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Key developments since May 2000: By the end of May 2001 a total of 26.2 million square meters of land had been cleared, including 13,805 antipersonnel mines, 5,452 antivehicle mines, 6,482 CBUs, and 13,409 UXO. The UN Mine Action Coordination Center expects all known minefields to be cleared by the end of 2001. In 2000, a total of 4,684 mine awareness sessions were carried out in 935 towns and villages. Between 16 June 1999 and 31 December 2000, there were 437 civilians and 20 deminers killed or injured in Kosovo by mines, cluster bomblets and other ordnance. There were seven mine and unexploded ordnance incidents in the first five months of 2001. Use of landmines, particularly antivehicle mines, has apparently continued in Kosovo, by unknown persons apparently targeting the remaining Serbian population in Kosovo. Caches of weapons, including antipersonnel mines, continue to be uncovered in Kosovo.
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Kosovo is the southernmost province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The rest of FRY has been dominated by its Serbian majority, and the government previously took repressive measures against the predominantly ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign of March-June 1999, FRY forces were excluded from Kosovo and the province has been treated as an international protectorate under the International Security Force (KFOR).[1] The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), set up to administer the province, created the Joint Interim Administrative Structure in order to carry out its mandate.
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which had previously fought FRY forces in Kosovo, disbanded and disarmed in September 1999. Subsequently, however, another militant ethnic Albanian group emerged, the Liberation Army of Preshevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB). These three municipalities, all with majority ethnic Albanian populations, are in southern Serbia, across the provincial border with Kosovo. The UCPMB has operated from the three-mile-wide Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) established by KFOR between Kosovo and the rest of the FRY, from which FRY forces were excluded. In November 2000, the new FRY President Kostunica stated, “The violence is spilling over into the south of Serbia, where Albanian ‘terrorists’ have entrenched themselves,”[2] and in the following months Serbian police suffered casualties from mine incidents. In addition, a new ethnic Albanian group, the National Liberation Army (NLA), also took advantage of the GSZ to supply or conduct military operations in the neighboring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
During the previous Serbian repression in Kosovo and the NATO air campaign, approximately 863,000 civilians fled or were forced out of Kosovo and 590,000 were internally displaced.[3] There have been further population movements during the conflicts in 2000/2001—in southern Serbia, the GSZ and on the FYROM border. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that, by November 2000, more than 2,000 refugees had moved away from the border areas.[4] By 21 May 2001, 3,224 people were recorded as having left the Preshevo Valley to enter Kosovo, and 9,225 people had arrived in Kosovo from FYROM.[5]
In early 2001, KFOR changed its policy on the GSZ to allow a phased entry of FRY police and military forces; entry started on 14 April and was completed on 31 May 2001.
Use of landmines, particularly of antivehicle mines, has apparently continued in Kosovo, by unknown persons apparently targeting the remaining Serbian population in Kosovo. The following mine incidents suggest ongoing use of mines, although Landmine Monitor is not able to determine definitively when the mines were laid or by whom.
On 25 June 2001, a United States soldier was injured by an antipersonnel mine near Basici, and investigators later found four other antipersonnel mines in the immediate vicinity.[6]
On 13 February 2001, three Serb civilians were injured when their tractor drove over a mine in the Zubin Potok district of northern Kosovo.[7]
On the night of 27 November 2000, ethnic Albanian civilians were fleeing from southern Serbia into Kosovo when their tractor hit a mine, killing one and injuring several more.[8]
On 13 April 2000, one British KFOR soldier died and two others were injured when their Scimitar armored vehicle hit a mine near the village of Krivenik, on a road that had been used regularly. When the road was rechecked, a second antitank mine was detonated by a mechanical flail. An official investigation launched to determine if the mines were newly laid or had been missed in previous clearance was still ongoing in May 2001.[9]
Landmines have also been used in southern Serbia and within the GSZ by the UCPMB operating from the GSZ.[10] On 18 February 2001, at Lucane on the border of the GSZ with Serbia, three Serbian policemen were killed when their vehicle ran over two antivehicle mines.[11] On 7 March 2001, at Orovica just outside the GSZ, a mine killed two Yugoslav military personnel and injured two others.[12] On 24 May 2001, an antivehicle mine exploded in the GSZ near Preshevo, although no casualties were reported.[13] On 1 June 2001, Yugoslav forces re-occupying the GSZ suffered a casualty when a soldier trod on a mine near Lucane and lost his leg.[14] On 11 June 2001, a Yugoslav soldier was injured when stepping on an antipersonnel mine in Bujanovac municipality, in the northern part of Sector B of the GSZ.[15] Many other such incidents have been recorded by the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior, which estimates that there are between 1,500 and 1,600 antipersonnel mines, plus other explosive devices, in southern Serbia, including in the GSZ.[16]
Caches of weaponry have continued to be discovered in Kosovo, some of which include mines. Seventy antivehicle and antipersonnel mines were found in Krivenik on 28 March 2001, and, the following month, two other mines were found in Sinji Dol near Preshevo.[17] On 9 June 2001, 27 antipersonnel mines were seized in addition to other weaponry when 19 ethnic Albanian guerrillas were detained by KFOR while crossing the Kosovo/FYROM border.[18] According to John Flanagan, the Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) Program Manager, “Most arms caches include at least some mines.”[19] A weapons amnesty initiated in March 2001 led to a number of mines being handed in to KFOR; as of 31 May 2001 these had included 53 antipersonnel mines.[20]
Although some of Kosovo’s landmine problem arises from recent or ongoing use, the bulk of the threat has resulted from previous use by Yugoslav armed forces (the army, special police forces and paramilitaries) and the KLA. Contamination also include unexploded ordnance (UXO) and cluster bomblets dropped by NATO forces during the air campaign of March-June 1999, some of which failed to explode on impact. An unknown number of mines were also placed by Yugoslav forces on the Albanian side of the border with Kosovo.[21]
In May 2001, the MACC estimated that around 50,000 mines had been laid in Kosovo up to the end of the NATO air campaign in June 2000.[22] A previous estimate that Yugoslav army minefields along the southern border account for seventy-five to eighty percent of the mines laid in Kosovo has not changed. There were also unmarked nuisance minefields in the interior and in and around villages and infrastructure. In subsequent survey and clearance operations, a full range of Yugoslav mines has been found, together with a variety of UXO.
