| <Previous | Next> |
| <Previous | Next> |
Key developments since May 2000: There continued to be reports of armed groups from Georgia laying antipersonnel mines in the Abkhazia region. Georgia has said the government has “neither tacitly nor openly supported Georgian partisans in their use of antipersonnel mines.” Georgia acknowledges that it laid antivehicle mines (but not antipersonnel) on the Chechen sector of Georgia-Russia border, then subsequently cleared them. Georgia states that Russian forces have mined the Russian-Georgian border near the villages of Shatili and Omalo. The Georgian military began an inventory of its stockpiled mines, which was to be completed at the end of May 2001. In September-November 2000, the U.S. conducted humanitarian demining training of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani soldiers at a military base in Georgia. The ICBL Georgian Committee reports that between January and the end of June 2001, 51 people were killed or injured by landmines and unexploded ordnance.
| Related Report: |
Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. While frequently expressing support for the treaty, Georgia has stated it is unable to join because “the existence of territories uncontrolled by Georgian authorities, particularly in Abkhazia, where anti-personnel mines are laid” makes it impossible for Georgia “to assume and fulfill legally binding obligations” such as those related to clearance of emplaced mines. Georgia also states that it “does not have enough financial resources and technologies to destruct anti-personnel mines. Therefore, without financial and technological assistance, Georgia will not be able to fulfill its obligations” under the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]
The head of the Engineering Department of the Ministry of Defense said that while Georgia is not against “prompt” accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, its “realization at this stage is connected with the Abkhazian region, which is out of Georgian Central Forces’ control.”[2] The head of engineering for the Border Defense Department has stated that the border guards are interested in the “regulation of this problem,” pointing out that “mines threaten the lives of border guards;” he said that their department is “ready for the multilateral partnership.”[3]
Georgia attended the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000, but did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in December 2000 and May 2001. Georgia voted in favor of the November 2000 UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in previous years.
Georgia is party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II, but has not ratified 1996 Amended Protocol II. In a January 2001 response to an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe questionnaire on antipersonnel mines and the CCW, Georgia stated that steps toward ratification of Amended Protocol II were underway, but that some formal procedures had to be completed.[4] Georgia did not participate in the 2000 or 2001 diplomatic conferences related to Amended Protocol II.
Georgia is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but stated that it believes that the CD “could be the forum for negotiation a global ban on anti-personnel landmines” and is “capable of producing a treaty that would have universal adherence and provide for clear verification.”[5]
Officials have stated that Georgia has never produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel landmines since independence, and that no such activity is planned for the future.[6] Georgia reports that it has had a moratorium “on the production, import and use” of antipersonnel mines since September 1996 and there are no “time limits foreseen in the moratorium.”[7]
Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union, though the exact size and composition remains unknown. An inventory of landmines was initiated after an incident on 27 May 2000, in which a PMN-2 mine exploded in the artillery regiment of the Ministry of Defense near Arcenali Mountain, wounding the two engineers who were searching for mines.[8] The head of the Engineering Department confirmed that an inventory of stocks was underway, and should be completed in May 2001.[9] There has been no further information provided about the inventory process or its outcome.
In addition to the Georgian mine stocks, there are antipersonnel mines stockpiled at military bases under Russian control. Colonel Jano Gagoshidze, head of the Engineering Department, is part of the negotiations with Russia on the transfer of military bases. He said he believed the most significant stocks were located at Russian military base No. 105, near the town of Sagarejo. He also said the territory around the base is mined and there are no records of the minefields. There are also Russian mine stocks in Batumi and Akhalkalaki; the situation of stocks in Tskhinvali is unknown.[10]
In talks held on 8-9 February 2001 regarding the transfer of bases, a priority issue was the transfer of mine stocks from the Russian base at Sagarejo. Reportedly, Georgia wanted the stocks removed in ten months, while Russia asked for a period of four years.[11] At a meeting on 8 March 2001 experts worked out a schedule of three years to withdraw the mines from the Russian military warehouse in Sagarejo. Colonel Gagoshidze told the Prime News Agency that Russia must defuse antivehicle and antipersonnel mines in 183 carriages.[12]
Georgia has had an unlimited moratorium on use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.[13] The Landmine Monitor Report 2000 noted press accounts stating that Russia and Georgia were considering mining several stretches of the border in order to stop the flow of men and material between Georgia and Chechnya.[14] Subsequently, the Georgian Foreign Ministry wrote:
The position of Georgia towards the process of landmine ban and use is known worldwide. This is confirmed by the Moratorium moved out by the President in September 1996 as well as by the support by the Georgian party of all resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly on the global landmine ban. Thus, we consider inadmissible the statement as if the Georgian party continues to mine the Chechen sector of the Georgia-Russia border, as it is mentioned in the booklet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has verified the above mentioned information at the respective body. According to the notice provided by the State Department of State Border Protection, the Chechen sector of Georgia-Russia border for the well-known reasons was actually mined not by the landmines but by the tank mines for a small period. According to the notice of the State Department of Border Protection the mentioned sector is now cleared of mines.[15]
In a meeting in May 2001 an official reiterated that Georgia had only used antivehicle mines on the border. He also stated that there have been cases of Russian mining of the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border near the villages of Shatili and Omalo.[16]
In recent years, there have been reports of armed groups from Georgia, allegedly linked to the Georgian government, passing into Abkhazia and laying antipersonnel mines. On 31 January 2001, CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Abkhazia were the target of a mine attack resulting in two peacekeepers being seriously wounded. Dato Shengelia, a paramilitary group that reportedly operates from Georgia, publicly accepted responsibility for this act.[17]
In response to previous reports and allegations of this nature, the Georgian Foreign Ministry stated, “Unfortunately, as you are aware, certain parts of Georgia are not under the control of the Government of Georgia, therefore we are not able to control any kind of military or paramilitary activities there. Neither the Government of Georgia is supporting or controlling the paramilitary units functioning on the above mentioned territories.”[18] In July 2001, a representative of the Georgian Foreign Ministry said, “The governmental structures of Georgia [have] neither tacitly nor openly supported Georgian partisans in their use of antipersonnel mines.”[19]
The majority of landmines are located near the Inguri River separating Georgia and Abkhazia.[20] Outside of the Abkhazia, mines pose dangers to civilians in Georgia mainly in areas near the border with Abkhazia and near Russian military bases, which have been mined. There are also minefields on the Chechen, Ingush, and Dagestani sectors of the Russian-Georgian border. On 27 October 2000, two Georgian border guards were killed and one wounded when they ran over a landmine on the Ingush sector of Russian-Georgian border.[21]
On 29 January 2001, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Necdet Sezer signed an agreement on the elimination of landmines on the border of the two states.[22] Antivehicle mines will apparently remain in place. This agreement also included a commitment to ban the use of antipersonnel mines in these areas in the future.[23] In correspondence with Landmine Monitor in July 2001, the Georgian Foreign Ministry stated, “According to the information received from the Ministry of Defence of Georgia and the State Department of the State Border Protection, there [are] not any sort of minefields located on the Georgian side of the state border between Georgia and Turkey.”[24]
Georgia has no national programs for humanitarian clearance, mine awareness, or survivor assistance. Responsibility for mine clearance in the zone of military actions and territory of military bases is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense, whereas the Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for populated areas, roads, and railroads, and finally the State Department of Border Guards is accountable for frontier areas. Since 1994, CIS peacekeepers have conducted demining operations in the security zone along the Inguri River.
In September-November 2000, under the “Beecroft Initiative,” US military conducted simultaneous humanitarian demining training of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani soldiers at the Gori military base near Tbilisi. The initiative was designed to “speed the pace of reducing the landmine threat that endangers populations in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and to strengthen confidence and security in the southern Caucasus....”[25] Once trained, the soldiers were to carry out demining operations in their own countries, as well as teach other soldiers current demining techniques. The cost for deploying the US military trainers and conducting the training was estimated at $3.2 million.
Recently a German company offered to help Georgia with mine clearance; as a result the State Minister has called upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Border Department and other ministries to form a working group to deal with the issue. The Border Department has recommended that the ICBL Georgia Committee form part of the group.[26]
The ICBL Georgian Committee, in cooperation with Abkhazian NGOs, has begun a mine awareness campaign, including mapping mined areas, organizing lectures and seminars for teachers in high-risk regions, and publication of a mine awareness brochure for people in Georgia and the Abkhazia region of Georgia. In organizing the seminars and lectures, assistance has been provided by the Georgian Ministry of Education, the local government of the Zugdidi region, Abkhaz representatives in the region of Zugdidi, peacekeeping forces, and representatives of local and national press and mass media. Informational booklets were prepared in consultation with specialists from the Defense Ministry and Ministry of Home Affairs. Posters were prepared using materials from the ICRC.
A puppet show on mine awareness was developed with help of materials from UNICEF. The first stage of the program was implemented in Zugdidi with school directors, junior-class teachers and military preparation instructors; representatives of some NGOs took part in seminars. Lectures about problems of landmines and the need for mine awareness for children were held and children were asked to take part in preparing an exhibition of children’s pictures, called “Save us from Landmines.” The seminars were well received and confirmed the need to distribute mine awareness information not only in schools in the town of Zugdidi itself, but also among pupils in village schools in the Zugdidi region. The second stage of the program was held in the end of school year.
