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Key developments since May 2001: There is increasing information about the considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance, including mines, from the Second World War and later Soviet occupation uncovered each year. Hungary has a landmine alternative under development. Hungary has not confirmed whether it has completed the destruction of its UKA-63 antivehicle mines with tilt rod fuzes, which function like antipersonnel mines.
The Republic of Hungary signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 6 April 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and criminalizing violations entered into force on 7 March 1998.[1]
Hungary attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, where it associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union. Hungary also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.[2]
The annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report was submitted on 24 April 2002. Previous Article 7 Reports were submitted on 1 October 1999, 25 April 2000, and 30 April 2001.[3] Hungary transmitted an annual report on antipersonnel landmines for 2001 to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[4] On 29 November 2001, Hungary cosponsored and voted for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.
On the issue of joint military operations and exercises with non-States Parties, in May 2001, the Ministry of Defense repeated a previous statement that: “Hungarian soldiers are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines abroad during NATO army exercises, and foreign soldiers are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines in Hungary during NATO army exercises.”[5] The Hungarian Army took part in “63 NATO-NATO/PFP-PFP, and 22 bilateral and multilateral army exercises and programs” at home and abroad in 2001.[6]
Hungary is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II. Hungary attended the Third Annual Conference to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. Hungary associated itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union by Belgium. The annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II was presented at the annual conference. At the Second CCW Review Conference, Hungary supported the creation of a group of governmental experts to look at the issue of explosive remnants of war, and also co-sponsored the US-Danish proposal on antivehicle mines.[7]
Previously, a regional expert meeting on explosive remnants of war was held by the local office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Budapest, on 21-22 June 2001.[8] This was attended by 60-70 participants from 23 States in Central and Eastern Europe and concerned NGOs. Hungary was represented by 10-15 experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute of Military Technology.[9]
Hungary also took part in the regional seminar “Understanding the Ottawa Convention” held in Poland on 18-19 June 2001. In October 2001, Hungary attended a workshop on regional mine action that was organized by the NATO Partnership for Peace and held in Athens.
The Landmine Monitor Report 2001 report on Hungary was published in Hungarian in the military technology journal of the Hungarian Association of the Art of War.[10] Previous Landmine Monitor reports on Hungary have also been published locally. In November 2000, and again in January 2001, the Landmine Monitor researcher requested that issues raised in the reports be discussed by three Boards of the Hungarian Parliament (Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board). On the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first two Boards declined to consider the report, but the third Board did consider it. László Deák (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Colonel József Tián (Ministry of Defense) and the Landmine Monitor researcher took part in the Board’s hearing on 23 May 2001. The hearing considered the researcher’s findings on MON type mines, the 1,500 GYATA-64 mines retained for permitted purposes, the POMZ-2 mines already destroyed, and the mined area at Nagybajom-Mesztegnyő, and considered the views of the authorities on these issues. Mr. Deák told the Board that “since Hungary fulfilled her national level obligations included in the Ottawa Treaty ... we do not think that there are any open questions regarding the execution of the treaty that would be justified to discuss in public.”[11] He added that “for the government’s part, we have no aversion to so-called civilian oversight of the implementation of an international treaty.”[12] The Board closed the hearing without passing a resolution or proposition.
Hungary stated in 1995 that it no longer produced or exported antipersonnel mines and has previously reported that it completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 29 June 1999.[13] The April 2002 Article 7 Report clarifies that the entire stock of POMZ-2 mines (16,955) was destroyed by 16 June 1999.[14] There remains conflicting information about when some other types of mines (M-49 and M-62) were destroyed.
