Key developments since May 2001: Perú has played a leadership role in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program, and in promotion of full implementation of the treaty. Perú served as co-chair of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance until September 2001 and since then, has served as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation. In September 2001, Perú completed destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines. It reduced the number of mines retained for training to 4,024, and destroyed a total of 322,892 mines. In June 2002, the Peruvian Army completed mine clearance along 18 kilometers of the Zarumilla Canal on the border with Ecuador.
Perú signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 17 June 1998, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. On 16 May 2002, Perú submitted its third Article 7 Report, covering the period from March 2001 to March 2002.[1] It included information in optional Form J.
While Perú has reported thirteen different implementation measures, there is no specific legislation in place to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.[2] A number of provisions in Perú’s Criminal Code apply to possession and trade in weapons and include criminal sanctions; these would apply to antipersonnel mines.[3]
Perú attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, where it announced completion of its stockpile destruction.[4] Representatives from Perú’s diplomatic mission in Geneva and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.
Perú continued to play a leadership role in the intersessional work program in general. It served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies, along with the Netherlands, from September 2000 to September 2001. Following the Third Meeting of States Parties, it took on the role of co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, together with Austria. [5]
At the May 2002 meeting of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Perú made an intervention with respect to Article 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty (on the issue of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices), in which it encouraged States Parties to evaluate their positions taking into account humanitarian aspects, and to make an “authentic interpretation” of the Mine Ban Treaty according to its spirit as well as its letter.[6]
At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, Perú and the ICRC organized a Spanish-language information seminar on the Mine Ban Treaty and related topics such as antivehicle mines, explosives remnants of war, and the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its protocols, which was attended by government representatives from the region, as well as the OAS, ICRC, GICHD, UN, and ICBL.
Perú cosponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in support of the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001.
Perú is a State Party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It participated in the third annual meeting of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW and the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001. Perú submitted its annual Article 13 report, on 10 December 2001.
Perú continues to promote implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in bilateral and regional efforts. On 9 September 2001, the Perú-Chile Permanent Committee on Consultations and Policy Coordination, which was established in July 2001, met for the first time, with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of both countries participating.[7] One of the first measures agreed on was to hold simultaneous stockpile destruction events on 13 September 2001 in Calama, Chile and Pucusana, Perú.[8] The Ministers agreed on a ten-point declaration that included a commitment to eradicate landmines from their common border as soon as possible.[9]
On 23-25 November 2001, Perú hosted the XI Iberoamerican Summit, attended by the 21 member nations.[10] The 43rd point of the Lima Declaration focused on the landmine problem in the region and stated, “[T]aking into account the devastating effect of antipersonnel mines on civilian populations, we highlight the importance of the Third Meeting of State Parties and reaffirm our expectations for finding solutions to eliminate this problem, to improve the situation of victims and facilitate their reinsertion in the socioeconomic life of their countries. In this sense, we make a call to States that have the necessary resources and technologies to continue to provide assistance.”
Representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army attended a conference on “Mine Action in Latin America” in Miami, from 3-5 December 2001, where Army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives made a presentation on Peruvian perspectives in mine action.[11]
On 17 June 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú and Venezuela) met in Lima and issued the “Lima Commitment.”[12] In the Lima Commitment, six points were outlined related to the Mine Ban Treaty, including complete destruction of stocks, establishing national programs for victim assistance and socioeconomic reintegration, and a call for non-state actors to comply with the international norm against antipersonnel mines.
On 25 June 2002, Chile’s Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Perú’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Lima. In a joint press release, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to eradicate antipersonnel mines, according to the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty, and expressed satisfaction that Chile had decided to implement a national mine clearance plan to eradicate mines along the common border.[13]
The Navy’s Center for Weapons Manufacturing used to produce antipersonnel mines. Perú has reported that production facilities were permanently closed in 1997.[14] The National Police also produced antipersonnel mines, but stopped in 1994.[15] In its most recent Article 7 report, Perú disclosed that antipersonnel mines were also manufactured at the “Los Cibeles” Police Barracks.[16]
A senior Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor that Perú never exported antipersonnel mines.[17] In the past, Perú imported mines from Belgium, Spain, the United States, the USSR, and Yugoslavia.
