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A total of 140 countries have signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31 July 2001, thereby legally committing themselves to no use of antipersonnel mines. A total of 117 of those countries have ratified or acceded, thereby fully committing to all the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty. After the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify at a later date. Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2000, three states have acceded: Nauru (7 August 2000), Kiribati (7 September 2000), and Congo-Brazzaville (4 May 2001). Considering the relatively short time that this issue has been before the international community, the number of signatories and accessions – nearly three-quarters of the world’s nations -- is exceptional. This is a clear indication of the widespread international rejection of any use or possession of antipersonnel mines.
Every country in the Western Hemisphere has signed except the US and Cuba, every member of the European Union except Finland, every member of NATO except the US and Turkey, 42 of the 48 countries in Africa, and key Asia-Pacific nations such as Australia, Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia. Several of the most heavily mine-affected states are states parties: Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Several others are signatories: Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Major past producers and exporters are now States Parties, including: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Still, 53 countries have not yet joined the treaty. This includes three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States. It includes most of the Middle East, most of the former Soviet republics, and many Asian nations. Major producers such the US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan are not part of the treaty.
Virtually all of the non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines at some point in time, and many have already at least partially embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/33v calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted in November 2000 by a vote of 143 in favor, none opposed, and 22 abstentions. Nineteen non-signatories voted for the resolution, including Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Comoros, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
Some developments during the reporting period are encouraging. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey announced that they will join the treaty and will deposit their instruments of ratification and accession, respectively, at the same time. Cyprus has announced its intention to ratify soon. FR Yugoslavia has announced its intention to accede to the treaty. Nigeria has decided to accede and initiated the legal process. In several countries where conflict has ended recently, governments have expressed interest in joining the Mine Ban Treaty, including DR Congo, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.
Many States Parties are putting a high priority on promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. A Universalization Contact Group has been formed, coordinated by Canada, with participation by a number of States Parties, the ICBL and ICRC. In addition to many bilateral efforts to promote adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty, there have been important regional conferences aimed at universalization.
Nevertheless, there has been little or no change in the ban policies of some states in the past year, including the US, Russia and China. Universalization clearly remains the biggest challenge facing ban supporters. The fact that only five countries have acceded to the treaty since its entry-into-force on 1 March 1999 is testament to that.
After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty ever. For a State that ratifies or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State deposited its instrument of ratification. That State is then required to make its implementation report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days, destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.
A total of 117 countries have ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty as of 1 August 2001, including seventeen since publication of the Landmine Monitor Report 2000. Three nations acceded (Kiribati, Nauru, and Congo-Brazzaville) and fourteen ratified in this reporting period: Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Colombia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Maldives, Malta, Moldova, Romania, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zambia.
There are 23 governments that have signed but not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. Several have reportedly already completed, or nearly completed, the domestic process necessary for ratification, but have not formally submitted an instrument of ratification to the United Nations: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Cook Islands, DR Congo and São Tomé e Príncipe.
There is concern that the pace of ratifications/accessions has slowed. There were three ratifications in December 1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference, 55 in 1998, 32 in 1999, and 19 in 2000 and eight from January-July 2001.
The first two years of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program successfully fulfilled their intended purpose in helping to maintain a focus on the landmines crisis, in becoming a meeting place for all key mine action players, and in stimulating momentum to fully implement the Mine Ban Treaty. The four intersessional Standing Committees on Victim Assistance, Mine Clearance, Stockpile Destruction and General Status and Operation of the Convention helped to provide a global picture of priorities, as well as to consolidate and concentrate global mine action efforts. As a result, the role of the Mine Ban Treaty as a comprehensive framework for mine action continued to be highlighted.
The intersessional process is a collaborative process conducted in the Ottawa Process tradition of inclusivity, partnership (between governments, ICBL, ICRC, and International Organizations), dialogue, openness and practical cooperation. Action points identified from the first year of the intersessional work program were included in the Second Meeting of States Parties President’s Action Program and served as the basis for planning for the second year of intersessional work. Implementation of these Action Points was ongoing throughout the year. Compliance with all key Articles of the Convention became an overall focus of the second intersessional year.
The intersessional Standing Committee meetings will become increasingly important in the years leading up to the first Review Conference in 2004, as the Mine Ban Treaty continues to rapidly move toward establishment of the international norm. The ICBL remains deeply committed to full and active participation in this critical intersessional process.
