| <FALKLANDS/MALVINAS | NAGORNO-KARABAKH> |
Key developments since May 2001: In December 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center stated that the clearance of all known minefields and cluster munition strike sites had been completed. It handed over responsibility for mine action to UNMIK and local bodies. Small-scale mine and UXO clearance will be needed for years to come. An estimated $85 million has been spent on mine action in the province since June 1999. This resulted in the clearance of more than 32 million square meters of land and the destruction of more than 50,000 mines, cluster bomblets and other unexploded ordnance. In 2001, over 8 million square meters were cleared. Caches of weaponry including antipersonnel mines continue to be discovered. Civilian deaths and injuries declined during 2001 with a total of 22 casualties, including nine fatalities.
Kosovo remains a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but has been under the administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) since 1999.[1] Elections were held on 17 November 2001 to form the Kosovo Provisional Assembly, as mandated by UNMIK. Nine previously UN-administered local government departments were then transferred to local government bodies, charged with all matters of internal administration with the exception of security, which, along with foreign affairs, remain under the direct administration of UNMIK.[2]
The UN Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) completed its scheduled term and handed over responsibility for mine action to UNMIK and local bodies in mid-December 2001. Survey and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) was transferred to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which reports to UNMIK.[3] Other aspects of mine action were handed to the Kosovo Cadastral Agency, the Ministry of Health Environment and Spatial Planning, and the Ministry of Education Science and Technology.
Since 1999, landmines have been used by unknown persons in attacks on the remaining Serbian minority in Kosovo and on Serbian military and police forces operating on the province’s border with southern Serbia.[4] In 2001 and 2002, the use of mines has declined substantially, as attested to by international personnel in Kosovo, KFOR and UNMIK reports, and a significant reduction in the number of mine casualties.[5] The reduction in new use of mines is consistent with a reduction of tension in the Preshevo valley since early 2001, when militant ethnic Albanian groups conducted operations on the borders with southern Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Reported incidents involving mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since June 2001, some of which may be new uses of mines/IEDs, include:
Caches of weaponry including antipersonnel mines continue to be discovered by security forces. Caches including mines were reported in June-July 2001 (5 boxes of antipersonnel mines, and 1,100 grenades and antipersonnel mines), August (2 antivehicle mines and an unspecified number of antipersonnel mines), October (14 antipersonnel mines), November (265 grenades and mines), December 2001 (13 antivehicle mines and 3 antipersonnel mines), and February 2002 (293 grenades and mines).[9]
Weapons possession is banned for all Kosovo residents except those holding weapons authorization cards under UNMIK Regulation 2001/7. Illegal possession of weapons is punishable by a prison term of up to eight years or a maximum fine of €7,500 (US$6,735).[10] Two periods of amnesty for the voluntary handing-in of weaponry by the civilian population have been held in Kosovo, in early 2001 and 15 March-15 April 2002. In the latter case, a total of 90 mines were collected.[11]
In December 2001, it was announced that UNMIK had determined “that all known minefields and cluster munition strike sites in Kosovo have been cleared to internationally acceptable standards.”[12] In its final annual report, the MACC stated that “the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated.... Whilst it may take years to completely eradicate all items of explosive ordnance from Kosovo, as indeed it will in most other countries in Europe, the situation is such that the level of contamination no longer impedes social and economic development within the province.”[13] The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) stated, “While there still is a possibility that some mines may be found in the future, the remaining threat in Kosovo consists primarily of limited numbers of CBU [cluster bomb units] and other UXO.”[14]
Some areas of known contamination were not yet cleared when the MACC completed operations. MACC clearance plans were delayed by unseasonably heavy rain in the middle of 2001 and early heavy snowfall in November 2001, resulting in more uncompleted “task dossiers” at the time of handover than initially envisaged. Task dossiers identify specific geographical areas verified as a “dangerous area” and contain details of surveys, past clearance, and other relevant information. A single task dossier may refer to more than one minefield or cluster bomb strike site, as dossiers identify dangerous areas.[15]
As of 15 December 2001, 47 task dossiers remained to be completed. Subsequent discoveries of mine/UXO contaminated areas increased the total of outstanding task dossiers to 52 by April 2002. Of the 50 tasks outstanding in March 2002, 34 involved CBU strikes. Seventeen required the continuation of clearance activity and six required the commencement of clearance. The remainder required resurvey and an evaluation to assess the remaining threat.[16]
When the MACC handed over responsibility for residual mine/UXO clearance to the KPC in December 2001, one minefield was still being worked on as a result of previous bad weather and other delays. The minefield, which is inside the Albanian border, was half-cleared before winter snows stopped work; it has been marked and passed to the Albanian Mine Action Executive for completion in 2002.