In mid January 2002, a Newsweek magazine article reported that guerrillas from one of Colombia’s main guerrilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army, FARC-EP) were seen deep in the Peruvian jungle 450 kilometers from the border with Colombia, equipped with weapons including landmines.[18]
Perú maintains that it did not use landmines during the “Cenepa Conflict” with Ecuador in 1995.[19]
On 13 September 2001, the Engineering Service of the Army destroyed the final 27,025 antipersonnel mines from Perú’s stockpiles. The destruction took place at Quebrada Cruz del Hueso in Lurín, in the department of Lima.[20] Government officials, diplomats, and representatives of international and regional agencies attended the event. By completing this task ahead of the Third Meeting of State Parties, which opened on 18 September 2001, Perú met the key “Managua Challenge” goal.[21]
Perú destroyed a total of 321,730 antipersonnel mines, all in a period of three and a half months, from 30 May to 13 September 2001. An additional 926 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in December 2001, in keeping with a decision to reduce the number of mines retained for training purposes, bringing the total to 322,892 destroyed mines.[22]
In May 2002, Perú reported that it is retaining 4,024 antipersonnel mines for training.[23] This represents a decrease of 1,554 mines from the number previously reported.[24] The Army has retained 4,000 antipersonnel mines: 500 PMD-6 (USSR-manufactured), 775 CICITEC (Perú), 600 M18-A1 Claymore (USA), 100 M35 C/ESP M5 (Belgium), 525 M-409 (Belgium), 500 PMA-3 (former Yugoslavia), 500 PMD-6M (USSR), and 500 POMZ-2M (USSR).[25] The other 24 mines are CICITEC mines being retained by the National Police DIVSAM-DEXA (División de Seguridad de Activación de Minas-Dispositivos Explosivos de Autoprotección).
Date Destruction location (Institution) Number (Mine Type) 30 May 2001 Coscobamba, Piura, First Military Region (Army) 33,421 (PMA-3, CICITEC and P4A1) 17 Jul 2001 Lima (Navy) 108 (M-16) 17 Jul 2001 Lima (Navy) 254 (MA) 25 Jul 2001 Coscobamba, Piura (Army) 72,301 (PMA-3, CICITEC, POMZ-2M, PMD-6, PMD-6M) 3 Aug 2001 Quebrada Bocapán, Tumbes (Army) 63,596 (PMA-3, CICITEC, POMZ-2M, PMD-6/M-35) 17 Aug 2001 Arequipa (Army) 44,016 (PMA-3, M-35, M-409, FUZE M-5, POMZ-2M, PMD-6M, EXPAL P4A 24 Aug 2001 Quebrada del Espíritu, Tacna (Army) 81,009 (EXPAL, M-35, POMZ-2M, PMD-6M) 13 Sept 2001 Quebrada Cruz del Hueso, Lima (Army) 27,025 (EXPAL P-4, PMA-3, M-409, M-35) 14 Dec 2001 Lima (Navy) 926 (MA) Sub-total 322,656 Unknown 236 (DEXA and CICITEC) Total 322,892
Perú is affected by landmines on the northern border with Ecuador, as a result of the border conflict in 1995; on the southern border with Chile; and in two coastal departments (Lima and Ica) and five departments in the Andean Highlands (Cajamarca, Huancavelica, Junín, and Puno) where the Armed Forces and National Police laid mines around public infrastructure and electrical installations[27] during Perú’s internal conflict of the 1980s and early 1990s. Past reporting by Landmine Monitor has provided extensive detail of the landmine problem and affected areas.[28] Landmine Monitor has found no evidence of mine-affected areas in regions along the border with Colombia.