The ICBL continued to monitor developments at the CCW and its Amended Protocol II with a minimal presence during the Second Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in December 2000, and the December 2000 and April 2001 PrepComs for the Second CCW Review Conference, to be held in December 2001. Most NGOs who attended, though ICBL members, were there to further their individual NGO’s work on non-ICBL matters, such as cluster munitions. ICBL statements were made at both PrepComs.
Proposals presented and discussed at these meetings included: extension of scope, compliance issues, antivehicle mines, wound ballistics and Explosive Remnants of War. From the ICBL perspective the most important development during these sessions was the discussion surrounding the ICRC proposal regarding Explosive Remnants of War and progress made toward the goal of having the Review Conference approve a mandate for continuing discussions on remnants of war. Most delegations spoke in favor of ongoing consideration and discussion of this important humanitarian issue. The Netherlands plays a leading role in this issue and the ICRC as well as many NGOs, who are ICBL members, continue to work on the issue.
Landmine Monitor has received disturbing reports that indicate a strong possibility of use of antipersonnel mines by Ugandan forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June 2000. Uganda became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 1999. Landmine Monitor believes that these serious and credible allegations merit the urgent attention of States Parties, who should consult with the Ugandan government and other relevant actors in order to seek clarification, establish the facts, and resolve these questions regarding compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. The Ugandan government has denied that it used antipersonnel mines in the DRC.
One Mine Ban Treaty signatory has acknowledged continued use of antipersonnel mines: Angola (against UNITA rebels).
While Landmine Monitor does not have conclusive evidence, there are strong indications that two other signatories used antipersonnel mines: Ethiopia (until the end of its border conflict with Eritrea in June 2000), and Sudan (ongoing use against SPLA and other rebel forces). Both governments deny any use of antipersonnel mines.
There have also been serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Rwandan forces in the DRC in June 2000. Rwanda was a Mine Ban Treaty signatory at the time; it became a State Party on 1 December 2000. Rwanda denies any use of antipersonnel mines.
In Burundi, which is a treaty signatory, antipersonnel mines have continued to be used, and there have been allegations of use by both government and rebel forces, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to establish responsibility for the mine use. The government of Burundi denies any mine use.
In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000, the following countries which have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty, have acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines: Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan.
Other non-signatories who are credibly reported to have used antipersonnel mines in this time period include: Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, and Somalia. The DRC and Nepal have denied use.
Opposition groups are reported to have used antipersonnel mines in at least 19 countries.
As of mid-2001, it would not appear that antipersonnel mines are being used on a massive scale in any conflict. The most regular use is likely occurring in Russia (Chechnya), Sri Lanka, and Burma. Reports of Uzbekistan continuing to mine its borders were still being received in June 2001.
The kind of widespread use of antipersonnel mines that was witnessed in FR Yugoslavia/Kosovo in 1999 and in Russia/Chechnya at the height of that conflict in 1999 and early 2000 was not evident in this reporting period in any location. It would appear, however, that use of antipersonnel mines increased in a number of countries, notably in Colombia by guerrillas and in Namibia by Angolan rebels (UNITA) and Angolan government troops.
Most instances of use of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period were in ongoing situations of conflict, where the governments and rebel groups were using mines in the previous reporting period as well. However, there were a number of cases of new instances of antipersonnel mine use, or serious allegations of new use. These include:
On the other side from these new outbreaks of use of antipersonnel mines, it would appear that, compared to Landmine Monitor Report 2000, the government of FR Yugoslavia did not use antipersonnel mines in this reporting period and the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia stopped use early in the period. In each instance, the stoppage in use of mines was the result of the cessation of hostilities, rather than a policy decision.
In other developments in this reporting period:
Eritrea for the first time admitted to use of antipersonnel mines during its border conflict with Ethiopia from May 1998 to June 2000.
Israel acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in South Lebanon prior to its withdrawal from the area in May 2000, and provided minefield maps to the United Nations. It appears that Israel has continued to use antipersonnel mines in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, allegedly without proper fencing and marking as required by CCW Amended Protocol II, which entered into force for Israel on 30 April 2001. When asked about the allegation, Israel replied that it “fulfills its obligations to the fullest extent, and strongly rejects allegations to the contrary.” There have been allegations of mine use by Palestinians as well.
