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Key developments since May 2001: Poland has participated in the Mine Ban Treaty process, but has taken no concrete steps toward ratification. Ministry of Defense officials have estimated the cost of destruction of Poland’s antipersonnel mine stockpile as “a few million Polish Zloty,” and have informally estimated the size at more than one million. The Engineering Corps identified the types of antipersonnel mines stockpiled. Poland spent around $6 million on domestic mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal in 2001, destroying 3,842 mines and 45,000 items of unexploded ordnance. In March 2002, 39 deminers were sent to Afghanistan.
The Republic of Poland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 with pre-conditions for ratification. In 2002, its position was re-stated: “[R]atification is dependent on the accession of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, all states in our region, and supplying the Armed Forces with mine alternatives. So far, none of these conditions has been fulfilled. Ratification at the moment would deprive the armed forces of an important means of national defense system.”[1]
Poland participated in the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. Its statement described the Mine Ban Treaty as a “perfect example of an instrument that serves a noble humanitarian purpose” and “provides States with a framework for solving the mine crisis, not just by imposing a political ban, but also spelling out the principles of demining and survivor assistance.” But, it also noted that while “some States security environments have given them the opportunity to ratify the Ottawa Convention, our particular defense requirements have not so far permitted us to take such steps.”[2] Poland also aligned itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union, which urged all non-members to become States Parties as soon as possible.
On 29 November 2001, Poland cosponsored and voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Poland participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.[3] At the meetings in January 2002, Poland declared “Despite political support expressed on various occasions, we are still not completely prepared to withdraw from possessing the anti-personnel mines.... We need to find adequate alternative means. This process requires time. Nevertheless Poland would like to be seen as a state [whose] strategic position and painful historical experiences justify the delay in withdrawing from that type of weapon. At the same time we are ready to declare that the ratification of the Ottawa Convention by our country is a matter of near future.”[4]
Subsequent interviews seeking to clarify this statement indicated that the “near future” could mean five or even ten years. The Polish Armed Forces are currently undergoing a six-year modernization process, and ratification may be dependent on decisions regarding arms acquisition.[5]
Poland’s ongoing search for alternatives to antipersonnel mines was referred to at the Third Meeting of States Parties and at the Standing Committee meeting on 1 February 2002. The alternatives program and the ratification timetable and process are the responsibility of an inter-ministerial working group, on which are represented the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and others including the scientific research committee. Since May 2001, the working group has met monthly. Initially, work was dominated by the related issue of antivehicle mines, in view of proposed changes to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). At the working group meeting in February 2002, General Ryszard Zuchowki summarized international research and development, Poland’s military need of alternatives to antipersonnel mines, and financial aspects of the six-year modernization plan.[6]
Previous Polish-Canadian consultations on ratification and research into alternatives to mines continued in 2001, with Canada providing a study of alternatives.[7] On 15 April 2002, General Baril, retired Chief of the Defence Staff in Canada, visited Poland for meetings with representatives of ministries of defense, general staff and foreign affairs. The work of the inter-ministerial group, particularly regarding alternatives and treaty ratification, was discussed at the meeting.[8]
In 2001, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense also discussed the issues of stockpile destruction and development of alternative weapons, as well as demining and other issues connected with ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty and the CCW, with the Czech, Latvian and Norwegian armed forces.[9] In October 2001, Poland attended a NATO Partnership for Peace seminar on regional mine action in Athens, which included representatives of 21 countries, the United Nations and NGOs, including the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Landmine Monitor.
Following the seminar “Understanding the Ottawa Convention,” held in Warsaw from 18-19 June 2001, Poland plans to hold another regional meeting on the mine issue in late 2002.[10] Poland described itself as “an active promoter of the values set out by the Convention among the States in our region.”[11]
Poland announced in February 2001 that it intended to ratify Amended Protocol II to the CCW by the end of 2001,[12] but did not do so. Poland attended as an observer the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in December 2001 and distributed a statement which explained: “the reason why Poland cannot go ahead with it at the moment is the lack of funds the Polish Army needs to modernize its stocks of landmines” to comply with Amended Protocol II, and the need to prioritize “other, more pressing obligations and, consequently, re-route the resources away from landmine modernisation projects.” But, “we are perfectly aware of the importance of the Second Amended Protocol and are all for having it ratified.”[13] Poland aligned itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.