In May 2002, Perú provided additional information on departments in the northern border areas that are suspected mine-affected, due to mine incidents in the areas. These include six suspected areas in Tumbes, three in Piura, four in Amazonas and six in Loreto.[29] With respect to the departments of Amazonas and Loreto, Perú reported that it did not use mines before, during, or after the 1995 “Cenepa Conflict,” and that it does not possess maps or registries of mines in these areas.[30]
Perú’s mine problem has been affected by climate changes such as El Niño. Heavy rainfall along the border with Ecuador creates the danger of mine displacement.[31] It is also suspected that in the south, Chilean mines might have been displaced into Peruvian territory by rain and erosion. According to an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the landmine problem along the border with Chile was not included in the Article 7 Report because Perú had not laid mines there.[32]
Most mine incidents occur in the departments of Huancavelica, Ica, Junín, and Lima, and, according to the Office of the Ombudsman (Defensoria del Publico) which published the first national independent study about the landmine problem in Perú, the mined areas around the electrical towers pose a greater threat for the civilian population than mine-affected areas along the northern border.[33]
In March 2002, the ICRC and Ombudsman were reported as saying that people in the highlands often take down the protective fencing around the electrical towers to use it in their own fields. Then mine incidents occur when cattle enter the area to graze, and people ignore the warnings and try to recover their animals.[34]
The DEXA antipersonnel mine, used in the tens of thousands around the electrical towers, is believed to pose the greatest threat to civilians because it looks like a container which people usually associate with food or humanitarian aid supplies.[35] Children mistake the DEXA for toys or try to use them as toy boxes.[36]
In its fiscal year 2001, the United States provided over $1.66 million for mine action activities in Perú.[37] This contribution covered the costs of US Special Operations Forces “train the trainer” programs, as well as provision of vehicles and equipment for demining.[38]
In addition, in 2001 contributions to the OAS Assistance Program for Demining in both Ecuador and Perú totalled $1.59 million ($594,000 from Japan and $1 million from the US).[39] This represents an increase from $772,347 contributed for the year 2000 ($272,437 from Canada and $500,000 from the US), and $198,000 for 1999 (from Canada).
Total contributions for the “Managua Challenge” project, which assisted stockpile destruction by Perú, Ecuador, and Honduras prior to the Third Meeting of State Parties in September 2001, totaled $487,533 ($448,616 from Canada and $38,917 from Australia).[40]
In May 2002, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the National Police and the electric energy company ETECEN had signed a $371,000 agreement for mine clearance around 350 ETECEN high-tension towers.[41] A $100,000 OAS contribution will be used for insurance for the demining personnel, equipment, food, and lodging.[42] In its 2002 budget, ETECEN allocated $45,136 to purchase mine incident insurance for Divsam-Dexa personnel.
Perú is in the process of establishing the Peruvian Center for Mine Action, to be known as “Contraminas.” Contraminas is already preparing a draft mine action plan,[43] and setting up an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[44] Until Contraminas is officially launched, coordination of mine action activities in Perú remains the responsibility of the Mine Action Working Group, made up of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and established in September 1999.[45]
In February 2002, the Peruvian Army drafted a plan for the continuation of mine clearance along the border with Ecuador, as well as around the electrical towers inside the country.[46] Periodic visits by AICMA personnel are planned to provide assistance to this effort until a joint OAS-IADB technical team is established in mid-2002.
In May 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman asserted to Landmine Monitor that there is no coordination among the various institutions that deal with landmine issues.[47] It also said the absence of the landmine issue in the media is a problem, and this is because the issue is not an urban problem; victims are usually poor people from the interior of the country.[48]
As part of the peace agreement of 26 October 1998, Perú and Ecuador agreed to demine the border under the supervision of the Ecuador/Perú Multinational Observation Mission, MOMEP.[49] Mine clearance operations are the responsibility of Peruvian Army Engineers.
The demining battalion has 140 persons, in ten teams of fourteen each, trained in 1999 with the support of the US and Spain.[50] Perú reported that by the end of 2001, 95 people (officers and NCOs) had been trained in mine clearance and stockpile destruction.[51] Between May 1999 and June 2000, the Engineering School of the Peruvian Army conducted five courses on demining and on stockpile destruction.[52]
Perú has completed three important mine clearance projects along the Ecuadorian border. The first, between January and March 1999, involved clearance of 82,814 square meters of land, and destruction of 438 mines, in order to permit placement of border markers between the two countries.[53]
The second, completed between October 1999 and March 2000, together with Ecuador, involved mine clearance of a 7.1 kilometer-long and 5 meter-wide trail that joins the Tiwinza Memorial, located on the Peruvian side of the border, with Ecuador.[54] Some 963 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the demining operation, which cost $2,854,012.[55]
The third project, initiated in July 2001, involved mine clearance of the 18 kilometers of the Zarumilla Canal and its source at La Palma. In 2002, further clearance took place because flooding in December 2001 raised concerns about possible displacement of mines.[56] On 14 June 2002, the Army declared clearance of Zarumilla Canal complete and said that 906 mines and 1,259 UXO had been found.[57]
Mine clearance operations around public infrastructure and high-tension electrical towers is the responsibility of the electrical companies and executed by a specialized division of the National Police, DIVSAM-DEXA.
