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Key developments since May 2000: The beginning of stockpile destruction was apparently delayed due to safety and environmental concerns; the new target date was April 2001.
Portugal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 19 February 1999 and became a State Party on 1 August 1999. In October 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that Portugal’s official publication of the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 November 1999[1] “does not achieve total legislative implementation of the Treaty through the imposition of penal sanctions and this matter should be handled at an inter-ministry level.”[2] In January 2001, the ministries of foreign affairs and defense stated that Portugal “is currently studying the way, in coordination with the different competent entities, to create internal legislation on this matter.”[3] Nevertheless, the Ministries pointed out that Portugal has existing legislation related to the possession, transportation, selling or production of explosive devices and substances punished with a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment or a fine.[4]
Portugal attended the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2000, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in December 2000, but not the May 2001 Standing Committee meetings. Portugal voted in favor of the November 2000 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.
In October 2000, Deputy Maria Carilho appealed for a more determined effort by the European Union to exert pressure on NATO and Security Council members to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.[5] Portugal has also made efforts to promote the Mine Ban Treaty in the context of the PALOPS group (African Countries with Portuguese Official Language). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “This issue was brought up during the Maputo Summit (16 July 2000). It is seen by the CPLP (Community of Portuguese official Language Countries), as one of the more important and global current issues, inscribed in the organization’s political agenda.”[6] The Ministry also claimed, “For Portugal, eradicating antipersonnel mines is, and should remain, a priority, notably due to the overwhelming humanitarian and development problems caused by antipersonnel mines as it occurs in Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia.”[7]
In its December 2000 report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Portugal stated that it “accepts the principle of complementarity of all international and regional fora, leading to the universalization of the Ottawa Convention. In no case will be acceptable any negotiation which can set up exceptions to the ultimate goal of the Ottawa Convention.”[8]
Portugal submitted transparency reports as required by Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 on 1 February 2000 and 30 April 2001.[9]
Portugal ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 28 January 1997. The annual transparency report required under Article 13 of the Protocol was not submitted in 1999 “for bureaucratic reasons.”[10] Apparently an Article 13 report was submitted in December 2000, but it has not been seen by Landmine Monitor.[11]
Portugal has stated on several occasions that production of antipersonnel mines ceased in 1988.[12] Previously, at least eight different types of antipersonnel mines were produced, which have been found in nine countries.
Both Article 7 reports stated that, “the facilities that had been producing APMs closed their activities in the Defense domain.”[13] One of the production facilities – SPEL, Sociedade de Explosivos Portuguesa Lda – was reportedly converted to civil or industrial use, but according to an advertisement in the Yellow Pages it still produces detonators and triggers.[14] Questioned on the matter, the Ministry of Defense said, “The former producers of mines – Trafaria Explosives and Portuguese Society of Explosives (Explosivos da Trafaria e Sociedade Portuguesa de Explosivos) – stopped producing military items, producing only civil explosives. Legal Decree No. 396/98 of 17 December 1998 obliges all companies seeking to engage in industrial activities to require a specific authorization citing the items they intend to produce. Regarding the commercialization and export, authorizations are not given with respect to the direct application of the Ottawa Convention.”[15]
The Ministry of Defense stated in January 2001, “Portugal is not involved in investigations leading to the production of alternatives to antipersonnel mines.”[16] Previously, the Ministry of Defense has reserved the right to study alternatives to antipersonnel mines “eventually,” but in full respect of the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty.[17]
Portugal stopped using mines at the end of its colonial wars in 1974.[18] Regarding the possibility of Portuguese forces engaging in joint operations with NATO partners who continue to use antipersonnel mines, the ministries of defense and foreign affairs have asserted, “Portugal understands that it may participate in joint operations with armed forces which use antipersonnel mines, but it won’t gain any benefit from such use. A guarantee that Portugal will not benefit, in such case, would be assured at the operational level. The participation in any military operation comes under national sovereignty.”[19] The Ministry of Defense added, “So it belongs to Portugal to decide on this participation, the way it would be processed and to which extent, independent of whether it is an operation with countries that use mines or not.”[20] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared, “Portugal being a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, the Portuguese contingent will not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations.”[21]
With regard to the possible transfer of antipersonnel mines to and from the United States military base at Lajes on the Portuguese Ilha Terceira in the Azores, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated previously that “the base is American but under Portuguese sovereignty, so the Treaty of Ottawa should apply to the base.”[22] The last Portuguese-American negotiations took place on 11 October 1995 (therefore prior to the Mine Ban Treaty) and no specific mention of landmines was made at the time.[23] Nevertheless, there is an “obligation of communication to the Portuguese authorities” upon the US authorities, whenever a transfer or transit of weaponry is carried out by the US, and this “is based on the good faith by both Parties.” [24] However, there is no formal inspection regime.
