The Role of Civil Society in Disarmament Issues: Realism vs. Idealism?

I want to thank both the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for holding this conference on the critical issue of “A Disarmament Agenda for the 21st Century” at this very difficult point in our history. I also want to thank the co-sponsors for inviting me to be here and for giving me the opportunity to speak.

Like Dr. McCoy, I started thinking and writing about what I might say before arriving in Beijing. However, unlike Dr. McCoy, I did not finish in a timely fashion – but for that, I am pleased as I do not find myself, as he said he did, wishing for a chance to re-submit my comments, as I had the luxury of re-thinking my speech at the end of the day yesterday. I am glad for that, because I threw out much of what I had written before arriving.

As you note from the agenda, I am asked to comment on the role of NGOs – nongovernmental organizations, civil society – in the field of disarmament. I confess to feeling somewhat schizophrenic in trying to speak to that topic here. With schizophrenia, various elements compete in the schizophrenic’s world to define reality; some of those elements are quite real, but others are real only in the mind of the schizophrenic. Because of this duality, it is difficult for the schizophrenic to know what to react to and how.

After listening to the first day and a half of discussion, I must make another confession -- and that is that my sense of what constitutes reality and what is unreal has been further blurred rather than clarified. Since I am not the only speaker here to have used this analogy, I trust that some might have a sense of what I mean – for the others, I ask your indulgence as I try to explain.

It is obvious, I guess, why I was invited to speak on this subject. I have had the privilege of being involved in a global movement to eliminate antipersonnel landmines that has seen much success. Seemingly out of nowhere, the ban movement was able to build awareness and capture the public conscience in such a way that resulted in government action to deal with landmine proliferation in a timely fashion.

When the Norwegian Nobel Committee chose to recognize the work of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997, it noted that the Campaign had, with the Mine Ban Treaty of the Ottawa Process, made feasible reality of a utopian dream. Further, the Committee noted that the campaign had been able to “express and mediate a broad range of popular commitment in an unprecedented way. With the governments of several small and medium-sized countries taking the issue up...this work has grown into a convincing example of an effective policy for peace.” It concluded, “As a model for similar processes in the future, it could prove to be of decisive importance to the international effort for disarmament and peace.”

The ban movement and the ICBL in particular flourished in what now almost seems like a dream moment in the period following the end of the Cold War when anything seemed possible. The momentum of the movement to eliminate landmines grew seemingly effortlessly – in a world no longer bi-polar where any number of alliances seemed possible and where we would call the partnership of civil society and governments seeking to rapidly redress global problems “a new superpower.”

Given this experience, my perception and my concrete reality affirm that there is a role for civil society to play in defining a disarmament agenda. Given this experience, my perception and my concrete reality affirm that “realism” does not preclude having a vision of a better world and turning that vision into reality. My “schizophrenic doubts” are quelled for a moment and I can speak about the role of NGOs in disarmament issues.

It was also heartening to hear numerous speakers here recognize the importance of civil society’s involvement in setting the disarmament agenda. It was heartening to hear many government representatives recognize the need for public awareness on the key issues of disarmament, arms control, human security and national security – and to recognize the role of NGOs in helping to build that public awareness.

At the same time, concrete reality reminds me that often the “partnership” between governments and civil society is fragile and tenuous and that even as some call for greater involvement of civil society, others are equally determined to turn back the clock not only on disarmament issues, but also on the involvement of civil society in shaping the terms of debate of disarmament – and many other issues, for that matter.

I am sure that many in this room will remember in July 2001, at negotiations at the UN to try to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the US delegation attacked the involvement of NGOs in disarmament issues, declaring that the US does “not support the promotion of international advocacy activity by international or nongovernmental organizations, particularly when those political or policy views advocated are not consistent with the views of allmember states. What individual governments do in this regard is for them to decide, but we do not regard the international governmental support of particular political viewpoints to be consistent with democratic principles.”

Certainly, the US is not alone in wishing to marginalize the voice of civil society, but to do so in the name of “democratic principles” confounds the mind – at least it confounds this mind.

Yet, this inverted notion of democracy is not inconsistent with the new lexicon of today’s unipolar world. In this new lexicon, the definition of multilateralism reads “either you are with us or you are against us.” In this new lexicon, negotiation means “you will accept my position, my framework, my world view, my bottom line – period.” In this new lexicon, peaceful exploration of space includes defense and intelligence-related activities. In this new lexicon, realism means “going along to get along” because if an individual or an entire country, for that matter, dares to question the underpinnings of this new reality, they are likely to be labeled “the enemy” at best and “evil” at worst.

A few days after the September 11 attack, I wrote a statement noting, “We do need to respond to the terrorist attack – but many worry what form the response might take. One U.S. commentator reported that a former high government official speculated that perhaps even a nuclear response should be considered. Hopefully, more rational minds will prevail. How can anyone possibly think that nuclear weapons – the most indiscriminate, destructive weapon of all – are appropriate to consider as a response to a terrorist attack?”

