| <INTRODUCTION | HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION> |
Article 1. General Obligations. 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) To use anti-personnel mines;.... (c)To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
The most disturbing finding of this first Landmine Monitor Report is that at least three treaty signatories, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal, apparently used antipersonnel mines in 1998, after signing the treaty. (See below, and see Country Reports).
The current global landmine crisis is largely the result of the huge increase in the number of mines laid in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. U.S. government mine experts in 1993 estimated that more than 65 million antipersonnel landmines were emplaced in the previous fifteen years, an average of more than four million per year.[4] In the mid-1990s, the United Nations and the US government estimated that some 2.5 million mines per year were being planted, while only 80,000 per year were being removed through mine clearance.[5] The notion that mines were being laid at a much greater rate than being removed was one that few disputed.
Today, that notion apparently no longer holds true. In its 1998 Hidden Killers report, the U.S. State Department said, “Landmines are not being planted at as high a rate as estimated in 1994, certainly well below 2.5 million each year. By most expert assessments, more landmines are in fact being taken out of the ground than are being planted.”[6] The US did not provide estimates of numbers laid or removed, but it appears that we have turned the tide in the battle against mines, and that it is possible to solve the AP mine crisis in years not decades.
As the country reports in this Landmine Monitor Report attest, nowhere in the world in 1998 and early 1999 were mines being laid on a very large scale and sustained basis. This is arguably attributable mainly to the global movement to ban the weapon and the stigmatization of its use. It is not a reflection of a decrease in global warfare, or of the development of a new weapon system to replace the APM in the arsenals of governments or guerrilla groups.
It seems certain, however, that at least three treaty signatories, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal, used antipersonnel mines in 1998, after signing the treaty. (See country studies for details). Angola continues to use them to this day. While the ICBL condemns any use of AP mines, it is particularly appalled at these governments’ disregard for their international commitments. Though Angola and Guinea-Bissau have not ratified the treaty, and it had not yet entered into force for Senegal,[7] the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty.” Clearly, new use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty. In the complicated conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, there have been allegations of other signatories and ratifiers using mines since December 1997, but none are confirmed, and all are denied by the accused governments: Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Though Landmine Monitor is still gathering and assessing information, it appears likely that during the period December 1997 to March 1999, there was new use of antipersonnel mines in the following:
Africa
Angola: government and rebels
Djibouti: rebels
Guinea-Bissau: government, rebels, Senegalese forces
Somalia: various factions
Uganda: rebels
Americas
Colombia: various rebel groups
Asia-Pacific
Afghanistan: opposition forces
Burma: government and various rebel groups
Sri Lanka: government and rebels
Europe/Central Asia
Georgia: partisans (in Abkhazia)
Turkey: government and rebels
FR Yugoslavia: government and rebels
Middle East/North Africa
Lebanon: Israel and non-state actors in occupied south Lebanon
There have also been frequent allegations of new mine use in this period in: (1) Democratic Republic of Congo by government, rebels, and foreign armies (Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe); (2) Eritrea by government forces; (3) Sudan by government and rebels; (4) Afghanistan by Taliban; (5) Georgia by Abkhazian partisans; and (6) Tajikistan by rebels.
Article 1. General Obligations. 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances: (b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire...anti-personnel mines; (c)To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
Landmine Monitor research did not uncover any evidence of new production of antipersonnel mines by treaty signatories. Treaty signatories Albania and Colombia were for the first time identified as producers, but both have stopped the manufacture of APMs.
In 1993 Human Rights Watch reported that, according to U.S. government estimates, global production of AP mines totaled at least 190 million antipersonnel mines for the twenty-five year period from 1968-1993, with the average declining to about five million per year in 1988-1993.[8] While it is impossible to even estimate the number of mines produced in any one year, it seems certain that in recent years global production does not begin to approach five million APMs per year.
The number of APM producers has dropped dramatically, from 54 to 16. The 38 who have stopped production include a majority of the big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s -- those who bear much of the responsibility for the tens of millions of mines now in the ground. Eight of the twelve biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years have signed the treaty and stopped production: Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.[9] Other significant producers that have signed include Germany, Croatia, Chile, and Brazil.
Two non-signatories have stopped production: Israel (apparently in 1997) and Finland (in 1981). Of the 36 former producers who have signed the Mine Ban Treaty, seventeen had no production restrictions in place, even in terms of policy declarations, prior to signing the treaty.
Of the 16 who are still producers, eight are in Asia (Burma, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam), three are in Europe (Russia, Turkey, FR Yugoslavia), three are in the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, Iraq), two are in the Americas (Cuba, US), and none are in Africa.
Several of the 16 producers have not actually manufactured AP mines in a number of years. They are still considered producers because they have refused to institute moratoria or make formal statements against production. The United States for example has not produced for two years, and Singapore is not thought to have produced for several years.
Also notable is that Russia in 1998 banned production of “blast” mines -- the most common type of mine that explodes from pressure. This would include the PMN mine, which, along with the Chinese Type 72, is the most frequently encountered mine around the world. The US has stopped production of all so-called dumb mines. As a result of the new restrictions in Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), production of non-detectable mines by CCW states parties is stopping, which would include the Type 72 by China.