In March 2000, the Survey Action Center (SAC) reported that records indicated the mine and UXO contaminated area in Kosovo totaled 360.97 square kilometers (3.32 percent of the province), but noted that the true extent of contamination was probably “substantially less” due to duplicate, false and overlapping records (see later section, Survey and Prioritization).[23]
It was estimated previously that NATO dropped a total of 295,700 cluster bomblets on Kosovo during its air campaign from March to June 1999.[24] The MACC reported that NATO provided the locations of 333 CBU strike areas “upon which 1,392 bombs were dropped. Each bomb contains hundreds of smaller bomblets, which are designed to cover a wide area.”[25] Cluster bomblets which fail to explode on impact may be regarded as de facto antipersonnel mines. According to the MACC, “As many as 30,000 individual bomblets may have failed to function...are in a highly sensitive state, and can explode as a result of being moved or picked up. This volatile condition means that NATO-dropped CBU are a major part of the mine/UXO problem in Kosovo.”[26]
On the basis of the clearance rate by March 2001 of unexploded cluster bomblets, the MACC estimates that around seven percent of the BLU-97 bomblets and eleven percent of the BL-755, failed to explode on impact.[27] This figure is undoubtedly an underestimate, as it does not take into account bomblets destroyed by KFOR explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units, as well as by Yugoslav forces, which destroyed a considerable number of unexploded submunitions during the bombing.
The International Independent Commission on Kosovo recommended that cluster bombs should never be used in any future undertaking under UN auspices or any intervention purporting to be humanitarian in nature. It added that “cluster bombs are often more destructive than mines.... NATO has been slow to deploy its own expert teams to help in locating and defusing of these unexploded bombs.”[28]
UNMIK established the MACC in Pristina, “to deal with the threat posed to the returnees and internally displaced persons by landmines and unexploded ordnance.” The Center became operational on 17 June 1999, five days after the entry of KFOR into the province.[29] According to the SAC, however, “In June 1999 mine clearance organizations rushed into Kosovo...prior to the MACC having the required resources to establish a centralized coordination and management structure.”[30] Initially, the MACC established a coordination process that allowed decentralized management and execution of tasks.[31]
The MACC subsequently appointed implementing agencies to carry out mine action in each KFOR Multi-National Brigade (MNB) area. All organizations carrying out humanitarian mine/UXO clearance in Kosovo must be accredited by the MACC and operate to the International Standards for Mine Action and the MACC’s own guidelines. The MACC is responsible for quality assurance, and states that a “comprehensive quality management system has to be developed to ensure that all areas of the cleared ground are entirely free of any explosive hazards.”[32]
The Mine Action Program entered its final Consolidation Phase at the start of 2000, with the objectives of clearance of all high priority mined or dangerous areas, clearance of all CBU sites, reduction of casualties through effective mine awareness, and support to the existing prosthetic and rehabilitation capacities and to psychosocial and vocational training activities. The MACC reports that the objectives for 2000 were met, and in some cases exceeded, and that the consolidation phase will be completed by the end of 2001.”[33]
The MACC objectives for its Mine Action Program in 2001 are to:[34]
On 11 July 2001, MACC stated that all identified minefields in Kosovo will be cleared by the end of the year.[35] With respect to the future, MACC has said, “Whilst mines and UXO may be encountered for some time to come, by and large they will not impede social and economic development or pose a serious threat to the local population. In effect, Kosovo will go from having a mine problem to having a minor inconvenience.”[36]
The MACC included in its Mine Action Program a timetable for transition from international mine action implementing organizations to the local Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), an unarmed civil defense body made up of former KLA soldiers. The KPC was inaugurated on 21 January 2000.[37] The intention of the MACC is “to create a seamless transition from the existing internationally coordinated effort to locally managed and implemented projects that are based on the scope of the limited residual threat.”[38] As a part of this handover process, the number of foreign clearance agencies was reduced during 2000 from 17 to 11. Further reduction was expected in 2001, with the proviso that before full handover to the KPC “all of the known and suspected dangerous areas are cleared.”[39] Another factor affecting the handover may be hostilities on the Macedonian border, as several Albanian members of the KPC were reported to have joined rebels fighting Macedonian forces.[40]
Within the UNMIK Joint Interim Administrative Structure, the Department for Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness (CSEP) was assigned responsibility in November 2000 to “plan and develop the long-term arrangements for mine clearance in cooperation with the UNMIK Mine Action Coordination Centre.”[41] The CSEP is responsible for the KPC. However, the MACC will continue to oversee clearance operations until all known minefields and CBU strike areas have been cleared. Concurrently with this, KPC capacity will be developed “with a view to commencing operationally in this role as soon as possible.”[42] The overall intention was to put the necessary systems in place as early as possible in 2001, with an effective system fully operational before the end of the year. For this to be achieved, “local institutions will require development of capacity and some external financing and assistance in the initial period.”[43]
At the end of March 2001, the MACC reported that it is important “that all of the known and suspected dangerous areas are cleared before the ‘baton of responsibility’ is passed on to the KPC, because, with the exception of CBU tasks, they will not be capable of conducting the large-scale clearance operations that MACC-coordinated teams can currently undertake.”[44]
The scope of training and responsibilities will be limited initially. MACC states, “The initial capacity of the KPC team has been set at the minimum requirements, in accordance with the anticipated residual threat and allows for the progressive development of the teams as knowledge and confidence levels increase over time. It also takes into account the expertise currently available within KFOR EOD teams to deal with the more sophisticated items of NATO ordnance such as bombs, rockets and missiles used during the bombing campaign.”[45]
As of June 2001, there were no plans to transfer to the KPC the trained local demining/EOD personnel belonging to NGOs that will conclude their operations in Kosovo at the end of 2001.[46]
The MACC has planned that KPC EOD response teams will usually be activated upon requests by members of the public. But there is also scope for a proactive approach to search for, and dispose of, UXO in areas not addressed by the Mine Action Program. In this regard, the tasks envisaged are:
Staff positions with responsibility for coordinating mine awareness and victim assistance were not filled since the establishment of the MACC. These responsibilities were carried out on an ad hoc basis by other staff. [48] Recruitment of a Victim Assistance officer was reported to be in process at the end of March 2001.[49]
The MACC has responsibility for quality assurance of mine clearance, including interim and final evaluations. Full quality assurance capacity for post-clearance certification was not available until March 2000. BRZ International was contracted to provide five inspection teams, which carried out 2,025 clearance inspections in 2000. In 2001, the five teams have been employed directly by the MACC, due to lack of funding for an independent contract. There is also a quality control officer for explosive detecting dogs (EDD). [50]
Towards the end of 1999, the MACC estimated that US$30 million would be required for mine action between January 2000 and December 2001, and a further US$4.5 million for the operating costs of the KPC.[51] There appears to be no single comprehensive record of all mine action funding in Kosovo, however, donations seem to have greatly exceeded these estimates. A total of about US$32 million was provided in 2000 alone, through a variety of mechanisms.[52]
Various country reports in this Landmine Monitor Report 2001 indicate the following funding for Kosovo in 2000:[53] United Kingdom (US$12.4 million); United States ($9.9 million); Norway ($3.38 million); Denmark ($3.07 million); Switzerland ($2.27 million); Germany ($403,684); Sweden ($400,000); Netherlands ($364,998); Austria ($350,058); Italy ($231,000); the Czech Republic ($50,000), and Luxembourg ($44,395),
One funding mechanism is the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Kosovo (VTF), whose published records indicated a total of US$9,678,141 donated from June 1999 to 12 December 2000. The MACC reports that these donations have funded its operational costs, and quality assurance, survey, mechanical and EDD clearance contracts, mine awareness, and victim assistance.[54]
Another mechanism is the International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance (ITF) set up by Slovenia. The ITF reports that in 2000 it used donations totaling about US$1.8 million from the US, Germany, and the Czech Republic to fund four nongovernmental organizations: HALO Trust, Help, Intersos, and Care Germany. The ITF-funded demining/UXO clearance operations cleared some 2.3 square kilometers in Kosovo.[55] The ITF also used US funding of $915,745 for mine awareness programs conducted by HMD Response and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation in 2000.
