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ICBL Statement

Author/Origin: ICBL media@icbl.org

(Wednesday 19 September 2001 Managua - Nicaragua) To the Third Meeting of States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty
Delivered by Stephen Goose (Human Rights Watch), Head of ICBL Delegation

Mr. President, Madam Secretary-General, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen,

Like others, ICBL members come to this meeting with heavy hearts in the wake of last week’s tragic events. Many more campaigners were not able to be with us as planned. But we believe that it is important that we all -- NGOs, governments and international organizations -- collectively demonstrate our resolve to continue our fight against what we have long called a weapon of terror, the antipersonnel landmine.

We offer our thanks to the government and people of Nicaragua for hosting this important gathering, and for the great lengths they have gone to in trying circumstances to ensure its success. We also thank the government of Nicaragua for the key role it has played in promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, especially through its very active participation in the intersessional work program and the coordinating committee. We believe it is appropriate that this year the annual meeting of States Parties is returning to a mine-affected country, helping us all to stay grounded in the reality of the ongoing impact of landmines. It is also appropriate that the meeting is being held in a region that has almost universally embraced the Mine Ban Treaty, with the regrettable exceptions of the United States and Cuba.

We would also like to take the opportunity to thank the outgoing co-chairs of the Standing Committees for the excellent work they have done over the course of the past two years, and particularly to thank Ambassador Kongstad for the invaluable role he has played as President. His contributions to the creation and success of the Mine Ban Treaty cannot be overstated.

Intersessional Work Program and Third Meeting of States Parties

The ICBL believes that second year of the intersessional work program has been very successful. We appreciate the prominent role given to the ICBL in the intersessional work, and the close cooperation between Standing Committee co-chairs and co-rapporteurs and the ICBL. We strongly urge States Parties to endorse the Standing Committee reports and to act urgently on their recommendations. These recommendations should form the basis for an extensive and aggressive action plan to emerge from this meeting. The ICBL notes the important role played by the Coordinating Committee since its establishment at the Second Meeting of States Parties, and believes that its activities and responsibilities in facilitating effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty could be expanded. The ICBL supports the proposed establishment of an Implementation Support Unit, and the proposal to shift mine awareness to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies. The ICBL also notes the success of and urges the expansion of the Sponsorship Program, particular to facilitate participation by mine-affected countries.

Taking Stock

The Meetings of States Parties are designed largely to take stock of where we are and to plan for the future. There should be no doubt that overall, the Mine Ban Treaty is strong and that our collective efforts are having a major impact. We achieved our objective of 120 ratifications and accessions by the time of this meeting, and congratulate Chile and Eritrea as the most recent nations to formally deposit their instruments with the United Nations. The decisions by these particular nations to join the ban treaty are especially encouraging, with Chile as a former producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, and Eritrea as a nation still using mines in combat as recently as last year. A new international norm is indeed taking hold. We are also encouraged by the commitments of nations such as Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia to ratify or accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future.

In its third annual report, presented to delegates yesterday, Landmine Monitor finds that the positive trends continue. In recent years, there has been a dramatic drop in the number of mine producers, an almost complete halt to trade, widespread and extensive destruction of stockpiled mines, increased funding for humanitarian mine action, more land demined, and fewer new mine victims.

But the news is not all good by any means. Landmines continue to take an appalling number of innocent lives. Landmines continue to pose a crippling humanitarian and socio-economic problem in too many countries. Too many governments and rebel groups continue to use antipersonnel mines, with too little outcry from the rest of the world.

State Party Compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty

With respect to compliance by States Parties with their legal obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL finds it necessary to highlight the following concerns:

First, and most disturbingly, Landmine Monitor has received reports that indicate a strong possibility of use of antipersonnel mines by Uganda, a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2000. Uganda became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 1999. While we have not received any eyewitness accounts or direct admissions of mine use, the testimony of a significant number and range of knowledgeable sources, including those in the DRC and Uganda, coupled with practical physical evidence such as the location of mines around what were defensive Ugandan positions, indicates a strong possibility of use of antipersonnel mines by Ugandan troops. However, due to the difficulties and dangers of gathering and reporting information in the DRC, Landmine Monitor cannot make a definitive determination regarding use.