The project was implemented in several schools of Zugdidi region where refugees are densely populated. This also included villages located close to Abkhazia, for example in schools in Tkaia, Rukhi, Darcheli, and schools in Akhalabastumani and Kakhati in the Zugdidi region, where there are large numbers of displaced children. The request for presentations was greater than had been anticipated. The working group was able to conduct additional seminars and puppet shows in several schools, and distributed posters to them, but distribution of informational booklets and notebooks was impossible due to shortage of materials.
The seminars resulted in children launching the campaign “Children Against Landmines,” in which children of the town of Zugdidi and nearby villages distributed anti-landmine posters in the population.
The working group also worked closely with those forcedly displaced from Gali district, who mainly live and work in the Gali district of the region of Abkhazia, providing them with booklets, posters and notebooks to distribute among the local population. Materials were also given to the administrators of Dali-Kodori Gorge in Gulripshi region, where there is also a great risk due to landmines.
As part of its objective to lend support to mine awareness programs in Western Georgia, the ICRC agreed to assist HALO Trust by incorporating their mine awareness presentation into the ICRC/Georgian Red Cross dissemination sessions. HALO Trust had experienced difficulties in obtaining access to schools for displaced children in Zugdidi district. The ICRC was kept informed of the landmine/UXO situation through regular meetings and discussions with HALO Trust.[27]
There is no official information on the number of people killed or injured by landmines in Georgia. According to the Head of the Science and Technical Research Department of the Georgian Army General Staff, Colonel Tavadze, about 70% of casualties during the war were landmine victims.[28] Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs disputed that number, stating in a letter to the ICBL Georgian Committee that the “information that 70% of people killed or injured within the military activities are the landmine victims is very far from truth and requires more accuracy.”[29] The Ministry, however, did not offer more accurate information.
Pursuant to an order in April 2001,[30] the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs is creating a “single data base where along with other affairs all mine victims [have] been registered.”[31] The database will be housed at the Disaster and Emergency Medicine Center. The Ministry noted, “Recently in Zugdidi and Gali Regions there [has] been [an] increase in the number of landmine victims. The most alarming is the case in Saberioni village of Gali Region when five children were blown up by the mine.”[32]
Landmine incidents were reported in the media during 2000. Four people were killed and one injured, including an incident in which the brother of the Minister of Defense and another person were killed when their vehicle hit a mine and exploded.[33] The ICBL Georgian Committee reports that between January and the end of June 2001, there were 51 new landmine/UXO casualties. Twenty-two people, including one child, were killed and 29 people, including ten children, were injured.[34] The Head of the Zugdidi National Hospital, the main health facility in the border region with Abkhazia, reported treating eight mine victims, six of whom were men, between January and 7 June 2001.[35]
Under orders of the Minister of Labor, Health and Social Affairs, all regional and local medical institutions that provide emergency care are to stock medicines and devices for 5-10 mine victims.[36] However, hospitals throughout Georgia, including in the Abkhazia region, routinely run into shortages of basic medical supplies due to a lack of funding. Specialized medical and psychological rehabilitation has been inaccessible, or unavailable, for many mine victims.[37]
The ICRC runs two orthopedic projects for the war disabled, many of whom are landmine victims. It has centers in Tbilisi and Gagra (Abkhazia region). Since the production of artificial limbs began in February 1995, 2,557 patients have been assisted, 3,292 prostheses manufactured, and 1,757 pairs of crutches and 166 wheelchairs distributed. All treatments and services are provided free of charge.[38]
On 22 May 2001, the Georgian Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs provided the following information on ICRC projects:
|
|
Number of Registered Patients (prosthetics)
|
Number of Registered Patients (amputations)
|
Overall Number
|
Casualties of War
|
Casualties of Mines
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Georgia
|
2240
|
692
|
2932
|
533
|
309
|
|
Abkhazia
|
468
|
41
|
509
|
319
|
235
|
|
Overall
|
2708
|
733
|
3441
|
852
|
544
|
To ensure the long-term sustainability of these centers, the ICRC carried out a training program in the prosthetics and orthotics rehabilitation field. In March 2000, after two years of training, eight technicians in Tbilisi and six in Gagra graduated with the ICRC standard “Certificate of Professional Proficiency in Lower Limb Prosthetic and Orthotic Devices.” Six of the technicians from Tbilisi are continuing training to reach higher professional levels.[39]
The Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs is developing a special program for the care and rehabilitation of the disabled. The program involves the creation of rehabilitation centers where doctors, orthopods, prosthetists, physiotherapists, psychologists, and other health professionals will work together to provide medical and psychological rehabilitation for the disabled, including mine victims. The centers are in the Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and Batumi. The state budget allocation for 2001 is $175,000 (350,000 Georgian Lary), although additional funding is needed.[40] Currently, this Project “shows a loss and does not provide for the proper implementation of rehabilitation activity required for the invalids.”[41]
There is no information on any NGOs providing services for the disabled, including mine victims, in Georgia.