In-kind contributions of equipment and personnel have been made by Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Slovenia, the Swedish International Development Agency, Switzerland, the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), the US Department of State, and the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining.[56]
In addition, bilaterally-funded organizations implementing mine action programs at the end of March 2001 are shown in Table 2.
Organizations carrying out mine action programs in Kosovo as at 30 March 2001[57]
|
Organization/Country
|
Funding
(governmental unless stated otherwise) |
|---|---|
|
Danish Church Aid/Action by
Churches Together (Denmark) |
Denmark
|
|
Defence Systems Limited (UK)
|
DFID
Senior partner in MNB (S) |
|
EMERCOM (Russia)
|
Switzerland
|
|
HALO Trust (UK)
|
Czech Republic, DFID, Germany, Ireland, Japan (through AAR), Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and the ITF using US funds
Rollers donated by UNICEF |
|
Handicap International (France)
|
The Netherlands through Stichling Vlutchling, and France through the ITF
|
|
HELP (Germany)
|
Germany through the ITF (with matching US funds).
|
|
INTERSOS (Italy)
|
Italy and European Community Humanitarian Office
CBU teams funded by US Department of State through ITF |
|
MineTech (Zimbabwe)
|
MACC core assets funded by Canada
|
|
Norwegian People’s Aid (Norway)
|
Norway
Flails donated by Finland and operational costs funded through EU contribution to VTF |
|
RONCO (US)
|
US Department of State through ITF
|
|
Swiss Federation for Demining
|
Switzerland
|
The MACC believes that bilateral direct funding by donors to NGOs has not been cost-effective. Their view is that although the mine action effort in Kosovo has been successful, it has cost far more than if all funding had been channeled through the VTF, which would have reduced the number of organizations.[58]
In its annual report for 2000, the MACC warned of the need for “additional funding in order to undertake effective operations in 2001,” and the lack of funding for mechanical and EDD clearance teams.[59]
The SAC summarized the mine action situation in Kosovo with the observations that, “the rapid and resource-heavy response by mine action institutions to the situation in Kosovo has created an environment unique in the humanitarian demining arena. In most landmine-impacted countries, the local residents serve as expert informants, the primary source of information on the landmine threat for mine action organisations. However, in Kosovo, the roles were reversed due to large-scale displacement of the native Kosovar population during the war, and the rapid influx of mine action resources.”[60]
In June 1999, within days of the end of the NATO campaign, HALO Trust conducted a ten-week-long minefield survey, to which data supplied by the Yugoslav Army, the KLA and NATO forces was later added.[61] Two years later, the MACC’s opinion is that the information gathered by the HALO survey was extremely rough, lacking the detailed information usually supplied by local people. While it assisted with the initial deployment of resources, the initial survey did not facilitate detailed planning.[62] HALO notes that they were hampered by the fact that most Serb mine records were not released until after the survey, and that the survey achieved its main aim of identifying safe areas for returnees.[63]
In addition, NATO data on CBU-strike areas has proved to be unreliable. The MACC Program Manager believes that “NATO does not hold any new information that would add value to the clearance effort.... NATO does however hold classified imagery that would be useful if released.”[64]
An independent view of the situation in Kosovo is that “the mine/UXO threat in Kosovo is relatively well known. In fact, the planning and analysis process suffers from an information glut but its use is hampered by the quality of data and the resulting impact on its analysis.”[65] This report by the UN Development Program (UNDP) and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) referred to the SAC’s estimate in early 2000 that between 30 and 50 percent of all the entries in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database entries were either false, duplicate, or overlapping.[66] The MACC, though, believes that the data has provided an accurate enough picture to enable effective planning and management, although, with hindsight, it should have been graded as to reliability prior to entry.[67]
In June 1999, the SAC was asked by the US Department of State to consider undertaking a Level One Impact Survey (LOIS),[68] but decided that this should be modified in view of the population displacement, and the fact that “mine action NGOs and companies were simultaneously implementing technical surveys and clearing minefields and UXO.... Mine action programs were also being conducted simultaneously with a large-scale relief and reconstruction program.”[69] The SAC reported that the availability of the IMSMA database together with satellite and aerial imagery had provided “information resources to a degree unprecedented in other, less high-profile complex emergencies.” However, mine clearance, military and other sources “compiled rich physical mine/UXO area data” for which IMSMA was not designed, with the result that “IMSMA’s community-centric LOIS analysis, the primary mechanism for prioritizing mine action, was cut out of the process.”[70]
The Modified LOIS was funded by the European Commission through the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS). From October 1999 to March 2000, the SAC undertook responsibility for merging into IMSMA the disparate data streams: the dangerous area data stream (mainly NATO aerial attack data and Yugoslav minefield records), data from the HALO Trust emergency survey (including incomplete information on the socio-economic impact of mines and UXO), and incident and accident records prepared by ICRC, KFOR and other sources. Final outputs of the SAC project were a workplan for exploitation of various databases, a socio-economic index of the impact of landmines and UXO, and training of the MACC staff in survey and database management.
