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Since the opening for signing of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997, there have been several cases of new or renewed mine use in the world. Guinea-Bissau is one case of new use. The conflict erupted on 7 June 1998 when Guinea-Bissau President João Bernardo Viera sacked then Army Chief-of-Staff Ansumane Mane for supposedly covertly supplying arms to separatist rebels in the Cassamance region of southern Senegal. News reports claim that landmines, which have been used in the Cassamance conflict, were included in the suspected arms shipments.[1] Mane quickly rallied almost the entire Guinea-Bissau army into a self-proclaimed Military Junta and called for President Viera's removal on charges of corruption and mismanagement. With almost no forces to defend his regime, Viera called on the neighboring countries of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry to send troops to hold off the advancing Junta, which both countries quickly did.
The conflict then involved not just one signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, but three: Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. Evidence indicates that landmines were used by the government, by Senegalese forces and by the Junta since fighting broke out. Use of antipersonnel mines has been reported by the United Nations, the commander of ECOMOG forces, the chief of staff of Guinean forces in Guinea-Bissau, and by the media and other on-the-ground observers of the conflict.
In the midst of the conflict, two of the countries—Senegal, on 24 September 1998, and Guinea-Conakry, on 8 October 1998—ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. Though the Mine Ban Treaty had not entered into force for Senegal or Guinea-Bissau (which has still not ratified), the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty.” Clearly, new use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.
Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997, although it had been absent through most of the Ottawa Process. The government participated as an observer in the Brussels Conference in June 1997 but it did not endorse the Brussels Declaration. It also supported United Nations General Assembly Resolutions calling for a ban on landmines in 1996 and 1997, but was absent for the vote on a similar resolution in 1998. Guinea-Bissau has yet to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty.
A Human Rights Watch fact sheet notes that PAIGC, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, has acknowledged producing PMD-6 box mines during their struggle for independence from Portugal, but abandoned production after independence.[2] It appears that Guinea-Bissau has obtained mines from Portugal and France. There is little information on stocks of mines in Guinea-Bissau. On 7 February 1998, the government destroyed between 2,000-2,300 landmines from its stocks, in front of foreign diplomats, media and officials from the Senegalese army.[3]
The first instances of mine use in Guinea-Bissau date back to the decade-long struggle for independence against the Portuguese. Portuguese strategy involved the mining of strategic positions and bridges to prevent PAIGC from destroying them. However, owing to the difficult terrain, which experienced flooding half of the year making mines difficult to locate, Portuguese soldiers would often create “dummy minefields” with barbed wire and “danger- mines” signs, but containing no mines to thwart the PAIGC and satisfy their commanders.[4]
In 1974, PAIGC won its almost decade-long struggle against the Portuguese. In 1980, President Luis Cabral, the brother of slain Guinean independence leader Amilcar Cabral was overthrown by General João Bernardo Viera in an almost bloodless coup, which also terminated political ties between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. President Viera won the first multi-party election in Guinea-Bissau in 1994.
The conflict that broke out in June 1998 marks a new chapter in landmine use in Guinea-Bissau. The conflict centered on the capital, Bissau, where government troops reinforced by Senegalese troops defended the center of the city south of the airport. Conflict in other parts of the country included fighting in the south as well as Guinea-Conakry troops defending the interior cities of Bafata and Gabu in the east. However, the rebel Junta eventually consolidated its hold on the interior and forced the withdrawal of the foreign troops, turning the focus of fighting to the city of Bissau. Reports also put Cassamance rebels fighting on the side of the Junta.
The initial period of conflict lasted from 7 June until 26 August when a cease-fire, facilitated by the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) and regional diplomats, was declared. Fighting broke out again between 26 October and 1 November, when the Abuja Accord was signed by the government and the Military Junta. The Accord, and a subsequent agreement in December, hammered out under ECOMOG provided a structure for a transitional government and elections in early 1999 along with a West African intervention force to oversee the peace accord and replace Senegalese and Guinea-Conakry troops. Delays in the formation of the transitional government and the replacement of foreign troops with members of the ECOMOG force led to another outbreak of fighting in early February. On 20 February 1999 the Government of National Unity was sworn in to oversee the transition period until elections can be organized sometime this year.
