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Key developments since May 2000: Russian forces continued to use mines in Chechnya. Russian troops also mined the Tajik border with Afghanistan. Russia had destroyed 1.5 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines as of January 2001, including all of its blast mines. In April 2001, the Federal Working Group for Mine Action was formed to facilitate Russia's progress in mine action, including stockpile destruction. Russia is expanding its participation in international mine action operations. The Russian military carried out a public roundtable analyzing mine use in Chechnya; among the revelations was that remotely-delivered AFM-1С/PFM-1S mines failed about 50 percent of the time because of problems with the self-destruct mechanism.
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The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, although various government officials continue to state Russia’s willingness to sign at some point in the future. It is clear that the Russian military still considers antipersonnel mines a necessary weapon, as evidenced by extensive and ongoing use of the weapon in Chechnya, as well as in Tajikistan. Russia insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines must be in place before Russia can ban the weapon. Russia has also expressed concerns about the financial costs of implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]
An official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that there is a growing understanding among both decision-makers and the public of the importance of putting an end to the carnage caused antipersonnel mines. He maintained that there is a growing political will that has been accompanied by concrete steps on the official level, and by the growing activities of the legislative branches and non-governmental organizations.[2]
The concrete progress he cited includes: no violations of the five-year moratorium, launched on 1 December 1997, on export of non-self destruct and non-detectable antipersonnel mines; a halt in 1998 to the production of “blast” or “crater” type antipersonnel mines; the destruction of the entire stockpile of more than half a million blast/crater antipersonnel mines; and the destruction of a total of 1.5 million antipersonnel mines of different types in the context of pre-planned destruction activities.[3]
In April 2001, under Zinoviy Pak, Chief of the Russian Federal Agency on Munitions, the Federal Working Group for Mine Action was formed. It includes representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/General Staff - Chief Division of Engineer Forces, the 15th Central Scientific Research Institute of Engineer Forces, the Chief of the Division of International Military Cooperation and International Treaties Division, the Russian Federal Agency on Munitions, the Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise, SPA Ecodem, and the Russian Affiliate of IPPNW/CBL-Russia.
The purpose of the Federal Working Group is to maintain momentum and facilitate Russia's (a) qualitative and quantitative progress in mine action, namely stockpile destruction, humanitarian demining planning and implementation, mine victim assistance and mine awareness and (b) the deeper integration of Russia into the Ottawa process, developing discussion and cooperation on the way to a mine-free world. The establishment of a Mine Action Center and a related foundation based on the Federal Working Group is underway.
Russia did not attend as an observer the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2000, but did participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in December 2000 and May 2001. The government continues to state its strong preference for dealing with controls on antipersonnel through the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), rather than the Mine Ban Treaty.[4] Russia abstained in the voting on the November 2000 UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in previous years.
Russia is a party to CCW and its original Protocol II on landmines, and continues to state that it is through building upon this vehicle that it will ultimately ban landmines. Russia believes it is a balanced document which lays a solid basis for a phase-by-phase movement toward a world free of antipersonnel mines, and which is acceptable for those countries that for economic or strategic reasons cannot afford immediate eradication of antipersonnel mines.[5]
When President Putin submitted CCW Amended Protocol II to the State Duma for ratification in early May 2000, it had been expected that hearings on the ratification would take place shortly thereafter.[6] As of July 2001, this had still not happened. In March 2001 the ratification package was called back for further interdepartmental consultations on legal, political, military, technical, and economic matters.[7]
Though ratification has not yet occurred, Russian officials state that Russia adheres to the spirit and letter of CCW Amended Protocol II, and that steps are already being taken to fulfill the requirements of Amended Protocol II. Russian officials have indicated that when ratification takes place, Russia will exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for implementation of key provisions.[8]
Russia has been one of the world’s largest producers of antipersonnel mines. Since 1992, it has produced at least ten types of antipersonnel mines.[9] (For more detail on mines types and production sites, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806.)
In May 1998, officials of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast antipersonnel mines, in recognition of the humanitarian problem caused by these mines and because of the provisions of Amended Protocol II.[10] In December 2000, at the Second Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Russia said that it was decommissioning production facilities for blast mines.[11]
Russian officials state that rather than new antipersonnel mine production, Russia is increasingly focusing more efforts on research and development of landmine alternatives.[12]
The former Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest exporters of antipersonnel mines. However, on 1 December 1994 Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This moratorium was extended for five years on 1 December 1997.[13]
There is no official public number of antipersonnel landmines stockpiled in Russia. Landmine Monitor has previously reported an estimate of 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock.[14] (For information on types and locations of stocks, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809.)