In February 2001 the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the first time known to Landmine Monitor denied current or past use of antipersonnel mines.
In August 2000, the government of Burundi, for the first time known to Landmine Monitor, accused rebel forces of using antipersonnel mines. This came in response to Landmine Monitor’s report of serious allegations of use by the Burundi army. The government has subsequently frequently accused rebels of planting mines.
In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000, there was confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines, or credible allegations of new use, in the following countries:
In its first two annual reports, Landmine Monitor identified sixteen producers of antipersonnel landmines. This year, Landmine Monitor has decided to remove two of those nations, Turkey and FR Yugoslavia, from the list.
Turkey has, for the first time, provided Landmine Monitor with a written statement indicating that it has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has said that it does not intend to produce them. Turkey’s Foreign Minister announced in April 2001 that Turkey was starting the process of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.
FR Yugoslavia has also provided a written statement saying that it has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1992. While Landmine Monitor has received some contrary information in the past, this statement, combined with the decision of the new government to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, justifies removal from the list of producers.
Forty-one nations have ceased production of antipersonnel mines.
Of the 14 remaining producers, it should be noted that:
Among the other developments in the global situation with respect to antipersonnel mine production since May 2000:
The 41 nations that have stopped production of antipersonnel mines include a majority of the big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Eight of the twelve biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and have stopped all production and export: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia), France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Landmine Monitor research did not find evidence of antipersonnel mine exports or imports by Mine Ban Treaty State Parties or signatories. Indeed, Landmine Monitor did not identify a single significant shipment of antipersonnel mines from one nation to another. It was noted in Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2000-2001 that there has been a “virtual absence of mines--legitimate or otherwise--at arms shows and military equipment exhibitions this year. The stigmatization process has clearly had a major impact: even the non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty seem to feel the need to appear politically correct.”[4]
There remains a concern about the possible transit or trans-shipment of antipersonnel mines through treaty nations. There have been a few reports of seizures of illicit shipments of light weapons that have included some antipersonnel mines. It continues to be the case that antipersonnel mine trade has been reduced to a relatively small amount of illicit trafficking.
Thirty-four countries are known to have exported antipersonnel landmines in the past. Today, all of those nations with the exception of Iraq have at the least made a formal statement that they are no longer exporting. In September 2000, an Iraqi diplomat said to Landmine Monitor, “How can we export landmines? We only export oil for food.”
Twenty-two countries have signed the Mine Ban Treaty and thus stopped exporting, although many had unilateral restrictions in place prior to signing. Among non-signatories, one has an export ban in place (USA), four have a moratorium in place (Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore), and six have made declaratory statements that they no longer export (China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Yugoslavia, Vietnam). Russia’s moratorium and China’s declaratory policy only apply to export of non-detectable and non-self-destruct mines, in keeping with CCW restrictions. However, neither nation is known to have made a significant export since 1995.
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows transfers of antipersonnel mines for research and development of demining technologies and for training as well as for the purpose of destruction. Several states parties have commendably reported these activities in their Article 7 reports:
Landmine Monitor estimates that there are 230-245 million antipersonnel mines stockpiled by about 100 countries. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties account for an estimated 8-9 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. According to the latest data made available to Landmine Monitor, the biggest stocks among States Parties are: Italy (3 million), Albania (1.6 million), and Japan (762,729). However, these numbers are outdated, as destruction programs are underway in all these countries.
Signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty (countries which have signed but not ratified) also hold an estimated 8-9 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Ukraine has revised downward its stockpile estimate to 6.35 million. Other Mine Ban Treaty signatories with large stockpiles are likely to be Angola, Ethiopia, Poland and Greece. None of these states will reveal information about their mine stocks.
Treaty non-signatories have an estimated 215-225 million antipersonnel mines in stock. Landmine Monitor estimates that the largest stockpiles belong to: China (110 million), Russia (60-70 million), United States (11.2 million), Pakistan (6 million) India (4-5 million), and Belarus (4.5 million). Other non-signatories believed to have large stockpiles are Egypt, Eritrea, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.
In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in such places as Angola, Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, DR Congo, Kashmir, FYR Macedonia, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, and FR Yugoslavia (including Kosovo).
Landmine Monitor research shows that approximately 27 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in recent years by more than 50 nations, including Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, signatories, and non-signatories. Some 5 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in this reporting period.