Hungary’s Article 7 Reports provided little information on destruction methods, and safety and environmental standards, during stockpile destruction at the MWS site.[15] The full environmental impact report on the site, including mine production and stockpile destruction, due by 31 August 2001, is now expected by September 2002. The latest estimate is that complete cleaning may cost HUF1.5 billion (US$5,408,913).[16]
Hungary initially reported that 1,500 GYATA-64 mines would be retained under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.[17] Then the April 2001 Article 7 Report noted a “change in policy,” with the suggestion that they would be destroyed by the end of 2001.[18] Now the April 2002 Article 7 Report states the mines will be retained for development of demining techniques.[19]
In February 2002, the Mechanical Works Special PLC in Törökbálint, where these mines are stored, requested the Technology Bureau of the Hungarian Army to state its plans for these mines. MWS added that it could either return the mines to the competent authority or disassemble the whole quantity within an eight-hour shift, if instructed.[20] The Ministry of Affairs has agreed to consider civil participation in inspecting the 1,500 GYATA-64 mines.[21]
In addition, 6,548 inert training mines of the same type are stored at three training centers and the Ministry of Defense site at Budapest-Háros.[22]
While not mandatory under Article 7, the ICBL has asked States Parties to report on steps taken to ensure that directional fragmentation mines cannot be used in victim-activated (i.e., tripwire) mode, as use in victim-activation mode would constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Hungary has not reported on its MON directional fragmentation mines or possible modifications.[23] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s most recent statement on the issue says that “the MON-50, MON-100, and MON-200 type antipersonnel mines possessed by the Hungarian Army are directed splinter mines, and belonging to that type, they do not fall in the scope of the prohibitory orders of the Ottawa Treaty, therefore Hungary as a State Party is not obliged by international law to report them.”[24]
The UKA-63 antivehicle mine with tilt rod fuze remains a matter of concern, since it functions like an antipersonnel mine. Hungary previously indicated in March 2000 that it had destroyed half its inventory of UKA-63s, and would destroy the remaining 100,000 by March 2002. No confirmation of this has been received, and no mention is made in the CCW Article 13 Report of 29 November 2001 or the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report of 30 April 2002.
At the parliamentary board’s hearing in May 2001 the Ministry of Defense representative repeated a previous statement that “there are no antipersonnel mines stockpiled at the Taszár base, used by the USA.”[25] Since the military operations started in Afghanistan “the international forces has not increased their presence in Hungary, there has not been any growth in movements at Taszár, there are no special units of the NATO or the USA there.”[26] The Ministry of Defense has agreed to check if the leasing agreements for foreign use of Hungarian military ranges prohibit mine use.[27]
In 2001, Hungary contributed HUF15 million (US$54,089) to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund established for the destruction of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine, and HUF10 million (US$36,059) to the PfP Moldovan project.[28]
There have been no developments in the creation of a “regional mine destruction center” at Nyírtelek, as proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000 and at a seminar on the PFM mine in February 2001. The Ministry states that Hungary does not now want to destroy foreign mines in her territory (including the Ukrainian stockpile) and there are no negotiations ongoing.[29]
Hungary has a seven-person mine clearance unit in Georgia as part of UNOMIG.[30] The Hungarian military contingent in Kosovo includes a four-person bomb disposal squad under KFOR. Soldiers of this unit attend weekly mine instruction drills.[31] There is a four-person bomb-disposal squad within the Hungarian SFOR technical contingent in Croatia. A practice area was established in the Hungarian camp, so that soldiers can familiarize themselves with landmines.[32]
Hungary took part in the international donor conference held in Zagreb, Croatia, on 25 September 2001. Hungary declared its readiness to help in demining, but there were no bilateral discussions.[33]
Hungary is a member of NATO and regularly takes part in the twice-yearly meetings of its military technology committee (Army Armaments Group Landgroup 9 on Battlefield Engineering). Hungary participates in the Antipersonnel Landmine Alternative project (APL-A) of this committee with “above average” work and activity, according to Hungary’s representative. At the committee’s session in Budapest on 27-28 September 2001, Hungary reported on its development of a three-stage defensive system to replace antipersonnel mines. The first stage consists of a sensor-based signaling system of combined light, smoke, and sound emitting charges. The second stage is a “quickly deployable wire-entanglement” and the third is a “directed splinter charge.” This was described as a “territory defense antipersonnel weapon,” and “similar to MON type mines,” but with a more modern detonator.
The “special splinter grenade” was described as “quickly and easily deployable and removable.” It “can be separately activated and deactivated” and “is set into operation by remote control.” It could be used against tanks and infantry as well as personnel. It was said to cost ten times more than antipersonnel mines, and would not be left in the battlefield if only because of its price. At the same time, this new weapon was said to be more “humanitarian, since it endangers only the fighting parties.” Development is in progress.[34]
Hungary has reported officially that “there have been no identified or suspected minefields” and therefore no mine clearance programs in Hungary.[35] In March 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: “According to available documentation, there are no mined areas subject to point 1c of Article 7 of the Treaty in Hungary.”[36] However, there is increasing information about areas contaminated by mines and UXO.