At the Budapest Seminar “Destruction of PFM-1 mines” in March 2001, the Russian representative indicated that Russia would need four destruction complexes for the destruction of its stockpiled PFM-1/PFM-1S mines, and the annual destruction capacity of each complex would be up to 100,000 cluster units, each containing 64 or 72 mines.[15] Given those facts, a rough estimate of the number of PFM-1/PFM-1S mines alone in stock is at least 50-60 million.
Russian officials have acknowledged that in certain CIS states, there are antipersonnel mine stockpiles that remain at the disposal of Russian military units and contingents located there. There are reports of use of antipersonnel mines by Russian peacekeepers in Georgia/Abkhazia and Tajikistan.
Russia carries out systematic destruction of its obsolete antipersonnel mines and mines with an expired shelf life, and more recently mines not in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II. Some mines are recycled, extracting explosives and reprocessing them for civilian use. By early 2001, some 1.5 million mines of all types had been destroyed.[16] The timeframe for destruction of CCW non-compliant mines remains unclear.[17]
Under a “Presidential Decree on Humanitarian Demining,” the issues of stockpile destruction are being addressed.[18] In order to make destruction of stocks more efficient, “Ecodem” (Ecological Demilitarization), a scientific production association (SPA) which includes the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Federal Agency of Munitions, among others, has been established. SPA Ecodem is to “accumulate existing Russian scientific, industrial, and intellectual potential for a better and comprehensive solution of mine problems. The next important step will be the establishment of the Russian Federal Foundation for Mine Demilitarization.”[19]
A significant challenge for all countries with stockpiles of PFM-l and PFM-1S mines is the difficulty of their destruction, because of the toxic liquid explosive that they contain. The Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise and the Fakel Research and Production Center, together with Central Research Engineer Institute #15 of Russia's Ministry of Defense, have developed a mobile method of disposal of KSF-1/1S clusters with PFM-1/1S mines. It consists of injecting a special compound into the cluster cavity, which solidifies and completely blocks the minelets and cluster components as well as their arming systems and prevents possible displacement. Treated minelet clusters can be safely transported in standard packing. With one-shift operation, one disposal system can annually deactivate 100,000 to 120,000 minelet clusters. Disarming minelet clusters ensures their safety in handling and makes them suitable for use as blast hole charges for the mining industry or for ecologically safe burial.[20]
In this reporting period (since May 2000), Russian forces have continued to use antipersonnel mines extensively in the ongoing conflict with Chechen rebels, have laid antipersonnel mines on the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border, and have laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan on its border with Afghanistan. In addition, Russian peacekeeping forces have used antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan, and possibly in Abkhazia/Georgia. (For details on past use of mines, see relevant reports in Landmine Monitor Report 1999 and 2000.)
Landmine Monitor Report 2000 noted that Chechens had made unverifiable claims that Russia had used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the fighting broke out.[22] Subsequently, a Russian military official reportedly said at a press conference that Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in Chechnya.[23] A Chechen commander contends that even using conservative estimates, by this time, Russian troops have used 1.8 million mines in Chechnya. Accurate assessments are impossible while fighting continues.[24]
Russian officials themselves, including at the highest military levels in the operation in Chechnya admit the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations, but reject allegations of the indiscriminate use of mines by the Russian forces in Chechnya. They contend that only “controllable minefields” and mines equipped with self-deactivation and self-destruction mechanisms are being used in the area of conflict. They have contended that minefields have been mapped and in some cases marked and that mines used in temporary positions have been removed when units changed position.[25] The Defense Ministry says that Russian engineers “carefully follow international landmine use requirements including those added during the International Convention in Geneva (1980). Federal units generally use transportable set of landmines TSL-1 and TSL-2 [VKPM-1 and VKPM-2, transportable set of antipersonnel mines)] to protect their positions. Moreover, dirigible minefields DM-3 [UMP-3, command-detonated minefield], signal mines and non-explosive obstacles were used.”[26]
Russian military have analyzed the war in Chechnya, including mine use. Planning for engineer supply was carried out by “directives of the commander and instructions of the headquarters of the Joint Military Forces in Northern Caucasus.” Minefields were installed by engineer units as well as regular army sub-units.[27]
In the “Western operational military group,” it was noted that there were only three officers in the engineer unit, and all engineer supply documentation was kept on topographical maps with a 1:50,000 scale. Planning of obstacles, which generally is developed for large-scale operations, was not carried out. The engineer unit explained, “The design of the system of obstacles disposed in depth wasn't necessary. Mined obstacles were installed for immediate protection of military positions and blockage of separatists.”[28]
Regarding use by Russian airborne troops, Colonel General G. I. Shpak said, “After capturing a new position it's necessary to mine the surrounding territory using dirigible minefields [command-detonated minefields].”[29] The air force mined roads and other places where rebels had been dislocated, and for the psychological impact. In initial stages of the operation, bomber aircraft worked at a height of 3,500 meters and higher, at night.[30] Later the aircraft worked day and night. The commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force General A. M. Kornukov admits, “The efficiency of middle altitude and long range aviation was low....”[31]
In the “Southern operational military group,” particularly in operations in Argun Gorge (“Operation Rock”), federal troops emplaced mined obstacles to cover base stations, in areas of landing operations and in displacement of rebel maneuvers.