The Ugandan government has denied that it used antipersonnel mines in the DRC. The ICBL has engaged in a dialogue with Uganda on this matter over the course of the past five months and has requested the Ugandan government to launch an investigation.

Landmine Monitor believes that these serious and credible allegations demand the urgent attention of States Parties, who should consult with the Ugandan government and other relevant actors in order to seek clarification, establish the facts, and resolve these questions regarding compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. This should be done in the “spirit of cooperation” called for in the treaty’s Article 8, under which States Parties have agreed to “consult and cooperate with each other” to facilitate compliance with obligations.

The manner in which States Parties deal with this matter is crucial to the credibility of the Mine Ban Treaty. Through the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, there have already been wide ranging discussions on how to deal with compliance issues, including a paper circulated by Canada which stressed the many steps short of Article 8 available to States Parties. Now is the time to act on those recommendations. This matter also demonstrates the necessity and urgency of the work underway to operationalize Article 8. There should be no higher priority for States Parties than dealing in a meaningful fashion with compliance issues.

A second matter of great concern regarding compliance involves Tajikistan, a State Party since April 2000. The Russian government has admitted to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces based in Tajikistan have laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan since April 2000, along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. If Tajikistan requested or acquiesced to Russia’s use of mines, this would seemingly constitute a violation of Tajikistan’s obligation under Article 1 not to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.” The government of Tajikistan has not responded to Landmine Monitor inquiries about this matter, and Landmine Monitor is unaware of any public reaction by the government to Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan, either in protest or approval. In contrast, Tajikistan has publicly and formally protested on several occasions use of mines by Uzbekistan on the Tajik-Uzbek border.

A third compliance concern is Article 7 reporting. As of 1 August, a total of 37 States Parties were late submitting their initial Article 7 transparency measures reports. Some of these reports are more than two years late. More than one-third of States Parties have failed to meet this treaty obligation. Article 7 reports are not optional and 180 days after entry into force is a legal deadline, not a target date.

Global Compliance with the Emerging International Norm

Mr. President, the ICBL noted last year that the annual Meetings of State Parties should serve the purpose of reinforcing the emerging international norm against any use or possession of antipersonnel mines by anyone. We called upon States Parties to loudly and consistently condemn those who choose to stay outside of the norm, particularly those who continue to use antipersonnel mines. We have been disappointed with the response to our call. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have not condemned instances of use regularly or forcefully enough, and have taken very few concrete steps to penalize mine users, diplomatically or otherwise. This meeting, and the meetings related to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, are the prime opportunities for speaking out to stigmatize the use of this barbaric weapon. More importantly, a mechanism needs to be established that will ensure a consistent and strong response to instances of use of antipersonnel mines by non-States Parties and by rebel groups and other non-state actors. This is a role that could fall to the Coordinating Committee, or an informal contact group such as the Universalization and Article 7 contact groups, or through some other means.

With respect to the broader effort to eliminate the use of and to eradicate antipersonnel mines, beyond Mine Ban Treaty obligations for States Parties, the ICBL has a number of very serious concerns to bring to the attention of this meeting:

In its latest reporting period, Landmine Monitor identified confirmed use of antipersonnel mines, or credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines, in 23 conflicts by as many as 15 governments and more than 30 rebel groups. These are increased numbers from the previous reporting period. In addition to ongoing use in many existing conflicts, new instances of use were identified in Tajikistan, as already noted, by Russian forces, in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by government forces, and in FYR Macedonia by rebels. There are also strong indicators that government forces in Nepal are using antipersonnel mines against Maoist rebels, who extensively use improvised explosive devices.