When I mentioned my concern to a colleague, he was certain that either I had misheard the report or that it merely reflected the thinking of “a fringe element.” Yet, with the new revelations of US nuclear policy – which have already been much discussed in this conference -- how rapidly these words of concern have become clear reality in the post-September 11 world.

I share the feelings expressed by many over the past days. The challenges facing the global community are greater than at any moment since the end of the Cold War. Not only do we not want to lose the gains made in the 90s, but we need to insure that there is a rational response to terrorism, firmly grounded in international law. The need to address terrorism is real. But how it is addressed is as critical to the outcome as is the need to deal with terrorism. We cannot allow the campaign against terrorism to mask the dramatically increasing militarism in the world that threatens to launch a new global arms race.

In order to deal with this impending crisis in disarmament, I believe that the role of civil society in framing and carrying out a disarmament agenda for the 21st century is more critical than ever. But I also share the view expressed by many here that governments too must take a more forceful role in shaping the world they want to see and not be held hostage to this moment in time.

Maj-Britt Theorin is one of the speakers who noted the dramatic changes that can be wrought by the involvement of civil society in disarmament issues, recalling the impact of mass European protest to nuclear weapons to be stationed there. Other speakers have noted that while the situation might look bleak at the moment, we all know that change is inevitable. That all might not be lost in what has been accomplished to date in arms control and disarmament.

In moving wildly, “schizophrenically,” between despair about the present situation and “wild-eyed idealism” about the ability of the human spirit to rise above seeming impossible odds, I choose to focus on the inevitability of change and to be an active agent of the change I want to see. I choose to focus on what I believe to be the fundamental right of individuals and groups of individuals to determine their own future and not to have it determined for them in the name of “realism.”

A few moments ago, I spoke about the movement to ban landmines, noting that it seemingly “came out of nowhere” to capture the public conscience and bring about dramatic change in a short period of time. But as anyone who knows the history of the movement to control certain conventional weapons can tell you, the “quick” success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the resulting government-NGO partnership of the Ottawa Process was actually built upon much earlier work by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN and a few governments – such as Mexico and Sweden – that had begun calling for a ban of landmines – and other conventional weapons -- in the 1970s. While that earlier arms control effort had languished for over a decade when we launched the ICBL, it had served as a base from which we could launch our ban agenda.

Probably not surprisingly, I echo many of the points expressed at this conference by the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy – both in his various comments during the panels and in his discussion of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Minister Axworthy notes Rebecca Johnson’s call for a space focused “Ottawa Process” -- a variation of the process that brought about the Mine Ban Treaty.

While it is widely held that civil society was the key to capturing the public conscience on the issue of landmines, the Canadian government was one of our key allies in forging the government-NGO partnership that made real change ultimately possible. And it was the bold personal leadership of Minister Axworthy in stepping outside the normal diplomatic mold to challenge the world to transform its mine ban rhetoric into treaty reality that gave our partnership a real framework in which to work.

We learned many things in the mine ban movement. And as the world now grapples with what a disarmament agenda for the 21st century might look like, it is incumbent upon those of us who believe that civil society has a meaningful role to play to work hard to not see the gains of the 90s lost in the new “realism.” Some of the relevant lessons that we took from our work include:

First, it is possible for NGOs to put an issue – even one with international security implications -- on the international agenda, provoke urgent actions by governments and others, and serve as the ongoing driving force behind change. Civil society can indeed wield great power in the post-Cold War world.

Second, it is possible to achieve rapid success internationally through common and coordinated action by NGOs, like-minded governments, and other key actors such as UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross. It is through concerted action that change is most likely to be effected.

Third, it is possible for small and medium size countries, acting in concert with civil society, to provide global leadership and achieve major diplomatic results, even in the face of opposition from bigger powers, and

Fourth, it is possible to work outside of traditional diplomatic forums, practices and methods and still achieve success multilaterally.

I would like to take a moment now to elaborate on some of these lessons, which might be applicable to critical issues facing us today:

• Partnership Pays.
  Perhaps the key factor in the success of the ban movement has been the close and effective cooperation between NGOs (primarily through the ICBL), governments, the ICRC, and UN agencies. This cooperation has been at the strategic and tactical level, and continues to this day.
• Build A Core Group of Like-Minded Governments.
  After being in an adversarial relationship with nearly every government from 1992-1995, an increasing number of governments began to endorse an immediate ban. The campaign called upon individual governments to come together in a self-identifying pro-ban bloc at the beginning of 1996, and they rapidly did so. Historically NGOs and governments have too often seen each other as adversaries, not colleagues, and at first some in the NGO community worried that governments were going to “hijack” the process in order to undermine a ban. But a relationship of trust among a relatively small “core group” of governments (most notably Canada, Norway, Austria, and South Africa) and ICBL leadership quickly developed and has been maintained. This core group was geographically diverse, committed, and willing to provide leadership in the face of opposition from bigger states. The extraordinary dedication, energy, and talent of key governments and key individuals within those governments were absolutely vital in the success of the ban movement.
• NGOs Need to Be Inside Too.
  Obviously, a crucial role for NGOs is mobilizing public opinion. But the mine ban movement has demonstrated that extensive involvement of NGOs in what are traditionally thought of as diplomatic activities is also crucial to insuring rapid and effective change. The ICBL played a major role in the actual drafting of the ban treaty, from its earliest stages. The ICBL was given a formal seat at the table in all of the diplomatic meetings leading up to the negotiations, and then during the negotiations as well. Not just plenary sessions, but all working meetings were open to the ICBL. Many government representatives have since commented that the presence and input of the ICBL and ICRC made a huge difference in the Oslo outcome. This prominent and official role for the ICBL has continued during the treaty intersessional work (with its Standing Committees of Experts meetings) and during the annual meetings of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty.
• Non-traditional Diplomacy Can Work.
  The Ottawa Process that led to the Mine Ban Treaty largely grew out of the failure of negotiations in 1995-1996 on the Landmines Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The pro-ban governments decided to pursue a “fast track” approach, outside of traditional negotiating forums. The members of the Ottawa Process were self-identifying. Core group governments Austria, Germany and Belgium hosted what were in essence preparatory meetings, followed by negotiations hosted by Norway and a treaty signing conference hosted by Canada. Though done outside the formal UN structure, the Ottawa Process was strongly supported by various UN agencies, and especially by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The Secretary-General now serves as the depositary of the convention.
• Say No to Consensus.
  From the start of the Ottawa Process, the core group governments made clear that this was not to be a repeat of the Landmine Protocol negotiations where any one country could thwart the will of others. While always striving for consensus, the Ottawa Process stressed the concept of like-minded, in essence saying, if you are not like-minded regarding a total ban, do not participate. During the Oslo negotiations, the Rules of Procedure rejected the consensus approach, and while a vote never occurred, the fact that it took a two-thirds majority to make changes to the text contributed to the demise of several severely weakening amendments sought during the final negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty in Oslo in 1997.
• Promote Regional Diversity and Solidarity without Blocs.
  Both the campaign and core group governments worked hard to ensure geographic diversity within the ban movement, and to promote a sense of ownership of the issue among regional organizations, especially the Organization of African Unity. This strategy paid off well. But parallel to that, it was important that the traditional diplomatic alignments never came into play; there were not “Western Group” or other regional meetings.

Certainly, not all of these lessons would be applicable in all cases, would be difficult to carry out in some cases, and could be counterproductive in others. Some have noted how the mine ban campaign had certain “advantages” -- its focus on single weapon, an easy to grasp message, its highly emotional content. Perhaps even more important, the weapon is obviously not vital militarily, nor important economically. But the difficulties encountered should also not be underestimated. There was virtually uniform opposition from governments at first, due to the widespread deployment of mines, considered by most as common and acceptable as bullets, an integral part of in place defenses and war plans, training, and doctrine. About 125 nations had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines; mines had been used in 88 countries. They were considered a cheap, low tech, and reliable, substitute for manpower, but were also the focus for future research and development for richer nations.

These were long odds to overcome. But overcome them we did. We created the reality we wanted out of our vision of a world free of landmines. Those of us who believe that civil society has both the right and the responsibility to determine the ‘reality’ of our world must refocus our efforts and energies on expanding the dialogue, interaction and partnership between NGOs, governments, international agencies and the United Nations – the body that provides a forum for all voices to be heard in developing a disarmament agenda for the 21st century. While sometimes the landmine ban movement worked outside traditional UN structures, it has also forged a strong and growing relationship with the United Nations. It is this UN, under the leadership of its Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan, that has worked diligently for broadening the involvement of civil society in its various deliberations. Witness, for example, this conference in Beijing. We can and must build upon these partnerships.

Perhaps these words sound like the mad rambling of an idealist. Of a person who does not have a firm and ‘realistic’ grasp on the state of the world today. Yet, I am not the only idealist in this room. Others at this conference – individuals from both the NGO world and government representatives – have confessed to being “idealists” if that means that we believe that we can create a world with a meaningful disarmament agenda that can encompass human security and national security.

Too often we “idealists” are told that the real world is a cold, hard, and unforgiving place and that to insure peace we must prepare for war. That is not a view that this idealist will accept. My view of realism is that you get what you prepare for. If we want to build a peaceful world, we must prepare for peace. If we want to live in a world with a meaningful agenda for disarmament in this century, civil society, like-minded governments, international agencies and the United Nations must forge a partnership to ensure that our “idealistic” vision becomes the new reality.

THANK YOU.