There was limited remote mining because of irregular cluster weapon supply. The efficiency of CAFS [KSF] clusters and AFM-1С [PFM-1S] mines was only about 50 percent because of problems with the self-destruction mechanisms. The most expedient means, according to engineer department experts of the Southern military operational group, would be “employing SAPC (2С) [KPOM2 (2S) minelet clusters], but because of the deep snow it's not possible to spread anti-drag wires.”[32]
Russian deputy chief engineer of OGV (S), Colonel Vladimir Shcherbakov, noted, “In general, the places where large-scale combat operations took place are ‘choked’ with explosive devices. In Grozny this would be the Staropromyslovskiy region, and the areas surrounding the Severnyy airport where Khattab's assistants were outfitted. Here, our combat engineers have had to work quite a lot. And near Alkan-Kala, Russian troops laid mine fields. True, the mines had elements that would cause them to self-destruct in ten days, however, some of them did not work, either due to factory flaws or as a result of mechanical damage from shrapnel and bullets.[33]
Evaluations of the equipment used in federal operations in Chechnya in 1994-1996, as well as in 1999-2000, conclude that “EMOC, MCM-77, ATS-2, APMF, TBPD, AMCM [IMR (Engineer machine of obstacle clearing), UR-77 (mine-clearing device), PTS-2 (Amphibious vehicle), PMP (pontoon-bridge park), MTU (Tank bridge placing vehicle), BMR (Military mine clearance vehicle)] made a good showing. It was the use of MCM-77 [UR-77 (mine-clearing device)] in built-up areas and base stations that predetermined the results of the battle.”[34]
The results of military actions in Chechnya in 1995-1996 were taken into consideration for the current operations and the equipment of sapper troops has been improved. Units received an increased number of signal mines, mine clearing supplies, and TSL [VKPM (Transportable set of AP landmines)], and equipment was delivered directly to the troops.[35]
According to the commander of engineer troops of the Ministry of Defense Colonel General N. I. Serdtsev, dirigible antipersonnel minefields [command-detonated minefields] have become the main means of fast covering of positions and military dislocation areas. At the same time he admits that using this kind of obstacle in built-up areas is very difficult.[36] Doctrine requires that non-explosive obstacles and minefields be connected with the system of protection and defense of the objects. Furthermore, it is not possible to set up cover fire in a residential area. Thus the theoretical high efficiency of mined obstacles is not always true in real situations.[37]
Additionally, the use of mined obstacles brings to light another problem: keeping track of all federal and rebels' obstacles. It is extremely difficult to notify troops about locations of all the obstacles, to say nothing about trying to inform civilians. Thus the Defense Ministry has concluded that it is necessary to set up a special service of obstacles and obstacle clearing.[38]
Finally, high level officials of the Ministry of Defense acknowledge that the “level of engineer training is still low. The reason is insufficient emphasis on it in colleges and universities, as well as in the military units. Engineer training is considered to be secondary, it takes only 2-3% of all study time. As the result, the number of casualties is high.”[39]
As in the previous fighting, the Chechen side uses mainly PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200, improvised cluster devices (e.g., with artillery shells used as explosives), grenades with tripwires and to a wide extent booby-traps.[40] Chechen fighters have used mines to retard the advance of Russian troops, as well as to complicate rebuilding of communication infrastructure, and along railroads, electrical supply lines and other such sites.[41]
In comparing Chechen mine use in 1994-1996 to that of 1999-2000, Colonel General N. I. Serdtsev acknowledged that the engineer units of separatist army have become highly proficient.[42] The rebel base stations are highly fortified. While there was no real system of obstacles, booby-traps and fougasses made of bombs, shells, and mines, were used more than ever.