As agriculture, construction, and other economic activities resume, and as displaced persons return, potential areas of unknown mine/UXO contamination may pose more of a hazard than the known sites. Maps and information on the 620 minefields laid by the Yugoslav Army were handed to the MACC in 1999, but there is a possibility of some small, unknown minefields remaining. In addition, MACC was not given records of mines laid by Serb Ministry of the Interior police units and paramilitary groups.[17]
At least one CBU strike site previously cleared has since caused a civilian casualty and is undergoing renewed clearance that is expected to take until the end of 2002.[18] (See also later section on Mine/UXO Clearance). Of the 295,700 cluster bomblets reportedly dropped on Kosovo, the MACC estimated initially that “as many as 30,000 individual bomblets may have failed to function.”[19] In May 2002, a member of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal team (EOD) stated that about 17,000 bomblets had been cleared and the initial estimate has been revised downwards to fewer than 20,000 bomblets that failed to function.[20]
In its final annual report for 2001, the MACC stated that while some new mines may still be found, these are unlikely to be large-scale minefields and should be within the capability of KPC teams trained in technical survey. It added, “In the unlikely event of a large minefield, or a number of large mined areas being located in the future, then it will be possible to contract specialist assistance as required.... This is a more cost-effective solution than maintaining these capabilities in the Province when there is little likelihood that they will be used on a regular basis.... These new areas have generally been in extremely remote, difficult to access areas where the impact of the mines is minimal.”[21]
The structure and responsibilities of the Mine Action Coordination Center were described in previous Landmine Monitor reports. An external evaluation of the mine action program in Kosovo was carried out on behalf of the UNMAS by the independent Praxis Group in October-November 2001. This evaluation, delivered in February 2002, praised the achievements of the MACC, which had been constrained to operate on a new partnership model (as opposed to a command and control model), with “piecemeal funding” and seconded staff, in a context of “deprivation and improvisation.” The evaluation noted that, “With minimal equipment and a weak logistics link to its parent UNMIK ... the UN team was forced to ‘make do’ often relying on mine action NGOs for support and assistance. Without the goodwill and help of the NGOs (and at least one major donor – the UK’s DFID), the fledgling MACC might well have failed to go much further.”[22]
The evaluation ascribes much of the “resounding success” of the mine action program in Kosovo to the MACC’s flexibility, vision and overall competence, and the acceptance of its central coordinating role by KFOR and the many NGOs establishing operations in the province. The evaluation notes the absence of “viable standby capacity on the part of UNMAS and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.”[23]
On 15 December 2001, responsibility for mine action and explosive ordnance disposal passed from MACC to Kosovo local government bodies and the UNMIK Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP). The DCP manages the Kosovo Protection Corps, which was formed from members of the disarmed KLA following its disbanding in 2000. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation is critical of the early and “political” decision to make the KPC responsible for ongoing mine/UXO clearance, “thereby effectively reducing the options available to the MACC for the creation of (civilian) long-term capacity in Kosovo.”[24]
To ease the transfer from the MACC to this new structure, two of the three international posts and all seven local staff posts within the DCP EOD management have been filled by staff from the previous MACC.[25] International staff remain in the posts of Operations and Quality Assurance, and Mine Awareness/Public Information.
In August 2001, the KPC began a training program to develop seven teams with an EOD capacity, starting with initial training in CBU clearance and a period of practical operations in the field. Four of the teams had completed training and become operational by 15 December 2001 and the other three teams in early 2002. The training was carried out by the NGO Handicap International (HI) with KFOR monitoring, and HI provided supervision in the field.[26] The Praxis evaluation team, visiting in October 2001, was surprised that “mine clearance was not on the curriculum. We later learned that a small group, no more than 16, would receive mine clearance training in the spring of 2002, notwithstanding KFOR’s objections....”[27]
HI reports that it was contracted to provide managerial support and continue training in EOD, Battle Area Clearance, CBU search and clearance techniques, survey and humanitarian demining, as well as training support to KPC medical teams, until September 2002, with seven international and nine national staff.[28] The MACC annual report for 2001 stated that all formal training of the KPC teams should be completed by May 2002 and “from this time the KPC will be capable of dealing with the anticipated residual threat from mines and unexploded ordnance in Kosovo. On the rare occasions when sophisticated NATO ordnance that has not been covered during training is encountered, these tasks can be undertaken under the supervision of experienced KFOR EOD teams.”[29] Mines/UXO discovered by KPC teams are either destroyed in situ, in the case of CBUs, or removed for destruction by HI supervisors. All KPC clearance sites are supervised by HI staff.[30]
Each of the seven KPC teams consists of 11 EOD/clearance personnel, two medics and a driver, providing 77 staff trained in EOD/clearance activities, out of a total KPC complement of 3,000 (reduced from 4,300 in October 2001). The KPC is tasked with community development activities as well as disaster response, humanitarian assistance and demining.[31]
KFOR will provide medical evacuation and storage of explosives as necessary. An emergency response system involving KFOR and the Kosovo Police Service was developed to “ensure that there is a timely, integrated response to EOD situations as they are encountered.”[32]