The ICBL is especially concerned about use by a number of signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty. While signatories are not fully bound by the Mine Ban Treaty in the way States Parties are bound, under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, signatories to a treaty are obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty. Thus, signatories that continue to use antipersonnel mines are not only making a mockery of their supposed commitment to eradicate mines, but are also in violation of their legal obligations under international humanitarian law.

Mine Ban Treaty signatory Angola has admitted to continued use. Landmine Monitor believes that there is compelling evidence that signatories Ethiopia and Sudan used antipersonnel mines in this reporting period (since May 2000). There have also been serious allegations about use by Rwanda in the DR Congo in June 2000 when Rwanda was still a signatory. There has been continued use of antipersonnel mines in Burundi, with allegations against both government and rebel forces, but Landmine Monitor has been unable to establish responsibility for the mine use. The governments of Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi all deny use of antipersonnel mines.

In another disturbing development, a number of established mine action programs suffered through severe funding problems in the past year, including in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Cambodia. In some instances, operations were suspended and mine clearance teams were laid off. This occurred despite the fact that globally, funding for mine action has continued to increase.

Finally, there should be concern that universalization is not proceeding as quickly as demanded by the nature and scope of the landmine problem. Since the last meeting of States Parties, 11 signatory countries have ratified, and two non-signatories have acceded, Congo-Brazzaville in May and Eritrea in August. While the 120 States Parties, and an additional 21 signatories, are impressive numbers, comprising nearly three-quarters of the world’s nations, universalization is proving to be a daunting challenge that requires expanded efforts on the part of States Parties, the ICBL, ICRC and other partners in the ban movement.

In this hemisphere, there are three governments that have signed, but not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty (Guyana, Haiti, and Suriname), and two governments that have not signed or acceded (Cuba and the United States). It has been an added sadness and pain for the US citizens in the ICBL, such as myself, to recognize that the same terms used to describe the barbaric actions of September 11th – such as act of terror, cowardly attack, indiscriminate attack, wanton disregard for innocent civilians – are terms that we have long used to describe use of antipersonnel landmines. Others have drawn this parallel, calling use of mines an “act of terror less visible.”

Landmine Monitor Findings

Mr. President, I would now like to report to delegates some of the other major findings of this year’s Landmine Monitor report:

  • Fewer new mine victims. Landmine Monitor estimates that there were some 15,000 to 20,000 new casualties from landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in 2000, an encouraging decrease from the long-standing and commonly cited figure of 26,000 new victims per year. This represents not a sudden decline from the previous year, but rather a decrease over the course of recent years, due to successful mine action programs, decreasing use of antipersonnel mines and other factors. Important reductions in the number of new casualties were recorded in some heavily mined areas in 2000, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Kosovo.
  • Decreasing use. As of mid-2001, it would not appear that antipersonnel mines are being used on a massive scale in any conflict. The most regular use is likely occurring in Russia (Chechnya), Sri Lanka, and Burma. In all three instances, both government and rebel forces are using antipersonnel mines. The kind of widespread use of antipersonnel mines that was witnessed in FR Yugoslavia/Kosovo in 1999 and in Russia/Chechnya at the height of that conflict in 1999 and early 2000 was not evident in this reporting period in any location. It would appear, however, that use of antipersonnel mines increased in some countries, notably in Sri Lanka by government and rebel forces, in Colombia by guerrillas, and in Namibia by Angolan UNITA rebels and Angolan government troops.
  • A dramatic drop in production. The number of producers has dropped from 55 to 14 in recent years; in this year’s report, Landmine Monitor removed Turkey and Yugoslavia, both non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty, from the list of producers.
  • An almost complete halt in trade. Not a single significant shipment of antipersonnel mines (including by Mine Ban Treaty non-signatories) was identified in this reporting period, or indeed since 1998 when Landmine Monitor was launched.
  • Increased destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines. More than 27 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed by over 50 nations, including some 5 million in this reporting period. Thirty Mine Ban Treaty nations have completely destroyed their antipersonnel mine stockpiles, including ten since the last Landmine Monitor report; we must congratulate Peru and Ecuador for completing destruction earlier this month, thereby meeting the Managua Challenge. Another 17 States Parties are in the process of destruction. However, seventeen States Parties have yet to begin destruction, which must be completed within four years of entry into force for each nation. The deadline for many nations is in 2003.
  • Increased funding for humanitarian mine action. Major donor nations provided more than $224 million in 2000 alone, an increase of about $19 million over 1999. Donors have now contributed more than $1 billion to mine action since 1993.
  • More land demined. In 2000, eight of the largest humanitarian mine/UXO clearance programs cleared a combined total of more than 185 million square meters of land, including in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo, Laos, and Mozambique.
  • Landmine Monitor research identifies 90 countries that are affected to some degree by landmines and/or unexploded ordnance. Bulgaria has completed mine clearance and is now considered mine-free. New mine laying in FYR Macedonia and Uzbekistan has added them to the list of mine-affected nations. A new survey in El Salvador, which previously declared itself mine-free, has identified 53 mine and UXO affected sites.
  • Landmine Monitor research indicates that there were new mine/UXO victims in 73 countries in 2000 and 2001 (through May). A majority (45) of these countries were at peace, not war. The greatest number of new victims in this time period appear to be found in Afghanistan, India, Angola, Cambodia, Northern Iraq, and, likely, Burma. Significant numbers of new victims are also found in Chechnya, Iran, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka and, likely, Vietnam.
  • The first, groundbreaking national Landmine Impact Survey was completed in Yemen in July 2000; additional national Landmine Impact Surveys have been completed in Thailand, Chad and Mozambique. In total, 30 countries as well as Abkhazia and Kosovo have undergone some type of landmine survey or assessment since 1997.
  • Five non-signatory governments acknowledge use of antipersonnel mines in this time period: Eritrea, Myanmar/Burma, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan. Eritrea states that it has not used mines since the end of its border conflict with Ethiopia in June 2000. Use is ongoing for the other governments.
  • Landmine Monitor also believes that it is likely the following non-signatories used antipersonnel mines: DR Congo, Israel, Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan. Officials from DR Congo and Nepal have denied use. Israel acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in South Lebanon prior to its withdrawal in May 2000, and appears to have continued to use mines in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, allegedly in one instance without proper fencing and marking as required by CCW Amended Protocol II.
  • In addition to the instances of use noted above, there was ongoing use of mines in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance opposition forces, in Kashmir by militant groups, in the Philippines by three rebel groups, in Senegal by rebel forces, in Uganda by rebel forces, in Somalia by various factions, in Georgia/Abkhazia by non-state actors, and in Yugoslavia by non-state actors.

Mr. President, a total of 122 Landmine Monitor researchers in 95 countries systematically collected and analyzed information from a wide variety of sources for this comprehensive report. We would like to thank the dozen governments as well as the European Commission and the Open Society Institute for funding the Landmine Monitor initiative this year. The Monitor reflects our shared view that transparency and cooperation are essential elements to the successful elimination of antipersonnel mines, but also the recognition that there is a need for independent reporting and evaluation. We welcome comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others, in the spirit of dialogue and in the search for accurate and reliable information necessary to reach the goal of a mine-free world. It is our practice to post any official responses to the Landmine Monitor from governments in their entirety on our web site.

Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention

The GSOC Standing Committee addressed a number of issues of vital concern to the ICBL over the course of the past year, with mixed results.

First, the issue of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. Numerous States Parties have stated that antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices that can explode from an unintentional act of a person are banned by the treaty, though some States Parties remain reluctant to acknowledge this. The need for clarity on this issue has been underlined by Landmine Monitor research that shows that some States Parties are destroying certain types of mines classified as antivehicle mines because the State Party has determined they will function as antipersonnel mines, while other States Parties are electing to keep the same types of mines. This inconsistency and ambiguity without doubt undermines the integrity of the treaty.