Subsequently, in January 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that ratification of Amended Protocol II was delayed because Poland was trying to avoid modernizing mines to be CCW-compliant, which would later have to be destroyed after ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty.[14] In February 2002, the Ministry stated that all relevant ministries had agreed to ratify Amended Protocol II and it expected the legislative procedures to be ready by September 2002. Poland will not modernize its stock of antipersonnel mines, and all costs of complying with Amended Protocol II will be covered by the Ministry of Defense.[15]
Poland attended as a State Party the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. At the Review Conference, Poland acted as a “Friend to the Chair,” and was co-sponsor of a US-Danish proposal to increase the regulation of antivehicle mines. Poland also supported establishing an expert group to study how the problem of explosive remnants of war may be addressed by the CCW. Poland supported the CCW’s extension to internal conflicts and the introduction of a verification regime which should be carefully considered in order “to avoid undermining the process of universalization of the Convention.”[16]
Poland’s 2001 report to the OSCE stated that it “actively supports the efforts on creation of legally-binding instrument banning the transfers of anti-personnel landmines within the Conference on Disarmament. Poland believes that the most important way of combating landmine hazards is to eliminate the possibility of their transfers to high-risked and armed-conflict areas.”[17]
The Polish statement to the Third Meeting of States Parties affirmed that “Poland complies with the conditions of the Ottawa Convention concerning the prohibition of production and transfer of landmines.”[18] No precise information on the size and make-up of Poland’s antipersonnel mine stockpile has yet been given. In January 2002, a Polish military representative at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva indicated unofficially that the stockpile is “over 1 million” antipersonnel mines.[19] The Ministry of Defense declined to comment on this figure, as it has with previous estimates.[20] However, Ministry of Defense officials stated that they have estimated the cost of destruction of the stockpile as “a few million Polish Zloty, a cost the Ministry does not consider a problem.”[21]
The Engineering Corps indicated that Poland possesses the following types of antipersonnel mines: PMD-6, POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PSM-1, PSM-1 (no explosive content - for training), MON-100, MON-100 (no explosive content - for training), and MOP-2 (very small quantities).[22]
Human Rights Watch has identified several antivehicle mines produced and stockpiled by Poland that may have antipersonnel capabilities: MN-111, MN-121, MN-123 and MPP-B varieties.[23]
The Ministry of Defense stated that the armed forces of Poland did not use antipersonnel mines in 2001 “in joint military operations, or in joint exercises with other States. APs are used exclusively for trainings for the demining troops and it is very rare and in a limited range.”[24] The statement by Poland to the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 explained, “Poland has always regarded mines as a typically defensive weapon, which should be applied in a way minimizing any undesirable effects.”[25]
The Military Institute of Technical Engineering in Wroclaw conducts R&D on landmine detection and clearance technology, as well as on antipersonnel mine alternatives. In early 2002, the Ministry of Defense explained that “limited financial resources provided for research and outlined priorities of modernization were not sufficient to conduct broader research in the previous year.”[26] The engineering forces are responsible for a study on alternative means of antipersonnel mines, which is expected to be finished in late 2002. Many institutions were reported to be involved in research on alternative means to antipersonnel mines.[27]
The areas considered as most contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from World War II and the Soviet occupation are the drainage basins of the Vistula and Odra rivers, and the forest areas of southeast Poland. Mines and UXO are discovered most often in urbanized areas during the construction of buildings. Planned clearance operations are carried out on former military sites. In other areas, mine clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) “interventions” are carried out in response to reports of mine/UXO contamination. The military engineering forces are responsible for coordination and carrying out both types of operations. The Ministry of Defense estimated that between 90 and 97 percent of the total contaminated area had been cleared by the end of 2001, but caution that it is very hard to identify the area remaining contaminated.[28]
In 2001, a total of 3,842 mines and 45,322 UXO were detected and destroyed.[29] Former military areas totaling 62,500,000 square meters were cleared and 8,822 interventions were reported in 2001. Each intervention requires checking an area of approximately 3,000 square meters.[30] In 2001, the cost of mine clearance and EOD was 25.5 million Zloty (US$6.2 million), a similar amount to the previous year.[31]
Former military areas (now in local civilian control) suspected of mine/UXO contamination cover a total of 241,090,000 square meters and clearance operations are planned to the end of 2003. These former military areas are fenced. In total, 380 deminers and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists are involved in these clearance operations.[32]
A further 320 deminers and EOD specialists conduct clearance in other areas. They are divided into 39 troops of six deminers (including four troops in the navy, of which two are specialized in clearing sea mines).[33] If an area is thought to be contaminated by mines or UXO, it is fenced and marked with warning tape and signs. Very large areas are marked only with warning signs.[34] After clearance, areas are handed over to the local authorities and the State forest administration, which decide on the use of the land in accordance with local plans.[35]