Other MACC functions were transferred to a variety of local government bodies. International staff have expressed concern about the limited consultation with non-UN bodies in the division of MACC duties between the various local government departments, and how well the new arrangements are working in practice.[33] Ongoing maintenance of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system and supply of updated IMSMA information to the KPC and other organizations was transferred to the Kosovo Cadastral Agency, which received extensive training.[34] However, serious delays occurred, and as of early April 2002 HI had received no update of the IMSMA database since November 2001.[35] As a result, IMSMA entries are now verified and processed by the DCP Operations Officers and the updated information is then forwarded to the Agency.[36] As of April 2002, the Ministry of Health had not supplied updated mine casualty statistics.[37]
KPC teams are all ethnic Albanians, and there is concern whether they will be allowed entry to minority areas. A Prizren-based KPC EOD team assisted by an HI Technical Advisor withdrew from the Serbian minority area of Vilica Hocha in November 2001 without completing its activities due to perceived hostility from the local population.[38]
The speed of the hand-over, the inflexibility (leaving no margin for operational delays) and lack of a planned transitional phase have been criticized as working against the stated intention of creating “a seamless transition from the existing international coordinated effort to locally managed and implemented projects.”[39]
The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) channeled donations totaling US$7,176,650 to mine action agencies operating in Kosovo in 2001.[40] In addition, the MACC received US$1,177,995 from Canada, via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. These donations were used to cover the MACC operational costs in 2001 (with other donations received in 2000), to contract core assets, and to support a clearance project in the Dulje Pass area.[41]
After successful clearance in 2000, the number of NGOs and commercial clearance organizations was reduced to eight and three respectively, which all received bilateral funding/contracting in 2001. Although, in some case, the funding was delayed, which delayed or shortened operations in 2001, overall “the capacity available to the MACC in 2001 has been about right.”[42]
Throughout the period mid-1999 to December 2001, mine action in Kosovo was funded from the UNMIK budget, the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), the ITF, bilateral donations from governments and in-kind contributions. These donations have gone to the MACC or directly to the many mine action organizations operating in Kosovo. This variety of funding sources and routes, and the number of organizations supported, has allowed only estimations of the total mine action funding in Kosovo. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation concluded that a total of about $85 million had been invested in the mine action program in Kosovo from mid-1999 to the end of 2001, including over $59 million in bilateral funding and in-kind assistance by the donor community. However it is emphasized that this is not an exact figure, and the evaluation details some of the features of each source of funding.[43]
UNMIK. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation gives no single figure as representing contributions to UNMIK for the MACC, but notes that administrative confusion and disputes between the different agencies involved resulted in funding of the MACC being both delayed and inadequate. It also notes that “funds for operations were far easier to access than funds for the management of these operations. While Kosovo was disproportionately blessed by donor attention, the MACC often was left to starve in the midst of plenty.”[44]
UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). The VTF is described as the MACC’s “financial backbone;” funds channeled through the VTF totaled US$9,967,135. As noted above, the total for 2001 was $1.18 million. Over half the VTF funding came from donations by European Union countries and Canada. However, bureaucratic problems resulted in long delays in some cases, and resulted in the withdrawal of €2 million pledged by the European Agency for Reconstruction and €1.7 million by the European Union.[45]
International Trust Fund for Demining and Victims Assistance (ITF) – This fund, set up by Slovenia in 1998, was favored by donors for its speed, low costs and lack of bureaucracy – and the doubling of donations via a matching-funds agreement with the United States. The ITF began supporting mine clearance in Kosovo in 2000, and in 2001 allocated nearly 25 percent of its funds to Kosovo. In 2001, $4,165,619 was donated by the ITF for demining (from donations by the US, Germany, Switzerland and France), $315,582 for mine awareness (US) and $543,314 for victim assistance (US). In addition, a number of NGOs received donations channeled through the ITF and the Canadian International Demining Agency channeled funds for the VTF through the ITF to attract US matching funds.[46]
Bilateral funding – The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation identified the following bilateral donations to mine action in Kosovo, but presented this as only a “ball-park” indication of the breadth of bilateral support.[47]
[48] The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation concluded that: “The MACC’s ability to collect and track costs associated with the various mine action activities appears to have been severely hampered by the extensive number of bilateral funding agreements which the MACC was not always privy to.”[49] As a result of the funding situation, planning was resource-driven rather than need-led.
Survey and, in particular, the use of the Information Management System for Mine Action in Kosovo were reported in the Landmine Monitor Report 2001. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation commented that Kosovo was the first use of IMSMA in a mine action program, which revealed many deficiencies in the original system, and resulted in a version 2.1 being delivered in November 2001.[50]
In August 1999, the IMSMA database contained reports of over 4,000 dangerous areas. During the two and a half years of mine/UXO clearance; this was reduced to 47 remaining task dossiers by 15 December 2001 when the MACC closed. In April 2002, there were 52 task dossiers.