In the absence of LOIS-supported prioritization of mine action based on socio-economic impact on communities, SAC agreed with the MACC to rank communities by mine-impact severity and prioritize dangerous areas based on proximity to “essential livelihood space.” This was defined as an area within a 500-meter radius of communities and 200 meters either side of roads, plus agricultural land and wood foraging areas. This essential livelihood space equated to about forty percent of Kosovo.[71] The socio-economic index categorized each of the 320 districts as having High, Moderate, Low or Nil impact as a result of mine/UXO contamination, and allows each mined/dangerous area to be so categorized. This replaced the more general categorization by the Province’s 29 municipalities, and enabled more precise prioritization of mine/UXO clearance and related activities such as mine/UXO awareness.[72]
In practice, prioritization for planning of mine clearance was complicated by the many reports of suspected mines and UXO made by NGOs or by returning refugees and displaced groups, possibly prompted by the extensive mine awareness programs. The SAC case study of Kosovo for the UNDP/GICHD Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action noted, “During the chaotic period following the international community’s entry into Kosovo, mine/UXO clearance efforts focused mainly on responding to requests from relief and reconstruction agencies and the civilian population. This approach was not the best application of resources from a strictly mine clearance perspective, but proved to be the only option given the high visibility of large concurrent relief and resettlement activities and the mine action community’s lack of a definitive provincial workplan prioritizing danger areas for clearance.” For example, UNICEF requested the survey/clearance of 776 schools, and civilians requested the same for more than 16,000 houses and gardens.[73]
With ongoing clearance operations, the maintenance of accurate records was also made difficult because there is “limited reporting of...clearance by KFOR contingents...independent of a tasking by the MACC, resulting in many danger area records remaining in the system though the areas are in fact clear.”[74] Although mandated to clear only those mines and UXO that obstruct its mission, KFOR cleared most primary and secondary roads in Kosovo.[75]
In view of the importance of assigning and monitoring clearance tasks, a special staff position with this responsibility was created in late 1999. However, the position became vacant in late 2000 and recruitment of a replacement was a priority for 2001. With up to 40 groups of minefields and 20 CBU strike areas being cleared simultaneously, a high degree of coordination was required. To assist in the best use of resources, in August 2000 UNOPS contracted a level one (general) and level two (technical) survey team from the German NGO HELP, which not only surveyed each reported area but also carried out small clearance tasks, avoiding the deployment of large assets in restricted areas. To optimize clearance, heavy emphasis was placed on integrating manual, mechanical and EDD teams, using machines and EDD to reduce the size of the suspected area and limiting the area for subsequent manual clearance. As a result, the MACC reported “improving productivity” of clearance operations throughout 2000.[76]
According to the UNDP and GICHD: “The speed and size of the deployment of a wide range of mine action resources to the province of Kosovo are unprecedented in the history of humanitarian demining.... Massive amounts of mine action capacity flowed into the region. Initially, this came in the form of military engineer and EOD units but was soon followed by a wide array of commercial and NGO mine action organisations. The ratio of clearance resources to contamination is probably greater in Kosovo than in any other mine-affected region in the world.”[77] From the outset, the MACC was established as a coordinating body rather than as an implementing institution of mine action operations.
Initially, lack of explosives to destroy mines and UXO was a major constraint, although subsequently KFOR provided explosives to MACC-accredited organizations.[78] However, the clearance effort subsequently made good progress and by the end of 2000 the MACC reported completed clearance of 73 percent of Yugoslav army minefields, 26 percent of CBU areas, and 69 percent of other dangerous areas.[79] Mine clearance assets in 2000 included 11 EDD teams (six teams were listed for 2001) and four flail machines.[80]
Since the MACC’s objective for 2000 of clearing all high priority areas was not only met but exceeded, clearance operations in 2001 are concentrating on CBU strike areas, and on minefields previously rated as low or nil priority.[81] These minefields are generally in heavy forest, or remote land used for grazing in the summer, but still pose a hazard and have inflicted casualties among the local population.[82]
The unusually mild winter in Kosovo allowed significant clearance to be achieved in the first quarter of 2001, clearing 750,323 square meters in that period.[83] By the end of May 2001 a cumulative total of 26.2 million square meters had been cleared, including 13,805 antipersonnel mines, 5,452 antivehicle mines, 6,482 CBUs, and 13,409 UXO.[84] The increasing rate of clearance can be seen from the following table.
Mines, CBU and UXO cleared/destroyed under MACC auspices[85]
|
Description
|
Number of items cleared/destroyed
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
by 31 December 2000
|
by 1 February 2000
|
|
|
AP mine
|
13,805
|
10,713
|
2,430
|
|
AT mine
|
5,452
|
3,926
|
2,319
|
|
CBU
|
6,482
|
3,729
|
2,743
|
|
UXO
|
13,409
|
9,643
|
8,475
|
By the end of May 2001, clearance of CBU areas had increased to 59% (compared to 26% in December), clearance of Yugoslav minefields had increased to 79% (compared to 73% in December), and clearance of other dangerous areas had increased to 71% (compared to 69% in December). [86]
Status of Recorded Areas as at 30 May 2001[87]
|
Areas
|
For Future
Clearance |
Currently Being Cleared
|
Surface cleared/
suspended |
Completed or no further action
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
CBU
|
11%
|
12%
|
18%
|
59%
|
|
Minefields
|
11%
|
8%
|
2%
|
79%
|
|
Dangerous areas[88]
|
18%
|
9%
|
2%
|
71%
|
The 2000 clearance season uncovered several improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that used mines or UXO and other explosives. On several occasions, PMA-2 mines were found near Serb enclaves and former defensive positions with pieces of steel placed underneath them to aid their rapid location and recovery. Double-stacked PMA-3s are prevalent in the southern minefields bordering FYROM, and have also been found in an MNB West minefield.[89] It has become common practice in Kosovo for local forestry workers prior to felling trees in a suspected mined area to burn the low-lying vegetation in and around the forest to melt and destroy any mines laid there.[90]
According to the MACC, “The CBU problem is exacerbated by the fact that many bomblets have penetrated the ground and some have been found up to 50 centimeters below the surface. This means that CBU strike areas must be subjected to sub-surface clearance using detection equipment before the area can be declared free of UXO.”[91]
By April 2000, it had been recognized that cluster bomblets were a major cause of civilian casualties, especially the young. The policy of destroying both surface and sub-surface CBU was changed, as bomblets on the surface posed the immediate hazard and sub-surface clearance was extremely time-consuming. Instead, “a two phased plan was implemented to undertake an instrument-assisted surface clearance in the initial stage, followed by a sub-surface clearance at a later stage. The introduction of this process has meant that clearance will not be completed until 2001, however, it proved to be very successful in reducing the casualty rate caused by CBU.”[92] Since August 2000, there have been only two reported CBU incidents involving the civilian population, and this can largely be attributed to the fact that the immediate hazard is removed following the surface clearance.[93]
Where land is used agriculturally, sub-surface search is conducted in the first phase. A risk assessment is conducted on all areas to determine if later sub-surface clearance is necessary. Not all areas will require this, because of the nature of the terrain (rocky areas or steep, heavily vegetated areas in remote locations). At the end of 2000, 162 CBU strike areas had been surface and sub-surface cleared and 217 surface-cleared, leaving 219 areas to be cleared in 2001. With the success of minefield clearance in 2000, several organizations were reoriented to CBU clearance in 2001.[94]
Mine clearance organizations operating in Kosovo on 21 March 2001[95]
|
Organization
|
Capacity
|
|---|---|
|
Danish Church Aid/Action by Churches Together (DCA/ACT)
|
127 manual mine clearance personnel and one Explosive Detecting Dog (EDD)
team Operating in Multinational Brigade (MNB) West and MNB North
|
|
Defence Systems Ltd
|
Two six-man survey teams
Two five-man EOD ready response teams |
|
EMERCOM
|
Two manual clearance teams and two EDD teams.