Forty-eight States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed about 21 million antipersonnel mines. A total of twenty-nine States Parties have completed destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles. Eight have completed destruction in this reporting period, including the Czech Republic in June 2001, Malaysia in January 2001, Bulgaria in December 2000, Honduras, Spain and Zimbabwe in November 2000, Slovak Republic in September 2000, and Mauritania at an unknown date.
Of the twenty-nine, fifteen completed destruction since entry-into-force of the Mine Ban Treaty in March 1999. In addition to the above: Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. Another fourteen States Parties reported destruction of their stockpiles prior to March 1999: Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland.
Another nineteen States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Albania, Argentina, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Moldova, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, and Yemen.
The seventeen States Parties that have not begun the destruction process include: Bangladesh, Brazil, Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, Macedonia FYR, Mozambique, Niger, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Venezuela and Zambia. A number of these have only been States Parties a short time including Bangladesh, Kenya, Romania, Tanzania, and Zambia.
It appears that the majority of States Parties possessing a stockpile of antipersonnel mines are opting to exercise the Article 3 exception. Many intend to keep between 1,000-5,000 mines. Several intend to keep significantly more: Brazil 16,550; Ecuador 16,000; Japan 13,582; Sweden 11,120; and Italy 8,000. Argentina declared in May 2001 that it will increase the number of mines retained from 3,049 to 13,025.
After the ICBL raised this issue repeatedly in the Standing Committee meetings, a number of countries have decided to decrease the number of mines kept: Australia from 10,000 to 7,845; Bulgaria from 10,446 to 4,000; Croatia from 17,500 to 7,000, Denmark from 4,991 to just over 2,106, Peru from 9,526 to 5,578; Slovakia from 7,000 to 1,500; Spain from 10,000 to 4,000; Thailand from 15,600 to 5,000. Slovenia confirms that it will reduce the number of antipersonnel mines retained from 7,000 to 1,500 after 2003.
The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training. The ICBL believes that it is important not only to have complete transparency on this through more detailed Article 7 reporting, but also to continue to evaluate the necessity for the exception.
During the Oslo treaty negotiations in 1997, the ICBL identified as “the major weakness in the treaty” the sentence in the Article 2 Paragraph 1 definition of antipersonnel mine that exempts antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices: “Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.” The ICBL expressed its belief that many antivehicle mines (AVMs) with antihandling devices (AHDs) could function as antipersonnel mines and pose similar dangers to civilians.
To address this concern, which was shared by many government delegations, negotiators changed the draft definition of antihandling device (which had been identical to the one in CCW Protocol II) by adding the words “or otherwise intentionally disturb”: “‘Anti-handling device’ means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.” It was emphasized by Norway, which proposed the language, and others, that the word “intentionally” was needed to establish that if an AVM with an AHD explodes from an unintentional act of a person, it is to be considered an antipersonnel mine, and banned under the treaty. This language was eventually accepted by all delegations without dissent.[5]
The ICBL has expressed concern that there has not been adequate recognition by States Parties that AVMs with AHDs that function like antipersonnel mines are in fact prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, nor discussion of the practical implications of this. The ICBL has repeatedly called on States Parties to be more explicit about what types of AVMs and AHDs, and what deployment methods, are permissible and prohibited. The ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, and the German Initiative to Ban Landmines have all produced lists and publications regarding AVMs of concern.[6] Landmine Monitor researchers have identified such mines in their individual country studies contained in this report.
During the reporting period, officials of a number of States Parties made policy statements on the issue of AVMs with AHDs in various domestic and international venues or in communications with Landmine Monitor researchers. Highlights of these statements include (see individual country reports for details):
Acting upon recommendations made in Standing Committee meetings in 2000, the ICRC hosted a technical experts meeting on “antivehicle mines with sensitive fuses or with sensitive antihandling devices” on 13-14 March 2001 in Geneva. Governments that sent representatives to this seminar included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Nicaragua, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The GICHD and ICBL also participated.
Discussion at the seminar centered on identifying the specific technical measures that States Parties can adopt to minimize the risk to civilians posed by AVMs with sensitive fuze mechanisms and antihandling devices that might be activated by an unintentional act. Emerging from the seminar was a set of recommendations for best practices regarding the design and use of sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices. Key among them were establishing a minimum pressure threshold of 150 kilograms for AVMs and discontinuing use of AVMs with tripwires and tilt rod fuzes, because they function as antipersonnel mines. Participants in the ICRC seminar had trouble developing recommendations about best practices for sensitive antihandling devices. The experts called upon states to do further research on this matter and to examine the sensitivities of their AHDs with the goal of establishing a minimum level needed to fulfill their function.