According to the information provided to Landmine Monitor researchers, none of the former Soviet republics, except Russia, are producing antipersonnel mines. It has been reported that Ukraine and Belarus and perhaps other republics inherited and utilized AP mine production facilities from the Soviet Union, but they all deny any new production since gaining independence.
Even though production has stopped in many countries, Landmine Monitor researchers could find little evidence that nations are engaging in “programmes for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities,” as called for in the Mine Ban Treaty.
ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE PRODUCERS
TOTAL: 16 producers
FORMER ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE PRODUCERS
TOTAL: 38 former producers
Others who have been identified as producers by US Government and others, but who deny current or past production: Belarus, Cyprus, Namibia, Ukraine, Venezuela.
Article 1. General Obligations. 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances: (b) To...otherwise acquire,...or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; (c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
Article 3. Exceptions. 1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted....
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
Landmine Monitor research did not find evidence of antipersonnel mine exports or imports by treaty signatories, though some allegations have been made.
When the world began to turn its attention to the landmine crisis in earnest, the export of mines was readily identified as one of the fundamental underlying problems contributing to the crisis. With few exceptions (most notably the former Yugoslavia), the nations most affected by antipersonnel mines were not themselves producers. All of the mines had been supplied from the outside. This was true of Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola, and more. Though in some of these cases the problem was not so much the export/import of mines as the use of mines by foreign forces, the international community quickly coalesced around the notion that halting the export of mines would be a major step forward in checking the landmine crisis. Thus, the first significant steps in the movement to ban mines, both on the national and international levels, dealt with export, notably the US export moratorium in 1992 (soon followed by France and others) and the United Nations call for formal export moratoria (UNGA Resolution 48/75 K of 16 December 1993).
Based on the information collected for Landmine Monitor, there are 34 nations that have exported antipersonnel landmines in the past. Today, all of those nations with the exception of Iraq have at the least made a formal statement that they are no longer exporting. Twenty-two have signed the treaty and thus stopped exporting (though many had unilateral restrictions in place prior to signing). Among non-signatories, one has an export ban in place (USA), four have a moratorium in place (Israel, Pakistan, Singapore and Russia), and six have made declaratory statements that they no longer export (China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Vietnam, FR Yugoslavia).[10] It is possible, of course, that some of these nations continue to export APMs despite their public policy pronouncements.
Landmine Monitor researchers have not identified a single significant shipment of antipersonnel mines from one nation to another in 1998 and early 1999. This does not mean that no AP mines have been transferred; there are great difficulties in tracking mine trade. But the findings (or lack thereof) are consistent with the observations of military specialists that in fact there have been no major mine shipments of APMs dating back some 4 years. A de facto global ban on export already seems to be in place; a norm against APM supply seems to already have taken hold. The days when a country like Italy would ship millions of mines to Iraq over the course of just a few years appear to be over.
Thus, when critics say that the Mine Ban Treaty does not include major mine exporters, they are wrong on two counts: there are no major exporters today, and most of the major exporters of the past have signed the treaty.
In 1998 and again in 1999 some nations are attempting to get agreement to begin negotiations on an antipersonnel mine transfer ban in the Conference on Disarmament. In 1998 Australian Ambassador John Campbell was appointed Special Coordinator to examine the possibility of the CD taking up a mine transfer ban. He could not find a consensus. Another attempt is being made in 1999. In February, twenty-two nations made a joint call for the CD to re-appoint a Special Coordinator, “with a view to the early establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee” to negotiate a mine transfer ban.[11] The 22 were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela. The ICBL has expressed its strong opposition to such negotiations in the CD, believing that the potential negative impact far outweighs the potential benefits. Foremost, the ICBL has argued that a proliferation of international legal instruments on AP mines, particularly limited ones, undercuts the establishment of an international norm against any possession or use of AP mines. An ICBL position paper on this issue is available.[12]
FORMER EXPORTERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
Landmine Monitor has identified 34 countries that have exported antipersonnel mines in the past. All of these, with the exception of IRAQ, have halted exports either by virtue of having signed the Mine Ban Treaty (22), instituted a unilateral ban (1) or moratorium (4), or made a declarative statement of “no export” (6). It is, of course, possible that some of these nations continue to export APMs despite their public policy against it, but Landmine Monitor is not aware of any significant exports of antipersonnel mines in recent years.
Mine Ban Treaty Signatories
Note: Many treaty signatories already had unilateral export bans or moratoria in place.
Non-Signatories with Ban on Exports
United States
Non-Signatories with Moratorium on Exports
Israel Russia (non-detectabel, non-self-destruct only)
Pakistan Singapore
Non-Signatories with Declaration of “No Export”
Iran China (non-detectable, non-self-destruct only)
Vietnam Cuba
FR Yugoslavia Egypt
Known Exporters Without Export Moratorium or Declaration: Iraq
Known Producers Without Export Moratorium or Declaration: Burma, North Korea, Iraq
Producers (past and current) Not Known to Export: Albania, Burma, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Japan, India, North Korea, South Korea, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda.