The MACC reported at the end of 2001 that Kosovo had been extensively surveyed for more than two years, and very few new mined areas had been located in the past 12-18 months. Although some mines may be found in the future, it is unlikely that these will be large-scale mined areas and “will be within the clearance capabilities of the teams trained in Technical Survey.”[51]
Responsibility for IMSMA in 2002, post-MACC, is described in an earlier section of this report. The DCP Operations Officers will continue to oversee and prioritize tasking for EOD and clearance teams up to September 2002. Tasking will prioritize known minefields, followed by suspected minefields, known CBU strikes and reported UXO. Currently KPC EOD teams with HI supervision are providing support to teams removing wrecked cars from fields and roadsides. However, it has also been recognized that high-profile events such as in Grmija, where a previously cleared CBU strike site caused a civilian casualty in February 2002, will result in tasking priorities being changed.[52]
From the beginning of operations in June 1999 through 2001, a total of 32,224,107 square meters of land were cleared, with the destruction of 19,457 antipersonnel mines, 5,515 antivehicle mines, 15,940 cluster bomblets and 13,896 other items of UXO.[53]
Clearance during 2001 concentrated increasingly on the south and west of the province. Progress was slower than expected due to particularly bad weather, with heavy rain in June and July and early snow in November; also, clearance areas were more inaccessible than the high-priority areas cleared in 2000.[54] During 2001, 8,111,933 million square meters were cleared with the destruction of 7,568 antipersonnel mines, 77 antivehicle mines, 2,340 cluster bomblets and 1,072 other items of UXO.[55]
In 2001, following an assessment of tasks and resources made by the MACC in September 2000,[56] clearance agencies were reduced from 16 to 11, with the number of commercial agencies going from eight to three, while eight NGOs remained.[57]
The rate of casualties among deminers working for clearance agencies has caused concern. There were 30 accidents causing 32 casualties, including one fatality, from June 1999 to December 2001. Thirteen of these accidents occurred in 2001. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation regarded this as unacceptably high, because “[w]orking conditions and the mine/UXO threat in Kosovo were neither unique nor particularly difficult compared to other country’s mine action programmes.” The evaluation singled out Danish Church Aid, which experienced seven accidents in less than 18 months. It said the HALO Trust (four accidents and five injuries/deaths in 30 months), Mine Tech (four accidents) and NPA (four accidents) all experienced accident rates higher than normal for experienced operators. The MACC investigated all the incidents and considered them to have been preventable.[58] The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation linked the high rate of deminer accidents with the issue of missed mines/UXO devices in cleared areas.
Cluster bomblets pose an on-going clearance challenge. The MACC reported that by the end of 2001 all of the 224 CBU-affected locations had been worked to some extent but that 21 would require follow-up work.[59] In February 2002, a civilian was killed in Grmija by a cluster bomblet. Grmija is a popular recreation sports and picnic spot on the outskirts of Pristina, that was surface-cleared in July-September 1999 by BACTEC, followed by limited sub-surface clearance in 2000. Since the incident, three KPC teams under HI supervision were tasked with sub-surface clearance of this site, and 44 more CBUs had been discovered and destroyed by April 2002. It is envisaged that the KPC teams will continue working on this site until the end of 2002.[60]
Because all CBU strike sites could not be sub-surface cleared before winter 2001, the MACC instructed all teams to concentrate on sub-surface clearance of high priority sites close to populated areas and to surface-clear as many other sites as possible. The lower priority surface-cleared sites were marked and listed for the KPC to work on in 2002.[61] Sub-surface bomblet clearance on arable land became an issue of more concern early in 2002, when it emerged that every three years farmers usually plough to a depth of 75 centimeters to refresh the topsoil. MACC operating standards have required land to be searched to a depth of 50 centimeters, the normal ploughing depth in Kosovo in most years.[62]
Between June 1999 and December 2001, 945 villages and towns received community mine awareness training, 600 youth volunteers were trained and 71,500 youths participated in mine awareness education, 278 Imams and their wives were trained in mine awareness and 2,631 children were trained in child-to-child mine awareness activities.[63]
Mine awareness/mine risk education in 2001 continued to focus on community support, training of key community members and adolescent children, support to clearance organizations through the MAST (Mine Awareness Support Teams) initiative and the implementation of Operation Normal Life.[64]
MAST was initiated in 2000 due to confusion in some communities as to whether mine/UXO clearance had taken place, the extent of clearance, the remaining danger (if any) and similar issues. This arose mainly from the rapid tempo of clearance in 2000, which made integration of clearance and awareness activities difficult. Under the MAST program, “clearance organizations were required, to the extent possible, to undertake their own community based mine awareness liaison as an integral part of their mine/UXO clearance activities.”[65] Clearance agencies without staff available for such tasks were assigned MAST teams from other NGOs. The process was formalized with the inclusion of a mine awareness handover certificate as part of the quality assurance inspection process.[66]