|
|
HALO Trust
|
Two manual mine clearance teams (MNB West)
Two Case armored front loaders (MNB West) Fourteen CBU clearance teams (MNB West, Central and East) Two mine awareness support teams (MNB West, Central and East) |
|
Handicap International
|
Four manual mine clearance teams and one support team
Operating in MNB West |
|
HELP
|
One level one and one level two survey team
|
|
INTERSOS
|
Three CBU clearance teams and one mine awareness support team Operating in
MNB West
|
|
Mine Tech
|
Four manual teams and four EDD teams
Operating in MNB East. |
|
Norwegian People’s Aid
|
Eight manual mine clearance teams
Two SISU flails as MACC core assets Two CBU clearance teams Operating in MNB West |
|
RONCO
|
Six CBU clearance teams
Operating in MNB East |
|
Swiss Federation for Demining
|
One CBU clearance team
|
As of June 2001, the Yugoslav army remained excluded from clearance operations in Kosovo, although specific provision for its involvement had been made in the Military-Technical Agreement.
From late summer 1999 until December 2000, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided mine clearance, house search, EOD and mine awareness training in Kosovo. MAG was the lead agency for the UNMACC in the Mitrovica area and supported a number of projects of other development NGOs. MAG operated three mine action teams, a child-to-child mine awareness project, community-based mine awareness teams, and a mechanical team using the prototype Norwegian Minecat 230 mini-flail system for a variety of tasks. From August-September 2000, following a reduction of funding, MAG phased out its operations in Kosovo.[96]
After the early proliferation of mine awareness programs, in 2000 the MACC reinforced its coordinating role to include accreditation of mine awareness organizations working in Kosovo. In 2000, it became a MACC requirement that mine awareness be included as an element of all clearance tasks, on the basis that awareness has a role before, during and after clearance. This role is fulfilled by Mine Action Support Teams. All mine awareness organizations were already required to meet specific accreditation standards prior to project implementation. The MACC monitors mine awareness programs and maintains a database that helps investigation of new casualties and future planning, and feeds into the IMSMA Mine Awareness Module.[97]
The MACC aim is that mine awareness messages are not only delivered but that “the target population has received, processed and internalised the message and subsequently made changes in behaviour which will reduce the risk of injury.”[98]
In 2000, a total of 4,684 mine awareness sessions were carried out in 935 towns and villages (this represents 45 percent of all towns and villages in Kosovo). The MACC database also reveals that, as at 25 January 2001, mine-related incidents had occurred in 185 towns/villages where mine awareness sessions had taken place, and in 221 towns/villages where none had taken place.[99]
Mine awareness programs are implemented both in direct support of mine/UXO clearance operations and as stand-alone direct presentations to adults and children in many settings. Mine awareness messages are also incorporated into other activities, such as soccer matches, summer camps, religious events and theater. In 2000, thirteen organizations were accredited to carry our mine awareness along with four KFOR contingents.[100]
A child-oriented awareness program was implemented in 2000 to cover the gap until mine awareness was integrated into the primary and secondary school curricula in 2001. Save the Children developed a mine awareness program for the school curriculum and supporting materials, with funding from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and support of the Department of Education and Science. According to Miranda Shala, Mine Awareness Officer for UNICEF Kosovo “including mine awareness in the school curriculum will ensure the sustainability of the messages after the international agencies leave.”[101] In addition to this, during the summer school holidays in 2000, when children would be free to roam more widely, the “Summer Days” mine awareness program was organized involving several NGOs and KFOR.[102]
On 5 and 6 April 2001, the MACC and UN Children’s Fund co-hosted the “Fearless Steps 2001” seminar in Pristina, to report on demining progress and repeat the message Report, Don’t Touch.[103]
As the following table illustrates, 12 organizations, including KFOR, are currently carrying out mine awareness programs in Kosovo. The ICRC carries out mine awareness through a network of more than 100 village representatives in risk areas.[104] The ITF is sponsoring mine awareness programs implemented by the NGOs, HMD Response and VVAF.[105]
Organizations implementing mine awareness programs as of March 2001[106]
|
Organization
|
Capacity
|
Remarks
|
|---|---|---|
|
Caritas
|
Direct presentation teams
|
Operating in MNB South
|
|
DanChurchAid/Action by Churches Together
|
Mine awareness support teams
|
Operating in support of clearance teams
|
|
Defence Systems Ltd
|
Mine awareness support teams
|
Operating in support of clearance teams
|
|
HALO Trust
|
Mine awareness support teams
|
Bilateral agreement with AAR Japan
Operating in MNB West in support of clearance teams |
|
Handicap International
|
Mine awareness support teams
|
Operating in support of clearance teams
|
|
HMD Response
|
Community Liaison Teams
|
Senior partner MNB South
Funded by the US Department of State through ITF |
|
ICRC
|
Safer village community mine awareness teams
|
Operating in support of the ICRC Safer Village scheme, and direct support
to EMERCOM, Swiss Federation for Demining and RONCO
|
|
INTERSOS
|
Mine awareness support teams
|
Operating in support of clearance teams
|
|
Islamic Relief Worldwide
|
Community liaison teams
|
Funded by UNICEF, Targeting the Islamic community
|
|
KFOR
|
Teams from UK and Sweden accredited by the MACC to carry out mine awareness
|
Teams from each Multinational Brigade were trained by SweMATT to conduct
mine awareness in schools.
|
|
Mines Awareness Trust
|
One training team
|
Senior partner in MNB West
Train the trainer program |
|
Norwegian People’s Aid
|
Mine awareness support teams
|
Operating in MNB West in support of NPA clearance operations
|
|
Save the Children
|
School curriculum development
|
Funded by and working with UNICEF
|
|
VVAF
|
Community liaison teams
|
Funded by UNICEF and the ITF
|
In March 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) updated previous data on the incidence of mine/UXO casualties and fatalities in Kosovo. New data indicated a prevalence rate of 15.4 per 100,000 population, mortality rate of 4.9 per 100,000 and case fatality rate of 5:1.[107]
The MACC reports that from 16 June 1999 to 31 December 2000, there were a total of 437 casualties from mines, UXO, and CBUs.[108] This includes 86 people killed and 351 injured. In the year 2000, 12 people were killed and 83 injured by mines, UXO, and CBUs. Of the total casualties in 2000, 50 were caused by AP mines (52.6%), 24 by CBUs (25.3%), 9 by UXO (9.5%), and one by an antitank mine (1%), with the cause of eleven casualties (11.6%) unknown. Of those injured, 35 required an amputation. There were nine mine and unexploded ordnance incidents in the first five months of 2001.