(Of these, Burma, Finland, India, Iraq, DPRK, ROK, Taiwan, Turkey are treaty non-signatories. Finland, India, ROK, Taiwan, and Turkey have comprehensive export moratoria in place).
Article 1. General Obligations. 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:(b) To...acquire, stockpile, retain...anti-personnel mines; (c)To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
Article 4. Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
In the past year, a good deal has been written about early over-estimates of the number of mines planted in the ground globally. (See below) Lost in that discussion is a fact that emerges from Landmine Monitor research: the common estimate of the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by nations (100 million) appears to be dramatically low.
Landmine Monitor estimates that there are more than 250 million antipersonnel mines stored in the arsenals of 108 countries. These mines must be destroyed before they have a chance to get into the ground. The ICBL calls for a major effort to eradicate APM stockpiles, as well as those already planted -- to engage in preventive mine action.
The largest stockpiles are held by China (110 million), Russia (60-70 million), Belarus (unknown, but likely tens of millions), US (11 million), Ukraine (10 million), Italy (7 million) and India (4-5 million). Landmine Monitor research indicates that the biggest current stockpiles of treaty signatories belong to Ukraine, Italy, Sweden, Albania, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Greece. Italy, Sweden, UK, France, Spain, and Ukraine are in the process of destroying their mines. Japan is in the planning process. Albania and Greece -- neither of which has ratified the treaty -- are not known to have any plans for destruction.
Landmine Monitor research shows that more than 12 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in recent years.
Eleven treaty signatories have already completed destruction of stocks: Austria, Canada, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Namibia, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland. (Note: many of these are keeping a small number of mines for training, as permitted under the treaty).
Another nineteen signatories are already in the process of destruction: Belgium, Cambodia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Mali, Moldova, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Yemen, Uganda, Uruguay, Ukraine, United Kingdom. Other signatories and ratifiers are in the planning process.
In addition, several non-signatories have recently destroyed significant numbers of AP mines. Perhaps most notably, the United States has destroyed 3.3 million AP mines as part of its commitment to eliminate use of dumb mines everywhere but Korea. Russia has destroyed 500,000 mines that were not compliant with new CCW requirements.
It appears that the vast majority of treaty signatories that have (or had) stockpiles of mines are opting to exercise the Article 3 exception that permits retention of mines for training purposes. While many nations have not yet revealed the number of AP mines to be retained, it appears many intend to keep between 1,000-5,000. Several intend to keep more: Belgium 6,240; Slovenia 7,000; Italy 8,000; Spain 10,000; Japan 15,000. During the Oslo negotiations, it was established for the diplomatic record that the number of mines retained for training should be in the hundreds or thousands, not tens of thousands.[13] The ICBL has repeatedly questioned the need for live mines for training.
GLOBAL STOCKPILES OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
China 110 million (e)
Russia 60-70 million (e)
Belarus Millions*
USA 11 million
Ukraine 10 million (being destroyed)
Italy 7 million (being destroyed)
India 4-5 million (e)
Sweden 3 million (e) (being destroyed)
Albania 2 million (e)
South Korea 2 million (e)
Japan 1 million (being destroyed)
(e): estimate
* Belarus has acknowledged “millions” in stockpile. However, it has estimated cost of destruction at “tens of millions,” which likely means that tens of millions of AP mines are in stockpile.
Landmine Monitor has identified 108 countries with antipersonnel mine stockpiles. Many are in the process of destruction, such as the UK (850,000), France (650,000) and Spain (595,000). Others believed to have large stockpiles, possibly larger than some listed above, include Iraq, Iran, FR Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Greece, Vietnam, Angola and others.
Estimated Global Total: More than 250 million Antipersonnel Mines in Stockpiles
| <INTRODUCTION | HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION> |
[4]U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, letter to Human Rights Watch, 1 November 1993, (assessing global production and trade of antipersonnel mines), p. 1.
[5]U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 1. UN officials have since indicated that the number planted was a rough estimate, and based on very extensive mine laying in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia at the time.
[6]U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. v.
[7]Senegal ratified on 24 September, in the midst of the conflict in Guinea-Bissau where it was laying mines. The treaty entered into force for Senegal on 1 March 1998, after a cease-fire took effect.
[8]US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center letter to Human Rights Watch, 1 November 1993. FSTC stressed that the estimates were rough, but believed to be very conservative.
[9]Based on Landmine Monitor research findings and on information provided by the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, letter to Human Rights Watch, 1 November 1993.
[10]Russia’s moratorium and China’s declaratory policy only apply to export of non-detectable and non-self-destruct mines, in keeping with CCW restrictions. However, neither nation is known to have made a significant export since 1995.
[11]Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.
[12]ICBL, “Antipersonnel Landmines and the Conference on Disarmament,” written by Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch, Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group, released in Geneva 1 March 1999.
[13]See ICBL Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference, 18 September 1997.