Clearance of 178 mined high-tension towers owned by the private electricity company EDEGEL was completed on 16 February 2001, and 9,168 mines were destroyed, according to the National Police.[58] Between March and December 2001, DIVSAM-DEXA destroyed 212 mines laid around eight high-tension towers owned by ETECEN.[59]
As noted above, the National Police and the electric energy company ETECEN have signed an agreement to demine 350 ETECEN high-tension towers.[60] The clearance of the towers is being carried out with the support of the OAS, and priority is being given to transmission lines located around populated centers.[61]
DIVSAM-DEXA and ETECEN have also carried out inspections and installed barbed wire and concrete barriers around high-tension electrical towers. Officers at the DIVSAM-DEXA’s Santa Inés base submit reports, including photos, on the status of warning signals and barbed wire fencing around mined electrical towers.
According to officials at DIVSAM-DEXA, in October 2001, nineteen National Police personnel participated in their eighth training course on mine clearance. In early 2002, DIVSAM-DEXA organized a short refresher course on mine clearance and first aid for all DIVSAM-DEXA personnel.[62] Between April and May 2002, the first phase of an OAS training course on humanitarian demining was held with support from MARMINCA instructors. Forty individuals were trained in mine clearance and another 30 in planning humanitarian demining operations. A second phase will train officers to supervise operations, and will update DIVSAM-DEXA procedures.[63]
Army personnel are in charge of mine risk education (MRE) campaigns in communities close to the border with Ecuador. They work with bilingual teachers, and produce and disseminate magazines, posters, and other graphic materials.[64] MRE activities take place in schools and local communities.
In 2001, DIVSAM-DEXA conducted 63 MRE activities including eleven in Huancayo, Junín department; eleven in Huancavelica; nine in Pisco, Ica department; and 32 in the department of Lima.[65]
DIVSAM-DEXA and ETECEN published a safety brochure that includes mine risk education messages. The brochure contains little visual information and does not accurately depict an antipersonnel mine. It is written in Spanish, but in remote areas such as Huancavelica department, most of the population speaks the local language (Quechua) and in addition, there is a high illiteracy rate. The brochure also includes emergency numbers in Huancavelica and other cities but many of Huancavelica’s villages lack telephone service.[66]
In 2001, four civilians were injured in three landmine incidents (two incidents in Chilean territory and one in Perú):
As of June 2002, two civilians had been injured and one killed in two mine incidents in 2002, (one incident in Ecuadorian territory and one in Perú):
There were no reported Perúvian military or police casualties in 2001 or 2002.[74]
A project to establish a national registry of landmine casualties did not start in 2001.[75] Officials from the DP told Landmine Monitor that there is no coordination yet between the National Institute for Rehabilitation and the Ministry of Health to determine causes of trauma or injury of patients they received.[76] The ICRC Lima has kept records of mine incidents and casualties in the country since 1992. According to a March 2002 media report, between 1992 and 2001 the ICRC recorded 64 civilians injured by mines laid around high-tension electrical towers; most of them were children.[77]
The Army and the National Police provide medical assistance, physical rehabilitation, and prostheses to their personnel injured by mines. Assistance for civilians is more limited, particularly in rural areas close to the border with Ecuador and in the central highlands. Most mine and UXO survivors are children from extremely poor rural areas, who face problems with social, economic and educational reintegration following medical care and physical rehabilitation.[78] In general their relatives do not have the economic resources available for transportation or to accompany the child for medical treatment, and their capacity to provide psychological support to a person in need of additional attention in the home is limited. Huancavelica, one of the most heavily affected departments is also the poorest department in the country, with some of the highest rates of illiteracy.[79]
In 2001, the ICRC provided prostheses for two new mine survivors, and to May 2002, supplied two pairs of crutches and four prostheses.[80] The ICRC also covered the medical expenses of 21 people, six of whom had been injured by landmines or UXO.[81]
An agreement between the National Rehabilitation Institute in Callao and the ICRC has allowed mine survivors to receive physical therapy at the Institute, as well as rehabilitation including psychological support and skills training in areas such as shoe repair, computers or knitting.[82] Most mine survivors, however, are very poor and do not have the funds needed to start a business when they return to their community after rehabilitation, and depending on the injury suffered and the location of their community, also some survivors cannot return to school.[83]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited CONADIS (National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities) to provide a representative to assist in the development of a National Plan for Victim Assistance, but it declined due to a lacks of funds to do this task.[84]
Perú has enacted a number of measures related to disabled persons, including mine survivors.[85]
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[1] The first report was submitted on 2 May 2000, covering up to March 2000. The second report was submitted on 4 May 2001, covering March 2000-March 2001.