According to the Ministry of Defense, the task of mine and UXO risk education is mainly carried out by the engineering forces, who draw attention to the problem in radio and TV programs and in the press. When there is a major clearance operation or removal of dangerous objects, the public is warned. The Ministry of Defense says that awareness activities are also conducted in schools by soldiers of the engineering forces.[36]
In 2001, Polish media reported several mine/UXO incidents. On 5 July 2001, mines and UXO were found at a construction site in the center of the town of Bochnia. On 27 July, 100 World War II mines were found in a lake. On 7 August, a man was found with 21 stolen landmines in his car. No injuries were reported in these cases. [37]
There is no comprehensive record of mine/UXO casualties in Poland. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred inquiries to the Ministry of Health and Ministry of the Interior and Administration, which have not supplied data on mine/UXO casualties in 2001. According to police sources, seven civilians were killed as a result of handling UXO in 2001.[38] However, according to the engineer corps, there were about 40 mine/UXO incidents resulting in injuries, most of the casualties being children, in 2001.[39] No Polish peacekeepers were killed or injured by mines or UXO while on international missions in 2001.[40] On 31 May 2002, the commander of a Polish demining platoon clearing mines near Bagram in Afghanistan was injured by an antipersonnel mine.[41] Subsequently, on 26 June, a Polish captain was lightly injured by a landmine at the Bagram base.[42]
Survivors of landmines and UXO are covered by the standard social healthcare system, which provides hospital care and some rehabilitative measures based on the law on general health insurance.[43] Regardless of insurance, mine/UXO casualties are treated as an emergency and receive first aid and surgery if needed. If the survivors are insured, they are entitled to surgery, prostheses, and rehabilitation free of charge. If not insured, survivors must cover the costs.
Poland contributed US$10,000 to the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund for the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in Ukraine, and the same amount for the Trust Fund project in Moldova.[44]
Polish deminers conduct mine and UXO clearance in their areas of responsibility within the following international missions: UNDOF in Syria (one troop, since 1974), UNIFIL in Lebanon (one troop, since 1992), DFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (two troops, since 1997), and KFOR in Kosovo (one troop, since 1999). Each troop includes eight mine/EOD specialists, therefore a total of 40 mine/EOD specialists are involved in international missions. The estimated annual cost of each troop is about US$175,000. In early 2002, the Polish government decided to send about 300 soldiers, including deminers, to Afghanistan.[45] On 16 March 2002, 39 deminers went to Afghanistan. Their primary purpose is to participate in the allied operation, and to conduct clearance mainly for military purposes.[46]
The Polish Red Cross includes the mine issue in its work. In 2001, the video “The Ottawa Treaty,” produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross, was translated into Polish and distributed to all Polish Red Cross district branches, the Ministry of Defense, and the Academy of National Defense. The mine issue was included in a course entitled “Armed Conflicts and Media” organized by the Polish Red Cross at the Department of Journalism at Warsaw University in 2001 and 2002.[47] In 2001, a young Polish filmmaker made the film “22 Minuty” (22 Minutes) about the global landmine problem.[48] Excerpts of the film were also been shown on State television in late 2001. In January 2002, the Polish edition of Newsweek magazine published an article about the landmine problem in Afghanistan.[49]
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[1] Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Deputy Director, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002. See previous editions of the Landmine Monitor Report for similar past statements. All Polish originals in this report have been translated by the Landmine Monitor researcher.
[2] Statement delivered on behalf of Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.
[3] It was represented by General Ryszard Zuchowski, Chief of the Engineering Forces, Colonel Boguslav Bebenek, Chief of Training Division, Engineering Corps, Zbigniew Ciolek, Ministry of Defense, and Adam Wilczynski, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, and in January 2002, Mariusz Handzlik, Deputy Director of the Department of Security Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
[4] Statement by Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.
[5] Interview with Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 5 February and 11 March 2002, and interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Head of Division and Lt.-Col. Waldemar Ratajczak, Senior Expert, Department of International Co-operation and Capt. Cezary Pawlak, Engineering Corps, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002.
[6] Interview with Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 February and 11 March 2002; and interview with Col. Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Ratajczak, and Capt. Pawlak, Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002.
[7] Email from Lt.-Col. John Macbride, Military Advisor, to Daniel Livermore, Ambassador for Mine Action, Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada.
[8] Telephone interview with Irena Juszczyk, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 16 April 2002; email from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2002.