In January 2001, the Ministry of Defense said because “Portugal does not authorize the transit of antipersonnel mines through its territory, therefore there is no existing Stockpile.”[25] The ministries of defense and foreign affairs have both declared that “under the Lajes Agreement, mines are contentious material, so any transfer would have to be requested by US to Portugal, which until now, never happened. In the event of such a demand, Portugal would not give the necessary authorization, because it is a State Party to the Ottawa Convention.”[26]
Portugal’s first Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report stated that 272,410 antipersonnel mines were held in stocks, and that 3,523 mines would be retained for permitted training purposes, leaving a total of 269,157 for destruction. The second Article 7 report, submitted on 30 April 2001, said that stockpile destruction would begin “during 2001.”[27] In January 2001, the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor, “The activity of demilitarisation, which was foreseen to start in October 2000, suffered a delay of approximately six months due to the difficulties of the company (IDD) in achieving the creation of the necessary infrastructure for such purpose. It is now foreseen, that this activity will start in April 2001, in Alcochete.”[28]
The government reported previously that the stockpile would be destroyed within a one-year period from October 2000,[29] and in December 2000 reported – erroneously -- that destruction was in progress.[30] In statements by the Ministry of Defense in October 2000, figures of 184,000 and 183,000 antipersonnel mines awaiting destruction were given.[31] These statements were made in response to events in the Alcochete municipality, where the two designated destruction sites noted in the Article 7 report are located.[32]
In May 2000, the Ministry of National Defense authorized the public company IDD (Indústria de Desmilitarização e Defesa – Demilitarization and Defense Industry) to undertake weapon destruction (including antipersonnel mines) in the industrial complex of Rego da Amoreira, where 184,000 antipersonnel mines were reported to be awaiting destruction. IDD was set up by the splitting in two of former mine producer SPEL into a civilian factory on the one hand and IDD on the other.[33] In the case of the antipersonnel mines, IDD planned to set up a detonation and incineration unit in the former facility of Explosivos Extra, which is close to a residential area and a main road. The plan included a system to treat gas and liquid residues, and a monitoring system. Inoffensive residues were to be deposited in industrial landfill, and the dangerous residues stored for later delivery to a suitably qualified company.[34]
The location and method of destruction led to a conflict between the State and the Municipal Assembly of Alcochete. In mid-October 2000, there were media reports of incidents and complaints from local inhabitants about explosions at the destruction unit. The reports noted that most inhabitants work, or used to work, in the military facilities and some referred to previous accidents (some fatal) in the former Explosivos Extra facility.[35] A popular initiative adopted by the town council resulted in questions to the military authorities about safety and the environment. The absence of an Environmental Impact Study was criticized, and a demand was made that the public inquiry should include environmental organizations and the town council, as well as representatives of the Ministries of Defense and Environment. The Green Party and the National Association for the Conservation of the Environment (QUERCUS) publicly urged the authorities to conduct an environmental impact study, arguing that there was a lack of safety measures to protect Alcochete’s inhabitants and other environmental concerns.