Rebels mined highways with controllable and uncontrollable mines of different types, antitank mines, and antipersonnel mines. Usually they used ammunition they found on the battlefields. Mining usually takes place at night, and if the road is not well traveled, then the rebels work during the day. High authorities believe that the level of preparation, ammunition accumulation, deployment of workshops, laboratories producing self-made explosive devices and radio-activated fuzes, elaboration of mine-explosive obstacles demonstrate the high level of organization of Chechen separatists.[43]
Almost all explosive devices were permanently installed; weapons are not only multi-objective, but also had several nonremovable mountings. Russian military contends that the nature of mining of roads demonstrates that rebels have been thoroughly trained. Russian engineers note similarities to mine use during the war in Afghanistan, during the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, and finally in Chechnya, concluding that the trainers of mine work are foreign experts.[44]
The increase in efficiency of the mine war is demonstrated by the increase of casualties among personnel and destruction of machinery. The table below gives only fragmentary information about a six-month active phase of military actions and casualties among the Russian units in the “mine war.”[45]
|
Time of military operations
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
August 1995 –
January 1996 |
August 1999 –
January 2000 |
|
|
Casualties among the personnel
- wounded - killed Damaged machinery, units |
56 20 32 |
139 39 94 |
The Landmine Monitor Report 2000 noted press accounts stating that Russia and Georgia were considering mining several stretches of the border in order to stop the flow of men and material between Georgia and Chechnya.[46] In a meeting in May 2001 a Georgian official stated that there have been cases of Russian mining of the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border near the villages of Shatili and Omalo.[47]
It was reported in October 2000 that Russian border guards have deployed antipersonnel landmines on the Tajik side of the Pyandge River to protect the Tajik-Afghan border from invasion by the Taliban.[48] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan, in order to stop real and potential “terrorist attacks” and to block illegal drug trafficking.[49]
In addition to use by Russian border guards on the Afghan border, Russian peacekeeping forces have also used antipersonnel mines, to protect their posts and for other purposes. A November 2000 report stated that “the peacekeeping forces of Russia in Tajikistan employ mine weaponry in accordance with the provisions of international law, and primarily for the protection of border outposts.”[50]
According to a Russian official, the use of antipersonnel mines by the Russian peacekeeping forces and border guards at the Tajik-Afghan border meet the requirements of Protocol II of CCW (both the methods of use and the types of mines). He said, “Mine use is regarded by Russia as a needed measure and serves to secure not only the Central Asian region, but the European part of the continent from illegal intrusion of drugs and weaponry, as well as to prevent the access of armed fundamentalists to the Tajik and other Central Asian territories. The mines used are the so-called controlled minefields.”[51]
In December 2000, the head of the Russian delegation to the Second Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II also acknowledged that Russian forces in Tajikistan have emplaced mines on the Tajik-Afghan border, and insisted that the mines were used in a manner consistent with the protocol.[52]
In the past it has been reported that Russian engineering units serving with the CIS Peacekeeping Forces used antipersonnel landmines in the security zone between Abkhazia and Georgia, but Landmine Monitor has not collected new information on this in the current reporting period (since May 2000).[53]
The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXO after World War II and they are still a problem in some areas. Today there are requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories in Russia where World War II battles took place.[54] For details on on-going mine clearance programs inside Russia, see past Landmine Monitor reports. [55]
Russia has not donated to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. However, Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and regions, as well as taking part in demining operations in more than twenty countries, e.g., Algeria, Bosnia, Libya and Syria. The Russian Ministry of Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is carried out within the framework of military-technical cooperation with foreign governments.
Russian officials note that the government is broadening its participation in international humanitarian mine clearance in an attempt to address the “compelling humanitarian issues” resulting from mine contamination.[56] The government has appointed a special coordinator on humanitarian demining and has, as noted above, formed a Federal Working Group for Mine Action. The special coordinator is Aleksander A. Orlov, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of International Organizations and his task is to coordinate activities within various state agencies related to international humanitarian mine clearance.