Operation Normal Life (ONL) started in September 2001 and was completed in April 2002.[67] The MACC described ONL as “an acknowledgement that during the initial stages of the programme, mine awareness was not fully integrated with clearance activities. This resulted in some villagers being unsure of the work conducted by the clearance teams. If cleared land is not being used, then clearance has not achieved the aim of returning land to normal use.” The goal was therefore “to make all communities in Kosovo aware of the extent of mine action in their area” ensuring that they had a chance to discuss “any issues they may have in regards to mine action especially with regard to ‘pre MAST’ days.”[68] ONL was managed by the MACC in close coordination with UNICEF, and involved most mine awareness agencies including KFOR contingents. Of 570 villages visited, 12 required remedial action and one unknown cluster strike site was discovered.[69] Follow-up work will be undertaken by KPC EOD teams.[70]
Twelve organizations were accredited by the MACC to undertake mine risk education during 2001, including two contingents of KFOR (British and Swedish), as shown in the table below.[71]
Following closure of the MACC in December 2001, it was intended that the Ministry of Education would be the lead agency for mine awareness and public information, partly because mine awareness was to be included in the new school curriculum.[73] When it was decided that mine awareness would not be in the curriculum, it was considered better that the public information/mine awareness role remain within the DCP.[74] Two local staff employed in the public information role within the MACC were transferred to similar duties in the DCP.[75] UNICEF agreed to provide a consultant to support and train these staff within six months of the handover, but as of April 2002, this had not been implemented.[76]
Two KPC staff from each of the seven teams are being trained by the local organization ARKA in MAST activities. Though originally scheduled to be completed by the end of May 2002, the training did not begin until that month.[77]
UNICEF and the Ministry of Education were piloting in early 2002 a curriculum component called life skills, which would include mine awareness. This was planned to be introduced in all schools in Kosovo for September 2002.[78]
Civilian deaths and injuries resulting from landmine/UXO incidents continued to decline during 2001. According to MACC, there were 17 incidents that caused 22 casualties, of whom nine were killed and 13 injured.[79] In 2000, there were nine deaths and 84 injured.[80]
UXO incidents were more prevalent than mine or cluster bomblet incidents in 2001. There were five separate mine incidents, two bomblet incidents, and ten UXO incidents. Most UXO injuries involved intentional handling of items, indicating the need for continued public information campaigns on the dangers posed by UXO. Of the casualties, mines were responsible for two deaths and three injuries, cluster bomblets for three deaths, and UXO for four deaths and ten injuries. During 2001, there was one female casualty, an injury caused by UXO.[81]
According to ICRC data, eight people were killed and 22 injured in mine/UXO incidents in 2001.[82] It is not clear why there is a discrepancy between the MACC and ICRC statistics.
In April 2001, one British soldier was killed and two others injured when their vehicle hit a landmine in southwestern Kosovo.[83] In another incident in June 2001, a US soldier was injured when he stepped on a landmine.[84] The soldiers were all part of the KFOR peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. The incidents involving KFOR personnel are apparently not included in the MACC casualty statistics.
In February 2002, there were six civilian incidents, involving three deaths and three injuries. One death resulted from handling a cluster bomblet, one from a mine incident, and one from a hand grenade accidentally burnt with garden rubbish.[86]
Casualties among deminers working for clearance agencies from June 1999 to December 2001 totaled 32 (including 14 traumatic amputations, one fatality, one permanent incapacitation, and one loss of sight).[87]
The ICRC provided support to the casualty surveillance system and maintained the database up to the handover of the MACC in December 2001.[88] Responsibility for casualty data collection was to pass from the ICRC to the Public Health Institute (PHI) within the Ministry of Health Environment and Spatial Planning.[89] The ICRC conducted a data collection training seminar for PHI staff on 13 February 2002. Initially, it was intended that a member of staff from each of the PHI’s seven regional offices would undertake casualty data gathering. However, it seems no reporting has taken place.[90] As of early April 2002, no update of the IMSMA database had been supplied since November 2001.[91]
Kosovo has an extensive network of medical support across the region, with hospitals in most major towns. Mine casualties can generally reach some form of medical facility within a relatively short period of time. However, the facilities that exist in the different locations can vary widely, with Pristina Hospital the only hospital capable of handling major trauma cases. KFOR units provide an evacuation capability as well as immediate medical attention, particularly for serious cases.[92]
The World Health Organization (WHO) made some contribution to the reconstruction of Kosovo’s healthcare infrastructure. But, the healthcare system remains poorly equipped to deal with trauma victims. There is little or no capacity to provide rehabilitation, occupational therapy, or psychosocial counseling. No investment was made in healthcare facilities for over a decade, and current funding is limited.[93]
The difficulties encountered in providing adequate survivor assistance in Kosovo include: the absence of a social welfare system in Kosovo; uncoordinated donor support; uncoordinated medical evacuation of survivors out of Kosovo and the creation of expectations; low prioritization and understanding from the government authorities; absence of immediate emergency care after an incident; inappropriate care immediately after an incident, because of lack of expertise or facilities; lack of facilities for the replacement of prostheses, especially for growing children; and ongoing health and psychological problems.[94]
The ICRC, in cooperation with National Societies, provided equipment, training and technical support to Gjilan hospital and regional primary healthcare facilities. Surgical instruments and equipment was also provided to the Mitrovica hospital. Red Cross teams in the Mitrovica region received training in emergency medical evacuations. In 2001, 52 war-wounded casualties, including 32 mine/UXO casualties were treated. The ICRC reports that with NGOs scaling down there activities in Kosovo, or leaving altogether, there are increasing reports of civilians needing medical, surgical, and rehabilitation assistance for war-related injuries.[95]