The totals do not count casualties among deminers, nor victims of deliberate attacks. The numbers differ from previous casualty data as a result of ongoing cleaning of the IMSMA database, and include only incidents registered since the end of the war. The MACC has analyzed this data under the lead of the ICRC, in cooperation with the WHO, subjecting it to extensive checking and validation.
A total of 26 deminers belonging to eight different organizations have been killed or injured since clearance began. Three of these have occurred in the year to May 2001. The MACC investigates all accidents involving deminers and the results are published together with lessons learned in order to improve demining procedures or equipment.[109]
The results of mine/UXO clearance in 2000 are reflected in the reduction in civilian casualties throughout the year. Coupled with the mine awareness campaign, the clearance of high-risk areas in close proximity to the local population dramatically reduced the likelihood that people will encounter mines and UXO.
In 2000, casualties occurred in all age groups: under 10 years of age, 7 casualties (7.4%); 11-20 years of age, 47 casualties (49.5%); 21-30 years of age, 17 casualties (17.9%); 31-40 years of age, 12 casualties (12.6%); 41-50 years of age, 2 casualties (2.1%); over 50 years of age, 10 casualties (10.5%). A high proportion of the victims are males (92.6%), particularly those in the 11-20 age group (95.7%). The second and third highest casualty rates occur in the 21-30 (88.2%) and 31-40 (100%) age groups for males. This has major socio-economic implications. If the main breadwinner of a family is injured or killed, the impact of one mine incident can affect the entire family.
Casualties increased as expected in the early part of 2000, with 4 killed and 21 injured in the first quarter. What was not expected, however, was the scale of the increase, which was largely attributed to CBU (25.3% of total casualties). This led to the change in clearance strategy already noted, which subsequently helped to stabilize the situation. The increase in casualties in August 2000 (2 killed and 10 injured) was also expected, as this was the woodcutting season and this activity takes place in remote areas known to contain mines. Although nearby villages had received intensive mine awareness and the dangers were known, people still ventured into these minefields because of economic necessity. These casualties have reinforced the need to clear these areas in 2001, which were previously assessed as being low priority in 2000. The MACC is confident that the exceptionally low incident rate during the latter quarter of 2000 (7 injured) can be maintained throughout 2001 until the clearance effort is complete.
Handicap International (HI) was appointed by UNMIK during 2000 as the lead agency for victim assistance in Kosovo, taking over from WHO. The Memorandum of Understanding of 20 November 2000 describes HI as lead agency for ‘physical medicine and rehabilitation’, which is carried out in cooperation with Handikos, a local disability NGO.[110] HI intends to develop physical rehabilitation by supporting specialized institutions for disabled people, to reorganize the ortho-prosthetic workshop in Pristina and integrate this into the hospital structure, to set up a sub-offices network, to capacity-build Handikos and to create local demining capacity in the Gjakova area. From August 1999 to January 2001, the ortho-prosthetic workshop dealt with 2,353 patients (not all mine victims), fitting 194 new prostheses and adapting 312 prostheses. In this period 506 prostheses were produced or repaired. HI has been working in Kosovo since 1994.[111]
Two other agencies, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), are providing psychosocial support to survivors and families. JRS is dealing with children under 18 years of age and all activities are coordinated through the disability forum chaired by HI with significant input from the MACC. One JRS program for the integration of mine survivors into society and reduction of their dependency provides medical, material, legal and psychosocial support, following the success of a similar program in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another JRS project aims to help disabled women by setting up a sewing training center in Ferizai, Cassava, in cooperation with Handikos. These programs started late in 2000, and are run from the JRS base in FYROM.[112]
Organizations with victim assistance programs[113]
|
Organization
|
Capacity+
|
Remarks
|
|---|---|---|
|
HI
|
Prosthetic and rehabilitation support
|
Lead agency for disability issues
|
|
ICRC
|
Victim surveillance system
|
In conjunction with WHO and MACC
|
|
VVAF
|
Victim assistance outreach program
|
Funded by EU contribution to VTF.
|
|
JRS
|
Medical, material, legal, psychosocial support,
Skills training |
Children under 18
Disabled women |
|
WHO
|
Victim assistance point of contact
|
Not engaged
|
|
NPA
|
Psychosocial support
|
Limited outreach counselling
|
|
DCA/ACT
|
Psychosocial support
|
Developing a program in support of mine action teams
|
The MACC considers itself the reference center for victim assistance, and acts as a central repository for all victim data. But in terms of its own capacity, the MACC recognizes the urgent need for a dedicated mine victim assistance officer.[114] The main victim assistance issues pursued by the MACC in 2001 were described as: tying national mine victim statistics into the national health system; ensuring that mine victims are recognised as part of the overall disabled community; and, ensuring that mine victims receive the same level of support as other disabled.[115]
HI’s lead agency status is for a period of 12 months. The Department of Health and Social Welfare is the future focal point for victim assistance, to which it was planned to gradually transfer responsibility throughout 2001. However, the MACC recognized that this depends on overall restoration of the public health system in Kosovo. There have been few rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives for mine victims to date. While the Department, assisted by WHO will take the lead role, the ICRC and NGOs such as HI, Handikos, VVAF and JRS will continue to play important roles in project implementation. A survey carried out by VVAF is expected to help identify long-term requirements for victim assistance.[116]
In July 2000, with support from the MACC, VVAF conducted a province-wide socio-economic survey of mine and UXO survivors.[117] During a three-week period, eight VVAF survey teams visited 186 villages and towns, interviewing 333 of the previously reported total of 537 mine and UXO survivors in Kosovo. Some mine casualties occurring in Albania were transported to medical facilities in Kosovo, as these were closer. VVAF excluded these cases from its survey, stating that “most of the 29 non-Kosovar persons are Albanians from Albania.”[118]
The survey questionnaire covered a wide range of topics, including physical wellbeing, social and emotional wellbeing, family and home, education, employment, and economic status.