[2] Article 7 Report, Form A, 4 May 2001; interview with Dr. Marcela Arriola, Chairperson, National Commission of International Humanitarian Law Application (CONADIH), 31 May 2002.
[3] Interview with the Air Force General Luis Raygada Cáceres, member of the Working Group Foreign Affairs-Defense, Lima, 25 April 2001.
[4] Statement by Minister Heli Pelaez Castro, Head of Delegation of Perú, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 18 September 2001.
[5] Gustavo Laurie, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Perú to the United Nations in Geneva, served as the co-rapporteur at the January and May 2002 meetings.
[6] Notes taken by Landmine Monitor (MAC) at the Standing Committee meeting on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 31 May 2002.
[7] “Dan primer paso reducir gastos militares,” El Comercio, Lima, 10 September 2001.
[8] Ibid.; Patricia Kadena, “Chile ratifica que comprará más aviones F16 y fragatas,” La República, Lima, 10 September 2001; “Simbólica destrucción de minas,” El Mercurio de Calama, Calama, Chile, 13 September 2001; “Ejército destruye 14,000 minas antipersonales en el norte de Chile,” AFP (Calama), 13 September 2001.
[9] “Cancilleres y ministros de Defensa de Perú y Chile acuerdan erradicar minas,” AFP (Lima), 9 September 2001.
[10] The summit included countries of Central and South America, as well as Spain and Portugal. See http://xicumbre.rree.gob.pe and Iberoamerican States Organization at www.oei.es/xicumbredec.htm.
[11] Presentation by Colonel Celso Salazar Lloreda of the Perúvian Army and Chief of the Countermine Office, and Mrs. Stella Maris Chirinos Llerena, Third Secretary, Vice-Directorate of OAS and Hemispheric Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Panel on Future Challenges, “Perúvian Perspectives,” 5 December 2001. See http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/.
[12] “Compromiso de Lima” (aka the “Andean Letter for Peace and Security towards Limits and Control of External Defense Spending”), 17 June 2002, at: www.rree.gob.pe; see also Statement by Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales, Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, at the Conference on Disarmament, 27 June 2002.
[13] Comunicado de Prensa Conjunto and “Canciller de Chile realiza visita oficial a nuestro país,” Nota de Prensa 100-02, Minsterio de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, 25 June 2002.
[14] Article 7 Report, Form E, 16 May 2002.
[15] Ibid. Past production by the National Police was not reported in Perú’s initial Article 7 Report, though it was reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 296.
[16] Article 7 Report, Form E, 16 May 2002.
[17] Telephone interview with General Raúl O’Connor, Director, Information Office, Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2000.
[18] Sharon Stevenson, “The FARC's Fifth Column,” Newsweek, 15-21 January 2002.
[19] Article 7 Report, Form C, 16 May 2002.
[20] “Record of Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines.” Document certifying the destruction, dated 13 September 2002.
[21] “Perú culmina destrucción de 321,368 minas antipersonales”, La República, (Lima), 13 September 2001, “Perú culmina destrucción de minas antipersonales, anuncia ministro”, AFP (Lima), 13 September 2001, “Respuesta por la vida” El Peruano (Lima), 14 September 2001; “Minas antipersonales peruanas ya son historia, Expreso, (Lima), 14 September 2001 “Ni una mina más en el arsenal”, El Comercio, (Lima) 14 September 2001.
[22] Article 7 Report, Form G, 16 May 2002. Perú had indicated a total of 315,312 stockpiled mines in its 2001 Article 7 Report, but in its 2002 report stated that following further evaluation by the Ministry of Defense, and the discovery of an additional number of CICITEC and P4 A1 mines, the total number of mines in stock, and subsequently destroyed was 322,892. Article 7 Report, Form G, Nota, 16 May 2002, and Article 7 Report, Form B, 4 May 2001.
[23] Article 7 Report, Form B and D, table 1, 16 May 2002.
[24] Article 7 Report, Form D, table 1, 4 May 2001. Of the 1,554 mines, it appears that 462 were destroyed before September 2001 (50 PMA-3 mines, 50 PMD-6M mines, 108 Navy M-16 mines, and 254 other Navy mines variously designated MA, MGP30 or AP60510), then 926 were destroyed in December 2001 (again various Navy mines). The remaining mines no longer listed as retained are likely M18A1 Claymore mines that are no longer classified as antipersonnel mines.