IDD released a summary of its limited environmental study that claimed that “the realization of the ammunition destruction unit will have a positive impact from the socio-economic point of view, in terms of environmental quality and development on the national scale.” The Ministry of Defense also stated that these plans are a matter of national defense, therefore an environmental impact study is not required,[36] and representatives of the town council or environmental organizations “would have to get the appropriate credentials to participate.”[37] The Ministry of Defense gave the reassurance that it and IDD will ensure that “environmental norms and public health were respected.”[38]
Following an unsatisfactory meeting on 23 October 2000 with the Ministry of Defense, the chairman of Alcochete’s Municipal Assembly stated that the town council would seek to annul the setting up of the mine-detonation/incineration unit in Rego da Amoreira (Alcochete), on the grounds that under Legal Decree No. 239/97 the town council must be consulted in residue management issues. The Municipal Assembly filed a suit against the Portuguese State for alleged breach of national and European norms in relation to the destruction units.[39]
Asked to clarify the apparent difference between 183,00 or 184,00 mines reported as awaiting destruction in Alcochete and the total of 269,157 awaiting destruction according to the Article 7 report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the lower numbers “were relative to the first tranche” earmarked for immediate destruction.[40]
It was reported previously that Portugal possesses the M453 antivehicle mine, which has an electronic antihandling device that may cause it to function as an antipersonnel mine. In January 2001, the Ministry of Defense declared that “Portugal does not have in its inventory M453 anti-tank mines.”[41]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Landmine Monitor in January 2001 that “Portugal in 1999, donated $20,000 to the United Nations Trust Fund for Assistance in Demining in Mine Clearance. In addition, in 1999, it donated $20,000 to Mozambique, for demining activities. Since 1999, Portugal has been assisting Angola through projects of technical and military co-operation, notably through a program of physiotherapeutic care to Angolan children who are amputee war victims, for a total amount of $107,500.”[42] Mine action funding figures for the year 2000 have not been provided.
The Ministry of Defense also declared that the Portuguese Army has been cooperating in mine and UXO clearance in the various operational missions in which it has been involved: Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo.[43]
In December 2000, Portugal reported to the OSCE that Portuguese soldiers have helped demining in Angola through a program of bilateral assistance and that Portugal also participates in INAROEE (Instituto Angolano para a Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos Explosivos) with training in mine removal by Portuguese officers.[44]
In 1999, Portugal participated and partly financed the ITC (International Institute for Aerospace and Earth Science) joint international project, involving several European countries, for the development of an airborne remote sensing minefield detection system, which was tested in Mozambique. A Portuguese private company – Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias de Vanguarda Aplicadas – has carried out small demining tasks and quality assurance evaluation in Mozambique over the last few years.[45]
Portugal is not mine-affected, and mine victims living in Portugal are colonial war veterans or people from the PALOPS countries (particularly Angolans). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that there have been several cases of Portuguese personnel becoming mine victims while working in Africa, but has not supplied details of these incidents.[46] On 8 January 2001, José Ribeiro, a Portuguese jeep driver assisting in the Paris-Dakar race survived the explosion of a mine in the Western Sahara. He received emergency medical care from MINURSO (the UN mission to Western Sahara) and was later transferred to Las Palmas in the Canary Isles, where he underwent surgical amputation of his left foot.[47]
The mine victim assistance program started in 1999 by the Hospital Militar de Coimbra, under the auspices of Portuguese Technical-Military Cooperation, is currently providing physiotherapeutic care to children from Angola who are amputees. To date, twenty boys have been treated.[48] Details of the selection criteria, durations of treatment, and follow-up rehabilitation have not been provided.
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[1] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 707, for further details.
[2] Interview with Dr. José Costa Pereira, Defense and Security Organizations Directorate [Direcção de Serviços de Organizações de Defesa e Segurança], and Ana Margarida Teixeira, Conventional Weapons Export Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 18 October 2000.