The ICRC hosted an important technical experts meeting on this matter in March 2001, attended by fourteen governments, the ICBL and GICHD. Emerging from the seminar was a set of recommendations for best practices regarding the design and use of sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices. Key among them were establishing a minimum pressure threshold of 150 kilograms for antivehicle mines and discontinuing use of antivehicle mines with tripwires and tilt rod fuzes, because they function as antipersonnel mines. Participants in the ICRC seminar had trouble developing recommendations about best practices for sensitive antihandling devices. The experts called upon states to do further research on this matter and to examine the sensitivities of their antihandling devices with the goal of establishing a minimum level needed to fulfill their function.

The GSOC Standing Committee has recommended that this Meeting encourage States Parties to review the antivehicle mines in their inventories to ensure the risk posed to civilians is minimized, and encourages States Parties to adopt relevant best practices of the type identified in the ICRC experts meeting. This important recommendation should be included in the Final Report adopted by this Meeting.

There has been an admirable exchange of information in the GSOC Standing Committee about antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3 for training or development purposes. We are especially pleased that as a result of these discussions, several States Parties have decided to reduce the number of mines they intend to retain, including Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Thailand. Most of these initially intended to keep more than 10,000 mines, but determined that the “minimum number absolutely necessary” was far less. The Standing Committee deliberations clearly established that the minimum number should be in the hundreds or thousands, but not tens of thousands, and the Standing Committee has recommended that States Parties reaffirm the understanding that the number of mines retained should be in the hundreds or thousands, not tens of thousands. This recommendation should be included in the Final Report adopted by this Meeting.

We also note that the several States Parties have responded to the ICBL’s call to include in Article 7 reporting information regarding the intended purpose and actual use of mines retained for training or development, and we urge other States Parties to follow suit. The GSOC Standing Committee has also encouraged this in its report. In this way, there will be greater clarity and consistency regarding appropriate and necessary requirements for retaining mines. The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training purposes, a position publicly shared by a number of States Parties.

Another issue repeatedly raised in the Standing Committee is the matter of States Parties possibly participating in joint military operations with a non-signatory that may use antipersonnel mines. The ICBL believes that participation in joint operations with an armed force that uses antipersonnel mines is clearly against the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, and possibly a violation of Article 1 obligations. The ICBL calls on State Parties to insist that non-signatories do not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations, and to refuse to take part in any joint operations that involve use of antipersonnel mines. It is notable that several States Parties have made strong statements rejecting use of antipersonnel mines in NATO operations.

Though difficult to discuss in the wake of the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, we would be derelict not to express our concerns regarding possible use of antipersonnel mines in a military response to the terrorist acts. The Bush Administration has made clear that its response will be wide-ranging and sustained, including potential use of any and all weapons and weapons systems in the US arsenal. NATO members for the first time invoked Article 5 of their charter, declaring the terrorist strikes an attack on all members, opening the way for a collective military response. It would only add to the tragedy if Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, in solidarity with the war on terrorism, acquiesced to use of antipersonnel mines by the US in NATO joint operations.

On a related matter, the ICBL has expressed concerns about varying interpretations by States Parties of the term “assist” in Article 1 of the treaty. The ICBL has emphasized the need for States Parties to reach a common understanding of the term “assist,” especially as it applies to joint military operations, foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines on the territory of States Parties, and foreign transit of mines across the territory of States Parties. Full and effective implementation of the treaty will be enhanced if States Parties are clear and consistent with regard to what acts are permitted and what acts are prohibited. It appears that various States Parties may have significantly different understandings about what acts are permitted.

Though often discussed in terms of potential US use of antipersonnel mines in a NATO operation, this is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. As already noted, there are significant questions regarding the position of Tajikistan, a State Party, toward the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces stationed in Tajikistan. In addition, it appears that a number of States Parties in Africa have engaged in military operations with (or in support of) armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines. This would include Namibia (with Angola against UNITA), as well as Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe with various forces in the DRC.

All of these States Parties should make clear the nature of their support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear their views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of their military operations with these armed forces. As parties to the treaty, they should state categorically that they will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines. We urge all States Parties to clarify their views on the legality of joint operations with non-States Parties using mines, as well as foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines.