At the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001, Lieutenant Zsolt Nemes presented a report by the 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Battalion of the Hungarian Army.[37] The battalion is responsible for all EOD in Hungary, and undergoes two trainings each year. The report indicated there are 2,600-2,800 calls per year requesting the clearance of UXO. The report included “mortars, shells, mines and bombs” in its definition of UXO.
Since World War II, the battalion has destroyed 20 million mines and UXO, and 20,000 tons of other ammunition and explosives, clearing an area of 10 square kilometers. From 1945 to 1957, most UXO were destroyed and minefields cleared; since 1957, the battalion has dealt with newly-discovered mines and UXO. Lieutenant Nemes identified the most contaminated areas as Pest, Fejer, Komarom-Eszetgom, Veszprem, Gvor, and Vas, resulting from World War II and later Soviet occupation.[38]
According to the Ministry of Defense, the First Bomb-disposal and Battleship Regiment of the Hungarian Army (HTHE) destroyed 141,180 explosive items in 2001, including 103 bombs, 282 mines, 1,197 mine-grenades, 1,275 hand-grenades, 5,074 artillery missiles, and more than 100,000 pieces of infantry ammunition. The bomb-disposal experts visited 2,836 sites, including 929 urgent cases.[39] Between 1 January and 24 March 2002, there were 477 calls.[40] In 2000, bomb-disposal experts turned out 2,775 times to deal with explosives, including 977 urgent cases. They destroyed 124,816 pieces of explosives.[41]
Captain Lajos Posta, Head of Reconnaissance Department, reported that in 2001 a total of 247 mines were found and destroyed in Hungary (95.2 percent were Soviet-made, 1.6 percent Hungarian, 3.2 percent German World War II mines). This included 39 antipersonnel mines, 15 of which were live mines, found near the Croatian border, on its Hungarian side, in former Soviet military areas, in a World War II battlefield in the Pilis Hills, and in the attic of a privately-owned house. Also included in the total were 25 live antivehicle mines. Most were found in former Soviet military areas.[42]
In 2001, the investigation of mine/UXO contamination of Lake Balaton continued. In the Pilis hills, an October 2001 excavation of the WWII Soviet defense trenches showed that Soviet troops created a minefield of two lines of POMZ tripwire mines.[43] It was reported in 2001 that there may be “still about 100-120 WWII mines in the Hungarian section of river Danube, mostly in the environs of the capital ... these mines might cause harm only if they are poked. The Danube has probably covered these mines with a thick layer of river gravel and silt.”[44]
In the State-owned woods around Nagybajom and Marcali, the remains of exploded munitions and unexploded mines and other munitions dating from World War II “caused serious problems in the last year.” Three lumber projects had to be stopped in recent years for these reasons.[45] Part of the contaminated area is in the Boronka Tájvédelmi Körzet (BTK - Boronka Landscape Protection Area) owned by the Somogy Természetvédelmi Szervezet (Somogy Nature Reserve Organization). The forestry director said that “there have not been any explosions for decades.”[46] The area “is not fenced, and there are no notice-boards of possible danger.”[47] The Marcali Forestry has submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and Country Development an application each year in recent years for explosive clearance, but without any agreement being concluded.[48]
Army experts describe the Mesztegnyő area as “the single mined area remaining from World War II.”[49] Battlefield researchers of the Faculty of History of War of the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense plan to start explorations in the area in 2002.[50] Recently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed support for mine/UXO clearance of the Nagybajom-Mesztegnyő area.[51]
Croatian firms have conducted clearance in a number of areas near the Hungarian border in 2001 and 2002.[52] It has been reported that,“demining of the whole borderline will be executed in 2002.”[53] There is said to be good cooperation between the Hungarian and Croatian border guard authorities, and joint inspection of demined areas is carried out.[54]
The most recent Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report referred to a “lack of victims with specifically mine-related injuries.”[55] However, there have been casualties from UXO, and it is not clear how mine and UXO casualties are distinguished. In December 2001, Hungary distributed a report to the CCW, which stated that in the last 50 years, 300 EOD personnel had been killed. Lt. Nemes also remarked during a noontime presentation that there were civilian casualties during 2001, and an average of two to three deaths per year, “mainly because people mishandle what they find.” No more details were given.[56]
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[1] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 658.
[2] At all these meetings, it was represented by László Szűcs, Counselor in the Department for Security Policy and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Szűcs succeeded László Deák as Hungary’s representative at antipersonnel mine conferences in August 2001.