The “Law of Georgia on Invalids’ Social Protection,” of 14 June 1995, provides protection of the disabled in Georgia. The Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs notes, however, that the “proper realization of this law in Georgia could not have been performed due to the economic situation.”[42]
| <Previous | Next> |
[1] Note Verbale, the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC. DEL/12/01, 17 January 2001.
[2] Interview with Colonel Jano Gagoshidze, head of the Engineering Department, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 8 January 2001.
[3] Interview with Vakhtang Chrelashvili, head of Engineering, State Department of the State Border Guards, Tbilisi, 20 February 2001.
[4] Note Verbale, the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC. DEL/12/01, 17 January 2001
[5] Ibid.
[6] Letter from General-Major G. Shervashidze, Commander of the troops of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia to M. Buchukuri, 6 February 2001; Note Verbale to the OSCE, 17 January 2001; see also, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 793.
[7] Note Verbale, the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC. DEL/12/01, 17 January 2001.
[8] Akhali Taoba (Georgian newspaper), 27 May 2000.
[9] Meeting with Colonel Jano Gagoshidze, head of the Engineering Department, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 20 January 2001; telephone interview with Colonel Gagoshidze, 22 February 2001.
[10] Meeting with Colonel Gagoshidze, 20 January 2001.
[11] “Tbilisi offers 10-month period to Moscow to take out mine stock from Sagaredgo,” Akhali Taoba (newspaper), 30 January 2001.
[12] “3 years will be necessary for withdrawing mines from the Russian military warehouse located in Sagarejo,” Prime News Agency (Tbilisi), 8 March 2001.
[13] This was proclaimed by President Shevardnadze at the United Nations in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792, and Note Verbale to the OSCE, 17 January 2001.
[14] See for example, Alexander Igorev and Georgi Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” Moscow Kommersant (Russian daily newspaper), 12 April 2000.
[15] Letter from George Burduli, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ref.: 8-14/388, to Maia Buchukuri, 16 April 2001.
[16] Interview with Mr. Sergo Gumberidze, Security Council Staff, 23 May 2001.
[17] Nuzhnaya Gazeta (Russian newspaper), No. 6, 7 February 2001, p. 10.
[18] Letter from Georgi Burduli, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2000.
[19] Letter from Giorgi Burduli, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor, 10 July 2001.
[20] United Nations, Country Report: Georgia, March 1998.
[21] Alia (Georgian language newspaper), No. 170, 28-29 October 2000, p. 2; Svobodnaya Gruzia (Georgian newspaper in Russian), No. 242, 31 October 2000, p. 3.
[22] “Georgia, Turkey agree to develop strategic partnership,” ITAR/TASS (Ankara), 29 January 2001.
[23] “Turkey, Georgia, agree to clear antipersonnel mines from common border,” Associated Press (Ankara), 29 January 2001.
[24] Letter from Giorgi Burduli, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor, 10 July 2001.
[25] US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Beecroft Initiative Trains Humanitarian Deminers, Advances Regional Peace U.S. Joint Project with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Concludes November 2,” 25 October 2000.
[26] Meeting with Vakhtang Chrelashvili, Chief of Technical Services of the Government Border Department, 29 March 2001.
[27] Information provided by the ICRC, 11 July 2001.
[28] Landmine Monitor 1999 interview with Colonel G. Tavadze, head of the Main Department of the Strategic Planning and Science-Technical Research.
[29] Letter from George Burduli, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Ref.: 8-14/388, 16 April 2001.
[30] Order #142/0 of the Minister of Labor, Health and Social Affairs, “On Implementation of the Universal Referral Critical and Emergency System in Georgia,” 2 April 2001.
[31] Letter from Marina Gudusauri, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia, Ref: 17/06-134, 23 April 2001.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Email from ICBL-Georgia Committee, 27 July 2001.
[34] Email from ICBL-Georgia Committee, 20 July 2001.
[35] Statistics provided to Maia Buchukuri, by Dr. N. Tsasidze, head of the Zugdidi National Hospital, June 2001.
[36] Letter from Marina Gudusauri, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia, Ref: 17/06-134, 23 April 2001. The letter cites Order #477/o of the Minister of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia, “On Landmines and Explosives Monitoring,” 8 December 1999.
[37] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 826.
[38] ICRC in Georgia, 1 April 2001.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Interview with Manoni Khachidze, Deputy Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs, 13 April 2001.
[41] Letter from Marina Gudusauri, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia, Ref: 17/06-134, 23 April 2001.
[42] Ibid.