In the previous editions of the Landmine Monitor Report, the ICBL raised concerns about the possible participation of States Parties in joint military operations with non-States Parties that use antipersonnel landmines. There is serious concern about the consistency of such operations with the treaty’s Article 1 obligation for a State Party “never under any circumstance...[t]o assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Such joint operations at the least would go against the spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all possession and use of antipersonnel mines.
In particular, the question has been raised as to what “assist” means in the treaty’s Article 1. A number of governments have interpreted this to mean “active” or “direct” assistance in actual laying of mines, and not other types of assistance in joint operations, such as provision of fuel or security. This narrow interpretation of assistance is of concern to the ICBL; in keeping with the spirit of a treaty aimed at total eradication of the weapon, interpretation of assistance should be as broad as possible.
During the meetings of the SC on General Status of the Convention, the ICBL has emphasized the need for States Parties to reach a common understanding of the term “assist,” especially as it applies to joint military operations, foreign stockpiling of AP mines, and foreign transit of mines across the territory of a State Party. Full and effective implementation of the treaty will be enhanced if States Parties are clear and consistent with regard to what acts are permitted and what acts are prohibited.
It appears that various States Parties may have significantly different understandings about what acts are permitted. Human Rights Watch prepared and distributed at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2001 a list of questions about joint military operations in order to help determine whether States Parties consider such actions to be prohibited.[8] The ICBL urges States Parties to clarify their views on the legality of joint operations with non-States Parties using mines, as well as foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines.
Though often discussed in terms of potential US use of antipersonnel mines in a NATO operations, this is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. Based on research for the Landmine Monitor Report 2001, there are significant questions regarding the position of Tajikistan, a State Party, toward the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces stationed in Tajikistan along the border with Afghanistan. In addition, it appears that a number of States Parties in Africa have engaged in military operations with (or in support of) armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines. This would include Namibia (with Angola against UNITA), as well as Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe with various forces in the DRC.
All of these States Parties should make clear the nature of their support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear their views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of their military operations with these armed forces. As parties to the treaty, they should state categorically that they will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.
As reported in the Landmine Monitor Report 2000, several NATO members have made strong statements rejecting use of antipersonnel mines in NATO operations including France and the Netherlands. A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, have adopted legislative provisions or made formal statements with regard to possible participation of their armed forces in joint military operations with a treaty non-signatory that may use antipersonnel mines. In each of these cases, government officials have stated that the intent is to provide legal protections to their military personnel who participate in joint operations with a non-signatory who may utilize antipersonnel mines.
Several governments have provided new or updated information on Joint Operations at Standing Committee meetings or during the research process for the Landmine Monitor Report 2001:
Participation in Combined Operations: Canada may participate in combined operations with a state that is not Party to the Convention. Canadian contingents may not, however, use anti-personnel mines and the Canadian Forces may not request, even indirectly, the use of anti-personnel mines by others.
Rules of Engagement: When participating in combined operations with foreign forces, Canada will not agree to Rules of Engagement which authorize the use by the combined force of anti-personnel mines. This would not, however, prevent States that are not parties to the Convention from using anti-personnel mines for their own national purposes.
Operational Plans: When engaged in combined operations with foreign forces, Canada will not agree to operational plans which authorize the use by the combined force of anti-personnel mines. While Canadians may participate in operations planning as members of a multinational staff, they may not participate in planning for the use of anti-personnel mines. This would not prevent a state that is not a Signatory to the Convention from planning for the use of anti-personnel mines by its own forces.
Command and Control: The use of anti-personnel mines by the combined force will not be permitted in cases where Canada is in command of a combined Force. Likewise, if Canadian Forces personnel are being commanded by other nationalities, they will not be allowed to participate in the use of, or planning for the use of anti-personnel mines. Were Canadian Forces personnel to engage in such activities they would be liable to criminal prosecution under Canadian law.”[10]
The ICBL continues to believe that the legality of State Party participation in joint operations with an armed force that uses antipersonnel mines is an open question, and that participation in such operations is contrary to the spirit of the treaty. The ICBL has called on States Parties to insist that any non-signatories do not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations, and to refuse to take part in joint operations that involve use of antipersonnel mines.