[3] Article 7 Reports, submitted on 1 October 1999 for the period 1 March-27 August 1999; submitted on 25 April 2000 for the period 27 August 1999-25 April 2000; submitted on 30 April 2001 for the period 1 May 2000-30 April 2001; and submitted on 24 April 2002 for the period 1 May 2001-30 April 2002.
[4] Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the OSCE for 2001.
[5] Statement by Col. József Tián, Ministry of Defense, minutes of the hearing on antipersonnel mines held by the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest, 23 May 2001, p. 5. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 714-715.
[6] Speech by General Lajos Fodor, Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian Army, at the General Staff meeting, 7 March 2002, Magyar Honvéd, (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 15 March 2002, supplement, p. 11.
[7] Letter from György Balogh, Security Policy and Arms Control Department (FEBIFO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 April 2002.
[8] “Nemzetközi konferencia a háborús fegyverekről,” (“International conference on weapons of war”), Budapest, Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI, Hungarian News Agency), 20 June 2001.
[9] Letter from Lt. Zsolt Nemes, First Bomb-disposal and Battleship Regiment of the Hungarian Army (MH HTHE), 13 March 2002.
[10] Dr. Tamás Csapody, “A gyalogsági aknák Magyarországon” (“Landmines in Hungary”), Műszaki Katonai Közlöny (Military Technical Journal), Technical Section of the Hungarian Association of the Art of War, No. 1, (special edition) 2002, pp. 3-35.
[11] Official minutes of the session held on 23 May 2001 by the Human Rights, Minority, and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, pp. 6-7 (unofficial translation).
[12] Ibid., p. 9 (unofficial translation).
[13] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, Landmine Monitor Report 2000 and Landmine Monitor Report 2001.
[14] Article 7 Report, Form G, 24 April 2002.
[15] On 11 December 2000, the regional environmental protection body found that “the geological medium is obviously contaminated by gunpowder” and MWS was reported as admitting that, “significant and only partly known pollution had been caused by the military and industrial manufacturing of explosives.” Resolution of the Environmental Conservation for Middle Danube Basin on Binding MW Special PLC to Implement a Comprehensive Environmental Investigation of its Plant in Törökbálint, Budapest, 15 December 2000, p. 3.
[16] Letters from MMS (MWS) to the Environmental Conservation for Middle Danube Basin, 18 //December 2001 and 29 January 2002, and letter to Landmine Monitor researcher from Roland Spitz, authorized supervisor, Environmental Conservation for Middle Danube Basin, 7 February 2002. Exchange rate at 24 March 2002: HUF277.32 = US$1.
[17] Article 7 Report, 1 October 1999.
[18] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2001.
[19] Article 7 Reports, Form D, 30 April 2001 and 24 April 2002.
[20] Letter from Dr. László Molnár, deputy director-general, Mechanical Works Special PLC (MMS), 12 February 2002.
[21] Email from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002. The Landmine Monitor researcher’s initial request to witness the transfer or destruction of these mines was refused. Letter from Árpád Adorján, Procurement and Marketing Director, Procurement and Security Investment Office, Hungarian Army, on behalf of Dr. János Kárász, deputy under-secretary, 28 February 2002, and letter from Tamás Ráth, director-general, Technology Bureau, Hungarian Army, (Rec. num: 154/2002), 18 February 2002.
[22] Letter from Major László Kiss, Deputy Manager, Technical Service and Support Center of the Hungarian Army, Budapest-Háros, 8 March 2001, and email from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 June 2002.
[23] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 660-661, and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 713.
[24] Letter from Zoltán Pecze, Deputy Head of the Arms Control and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rec. num. 2518/2001, 12 March 2001.
[25] Statement by Col. József Tián, Ministry of Defense, minutes of the hearing on antipersonnel mines held by the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, Budapest, 23 May 2001, p. 5.
[26] Brig. János Isaszegi, commander of the Interservice Operational Centre, Hungarian Army, “Egyeztetés a tájékoztatásról,” (“Agreement on giving information”), MTI, 12 October 2001.
[27] Email from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002.
[28] Report of the Hungarian Mission to the OSCE, (undated), and email from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 2002.
[29] Letter from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 714.
[30] Editorial, "Magyar rendfenntartók Boszniában" (Hungarian peace-keeping forces in Bosnia', Népszabadság (daily newspaper), 7 March 2002, p. 3, and Szurmay Zoltán, "Aknák között a megbecsülésért" ('Striving for esteem among landmines'), Magyar Honvéd (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 31 August 2001, p. 4.
[31] Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Árpád Korpás, commander, Hungarian KFOR unit, 5 February 2002.