We note that the Standing Committee on General Status has recommended that further consultations be undertaken with a view to reaching a common understanding of the interpretation of Article 1C, and encourages States Parties to inform the Standing Committee of their national views and practices.

This Standing Committee has taken steps to deal with the problems related to late and inadequate reporting under Article 7. We commend Belgium for taking the lead in forming an Article 7 Contact Group, with ICBL participation, and encourage those who are able to provide assistance with reporting to take part, and those who need assistance to make their needs known. We also express our appreciation to the NGO Vertic for developing and producing the Article 7 Reporting Handbook, and echo the Standing Committee’s recommendation that States Parties utilize the handbook.

Likewise, we are grateful to the ICRC for producing its Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation, and believe it will be of great use to States Parties in helping them to fulfill their obligations under Article 9. While progress is being made, a disturbingly small number of states have passed domestic laws implementing the Mine Ban Treaty – 28 by our count, compared to 20 at this time last year. Another two dozen countries report that steps to enact legislation or other measures are underway. We urge all States Parties to pass legislation or adopt other legally binding measures that would impose penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and would provide for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

An important aspect of the mine problem that has not been adequately addressed by States Parties and others is that of non-state actors, or NSAs. Armed groups, acting against or beyond the control of states also use, produce and stockpile antipersonnel mines. Many people live on mined land under non-state control. Some states have said they will not accede to the Mine Ban Treaty because of NSA use. It is clear that an inter-state ban alone is insufficient to stop new landmines from being put into the ground, and to clear all those already planted.

An increasing number of governments are acknowledging the necessity of engaging NSAs. Earlier this month, the European Parliament issued a resolution calling on the international community “to seek commitments from all parties in such conflicts, States and non-State actors, to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines, in order to achieve a truly universal ban on these inhumane weapons.” It also called on this Meeting to support efforts to obtain strong ban commitments from non-state actors and asked States Parties to give closer attention to the NSA landmine issue and to support efforts made by NGOs and international institutions to commit NSAs to the mine ban process.

Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction

The four year deadline for stockpile destruction is approaching for many States Parties. It is essential to the credibility of the Mine Ban Treaty that all States Parties meet this legal obligation. This will require political will and will likely require increased technical and financial assistance from donors. States Parties should give high priority to this pillar of mine action, which we like to call preventive mine action. The ICBL also reiterates its call for greater transparency on stockpiles worldwide.

Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies

The ICBL, through the Bad Honnef Guidelines and other means, has stressed that the overall goal of mine action must be community-based programs embedded in longer-term development and reconstruction objectives. Humanitarian mine action is not a stand-alone activity. In the last few years there has been a positive shift from a focus on the minefield to a focus on the effects of the minefield on local populations. This has led, for example, to the crucial Landmine Impact Survey process. Mine action is today more productive than ever. But, the future success of humanitarian mine action, and the potential for increased productivity, will depend on our ability to develop and implement new concepts and methods of “impact related” mine action. This will require more flexibility in existing and new project budgets, and above all will require sustained and even increased long-term commitment from donors. Resource mobilization must remain at the top the agenda for States Parties. With regard to technology, the mine action organizations in the ICBL are of the view that a smaller percentage of funding should be devoted to research and development and a larger percentage to actual work in the field.

Standing Committee on Victim Assistance

The treaty-related processes are an opportunity to improve the situation of landmine victims, war victims, and all persons with disability. We ask governments and international organizations to act on the language of the treaty, clearly stated, “to provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration of mine victims....” And every state is in a position to do so. Each mine-affected country should identify a focal point for victim assistance. Select a method of long-term planning and follow through with it. Make sure it has representatives from the community of landmine victims and disabled persons. Inclusion of the voices of landmine victims is very important to prevent mistakes, to contribute to effective programming, and to empower the very individuals and groups we seek to help to be able to help themselves. We urge States Parties to ut