[3] Letter from the Ministry of Defense in response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 4 January 2001; letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, 9 January 2001.
[4] Article 275, No. 1, Portuguese Penal Code [Código Penal]; letters from the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, 4 and 9 January 2001.
[5] Portuguese Socialist Party website: <www.ps.pt>, 27 October 2000.
[6] Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Report of the Portuguese Delegation to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), 7 December 2000, p. 1.
[9] Article 7 reports, submitted on 1 February 2000 for the period 3 December 1997-31 January 2000, and 30 April 2001 for the period 3 December 1997-31 January 2001.
[10] Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[11] Fax and email from Dr José Costa Pereira, Defense and Security Organisations Directorate (Direcção de Serviços de Organizações de Defesa e Segurança), and Ana Margarida Teixeira, Conventional Weapons Export Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 16 April 2000.
[12] Report to the OSCE, 7 December 2000, p. 1; report to the OSCE, 8 December 1999, p. 1; Article 7 report, submitted 1 February 2000.
[13] Article 7 reports, submitted 1 February 2000 and 30 April 2001, Form E.
[14] Yellow Pages [Páginas Amarelas], index, see Explosives, Detonators (Explosivos, Detonadores) and page 553.
[15] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001 (unofficial translation).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, General Direction for National Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 29 March 2000.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001; letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[20] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.
[21] Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[22] Interview with Dr. Fatima Mendes, Director of Services for Defense and Security Organizations, and Dr. António Ressano Garcia, Chairman of the Conventional Weapons (Arms) Export Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, Lisbon, 28 March 2000.
[23] The agreement lasts for five years but can be automatically renewed by both parties, as seems to have occurred in October 2000.
[24] Interview with Dr. Saldanha Serra, General Direction for National Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense, Lisbon, 26 October 2000.
[25] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.
[26] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001; letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[27] Article 7 reports, submitted 1 February 2000 for the period 3 December 1997-31 January 2000, and submitted 30 April 2001 for the period 3 December 1997-31 January 2001.
[28] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.
[29] Report to the OSCE, 8 December 1999, p. 2.
[30] Report to the OSCE, 7 December 2000, p. 1.
[31] Statement by the Ministry of Defense, LUSA (news agency), 11 and 23 October 2000; Statement by the Minister of Defense Castro Caldas, LUSA, 23 October 2000.
[32] Neither of these two sites were chosen. The Ministry of Defense instead chose Rego da Amoreira.
[33] José Vegar, “Portugal destrói minas,” Expresso (daily newspaper), 3 October 1998.
[34] Statement by Brigadier Oliveira Faria, Administrative Council Chair of IDD, LUSA, 26 October 2000.
[35] Statement by Francília Cadete, LUSA, 26 October 2000. Mrs Cadete is an inhabitant of Alcochete and former worker at the Explosivos Extra factory; She referred to the death of seven colleagues a few years ago at the factory.
[36] Portuguese legislation provides an exemption from the requirement to undertake an environmental impact study when national defense interests are at stake.
[37] Statement by the Minister of Defense, LUSA, 23 October 2000.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Statement by the Municipal Assembly of Alcochete, LUSA, 23 October 2000.
[40] Fax and email from Dr José Costa Pereira and Ana Margarida Teixeira, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 16 April 2000.
[41] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.
[42] Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.
[43] Letter from de Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.
[44] Report to the OSCE, 7 December 2000, p. 2.
[45] Diário da República, Portuguese Official Journal No. 271 – 2-4-1994, and Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 710.
[46] Fax and email from Dr José Costa Pereira and Ana Margarida Teixeira, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 16 April 2000.
[47] “Piloto Português vítima de Mina” [Portuguese Pilot Victim of Mine], Jornal de Notícias (daily newspaper), 9 January 2001.
[48] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.