The ICBL believes that it would violate the spirit of the treaty for States Parties to permit any government or entity to stockpile antipersonnel mines on their territory, and would violate the letter of the treaty if those stocks are under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party.
The United States stores antipersonnel mines on the territory of 12 states. The following states host US stockpiles: Norway (123,000), Japan (115,000), Germany (112,000), Saudi Arabia (50,000), Qatar (11,000), United Kingdom at Diego Garcia (10,000), Kuwait (8,900), Oman (6,200), Bahrain (3,200), Greece (1,100), Turkey (1,100), and South Korea. The US stockpiles about 50,000 self-destructing mines in South Korea, and maintains approximately 1.2 million non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines to be used in any future resumption of war in Korea, but it is unclear if the non-self-destructing mines are stockpiled in Korea or elsewhere.
The United States has antipersonnel landmines stored in at least five nations that are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and United Kingdom at Diego Garcia, as well as treaty signatory Greece. US antipersonnel mine stockpiles have been removed from Italy and Spain. Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom do not consider the US mine stockpiles to be under their jurisdiction or control, and thus not subject to the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty or their national implementation measures. Norway, through a bilateral agreement with the US, has stipulated the mines must be removed by 1 March 2003, which is the deadline for Norway to comply with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 4 obligation for destruction of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction and control. Qatar has yet to comment on the issue.
Developments in this reporting period highlight that this issue extends beyond US antipersonnel mines. Russian forces stationed in State Party Tajikistan are likely to stockpile antipersonnel mines there, given the recent use by Russian forces on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is not known whether Russian peacekeeping forces possess antipersonnel mines in the Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic, a breakaway region of State Party Moldova.
On a related issue, the United States has also discussed with a number of treaty States Parties the permissibility of the US transiting mines through their territory. A debate has emerged over whether the treaty’s prohibition on “transfer” of antipersonnel mines also applies to “transit,” with some States Parties maintaining that it does not. This would mean that US (or other nations) aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines could pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. The ICBL believes that if a State Party willfully permits transit of antipersonnel mines which are destined for use in combat, that government is certainly violating the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, is likely violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer. The ICRC has also expressed its view that the treaty prohibits transiting of mines.
Research published in previous editions of Landmine Monitor showed that States Parties including France, Denmark, Slovakia, South Africa, and Spain have indicated transit is prohibited. Canada, Norway, Germany, and Japan indicate that this is permitted.
Statements made by governments during this reporting period have increased the number of States Parties prohibiting the transit of antipersonnel mines with Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Guinea, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, and Switzerland added to the list. Namibia has said that the Angolan army is “prohibited from transiting weapons like mines through Namibia.”[28]
A “Claymore mine” is a generic term for a round or rectangular directional fragmentation munition that can function either in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode. They are mostly mounted above ground level and are designed to have antipersonnel effects. However, some of the larger variants of this type can be used to damage light vehicles. When operated in the command-detonated mode, they do not meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine in the Mine Ban Treaty. However, use of Claymore-type mines with a tripwire as an initiating device is prohibited. States Parties have not adopted a common practice regarding reporting of stockpiles of Claymore-type mines and what measures they have taken to ensure that the mines are not configured to function in a victim-activated mode.
Claymore-type mines have been found in or cleared in demining operations in at least 33 mine-affected countries and regions: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya, Chile, Colombian, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Rwanda, Thailand, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.[24]
A total of 14 States Parties are known to have decided to retain operational stocks of Claymore-type mines. These countries include: Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Honduras and Thailand have reversed their initial position of destroying their Claymore mines and have apparently chosen to retain them.
Representatives of several of these States Parties have made statements to Landmine Monitor confirming that measures have been taken to insure that their Claymore mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode or that they have destroyed the tripwire assemblies and mechanical fuzes. These include Austria, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Norway made a detailed presentation at the December 2000 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction of the steps it has taken ensure that its Claymore mines are permanently modified to operate only in a command-activated mode. No country has reported on modification measures in their annual transparency measures reports required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty.
A total of nine States Parties have signaled their intention to destroy their stocks of Claymore-type mines, aside for those retained under Article 3 for training or research purposes, or to not retain any Claymore-type mines: Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Croatia, Ecuador, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Peru. The Philippines destroyed all of its Claymore mines, but is now considering re-obtaining them.