According to a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment, the use of mines by both sides in the battle for Bissau in 1998 left an estimated 2,000-3,000 mines—“[I]n any case, 8,000 mines seem to be a maximum.”[5] It has been reported that the Togolese commander of ECOMOG forces, Colonel Gnakoude Berena, said that about 3,000 mines had been placed by loyalist and rebel soldiers in the eight-month rebellion. He further commented that all soldiers would have to remove mines laid around the capital before returning to barracks.[6] Combatants used mines principally in five locations: around the Bissau airport, along the demarcation line within Bissau, along the border with Senegal, around the psychiatric hospital in Bissau, and along main routes in the south of the country. The mines in Bissau seem to have been used in a manner consistent with military doctrine of recording minefields. The UNMAS assessment notes that “it is reported that Junta and government forces as well as the Senegalese contingent have established records of the different minefields.”[7]
As Junta troops advanced on Senegalese and Government positions, they often encountered landmines and began removing mines from lands they captured. Mines were of Portuguese as well as French origin.[8] An informed military source who was present on the ground contends that the vast majority of mines were planted by the government and Senegalese forces in their defense of the city against the advancing Junta forces.[9] That mines were used by government and Senegalese troops was reported on Portuguese television: “RTP [Lisbon RTP International Television] has confirmed the existence of antipersonnel mines in Guinnea-Bissau, where the conflict’s front line used to be. They were laid by government and Senegalese troops. The Bishop of Bissau had warned of mines before.”1[0]
In addition to the mining in and around Bissau, the UNMAS assessment notes the existence of mines in the north of the country along the border with Senegal, but offers no details. The report also mentions some mines, notably antitank mines, in the south of the country. A Junta spokesperson was quoted recently as saying the use of mines in the conflict is a lamentable situation since Guinea-Bissau is one of the signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty.1[1] It should be noted that the most recent outbreak of violence in February 1999 occurred after the UNMAS assessment, which could increase the estimates of mines around Bissau where government and Senegalese forces reinforced their defensive barriers against the Junta.
The 1994 edition of Hidden Killers report by the U.S. Department of State listed Guinea-Bissau as “heavily mined” due to contamination during the independence struggle.1[2] However, in the 1998 edition of Hidden Killers, which sought to recalculate what were perceived as gross overestimates of number of mines in affected countries, Guinea-Bissau was removed from the list of mine-effected countries.1[3] Twenty years after the independence war, many areas in the interior of the country were still treated as suspect and occasional accidents involving mines and UXO were reported (see below).
As noted above, the UNMAS assessment of the extent of the current problem, after discussions with different sources, is that between 2-3,000 mines were laid in the fighting in 1998. Minefields were reported mapped. Additional mines may have been laid in fighting in 1999.
The extent of the problem and the fact that maps exist for the vast majority of minefields should limit the need for any large-scale mine action program. However, Guinea-Bissau has no structured mine action capacity at present. Skills training of the armed forces for mine clearance is not known, but adequate equipment is definitely lacking for mine action operations.1[4]
In its evaluation that the mine situation is not a “significant threat” to the community nor does it hinder the provision of humanitarian assistance, UNMAS assessed that a level one survey was not essential given the scale of mine use and the fact that there are records, that it was “not relevant to create a too big mine capacity” and that the problem could be handled with a brigade of 200 deminers who could survey, mark and clear the minefields. Such a program could be 1) under the auspices of the international community and/or the UN, 2) a national autonomous program, or 3) created under the auspices of a national program with expert assistance and funding through UNDP.1[5]
In assessing the clearance capabilities in Guinea-Bissau, UNMAS noted that currently the military does not clear mines according to international standards and would need training. There was a strong recommendation that deminers be recruited from the military and “preferably those having already participated in the mining operations.” In concluding the report, UNMAS noted that “marking should be initiated as quick as possible by Junta and the Senegalese contingent before their departure under the control of the Good Will Commission.”1[6]