At a Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meeting in May 2001, the executive secretary of the Working Group noted that the Russian government is prepared to offer training of humanitarian demining personnel; to offer means of mine/UXO surveillance, detection and clearance; to conduct joint research and development on demining equipment; and to offer personnel for mine clearance operations, among other things.[57]
The government is targeting Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Mozambique as areas for mine action. It reports that more than one-half million antipersonnel mines have been cleared with Russian participation.[58] Russian representatives have been participating in demining operations in different countries, resulting in the following: more than 15,000 explosives have been demined in Bosnia; in Kosovo, more than 25,000; in the Georgia-Abkhazia zone of conflict, some 25,000; in Tajikistan, approximately 35,000; and in Chechnya, 10,000.[59] Russian officials state that its engineers and NGO demining organizations have been able to “destroy/demilitarize more than 100,000 landmines and UXO annually.”[60]
During the Soviet era, district military recruiting offices carried out dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas.[61] Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities halted, although the secondary school courses have been reinstated.[62]
With the increase of mine danger in a number of areas of the Russian Federation such as Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya, the lack of mine awareness programs becomes increasingly serious. Currently there are no federal mine awareness activities in the areas of on-going conflict in Chechnya and adjacent/neighboring territories.
Because of the “constant increase in the number of landmine and unexploded ordnance victims among the civilian population in Chechnya,” the ICRC has launched a mine awareness program in Ingushetia. Its aim is to inform Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) of the dangers these weapons represent and to teach them some basic rules of behavior in order to limit the risk of accidents when they return home. In March 2001 the ICRC mine awareness team, using the locally produced teaching material (posters, leaflets), gave 62 presentations to over 1,600 children in IDP camps. A leaflet is ready for printing that will be used at presentations for adults. These presentations are planned to be resumed in IDP camps in April 2001.[63]
The ICRC mine awareness team seized the opportunity to provide mine awareness education to the Chechen children who came to stay in sanatoria in several republics and regions of the North Caucasus as a break from the dire living conditions in Chechnya. In Kabardino-Balkaria, 46 presentations were given to 800 children. Ten performances of the puppet show “The danger of landmines - the new adventures of Cheerdig” were made to almost 3,000 children in sanatoria in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, and Stavropol krai. In addition, the ICRC provided over 2,600 of these children with school kits.
IPPNW-Russia launched the broadcast of a series of TV-clips on mine awareness in December 1999.
There have been a significant number of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999.[64] There is no complete official data on mine casualties/incidents among the Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians. Numerous media reports, however, give an indication of the extent of the landmine problem. In the year 2000, 66 people were killed and more than 162 injured in incidents involving landmines and IEDs. Civilians accounted for around half of those killed and injured.[65] These figures do not include an incident in Grozny in January 2000.[66] Some 600 rebels were killed or wounded after fleeing the city through a minefield.[67] Rebels fled west and south and one doctor in the nearby village of Alkan-Kala, said that in two days, he amputated limbs on sixty mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his left leg and right foot to the minefield.[68] Amputations were performed with a hacksaw, and without painkillers or antiseptics.[69]
According to a military report, between August 1999 and January 2000, 39 military personnel were killed and 139 injured in the mine war in Chechnya.[70] In May 2001, the Chechen Minister of Public Health reported to the Landmine Monitor researcher that the greatest number of mine incidents were noted “in the summer-autumn period of 2000. In only one Nojay-Yurt district in 2000 more than 160 cases of mine/explosive traumas of the civilian inhabitants were reported. The same picture can be seen in all others areas of Chechnya.”[71]
The Public Health Minister said that in August of 2000, he and a group of doctors began an attempt to calculate the number of people killed and wounded in the war, using information from all parts of Chechnya. The Minister said that the group believes that “today more than 8,000 people need artificial limbs. But taking into account that over the last months the mine-explosive traumas prevail, it is possible to predict that people needing artificial limbs will range from 14,000 to 16,000.”[72]
No Ministry of the Russian government was able to provide any information on civilian victims of the current war. (See Chechnya report for more information on civilian casualties).
The “Kids of the Chechen War” program of the Russian Childrens Foundation reported on around 300 injured children from Chechnya who applied for medical assistance; 120 of them were amputees requiring prosthetic aid.[73]
The number of injured in the republic of Ingushetia since the beginning of the last Chechen conflict in August 1999 is 347,[74] including 48 children, 89 women and 210 men. The number of persons that need prosthetics is 300, 25 of them critically.[75]
Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during World War II. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia.[76]
There are seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the Russian Federation. There are currently no prosthetic workshops operating on the territory of Chechen republic. A percentage of cases are being taken care of in Moscow and some cases were taken care of in Baku (Azerbaijan) within the framework of a joint program of the Ministries of Social Insurance of both republics. The closest prosthetic workshop operates in Vladikavkaz. UNICEF currently collects data on child amputees to provide them with prosthetic aid in the near future in Vladikavkaz.