No indication has been received from the following States Parties that are known to have at one time produced, imported, or stockpiled Claymore-type mines on their interpretation of this issue: El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Moldova, Mozambique, Romania, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
As of 1 August 2001, the UN had received initial transparency measures reports from 64 States Parties. A total of 37 States Parties are late submitting initial reports. One signatory, Cameroon, submitted its report even though it has yet to officially ratify the convention. The overall rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is 63%.
At the December 2000 and May 2001 meetings of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the ICBL outlined a number of overall concerns regarding Article 7 reporting:
Late Reporting -- 37 countries are late in submitting their initial transparency measures report. These governments have thus far failed to fulfill a treaty obligation; Article 7 reporting is not optional; 180 days after entry-into-force is a legal deadline, not a target date. Timely reporting is also an important indicator of a government’s commitment to the eradication of antipersonnel mines. It is important that governments meet the obligations of the treaty, so as to build confidence in their intention and ability to meet other vital obligations. Article 7 reporting is also crucial because it can provide a wealth of information that will be useful to mine action practitioners.
The ICBL appreciates that the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation has highlighted this problem and has sought ways to remedy it. States Parties and non-governmental organizations should make every effort to ascertain why a government is late, should provide strong encouragement to report as soon as possible, and most importantly, should provide any possible assistance in completing the report (consistent with Article 6 of the convention). Those in need of assistance and those willing to provide it should make known precisely what type of assistance (technical, translation, etc.) is needed and available, respectively.
Two important initiatives are underway on this matter. Belgium has taken the lead in coordinating an Article 7 Contact Group to encourage and facilitate reporting, and the NGO VERTIC has, in cooperation with the ICBL and ICRC, developed an Article 7 Reporting Handbook, which will be presented at the Third Meeting of States Parties. The ICBL urges governments to support these initiatives in all ways possible.
Need for Reporting on Victim Assistance, Use of Form J -- The ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance has noted that victim assistance reporting is conspicuously missing in treaty obligations. In order to give victim assistance proper attention, States Parties should report on their activities in this regard. For annual transparency measures reports due by 30 April 2001, 11 States Parties used form J: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.
Lack of Reporting on Foreign Stocks -- A State Party is required to report on mines “owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control.” States Parties should report on the US stockpiles in order to be consistent with at least the spirit if not the letter of the convention. Yet, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom did not even mention the existence of US antipersonnel mine stocks in their Article 7 reports. Norway acknowledged that “[t]here are pre-stocked US mines on Norwegian territory,” but “[d]ue to previously concluded agreements, information on pre-stocked military materiel is not available for reporting.” Qatar is late submitting its initial Article 7 report.
Lack of Reporting on Prohibited Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices -- According to the definitions in the treaty, antivehicle mines (AVMs) with sensitive fusing mechanisms (such as tilt rods or tripwires) and AVMs equipped with antihandling devices (AHDs) which explode from an unintentional act of a person – that is to say, AVMs that function like antipersonnel mines -- are banned by the treaty. Thus, prohibited AVMs with overly sensitive fuses or overly sensitive AHDs should be included in Article 7 reporting, including types and numbers possessed, modified and destroyed. Yet, none of the governments that have submitted Article 7 reports have given any details on prohibited antivehicle mines captured by the treaty, even though several governments have destroyed or modified such mines.
Lack of Reporting on Claymore-type Mines -- Claymore mines are legal under the Mine Ban Treaty as long as they are command detonated, and not victim-actuated (used with a tripwire). States Parties that retain Claymores must use them in command-detonated mode only. Transparency is necessary on Claymore mines, too. States Parties should take the technical steps and modifications necessary to ensure command detonation only, and should report on those measures. Yet, very few of the governments that have submitted Article 7 reports have given any details on stockpiles of Claymore mines and no State Party has reported on the efforts or modifications undertaken to make these mines compliant under the treaty.
Need for Expanded Article 3 Reporting -- Article 3 reporting on mines retained for mine clearance training and development should not only include types and quantities and institutions authorized to retain (as currently delineated in the Article 7), but should be expanded to include the specific anticipated purpose and then actual use of any retained mines.
Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty (“National Implementation Measures”) states “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. However, only 28 of the 117 countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty have passed domestic laws implementing the treaty.