[25] Article 7 Report, Form B and D, table 1, 16 May 2002. The 100 M-35 mines being retained were not listed in the May 2001 Article 7 Report.
[26] Based on Article 7 Report, Form G, 16 May 2002; and “33,421 Minas Antipersonas Fueron destruídas por el Ejército,” Editorial, Actualidad Militar, No. 412, June-July 2001. The article is available at www.ejercito.mil.pe in the publications section.
[27] For details on the more than 53,000 antipersonnel mines laid around 1,655 high-tension electrical towers in six departments, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 379; Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 2, 16 May 2002. The Article 7 Report does not provide additional information on electrical towers in the Paramonga area of Lima, or areas in the former Armed Forces training center in La Chira, Lima, that are suspected to be mine-affected.
[28] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 298-299.
[29] Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 2, 16 May 2002.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Interview with Advisor Manuel Talavera, Subdirector of International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and member of the Foreign Affairs-Defense Working Group, Lima, 24 April 2001; interview with Daniel Soria and Susana Klien, Commissioners of the Constitutional Affairs Department at the Ombudsman Office, Lima, 15 May 2002.
[32] Interview with Manuel Talavera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lima, 10 May 2002.
[33] Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe Defensorial N° 35: El problema de las minas antipersonales dentro del territorio nacional, March 2000; interview with Commissioners Daniel Soria and Susana Klien, Defensoría del Pueblo, Lima, 15 May 2002.
[34] Gastón Agurto, “Jaque a las Torres,” Caretas, No. 1713, Lima, 21 March 2002.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Interview with Dafne Martos, ICRC, 3 May 2002; Special Report by Julia María Urrunaga, “Meshac y Pedael buscaban pita para sus trompos,” El Comercio (Lima), 20 January 2002; Julia María Urrunaga, “Víctimas de las minas olvidadas,” El Comercio, Lima, 20 January 2002.
[37] US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” November 2001, p. 38.
[38] Ibid.
[39] “OAS Mine Action Program: Statement of Contributions Received by December 2001, 1992-2001,” Non-official table provided in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Carl Case, OAS, 18 June 2002.
[40] Colonel William McDonough. “Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security,” 14 March 2002.
[41] Interview with Minister Manuel Talavera and First Secretary Hugo Contreras, 10 May 2002; also Aide Memoire of Foreign Affairs, given to Landmine Monitor (Perú) on 10 May 2002; letter from Colonel Alfredo Miranda to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Email to Landmine Monitor (Perú) from First Secretary Hugo Contreras, Chair of the International Security and Disarmament Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 May 2002.
[44] In 2001, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining trained a police officer, a cartographer and an Army Engineer technician to use the IMSMA software. GICHD, “Updates on Activities between January and December 2001,” 31 December 2001, p. 4.
[45] Aide Memoire given by the Foreign Affairs Minister to Landmine Monitor (Perú) on 10 May 2002.
[46] Colonel William McDonough. “Report of the OAS-Mine Action Program to the Committee on Hemispheric Security,” 14 March 2002.
[47] Interview with Commissioner from the Office of the Ombudsman, 15 May 2002.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Telephone interview with Minister Manuel Talavera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2002.
[50] US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” November 2001, p. 38.
[51] CCW Article 13 Report, 10 December 2001, p. 7.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Statement by the Perúvian Delegation to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 9 May 2001.
[54] Telephone interview with Minister Manuel Talavera, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2002; CCW Article 13 Report, 10 December 2001, p. 6; Aide Memoire given by Chancellery to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 10 May 2002, p. 2.
[55] CCW Article 13 Report, 10 December 2001, p. 7.
[56] Aide Memoire provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 10 May 2002, p. 2.
[57] Milagros Rodríguez, “Culminan desminado humanitario en 18 kilómetros de la frontera norte,” El Comercio, Lima, 15 June 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release 91-02, “Ejército Perúano entregará desminado del canal de Zarumilla.”
[58] Interview with Pilar Campana, EDEGEL SA, Lima, 22 February 2001; Letter from Colonel Miranda to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.
[59] Letter from Colonel Miranda, DIVSAM-DEXA, to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002. Article 7 Report, Form G, Table 2, 16 May 2002, reports this as 236 mines.