Handicap International was appointed as the lead agency for victim assistance by UNMIK in 2000, taking over this responsibility from the WHO. HI undertakes support in cooperation with HandiKos, a local disability NGO.[96]
HI operates a prosthetics workshop in Pristina with the capacity to produce and fit lower limb prostheses. The workshop is the only such facility in Kosovo, and has sufficient capacity to deal with the number of cases it receives. However, it is very difficult for some patients to access the facility on a regular basis, particularly those living in rural areas without family and friends in Pristina.[97] In 2001, HI fitted 72 prostheses, distributed 290 wheelchairs and 460 crutches throughout Kosovo, and supported physical rehabilitation at the Klokot Physical Rehabilitation Center.[98] According to HI, there are currently only 24 physiotherapists in Kosovo – for a population of approximately two million. HI is seeking to support the University in Pristina in strengthening the Physiotherapy Department and developing training for physiotherapists to start in September 2002. In 2001, 360 landmine survivors benefited from the program.[99] In 2001, HI received funding support from DFID (UK), ECHO and the government of Luxembourg.[100]
Mine/UXO survivors can also receive assistance from the ITF in Slovenia, which has a specialist rehabilitation center in Ljubljana for mine survivors. In 2001, 28 mine survivors from Kosovo were treated at the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute.[101]
In February 2001, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) set up a mine victim assistance program aimed at reducing the dependency of mine survivors and assisting their reintegration into society. In 2001, the program operated in Prizren where activities included assessment visits to 155 mine/UXO survivors of which 59 were children, assistance with school materials, and the distribution of food parcels and firewood to 30 families. The JRS program to assist women with disabilities with training at the sewing center in Ferizai is in its second year. Sixty women have completed the training and a new group started in October 2001.[102]
The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) survivor assistance program ended on 28 February 2002, having been in Kosovo since November 1999. During 2001, the VVAF program provided psychosocial assistance to persons with war-related disabilities, including mine survivors, their families and communities, involved direct material assistance in food, medicine, or transport, educated survivors on their rights, and designed sports and recreational activities. In 2001 the program assisted 400 families, about 2,400 individuals. The program was budgeted at $595,000 with funds provided by UNICEF and the ITF.[103] After the program’s closure, VVAF presented each regional Center for Social Work (CSW) with summaries of VVAF’s work with the families and recommended follow-up action. The CSWs, a part of the UNMIK Department of Social Welfare, have responsibility for ongoing support. According to VVAF, one of the great successes of this program was enrolling all of its beneficiaries who qualified with the CSWs. VVAF also enrolled its beneficiaries with HandiKos.[104] In 2002, VVAF started a new program called “Sports for Life,” which aims to promote rehabilitation, rights, and reintegration for all persons with disability, including mine survivors.[105]
HI is concerned that, rather than seeking to establish sustainable programs of rehabilitation in Kosovo, some organizations have sought to provide assistance through transporting those requiring rehabilitation or prosthetics to other countries. HI claims that such approaches are more expensive than local solutions, often of limited benefit for the intended beneficiary, and work against the reestablishment of an effective and well-funded Kosovo-based rehabilitation capacity for mine survivors.[106]
In its exit strategy the MACC acknowledged that “more emphasis will need to be applied to rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives because of the relatively low level of attention given to this aspect of mine action to date.”[107] Under new arrangements of the provisional self-government, the Department of Health and Social Welfare has been split into the Ministry of Health, Environment and Spatial Planning, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which will assume responsibility for the long-term aspects of survivor assistance.[108]
Legislation has been introduced in Kosovo, which provides all mine survivors with a small monthly stipend.[109] HandiKos has been instrumental in establishing the Disability Council and the appointment of a Disability Adviser with the Prime Minister's Cabinet and the development of a Comprehensive Disability Policy Framework document, which is currently in the process of validation.[110]
| <FALKLANDS/MALVINAS | NAGORNO-KARABAKH> |
[1] For details of events leading to the administration of Kosovo as a separate entity, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 874, and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 948-949.
[2] “Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 15 January 2002.
[3] The Kosovo Protection Corps is an unarmed but uniformed body of 3,000 ex-members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The KPC reports to the new UNMIK Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP), previously the Department of Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness. See, “Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 15 January 2002.
[4] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 876-878, and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 949-951.
[5] For details of landmine/UXO casualties in Kosovo, see later section. For landmine/UXO casualties in southern Serbia, see report of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[6] “UNMIK-KFOR-UNMIK Police-UNHCR Press Briefing,” UNMIK, 9 July 2001.
[7] “Monthly Report to the UN on KFOR Operations, 1-30 September,” 23 October 2001.