A total of 10 States Parties have passed domestic implementing legislation since entry-into-force, including six in this reporting period (since May 2000): Bulgaria, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. They join Cambodia, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Monaco, which passed implementing legislation after entry-into-force on 1 March 1999.
The following 18 States Parties report that they enacted implementation legislation prior to 1 March 1999 or that legislation became effective on that day: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Some countries have deemed existing domestic law as sufficient to implement the treaty. These laws cover civilian possession of armaments and explosives. Included among these are Andorra, Denmark, Ireland, Jordan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Namibia, Netherlands, and Peru.
Another seven States Parties indicate that the legislation used for ratification is sufficient because international treaties become self-executing in those countries: Mexico, Portugal, Rwanda, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Yemen.
A total of 24 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway. This group of States Parties includes: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Croatia, Kiribati, Holy See, Iceland, Malawi, Mauritania, Moldova, Samoa, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
In a total of 50 States Parties, nearly 43% of all States Parties, Landmine Monitor is unaware of any steps underway to enact domestic legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.
Some governments have indicated that they do not believe an implementation law is required, because they have never possessed antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected, thus, no special action is necessary to fulfill the terms of the treaty.
The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that would impose penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and would provide for full implementation of all aspects of the convention.
The ICRC, in cooperation with the ICBL and the government of Belgium, has produced an “Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines.” This document will be of great use to States Parties in helping them to fulfill their obligations under Article 9.
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[3] Throughout this report, the term ratification is used as a short-hand for “consent to be bound.” The treaty allows governments to give consent to be bound in a variety of ways, including ratification, acceptance, approval or accession -- all of which give binding legal status beyond signature. Also for the purposes of this report, those countries who have given their consent to be bound, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included in the “States Parties” sections of the Regional Chapters.
[4] Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2000-2001, Fifth Edition, pp. [22]-[23].
[5] For a detailed description of the diplomatic history on this issue, see Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January 2000.
[6] See ICRC, “Information Paper: Anti-Vehicle Mines Equipped with Anti-Handling Devices,” April 1999; Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January 2000; and GIBL website at: http://www.landmine.de
[7] Canadian delegation, “Intervention on Article 2,” Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001. The intervention was made orally, but the written text was provided to Landmine Monitor.
[8] See http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/mines/2001/memo0511.htm
[9] Interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 15 June 2000; Belgian Response to the Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, March 2001, p. 5.
[10] Canadian delegation, “Intervention on Article 1,” Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001. The intervention was made orally, but the written text was provided to Landmine Monitor.
[11] Letter from Pavol Sepelák, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 15 February 2001; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 625.
[12] Letter from Ministry of Defence, 15 January 2001 stating “Ved deltagelse i fælles militære operationer involverer Danmark sig ikke i aktiviteter, der relaterer sig til udlægning af personelminer.” Also letter from K.-A. Eliasen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 January 2001.
[13] Extract from speech by Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Debate, Official Journal of the French Republic, unabridged report of Parliamentary sessions of Thursday, 25 June 1998, pp. 5402-5403.
[14] Letter to ICBL from Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 October 1999.
[15] Letter from Zoltán Pecze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 12 March 2001, and personal Communication from László Deák, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 29 March 2001.
[16] Oral remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001.
[17] Oral remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001.
[18] Letter from Ministry of Defense, 9 April 2001. Landmine Monitor translation from Norwegian: “The Norwegian forces can, when taking over positions from foreign forces in the frontline, take advantage of the cover that already put out antipersonnel mines give, but do not have the opportunity to strengthen or renew this cover if it is a question about time-limited/restricted period.”
[19] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001; letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[20] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.
[21] Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[22] Hansard, 17 May 2000, col 161W.
[23] Letter dated 18 October 2000 from John Spellar MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, to Dr. Jenny Tonge MP.
[28] “Army not breaking landmine treaty,” IRIN, 9 January 2001, citing MOD spokesman Frans Nghitila.
[24] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, Landmine Monitor Report 2000, and Landmine Monitor Report 1999. Original sources cited in respective country entries. All entries were also cross-checked with sources such as Jane’s Mine and Mine Clearance, 2000-2001,pp. 658-665, Minefacts, Version 1.2 - a CD-ROM distributed jointly by the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, and all United Nations Mine Action Service, Mine Action Assessment Mission Reports conducted between 1998-2000.