[60] Interview with Minister Manuel Talavera and First Secretary Hugo Contreras, 10 May 2002; also Aide Memoire of Foreign Affairs, given to Landmine Monitor (Perú) on 10 May 2002; letter from Colonel Alfredo Miranda to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.
[61] Letter from Colonel Alfredo Miranda, DIVSAM-DEXA to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002; interview with Major Víctor Andrés Patiño and Commander Silva, DIVSAM-DEXA, 21 May 2002.
[62] Letter from Colonel Miranda, DIVSAM-DEXA to Landmine Monitor (Perú), 17 May 2002.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 May 2002.
[65] Letter to Landmine Monitor (Perú) from Colonel Alfonso Miranda and Major Víctor Patiño, DIVSAM-DEXA, 27 May 2002.
[66] Landmine Monitor researcher observations.
[67] “Cuando intentaba entrar ilegalmente a Chile. Perúano resultó herido por mina antipersonal,” La Tercera (Santiago, Chile), 9 April 2001; “Pierde pie derecho por ingresar en forma ilegal a Chile,” El Comercio (Lima), 10 April 2001; Editorial, “Frontera con Chile,” La Industria de Trujillo (Trujillo), 11 April 2001.
[68] “Perúano herido por mina antipersonal al entrar a Chile” El Mostrador (Santiago), 7 November 2001.
[69] Article 7 Report, Form J, table 2, 16 May 2002.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Julia María Urunaga, “Meshac y Pedael buscaban pita para sus trompos” (Meshac and Pedael were looking for some string for their spinners) in El Comercio (Lima), 20 January 2002. A March 2002 report by DIVSAM-DEXA defined the device as an “anti-escalation” device. See Report 028-2002-DIRSEG/JESSEE-DIVSAMDEXA-APO of 2 March 2002, submitted to the Ombudsman, Walter Albán, who requested information to the Ministry of the Interior on 14 January 2002.
[72] Article 7 Report, Form J, table 2, 16 May 2002.
[73] “Joven Perúano pierde la vida al pisar mina” in La Hora (Zamora, Ecuador), 15 January 2002.
[74] Perú did not include information on any casualties in the Army or National Police in its May 2002 Article 7 report. DIVSAM-DEXA officials did not reported or recorded any antipersonnel mine casualties. Landmine Monitor Interview with Major Patiño and Commander Silva from Divsam-Dexa, National Police, Lima, 21 May 2002. For details on Army and National Police mines casualties in the period from 1990 to 2000 see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 384.
[75] The planned project was reported in Perú’s Article 7 Report, Form J, submitted 4 May 2001 and the institutions to be included were the National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS), the Ombudsman’s Office of Perú, the Army, National Police, the National Confederation of the Disabled CONFENADIP, the Association for the Development of Disabled Persons, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Perú office.
[76] Interview with Daniel Soria and Susana Klien, Commissioners of Constitutional Affairs of the Ombudsman Office, 15 May 2002. See also Agurto, Gastón. “Jaque a las torres” in Caretas N° 1713, 21 March 2002. The document notes that the Ministry of Health has no official records of landmine casualties in the country.
[77] Agurto, Gastón. “Jaque a las torres” in Caretas (Lima), N°1713, 21 March 2002.
[78] Interviews with Daniel Soria and Susana Klein, Office of the Ombudsman, and Dafne Martos, ICRC. See also testimonies of survivors’ relatives in “Niños deben cambiar prótesis cada seis meses”, El Comercio (Lima), 21 January 2002. A relative is quoting as saying “if I do not work on the crops, what do my children eat?”
[79] See “El reino de la desesperanza”, Somos magazine (Lima), 1 June 2002, pp. 18-24.
[80] Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Fanny Díaz, Medical Assistance Program, ICRC, 17 May 2002.
[81] ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001, ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 29.
[82] Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Fanny Díaz, Medical Assistance Program, ICRC, 17 May 2002. Since 1989, the medical assistance program of the ICRC has used the infrastructure of the Ministry of Health of Perú for medical or surgical treatment of persons injured by armed violence or antipersonnel mines.
[83] “Historias de vidas mutiladas” (Stories of mutilated lives) and “Niños deben cambiar de prótesis cada seis meses,” in El Comercio (Lima), 21 January 2002.
[84] Email from Luis Miguel del Aguila Umeres, Gerencia de Cooperación y Proyectos, Consejo Nacional de Integracion de la Persona con Discapacidad (CONADIS) to Landmine Monitor, 14 June 2002.
[85] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001 p. 385.