[8] “Three Injured after Booby Trap Explosion in Kosovo,” Agence France Presse, 21 January 2002.
[9] “UNMIK-KFOR-UNMIK Police-UNHCR Press Briefings,” UNMIK, 9 and 16 July, 9 and 20 August, 1 October, 3 December 2001; Monthly Reports to the UN on KFOR Operations, 1-30 September 2001, 1-30 November 2001, 1-28 February 2002, 1-30 April 2002; “Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 23 October 2001, 25 January 2002, 9 April 2002, 4 June 2002.
[10] “Top UN Official in Kosovo Welcomes Weapon Amnesty Programme,” UN News Service, 11 March 2002. Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: US$1 = €0.898, used throughout this report. On 1 January 2002 the euro became Kosovo’s main currency.
[11] “Monthly Report to the UN on KFOR Operations, 1-30 April 2002;” “Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 4 June 2002.
[12] “UN Set to Transfer Demining Activities to Kosovo Authorities,” UN News Service, 14 December 2001.
[13] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report – 2001,” MACC, p. 1. For details of the MACC, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 882-884, and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 952-955.
[14] “Support to the UNMIK Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Management Cell in Kosovo,” UNMAS, 15 December 2001.
[15] Interview with Steven Saunders, EOD Operations Officer, DCP, Pristina, 15 April 2002.
[16] “Remaining Tasks in MNB Order, Amendment Six,” MACC, Pristina, 12 March 2002.
[17] Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002; “UNMIK Mine Action Programme – Annual Report 2001,” para. 10.
[18] Grmija Task dossier, viewed 15 April 2002; see later section on Mine/UXO clearance.
[19] “The Mine Action Programme in Kosovo/Background,” MACC, undated.
[20] Email from Steven Saunders, EOD Operations Officer, DCP, Pristina, 9 May 2002.
[21] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 24 and 25.
[22] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen: an Evaluation of the United Nations Mine Action Programme in Kosovo 1999-2001,” 12 February 2002, p. 9.
[23] Ibid., pp. 5-10.
[24] Ibid., p. 10.
[25] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, p. 4.
[26] “Support to the UNMIK Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Management Cell in Kosovo,” UN Mine Action Service, 15 December 2001.
[27] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, p. 19.
[28] HI, “Work Plan For EAR-Funded Mine Action Project – August 2001 to September 2002,” 14 April 2002, p. 4. HI was funded to carry out the training, supervision and management support by the European Agency for Reconstruction. If further funding is obtained, HI will be requested to continue with a reduced presence after September 2002. “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para. 22, and interview with Driton Ukmata, Director, HI, Pristina, 15 April 2002.
[29] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para. 23.
[30] Emails from Lance Malin, Mine Action Program Manager, HI, 8 May 2002, and from Steven Saunders, EOD Operations Officer, DCP, 9 May 2002.
[31] UNMIK/REG/1999/8, 20 September 1999.
[32] “Support to the UNMIK Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Management Cell in Kosovo,” UNMAS, 15 December 2001.
[33] Interview with Nora Demiri, Mine Awareness Officer, ICRC Kosovo, Pristina, 19 February 2002.
[34] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, p. 83.
[35] Interview with Lance Malin, Mine Action Program Manager, HI, Pristina, 13 April 2002.
[36] Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002.
[37] Interview with Lance Malin, HI, 13 April 2002.
[38] Interview with David Hare, Technical Advisor, HI, 14 April 2002.
[39] Email from Paul Collinson, former Kosovo Program Manager for Norwegian People’s Aid, 8 April 2002; interview with Lance Malin, Mine Action Program Manager, HI, Pristina, 13 April 2002; interview with Ronen Shimoni, Administrator, HALO Trust, Pristina, 19 April 2002. The quote is from “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2000,” MACC, January 2001, p. 1.
[40] Email to Landmine Monitor from Eva Veble, Head of International Relations, ITF, 5 June 2002.
[41] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para. 48, Annex G.
[42] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras 6,7.
[43] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, pp. 85-97.
[44] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, pp. 85-87.
[45] Ibid., pp. 20-24, 90-93. The MACC Annual Report for 2001, Annex G, shows that the VTF received $10.6 million for Kosovo by the end of 2001; the difference is accounted for by $639,000 of unearmarked VTF funds.
[46] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, pp. 94-95.
[47] Ibid., pp. 95-97.
[48] Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[49] Ibid., p. 18.
[50] Ibid., pp. 59-62. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 958-960.
[51] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 24, 25.
[52] Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002; interview with Lance Malin, HI, 13 April 2002.
[53] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para 9. Landmine Monitor has added in to the cluster bomblet total the 7,455 cleared by KFOR.
[54] Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002.
[55] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para 9. The 8.1 square kilometers cleared in 2001 compares to 19.4 square kilometers cleared in 2000.
[56] “Concept of Operations for Mine UXO Clearance in 2001,” MACC, September 2000.
[57] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras 6, 7.
[58] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, pp. 77-78.
[59] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para. 15.
