan covering 20 months of actual work time.

A. Duration of the proposed extension

Venezuela is requesting an extension to October 2014. There is a detailed operational plan including maps and photographs to support the extension. A key part of the extension is that the heavy rainy season in the Amazonian region of the country limits clearance activities to January through May, or five months each year. Over the period of the extension this calculates to 20 working months, with none in the first year.
Under the five-year operational plan Venezuela will clear the equivalent of 2.5 mined areas per year. With the average size of a minefield at 13,000m2 this equates to approximately 30,000m2 per year, which is an extremely low annual productivity rate. Venezuela will procure mechanical demining assets to support clearance operations.
Venezuela states the weather is the primary factor in whether or not it will be able to meet the 2014 deadline. The weather patterns are unchanged from 1999, and the proposed operational plan for the extension could have been implemented in 1999. In its statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies in June 2008, Venezuela declared that a lack of financial resources could also impact on the operational plan. [1]

B. Reasons for the proposed extension

Venezuela has 13 mined areas at six naval bases covering an area of 18 hectares or 180,000m2 consisting of 1,074 landmines. The extent of the problem is based on records from the Venezuelan Navy, which placed the mines. The data is consistent with Article 7 reports. With the first year of planned activities, 2009, devoted to training, the four-year clearance operation from October 2010-October 2014 is actually only 20 months in total, or less than two years of work.
Venezuela has never attempted to clear mines since signing the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999 even though past Article 7 reports have asserted that the demining would take place by its 2009 deadline. Mines have not been removed because in the process of removing them the Venezuelan military states they will be exposed to possible attacks from Colombian guerrillas ( page 8). The very wet conditions have also prevented clearance from taking place. At the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Venezuela added a further obstacle-that clearance could not be conducted until safety measures were in place to ensure that none of the deminers would be at risk. At past Mine Ban Treaty meetings, Venezuela has stated that the mined areas could not be removed until an alternative defense system was installed at these locations. In essence, Venezuela was continuing to take military advantage of the mined areas, which is barred under Article 1 of the treaty.
The request includes several additional troubling elements. In the absence of any mine clearance activities it is not possible to assess whether the Venezuelan Navy with oversight from the Ministry of Defense can implement a mine clearance program to international standards. It also appears Venezuela has never trained demining teams, as it is stated that the first year of the operational plan beginning in October 2010 will focus on training. There is no explanation of why this training could not take place earlier.
The request adequately describes the mine action structure and states that national standards and SOPs exist but does not say if they meet international (IMAS) standards. Although the IMAS are included in the Glossary they are never specifically mentioned in the extension request. It seems the mine action program is under the complete control of the Venezuelan military with no civilian input including that of the national legislature.

C. Humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension

The 13 mined areas in Venezuela are located on naval bases near sparsely populated centers. The mined areas are difficult to access and are in areas where civilians are not allowed. The landmine problem in Venezuela is purely military-focused and related to defending against attacks by Colombian guerrillas.
Based on the photographs in the Extension Request at least some of the mined areas are marked and securely fenced with clear signs indicating the area is mined. The only recorded incident was in 2004. No civilians have been reported injured or killed.

D. Other relevant information

The extension request states that Venezuela will contribute 30 million Bolivars (BEF), equivalent to $13 million at mid-October 2008 exchange rates. With rampant inflation and devaluations over the past 10 years it would be important to know if the commitment is to today's value, not a potentially lesser future value. No budget is provided.

E. Conclusions and recommendations

Venezuela has made no effort in 10 years to clear the landmines they laid in 1995-1997. They have failed to respect their obligation to clear antipersonnel mines "as soon as possible," citing reasons of defense, weather and difficult conditions. Venezuela has regularly put forward plans in its Article 7 reports to complete demining over a three-year period, including a prediction to complete demining by April 2009 in its 2005 report. But it fails to explain in its extension request why it did not meet these goals nor why demining can only now commence under exactly the same conditions that existed for the previous 10 years. The request also does not explain why training has not occurred to date, or why the clearance plan is over five years instead of the three years previously forecast in Article 7 reports. With such a small amount of land to be cleared in clearly delimited minefields, even three years is an excessive amount of time.
Most importantly, a country that has not begun demining by its ten-year deadline should not receive the support of the Meeting of the States Parties, especially when it has signaled that a key reason for the delay was the military benefit that it continued to draw from the mined areas. Venezuela should therefore be asked to begin demining before its 1 October 2009 deadline, and receive no more than a two-year extension. This would give Venezuela almost three years from now to complete the work, which should be sufficient. If Venezuela fails to commit to initiating demining before the expiry of its Article 5 deadline in 2009, the request should be turned down.

[1] Statement of Venezuela, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 4 June 2008.