There are no prosthetic shops in the republic of Ingushetia, but one is to be built in the near future; the project has been approved and funds have already been allocated. Total number of hospitals/medical Centers in Ingushetia is 12, including: 1 of Republican-level, 2 of city-level, 4 of territorial/regional level, 1 rural, 2 local and 2 dispensers (1 TB and 1 Dermato-venerolgic). There is the only Rehabilitation Center in the republic - pediatric - in Troitskaya stanitsa).
RKK “Energia” has developed standardized prosthetic workshops, including mobile ones. Eight experimental mobile workshops vehicles (based on PAZ-3205 bus) have been produced to provide operative prosthetic aid in remote areas. The “Energia” enterprise manufactured components for 25% of all assembled prostheses in 2000. This amounted to approximately 15,000 units; 2,600 of which were for lower limbs prostheses.[77]
According to the Federal State Institution “Glavorgpomosch” Russia manufactures about 600 types of prosthetic devices. Lower limbs devices comprise 90% of all prostheses. The number of lower limbs prostheses ordered in 2000 was 180,000.[78]
There are no comprehensive rehabilitation centers in Chechnya, although mobile field psychological rehabilitation services (primarily for children) do operate.
Over the past two years, through the International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, mine victims have been treated by bringing US manufactured prosthetic technology to the Institute where their physicians supply the surgical and rehabilitative component for the most cost-effective delivery of the services. The cost of the procedure in Russia is about $3,500 per person; in the US, the same treatment has been estimated at $25,000. In 1998, the program treated four children and three adults.[79] The IPRLS has proposed a St. Petersburg Center for children which, if fully funded, could provide treatment and rehabilitation for up to 500 children who require surgery for their rehabilitation. The proposal has been accepted by UNICEF and is under consideration by the World Bank.[80]
Since 1995, mine victims in Russia have been under the protection of the Federal Law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped.” The law guarantees an individual multilevel rehabilitation program aimed either at complete rehabilitation of the disability and reintegration in social life, or compensation for physical and social limitations and the provision of financial independence. All issues of disability are under the control of the Ministry of Labor and Social Development. If a particular case goes beyond the capacity of local rehabilitation facilities, it is transferred to regional or Federal level institutions. The rehabilitation program includes medical, social, and professional issues.
The Federal program, “Social Insurance for Military Handicapped,” for disabled military personnel was implemented in 1997–2000. The total number of disabled military personnel currently registered under the social insurance system (Ministry of Social Development) exceeds 500,000. About 30 percent are under the age of 40. This number does not include the military from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry for Disaster Resources, thus the concept of a general database on military disability is under development. A total of 37.8 million rubles was allocated to the program in 2000.[81]
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[1] Interviews with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, Department of Security, Disarmament, and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001. One projected estimate of the cost of joining the Mine Ban Treaty is $576 million, which includes costs for development and production of alternatives as well as destruction of stockpiles. In comparison, to implement CCW Amended Protocol II, the estimate is about $374.6 million, which includes costs for making some mines compliant with the Protocol, development, and production of some alternatives, and destruction of some stocks. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 835-836.
[2] Interviews with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000 and 23 January 2001.
[3] Interview with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 January 2001. This includes destruction of obsolete mines, mines with an expired shelf life, and mines that are not compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II.
[4] For elaboration of these issues, see Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, “Russia and Antipersonnel Mines,” position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999.
[5] Interviews with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001.
[6] Interview with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, 13 May 2000.
[7] Interview with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, 30 April 2000. The cost of the fulfillment of the submitted ratification package was released in Press release No.177 of 10 April 2000, of the AP RF Division of Governmental Information/Information Analytical Materials: “Financing of the costs of the realization of the Protocol 2 by the Russian Federation will be provided by the RF Federal Budget. The expenditures will comprise 3,066,805 million Russian Rubles within 8 years (1998-2005). Annual amounts of financing will be defined by the federal laws on the Federal Budget.” This is approximately US$110 million according to the currency exchange rate on the day of submission.
[8] Interviews with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, 23 January 2001.