[9] Report of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 15 December 2001, p. 2.
[10] Interview with Mariusz Handzlik and Irena Juszczyk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 5 February 2002. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001 for details on the June 2001 regional meeting.
[11] Statement by Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.
[12] Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 February 2001; previously, it was stated that Protocol II would be ratified in 2000 but was then delayed for legal reasons.
[13] Statement by Krzysztof Jakubowski, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to the Third Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 10 December 2001.
[14] Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002.
[15] Interview with Mariusz Handzlik and Irena Juszczyk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 5 February 2002; Report of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the OSCE, 15 December 2001, p. 2.
[16] Statement by Krzysztof Jakubowski, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, to the Second CCW Review Conference, Geneva, 11-21 December 2001.
[17] Report of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the OSCE, 15 December 2001, p. 2.
[18] Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001. Production was previously stated to have ceased in the 1980s, and an indefinite export ban started in 1995. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 837.
[19] Discussion with a member of the Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 30 January 2002.
[20] Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002. Presented with previous estimates, the Ministry of Defense declared: “Transparency in armaments has an extremely important role in cooperation, security and confidence-building process... The process of opening access to the information...requires decisions on the level of the Ministry of Defense, Chief of General Staff and the Defense Affairs Committee... These issues will be on the agenda of the interagency task force group.” See also, Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 837-838.
[21] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Ratajczak, and Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002. Exchange rate at 22 March 2002: US$1 = 4.1085 Zloty, used throughout this report.
[22] Telephone interview with Col. Boguslaw Bebenek, Chief of Training Division, Command of Engineer Corps, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 12 April 2002.
[23] Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” prepared for the Standing Committee of Experts on General Status and Operation of the Convention, 10-11 January 2000.
[24] Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.
[25] Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001.
[26] Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.
[27] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Waldemar Ratajczak, Department of International Co-operation, and Capt. Cezary Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from Ministry of Defense, 15 April 2002.
[28] Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 838-839.
[29] Interview with Capt Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from the Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 5 February 2002. In 2000, 2,091 mines and 35,386 UXO were cleared. In 1999, 2,737 mines and 57,844 UXO were cleared.
[30] Telephone interview with Lt Col. Witold Gabis, Chief of the Transfer Protection Division, Engineer Forces, Warsaw, 15 April 2002.
[31] Interview with Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2002.
[32] Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.
[33] Interview with Capt. Cezary Pawlak, Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 14 March 2002; letter from the Ministry of Defense, Warsaw 14 March 2002.
[34] Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Witold Gabis, Chief of the Transfer Protection Division, Engineer Forces, Warsaw, 15 April 2002.
[35] Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.
[36] Ibid.
[37] “Niewybuchy usunieto juz z bochni” (“UXO Have Already Been Removed from Bochnia”), Gazeta Wyborczka (daily newspaper), 5 July 2001; “Wybuchowe jezioro” (“An Explosive Lake”), Polish Press Agency, www.wp.pl, 27 July 2001, and “Samochod pelen min” (“A Car Full of Mines”), Polish Press Agency, www.wp.pl, 7 August 2001.
[38] Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002.
[39] Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Gabis, Engineer Forces, 15 April 2002.
[40] Interview with Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2002.
[41] “Victim of the Black Widow – Sapper Injured in Afghanistan,” Gazeta Wyborcza (daily newspaper), 1 June 2002.
[42] TV Channel 1, 26 June 2002; Gazeta Wyborcza (daily newspaper), 27 June 2002.
[43] “Ustawa o Powszechnym Ubezpieczeniu Zdrowotnym,” 6 February 1997, DZ. UST. 1997 NR 28, POZ. 153, NR75, POZ468.
[44] Letter from Mariusz Handzlik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2002.
[45] Letter from Ministry of Defense, 5 February 2002.
[46] Interview with Col. Zadrozny and Lt.-Col. Ratajczak, and Capt. Pawlak, Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2002; letter from Lt.-Col. Waldemar Ratajczak, Department of International Co-operation, Ministry of Defense, 15 April 2002.
[47] Interview with Anna Wilk, International Humanitarian Law Dissemination Center, Polish Red Cross Headquarters, Warsaw, 18 December 2001.
[48] 22 Minuty (22 Minutes), documentary film produced and directed by Rafal Matysiak, Poland, 2001; interview with Rafal Matysiak, Warsaw, 19 February 2002.
[49] Joanna Kowalska and Katarzyna Derlicka, “Pola smierci” (“Fields of Death”), Newsweek Polska (Polish edition of Newsweek), 20 January 2002, pp. 34-35.