[32] Telephone interview with Col. József Tián, commander of the Hungarian SFOR technical contingent, 5 February 2002; Col. Tián, previously the MoD representative, was appointed to the SFOR position on 1 July 2001.
[33] Lajos Bencze, “Tíz évig tartó aknamentesítés Horvátországban” (“Demining Croatia in the next ten years”), MTI, Zagreb, 25 September 2001; Hungary was represented by László Szűcs, Security Policy and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
[34] Letter from Col. István Budai, head of Technical Engineering Branch of Logistics, General Management of Hungarian Defense Forces, 18 February 2002. Col. Budai is Hungary’s representative on the NATO military technology committee.
[35] Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 November 2001.
[36] Letter from Zoltán Pecze, Deputy Head of Department, Arms Control and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Rec. num. 2518/2001), Budapest, 12 March 2001.
[37] “Hungarian Army 1st EOD Battalion, 21-22 June 2001,” Report presented at the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001.
[38] Ibid., and Landmine Monitor notes.
[39] Z. T., “A tűzszerészek statisztikája” (“Statistics for bomb-disposal experts”), Magyar Honvéd, (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 25 January 2002, p. 5. In 2001, HTHE became the legal successor of the First Bomb-disposal and Mine-searcher Battalion (HTAZ).
[40] “Telefax rovat,” (“telefax column”), Magyar Honvéd (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 29 March 2002, p. 5.
[41] László Szűcs, “Kétezer-nyolcszáz bejelentés,” (“Two thousand eight hundred calls”), Magyar Honvéd (weekly magazine of the Ministry of Defense), 2 February 2001, p. 5.
[42] Letter from Capt. Lajos Posta, head of Reconnaissance Department, First Bomb-disposal and Battleship Regiment of the Hungarian Army (MH HTHE), Budapest, 20 February 2002.
[43] Dr. Lajos Négyesi, lecturer of the Faculty of History of War, Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense, “A pilisi német áttörés” (“German breakthrough in Pilis”), 6-14 January 1945; Dr. Lajos Négyesi, “Csatatérkutatás a Pilisben” (“Battlefield research in the Pilis”), 26-28 October 2001; and telephone interview with Dr. Lajos Négyesi, 25 February 2002.
[44] Lt. Col. Hubert István, commander of the Danube Fleet of the Hungarian Army, Zoltán Haszán, László Rab, “Elbocsátott flottilla” (“Dismissed fleet”), Népszabadság (Hungarian daily newspaper), 26 May 2001, p. 22.
[45] Telephone interview with István Borosán, director of the Marcali Forestry, Forestry and Timber Industry PLC, Somogy County (SEFAG Rt.), 28 March 2002.
[46] Ibid.
[47] József Takács, director of Nagybajom Forestry. SEFAG Rt., and József Fehér, “Akik minden nap a halálba indultak,” (“Those who every day started out for death”), Marcali Helytörténeti Füzetek (Booklets on the Local History of Marcali) No. 24, 2002, p. 28.
[48] Telephone interview with Dr. Gyula Jákó, retired colonel of the Hungarian Army, director of POLIGON 22 Industrial and Trade Service Provider Ltd, 28 March 2002.
[49] Col. József Tián, Ministry of Defense, minutes of the hearing by the Human Rights, Minorities and Religion Board of the Hungarian Parliament, 23 May 2001, p. 4.
[50] Email from Dr. Lajos Négyesi, lecturer of the Faculty of History of War of the Zrínyi Miklós University of National Defense, 13 March 2002.
[51] Email from László Szűcs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2002, and letter from Dr. Ferenc Gazdag, Head of the Arms Control and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 2 April 2002.
[52] Protocol of the Delegation of the Hungarian Local Joint Commission of the Hungarian Republic. Border section 3. Pécs, 2001. Documents No. 1, 2, 3, received from the Border Guard Management of Pécs, Ministry of the Interior.
[53] Delegation of the Hungarian Local Joint Commission of the Hungarian Republic. Border section 3. Discussion No. II, held on 7 December 2001, Pécs. Document No. 5, received from the Border Guard Management of Pécs, Ministry of the Interior.
[54] Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Pál Ancsin, Border Guard Management of Pécs, Ministry of the Interior, 5 February 2002.
[55] Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 November 2001.
[56] “Hungarian Army 1st EOD Battalion, 21-22 June 2001,” Report presented at the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001, and Landmine Monitor notes.