[9] Russia’s Arms Catalogue, Army 1996-1997, published by “Military Parade,” JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 276-83. See also, Landmines: Outlook from Russia, report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.
[10] Presentations by B. Schiborin, chief counselor of the Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, at the Moscow Landmine Conference, 27 May 1998.
[11] Landmine Monitor notes on remarks of Russian delegation in the plenary, Geneva, 11 December 2000.
[12] Interview with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, 13 May 2000.
[13] Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.
[14] Andrei Korbut, “Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense),” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 39, p. 6. ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock.
[15] Presentation by Yuri P. Osipovitch, “Demilitarization of APMs with Cementation Method,” made at the Budapest Seminar “Destruction of PFM-1 mines,” in March 2001.
[16] Interview with Senior Counselor Andrei Malov, 23 January 2001.
[17] In an interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999 on 25 February 1999, he said destruction would take place between 1998-2005; but at landmine conference held in Tbilisi, Georgia, in December 1999, Lt. Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, of the Engineer Forces, destruction would be completed by 2010-2012.
[18] Presidential Decree #62, “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Organization of the Russian Federation’s Participation in International Programs, Projects and Operations on Humanitarian Demining,” 17 January 2000.
[19] Yuri P. Osipovitch, Executive Secretary of the Federal Working Group for Mine Action, “Proposals of the Russian Federation Concerning Participation in Humanitarian Demining Operations,” report to the Standing Committee Meeting, Geneva, 9 May 2001.
[20] Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise 32 Velyaminovskaya St., Moscow 105318, Russia. Article by Nikolai Serdtsev, Chief of Engineer Troops of Russia's MoD, Colonel General, Cand. Sc. (Military) Vladimir Korenkov, Director General of the Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise, Cand. Sc. (Technology) Alexander Averchenko, Chief of Central Research Engineer Institute #15, Major General, D. Sc. (Technology) Alexander Yermakov, Leading Researcher of Central Research Engineer Institute #15, Colonel, Cand. Sc. (Technology).
[21] Also, available through Landmine Monitor researcher is “The Chronicle of Mine War in Chechnya: Year 2000,” which gives a month-by-month snapshot of mine-related operations/incidents in the war, gleaned from a survey of the media throughout the year.
[22] “Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June 2000.
[23] “Russia Admits: Land Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucusus, 10 January 2001. This was re-stated in the letter of Lyoma Usamov of 19 June 2001, which stated, “the Russian command, several months after the beginning of war, ‘boasted' about its 'achievements,' declaring that they planted half a million mines against 'the Chechen terrorists.’ (http: // www.chechenpress.com/news/ru/06_2001/12 _19_06.shtml).”
[24] Interview with I.T. Tauzov, assistant commander of Southwest Front of the Chechen forces, 20 February 2001. This number was again stated in the letter of 19 June 2001 of Chechen Representative Lyoma Usmanov.
[25] Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999; “Night Patrol of ‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000.
[26] Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Major General A. Nizhalovskii, report during a virtual roundtable discussion of engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik (Army collection), No. 6, June 2000, pp. 35-40. Armeyskiy sbornik is a specialized monthly analytical periodical covering a wide range of military-related issues and problems. It contains a “roundtable section” which is a “virtual roundtable” in which various military authors may publish articles on a given subject.
[27] Major S. Vashev, student at the Military Engineering University, roundtable report, Armeyskiy sbornik, No. 6, June 2000, pp. 43-44.
[28] Lieutenant Colonel A. Ovcharenko, student at the Military Engineering University, roundtable report, Armeyskiy sbornik, No. 6, June 2000, pp. 42-43.
[29] Colonel-General G.I. Shpak, commander of the airborne troops of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” rountable report for Voyennaya mysl (Military Concepts), No. 4, 2000, p. 13. Voyennaya mysl is a specialized military periodical that was formerly classified.
[30] Army General A.M. Kornukov, commander-in-chief of the Air Force, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, p. 7.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Major V. Denisov, student of the Military Engineering University, roundtable report on engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik, No. 6, June 2000, pp. 40-41.
[33] “Russian Combat Engineers Fight 'Mine War' in Chechnya,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Russian weekly independent military newspaper), 13-19 October 2000.
[34] Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Major General A. Nizhalovskii, roundtable report on engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik, No. 6, June 2000, pp. 35-40.
[35] Major V. Denisov, student of the Military Engineering University, roundtable report on engineer equipment of military operations in Chechnya, Armeyskiy sbornik, No. 6, June 2000, pp. 40-41.