As of December the Junta had reportedly removed 800 mines with two fatalities associated with clearance.1[7] The Portuguese Embassy in Guinea Bissau had reported that a group of young retired officers had started to create a local mine clearance company but suspended their activities with the outbreak of fighting.1[8]
In March 1999, the chief of staff of Guinean forces in Guinea-Bissau, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu Bony, confirmed that Guinea had now left Guinea-Bissau.1[9] He added that a demining commission involving mine specialists from both sides of in the conflict had been set up and would be supervising the removal of approximately 5,000 landmines.2[0]
Mine awareness, and more specifically UXO awareness is seen as an immediate need in Bissau itself. UNICEF has prepared a program for Guinea-Bissau, but implementation has been delayed because of the continued outbreaks of violence.2[1]
As noted above, there remains some threat from mines planted during the war for independence. “Since 1990 there have been a number of reported incidents, involving Russian or Portuguese antipersonnel mines. Osvaldo Semedo, the government delegate at the May 1997 OAU meeting on landmines in South Africa, reported that in 1997, two civilians in a town in the east of the country fell victim to landmines, demonstrating that landmines continue to pose a threat, twenty-three years after independence.”2[2]
There have been several reports of mine accidents as a result of the recent fighting involving civilians.2[3] While there have been some reports, it appears that the civilian exposure is low. However, the threat from UXO which litters the city of Bissau after the numerous rounds of shelling does pose an immediate danger to the civilian population. 2[4]
The infrastructure of the country has been decimated by the conflict and health services have been heavily damaged. The main hospital in Bissau was hit during the last round of violence in February and heavily damaged. The government reported that it had opened three orthopedic centers after independence to help the war injured, including mine victims, but that by 1997 none were functioning because of a lack of resources.2[5]
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[1]Alex Duval Smith, “Just a Little War among the Crocodile Swamps,” Guardian News Service, Johannesburg, 24 June 1998.
[2]Human Rights Watch, “The Mine Ban Treaty and Africa,” May 1998, p. 8.
[3]Photographs of the stockpile destruction were printed in the Senegalese media. See Le Soleil, (Dakar), 9 February 1998. See also Noel Stott, South Africa Campaign to Ban Landmines and Alex Vines, Human Rights Watch, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Global Campaign Against Anti-Personnel Landmines,” researched for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and presented at the XII NAM Summit, Durban, South Africa, 29 August-3 September 1998, p. 30.
[4]John Cann. (ed.), “Memories of Portugal's African Wars, 1961-1974,” Proceedings of a Conference, King's College, London, 10 June 1997; Contributions to War Studies, no.1, (Quantico: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1998), p. 140; Stott and Vines, p. 30.
[5]Major Herve Petetin, “Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau,” United Nations Mine Action Service, December 1998, p. 1.
[6]United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa, Update 404, 17 February 1999.
[7]Petetin, “Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau,” UNMAS, December 1998, p. 1.
[8]Ricardo Mota, “Report from Bissau,” RTP International Television, 9 November 1998; Pedro Rosa Mendes, “Minas antipessoal ameaçam a população de Bissau ‘Nous Ecomog, Guerra Vai Acabar,’” PUBLICOnlie.www.publico.pt, Pol. 1239, 12 February 1999.
[9]Confidential source.
1[0]“Guinea-Bissau: Mines Discovered on Both Sides of Front,” Lisbon RTP Television, 9 November 1998.
[1]1Pedro Rosa Mendes, 12 February 1999.
1[2]U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1994), p. 16.
1[3]Ibid., p. A-1.
1[4]Petetin, p. 2.
1[5]Ibid, pp. 3-4.
1[6]Ibid, pp. 2-4.
1[7]Ibid, p. 1.
1[8]Ibid, p. 2.
1[9]Reuters, 24 March 1999.
2[0]Ibid.
2[1]Petetin, p. 2.
[2]2Stott and Vines, p. 30.
2[3]ACEP- Associação para a Cooperação Entre os Povos, Portugal, November 1998; “Three Children Trigger Off Mines,” MISNA- Missionary Service News Agency, www.misna.org, 28 October 1998; Ricardo Mota, 9 November, 1998.
2[4]Petetin, p. 1.
2[5] Presentation by Mr. Osvaldo José Semedo, Guinea Bissau Delegation, at OAU meeting, Kempton Park, South Africa, 19-21 May 1997.