[60] Grmija Task Dossier, viewed 15 April 2002; interview with John Hare, Technical Advisor, HI, Pristina, 15 April 2002; interview with Ronen Shimoni, Administrator, HALO Trust, Pristina, 19 April 2002.
[61] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 963; email from Lance Malin, Mine Action Program Manager, HI, 8 May 2002.
[62] Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002.
[63] Interview with Miranda Shala, Mine Awareness Officer, UNICEF, Pristina, 12 April 2002.
[64] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para 26.
[65] Ibid., paras 27-28; interview with Leonie Barnes, Public Information Officer, MACC, Geneva, 12 November 2001.
[66] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para 28.
[67] Adrian Sahatciu, “Final report on the Outcome of Project Normal Life,” ARKA, Pristina (undated).
[68] “Guidelines for Project Normal Life,” MACC, Pristina (undated), p. 1.
[69] Discovered by ARKA in Peje. Information received in interview with Sgt. P. McCullough, KFOR, Prizren, 18 April 2002.
[70] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 33-35; interview with Sgt. P. McCullough, KFOR, Prizren, 18 April 2002.
[71] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, Annex F.
[72] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, pp. 51, 63.
[73] “UNMIK MACC Exit Strategy Discussion Paper,” MACC, 3 January 2001, p. 10.
[74] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 30-32.
[75] Interview with Rajmonda Thaqi, Mine Awareness Assistant, and Bajram Krasniqi, Public Information, DCP, Pristina, 15 April 2002; interview with Miranda Shala, UNICEF, 12 April 2002; interview with Nora Demiri, Mine Awareness Officer, ICRC, Pristina 19 April 2002.
[76] “Post MACC exit strategy for UNICEF Kosovo,” UNICEF, November 2001; interview with Miranda Shala, Mine Awareness Officer, UNICEF, Pristina, 12 April 2002.
[77] “Country Updates Delivered to the Mine Action Support Group – Kosovo,” in “Things That Go Bang!” (UNICEF e-bulletin), Issue Four, 13 May 2002.
[78] Interview with Miranda Shala, UNICEF, 12 April 2002.
[79] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 36-38; this data does not include deminers/EOD staff and is for the year to 15 December, the date of the handover of the MACC responsibilities.
[80] See table below, “Verified Civilian Mine/UXO Accidents in Kosovo June 1999-December 2001.”
[81] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 36-38.
[82] ICRC, “ICRC Mine/UXO Awareness Programmes: Mine incidents in South Eastern Europe,” 28 January 2002. The ICRC figures also do not include accidents involving mine/UXO clearance staff.
[83] Stefan Racin, “British Soldier Dies in Kosovo Mine Blast,” UPI, 14 April 2001.
[84] “2 U.S. Soldiers Hurt in Mideast,” Associated Press, 25 June 2001.
[85] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, p. 73; “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2000,” MACC, p. 4; “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 36-38.
[86] Interviews with Rajmonda Thaqi, Mine Awareness Assistant, and Bajram Krasniqi, Public Information Assistant, DCP, Pristina, 15 April 2002.
[87] “Summary of Lessons Learnt of the Mine/UXO Accidents in Kosovo,” MACC, 1 November 2001.
[88] Interview with Nora Demiri, ICRC, 19 April 2002.
[89] “Mine/UXO Victim Assistance in Kosovo: Roles And Responsibilities of Local Government Departments and Supporting Organizations,” MACC, 13 December 2001.
[90] Interview with Nora Demiri, ICRC, 19 February 2002.
[91] Interview with Lance Malin, Mine Action Program Manager, HI, Pristina, 13 April 2002.
[92] “UNMIK MACC Exit Strategy Discussion Paper,” 3 January 2001, p. 11.
[93] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, p. 103.
[94] Driton Ukmata, Program Director, Handicap International Kosovo, presentation at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.
[95] ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, pp. 35-36.
[96] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 969.
[97] “UNMIK MACC Exit Strategy Discussion Paper,” 3 January 2001, p. 11.
[98] Interview with Driton Ukmata, HI, 15 April 2002; and response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 19 July 2002.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Interview with Driton Ukmata, HI, 15 April 2002.
[101] “Annual Report 2001,” International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, p. 22.
[102] “Annual Report 2001,” Jesuit Refugee Service, p. 57.
[103] Robert Schmidt Jr, Head of Mission, VVAF, Pristina, Response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 18 February 2002.
[104] Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Robert Schmidt Jr, Head of Mission, VVAF, Pristina, 19 February 2002.
[105] Sarah Warren, Program Development Officer, VVAF, presentation at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.
[106] Interview with Driton Ukmata, HI, 15 April 2002. These views were also expressed by other participants at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1-2 July 2002.
[107] “UNMIK MACC Exit Strategy Discussion Paper,” 3 January 2001, p. 13.
[108] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 39-43.
[109] The Praxis Group Ltd, “Willing To Listen,” 12 February 2002, p. 84.
[110] Driton Ukmata, Handicap International Kosovo, presentation at the ITF Workshop, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.