Basic demographic data from the survey shows that mine/UXO survivors are predominantly young—77 percent are 35 years of age or less—therefore, “their rehabilitation and integration must be looked upon as a long-term issue.” Mine victims are also predominantly male—88.9 percent of those interviewed—and from rural areas.[119]
Of the 333 survivors interviewed, 152 (45.6 percent) had permanent disabilities, including loss of limb, sight or hearing, and 75.7 percent of interviewees said they suffer from one or more outstanding health problems, but less than half were receiving treatment. Among the most common problems are pain, remaining shrapnel, and difficulty moving an arm or leg. Most of the people requiring mobility equipment already had what they need. The key issues identified by the VVAF survey were reported as being the need to:
The information gathered has been used to expand the VVAF program and serves as a baseline from which the MACC and other organizations can build future program strategies. The MACC stated, “Given the quantity of information as a result of the VVAF survey, plus the fact that any new victims should be easily identified, it will be possible to track all victims through the various stages of rehabilitation and eventual reintegration back into society.”[121]
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[1] For a summary of events, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 875, and “The Kosovo Report,” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, October 2000), available at: <www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm>.
[2] “Tension mounts on Kosovo border,” CNN, 27 November 2000.
[3] “The Kosovo Report,” p. 21, (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, October 2000), available at: <www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm>.
[4] “Tension mounts on Kosovo border,” CNN, 27 November 2000.
[5] UNMIK-KFOR-UNMIK Police-UNHCR press briefing, 21 May 2001, available at: <www.reliefweb.int/balkans>.
[6] “2 US Soldiers Hurt in Mideast,” Associated Press, 25 June 2001, and “Team Finds Additional Mines Close to Site of Accident in Kosovo,” European Stars and Stripes (US military newspaper), 8 July 2001.
[7] “Three Serbs Injured in Land Mine Explosion,” Associated Press, Pristina, 13 February 2001.
[8] “Mine Kills Albanian, Hurts Others,” Reuters, 27 November 2000.
[9] David Holley, “Mine kills British soldier in Kosovo,” Los Angeles Times, 15 April 2001.
[10] See reports on FYROM and FRY in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[11] “Three Serb Police Killed in Mine Blast near Kosovo,” Reuters, 18 February 2001.
[12] “Monthly Report to the United Nations on KFOR Operations,” 10 May 2001.
[13] “Ground Safety Zone: KFOR Statement for Press Conference,” KFOR news release, 24 May 2001.
[14] “Yugoslav soldier loses leg in south Serbia mine blast,” Kosovo Daily News, 2 June 2001.
[15] “Yugoslav soldier injured in mine explosion in southern Serbia,” Serbia Info, 11 June 2001.
[16] Statement of Interior Ministry representatives at panel discussion organized by Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Belgrade, 6 June 2001, reported in Blic, (Serbian newspaper), 7 June 2001. Similarly, on 28 May 2001, KFOR had reported that a “residual mine threat” existed in the GSZ, particularly in the north, where demining operations were continuing. UNMIK-KFOR-UNHCR-OSCE-EUE press briefing, 28 May 2001. For further details of Serbian casualties, see report on the FRY in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[17] UNMIK-KFOR-UNHCR-UNMIK Police press briefing, 2 April 2001, and UNMIK-UNMIK Police-KFOR press briefing, 30 April 2001.
[18] “Peacekeepers seize 19 suspected Macedonia rebels,” Reuters, 11 June 2001.
[19] Interview with John Flanagan, Program Manager, MACC, Pristina, 24 May 2001.
[20] “Monthly Report to the United Nations on KFOR Operations,” 10 May 2001, and UNMIK-KFOR-UNHCR-OSCE-EU press briefing, 31 May 2001.
[21] For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 875-878, and report on Albania in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[22] Interview with Chris Clarke, Operations Manager, MACC, Pristina, 29 May 2001.
[23] “Modified Level One Impact Survey: Setting Mine Action Priorities in Kosovo,” Survey Action Center, Global Landmine Survey, 31 March 2000, p. ix, and “Case Study of Kosovo,” A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action” (Geneva: UN Development Program and Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), p. 103.
[24] Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” February 2000.
[25] “The Mine Action Program in Kosovo/Background,” MACC, undated, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 7 June 2001.
[26] “The Mine Action Program in Kosovo/Background,” MACC, undated, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 7 June 2001. A press report in July 2001 indicated that MACC estimated that 20,000 CBUs had failed to explode. “UN Mine Clearance Center Expects to Finish Kosovo Mine Clearance by End of 2001,” Agence France Presse, Pristina, 11 July 2001.
[27] Interview with John Flanagan, Program Manager, MACC, Pristina, 24 May 2001.
[28] “The Kosovo Report,” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, October 2000), p. 43, available at: <www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm>.
[29] For details of the mandate see “Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Resolution 1244 (1999),” UN Doc. S/1999/672, 12 June 1999, para. 12. For details of mine action planning in Kosovo, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 882-884.
[30] “Modified Level One Impact Survey: Setting Mine Action Priorities in Kosovo,” Survey Action Center, Global Landmine Survey, 31 March 2000, pp. 2, 29.
[31] Ibid.
[32] “Operations – Quality Assurance,” available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 7 June 2001.
[33] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 1, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[34] Ibid, p. 14.
[35] “UN Mine Clearance Center Expects to Finish Kosovo Mine Clearance by End of 2001,” Agence France Press (Pristina), 11 July 2001.
[36] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 1, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[37] “The Kosovo Report,” International Independent Commission on Kosovo, p. 29, October 2000.
[38] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 1, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[39] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001,” MACC, para. 21, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[40] Newsnight, BBC 2 (TV), 4 July 2001.
[41] UNMIK Regulation 2000/61, 9 November 2000.
[42] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 14, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[43] Ibid.
[44] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001,” MACC, para. 21, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[45] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001,” MACC, paras. 19 and 20, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[46] Email from Norwegian People’s Aid, 12 June 2001.
[47] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001,” MACC, paras. 19 and 20, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[48] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 2, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[49] “Monthly Summaries 1 June 1999-31 March 2001,” MACC, p. 9, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[50] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 3, and “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001” para 36, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[51] “Towards Stability and Prosperity, A Programme for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo,” European Union and World Bank, November 1999, and “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Operational Plan for Consolidation Phase Mine/UXO Clearance,” MACC, 1999.
[52] “Case Study of Kosovo,” A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action” (Geneva: UN Development Program and Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), p. 114. More than US$28 million was donated in 1999.
[53] In many cases the funding was provided for the 2000 fiscal year of the donor country, not the calendar year 2000.