[36] N.I. Serdtsev, commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, pp. 20-24.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] TV news by ORT, NTV, RTR among others; interviews with federal soldiers and officers participating in combat actions in Chechnya.
[41] “Railway Connection with Chechnya Will Soon Resume,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (weekly) 26 November-3 December 1999; “The Federal Center is Fully Determined,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 10-16 December 1999; “What is Grozny like after the Thunder?” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 February 2000.
[42] N.I. Serdtsev, commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, pp. 20-24.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] See for example, Alexander Igorev and Georgi Dvali, “Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia,” Moscow Kommersant (Russian daily newspaper), 12 April 2000.
[47] Interview with Mr. Sergo Gumberidze, Security Council Staff, 23 May 2001.
[48] Yuri Golotyuk, “Russia is just a river-far from new war,” Vremya Novostey online (News-Time online), №137, 2 October 2000; Patrick E. Tyler, “Russia Hardens Its Positions along a Tajikistan Border,” New York Times, 3 October 2000.
[49] Andrei Malov, Counselor of the Department for Security Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, presentation to IPPNW-Russia, 19 January 2001. Also, interviews with Senior Counselor Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001.
[50] Georgiy Mekhov, “How to Solve the Mine Problem: Russia Supports the Aspiration of the World Community to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines, But is not Ready for it,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, November 2000.
[51] Andrei Malov, Counselor of the Department for Security Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, presentation to IPPNW-Russia, 19 January 2001.
[52] Interview with Boris Kvok, Deputy Director, Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 13 December 2000.
[53] Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 810-811.
[54] For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 811-812.
[55] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 814-816; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 842-844.
[56] Interviews with Counselor Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, and 23 January 2001.
[57] Yuri P. Osipovitch, “Proposals of the Russian Federation Concerning Participation in Humanitarian Demining Operations,” report to the Standing Committee Meeting, Geneva, 9 May 2001.
[58] Interviews with Counselor Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, 23 January 2001, and at the opening of George Gittoes's “Minefields” exhibit in Moscow in December 2000.
[59] The figure of 10,000 cleared from Chechnya conflicts with Serdtsev N. I., the commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, in his report “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable report for Voyennaya mysl, No. 4, 2000, pp. 20-24 in which he stated that federal troops in Chechnya include four special companies for mine clearing from the Leningrad, Moscow and Ural military districts as well as various sapper subdivisions, and they have found and neutralized more than 250 highly explosive devices.
[60] Yuri P. Osipovitch, “Proposals of the Russian Federation Concerning Participation in Humanitarian Demining Operations,” report to the Standing Committee Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 9 May 2001.
[61] The so-called “District Military Committee” – “raivoenkomat.”
[62] V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.
[63] ICRC, “Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia (Mar 2001),” 21 May 2001.
[64] For casualties post-WW II, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 814.
[65] Landmine Monitor collated information on landmine incidents and casualties in Chechnya from 116 Russian newspaper articles.
[66] For details see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp 840-841.
[67] “Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap,” Associated Press (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February 2000.
[68] Andrew Kramer, “Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both Russians and Chechens,” Associated Press, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, “Doctor Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon,” Agence France Presse, 19 February 2000; Dave Montgomery, “ Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops,” The Dallas Morning News, 27 February 2000.
[69] “Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap,” Associated Press, 4 February 2000.
[70] N.I. Serdtsev, commander of the Engineer troops of the Defense Ministry of Russia, “Anti-terrorist operation in Caucasia: main lessons and conclusions,” roundtable discussion, “Military Concepts,” pp. 20-24.
[71] Email to Zarema Mazaeva from Oumar Khanbiev, Minister of Public Health of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, 1 May 2001.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Interview with Lubov Krzhizhanovskaya, chief of Russian Childrens Foundation, “Kids of Chechen War” Program, Moscow, 28 March 2001.
[74] Interviews with Minister of Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minster of Labor and Social Security Khalifa Zaurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman Arselgov, Chair of the Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of the Republic of Ingushetia, February 2000.
[75] Ibid.
[76] For more information see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p 845.
[77] Interview with S. Vovk, Director of Conversion Department, May 2001.
[78] Interview with Vadim Gelbras, “Glavorgpomosch,” May 2001.
[79] “International Meeting Highlights Aid to Amputee Landmine Survivors,” (Stoughton, MA), 13 July 1999.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Information provided by G. Anisimova, Committee on Statistics.