[54] “Funding Support to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF),” Donor Support, MACC, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>; accessed on 7 June 2001, and “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 13 and Annex F, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[55] Letter and email from Eva Veble, Deputy Director for International Relations, ITF, 31 January 2001 and 11 June 2001, and ITF presentation at IMAS regional workshop, Zagreb, 3-5 April 2001. The ITF website records different numbers: 606,244 square meters cleared by ITF-funded projects in Kosovo “up to now,” with 478 mines and 123 UXO found, see: “Results on Demining Activities of ITF: Kosovo,” ITF, available at: <www.sigov.si/itffund/demining>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[56] “Donor Support,” MACC, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>; accessed on 7 June 2001.
[57] “Mine Clearance Organisations Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period,” Quarterly Report 1 January-30 March 2001, MACC, Annex A, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>.
[58] Interview with John Flanagan, Program Manager, MACC, Pristina, 24 May 2001.
[59] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, pp. 13, 15-16, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[60] “Modified Level One Impact Survey: Setting Mine Action Priorities in Kosovo,” Survey Action Center, Global Landmine Survey, 31 March 2000, p. vii.
[61] Sources of information on mined areas are detailed in Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 878-880 and 884-885.
[62] Interview with John Flanagan, Program Manager, MACC, Pristina, 24 May 2001.
[63] Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Richard Boulter, Desk Officer Europe, The HALO Trust, 26 July 2001.
[64] Interview with John Flanagan, Program Manager, MACC, Pristina, 24 May 2001; the SAC also reported that NATO point target data entered into the IMSMA database does not equate to the actual points of impact.
[65] “Case Study of Kosovo,” Appendix 1, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, (Geneva: UN Development Program/Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), p. 101.
[66] Ibid, p. 102.
[67] Interview with John Flanagan, Program Manager, MACC, Pristina, 24 May 2001.
[68] This survey is now called the Landmine Impact Survey.
[69] “Modified Level One Impact Survey: Setting Mine Action Priorities in Kosovo,” Survey Action Center, Global Landmine Survey, 31 March 2000, p. 25.
[70] Ibid, pp. x-2.
[71] Ibid, p. 3, and “Case Study of Kosovo,” Appendix 1, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, (Geneva: UN Development Program/Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), p. 109.
[72] “Mine Action Program in Kosovo/Background,” MACC, available at:<welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 7 June 2001.
[73] “Case Study of Kosovo,” Appendix 1, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, (Geneva: UN Development Program/Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), pp. 104-105, 109.
[74] Ibid, p. 102.
[75] “Case Study of Kosovo,” Appendix 1, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, (Geneva: UN Development Program/Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), p. 105.
[76] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, pp. 2-6, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[77] “Case Study of Kosovo,” Appendix 1, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, (Geneva: UN Development Program/Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), p. 101.
[78] Ibid, p. 105.
[79] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, pp. 7-8, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[80] Ibid, pp. 3, 15.
[81] Ibid, p. 7.
[82] Ibid.
[83] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001,” MACC paras 13, 14, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[84] “Clearance Related Statistics,” Monthly Summary, May 2001, MACC, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 July 2001.
[85] Data compiled from “Monthly Summaries 1 June 1999-30 May 2001,” and “Annual Report 2000,” MACC; these data exclude clearance by KFOR and other non-commercial and non-NGO organisations.
[86] “Monthly Summaries 1 June 1999-30 May 2001,” MACC, <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 July 2001.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Definition: Areas with mine/UXO hazards other than NATO CBU and Serbian army minefields. These include non-recorded minefields laid by the Serb police, other minefields that cannot be attributed to any party and other areas containing UXO hazards.
[89] “Threat Assessment Fact Sheet 7,” UNMIK MACC, undated, pp. 1-6, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[90] Ibid.
[91] “Mine Action Program in Kosovo/Background,” MACC, available at:<welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 7 June 2001.
[92] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 1, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001, and “Case Study of Kosovo,” Appendix 1, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, (Geneva: UN Development Program/Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), pp. 107-108.
[93] Email from John Flanagan, MACC, to Landmine Monitor, 23 July 2001.
[94] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, pp. 1, 7-8, 15, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[95] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001,” UNMIK MACC, Annex A, and “Monthly Summaries 1 June 1999-21 January 2000,” MACC, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 11 June 2001.
[96] Email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, Mines Advisory Group, 19 July 2001.
[97] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 11, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 11 June 2001.
[98] “PI – Mine Awareness Education,” MACC, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 7 June 2001, original emphasis.
[99] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, pp. 11-12, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 11 June 2001.
[100] Ibid, p. 3.
[101] Interview with Miranda Shala, Mine Awareness Officer, UNICEF, Pristina, 27 March 2001.
[102] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 11, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[103] “Monthly Summaries 1 June 1999-31 March 2001,” MACC, p. 9, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[104] “Kosovo Humanitarian Update,” Issue No. 36, 2 May 2001, available at:<www.reliefweb.int/balkans>.
[105] Letter from Eva Veble, Deputy Director for International Relations, ITF, 31 January 2001.
[106] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001,” MACC, Annex B.
[107] Untitled report, 21 March 2000, Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, 21 March 2000.
[108] “Monthly Summaries 1 January 1999-31 May 2001,” MACC, available at:<welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 13 July 2001.
[109] Interview with Chris Clarke, Operations Manager, MACC, Pristina, 29 May 2001.
[110] Memorandum of Understanding between United Nations Interim Administration Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK) and Handicap International Kosovo, 20 November 2000.
[111] “Handicap International Mission in Kosovo,” HI, Lyons, pp. 4-21, January 2001; HI is also lead demining agency in Gjakova municipality.
[112] JRS Dispatches No. 80, Jesuit Refugee Services, 16 October 2000, available at: <www.reliefweb.int/balkans>.
[113] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 2, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[114] Interview with Leonie Barnes, Chief Information Officer, MACC, Pristina, 25 May 2001.
[115] “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, pp. 9-10, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[116] “Quarterly Report 1 January-31 March 2001, MACC, para 30, and “UNMIK Mine Action Program Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 14, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[117] Tanya Goossens, “Socio Economic Survey of Mine/UXO survivors in Kosovo,” Executive Summary, VVAF, November 2000, available at: <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
[118] Tanya Goossens, “Socio Economic Survey of Mine/UXO survivors in Kosovo,” VVAF, November 2000, pp. 2, 9-11; the VVAF report notes that 686 mine/UXO victims were recorded on the IMSMA system at MACC headquarters, of which 537 survived; after removing incorrect data entries, the MACC supplied 460 names of survivors to VVAF, which reduced the total for interviewing to 333 survivors.
[119] Ibid, p. 2.
[120] Ibid, p. 3.
[121] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2000,” MACC, 30 January 2001, p. 10, available at <welcome.to/macckosovo>, accessed on 12 June 2001.
