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Key developments since May 2001: Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. Russia is increasing its participation in international mine action programs.
The Russian Federation (RF) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Russian military still considers the antipersonnel mine a necessary weapon. While Russian officials have made positive statements about a mine ban in the past and the government has taken some steps, the policy focus for dealing with the landmine issue remains the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[1] In December 2001, Russia stated, “We are steadily advancing towards our common goal, towards a world free from mines. However, as we have pointed out more than once, it can be only a phased-out advance, which takes into account all circumstances pertaining to this matter, and provides for a necessary level of military stability.”[2]
In April 2001, the Federal Working Group for Mine Action, under the Chief of the Russian Federal Agency on Munitions, was created as a national focal point on landmine issues.[3]
Russia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, and participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva. Russia abstained from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, which called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Russia is a party to the CCW and its original 1980 Protocol II, but not the Amended Protocol II of 1996. Russia attended the third annual conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference, both held in December 2001 in Geneva. President Putin submitted CCW Amended Protocol II to the State Duma for ratification in early May 2000, and it was expected that hearings on the ratification would take place shortly thereafter. However, in March 2001 the ratification package was called back for further interdepartmental consultations on legal, political, military, technical, and economic matters.[4]
In December 2001, Russian officials at the Second CCW Review Conference said ratification of Amended Protocol II would take place in the near future.[5] Russia also said that it is “already taking measures to comply with the main provisions of this document,” and noted that in the past year, the “Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in particular, issued a directive which set the task of studying the requirements of Amended Protocol II and taking them into account during peacetime and operational training of troops and headquarters.”[6]
As of July 2002, there still had been no ratification hearings in the State Duma. Russian officials have previously indicated that when ratification does take place, Russia will exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for implementation of key provisions.[7]
IPPNW-Russia continues its work to build public awareness in Russia about the landmine issue. In November 2001, a 26-minute landmine documentary it produced with “Peliken” TV production studio was accepted for nationally televised broadcast. “Seeds of Death” is based on the experiences of an ex-engineer-combatant of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict who lost both arms during a demining operation.
In 2001, a new public foundation – The Mine Action and Ammunition Destruction Center (also known as Mine Action Center Foundation) – was established by a group of Russian researchers and experts as a self-sufficient, non-state, and non-commercial organization. Created at the initiative of the Federal Working Group on Mine Action in the Russian Federation, the foundation will conduct scientific research into various aspects of the mine problem in Russia, including humanitarian demining, stockpile destruction, mine risk education, and survivor assistance.
The former Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of antipersonnel mines. Since 1992, Russia has produced at least ten types of antipersonnel mines.[8] In May 1998, officials of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation had stopped producing blast antipersonnel mines,[9] and in December 2000, Russia said that it was decommissioning production facilities for blast mines.[10] Russia noted in December 2001 that “anti-personnel fougasse [blast] mines have not been manufactured in the Russian Federation for more than four years.”[11] Rather than new antipersonnel mine production, Russia is increasingly focusing on research and development of landmine alternatives.[12]
On 1 December 1994, Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This moratorium was extended for five years on 1 December 1997.[13] It is expected to be extended in December 2002.
At the International Exhibition of Defense and Protection Means in Nizhny Taghil from 3-6 July 2001, the Scientific Research Machine Building Institute (NIMI) presented the prototype of a new command-detonated antipersonnel/antivehicle mine: the M-225 Engineer Munition with Cluster Warhead.[14] The mine can be laid by hand or mechanically. The mine is operated by wire at distances up to four kilometers by a remote control unit (PU-404P) or to distances of 10 kilometers by wireless remote control (PU-404R). One remote control unit may control up to 100 mines.
The mine is equipped with a combined target selector including a seismic detector with a selecting target option for identifying vehicles and human beings. With a simultaneous entry of humans and vehicles into the mined zone, the selecting error rate may reach 15-18 percent. The mine can be programmed for self-destruction after a set period, or by command for self-destruction from the remote control unit. The mine can be equipped with devices suppressing metal detectors, and can be produced in a simplified version without complex detectors.
Although this engineer munition is in its essence an antipersonnel/antivehicle landmine, its developers contend it complies with both CCW Amended Protocol II and the Mine Ban Treaty.[15] According to other specialists, however, the mine can be easily modified to make it non-command detonated.
Official information on the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Russia is not publicly available. Landmine Monitor has previously reported an estimate of 60-70 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[16] Russia is believed to have the world’s second largest stockpile of landmines. Russian officials have acknowledged that in certain CIS states, there are antipersonnel mine stockpiles that remain at the disposal of Russian military units and contingents located there. This is likely to be the case in Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
In December 2001, Russia declared, “To date, all in all more than 1 million antipersonnel mines were destroyed and over 1 million antitank mines and about 1 million antipersonnel engineering munitions were disposed.”[17]
Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the Ministry of Defense for the period 1996-2000 indicates that 1,054,094 antipersonnel mines were destroyed, including PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200, and POMZ-2M, as well as KSF-1 clusters with PFM-1 mines and KSF-1S clusters with PFM-1S mines.
Figures for stockpile destruction in 2001 and 2002 have not been made available.
Landmine Monitor notes that there has been much discussion in the international community about the difficulties of destroying PFM mines, particularly the safety risks posed by their specific construction and toxic gases resulting from their explosion.[19] Russia is estimated to have some 17 million PFM mines, most or all of which have reached the end of their shelf life, increasing the risk of explosive degradation of the mines.[20]
An August 2001 “Appeal for a Credit: Emergency Humanitarian Project” from the Russian Research and Production Association “Ecodem,” which is involved in PFM destruction, stated that the Russian government has adopted a federal program of demilitarization of PFM-1 stocks that requires an initial $20 million investment. It noted, “there are several possible methods of elimination of these mines. However, none of them is perfect and safe,” and referred to a new “grouting method” developed by Russia that had been tested on “200 live cluster bombs.”[21]
Prior to publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2001, the Russian Federation was asked to comment on allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces during the Landmine Monitor reporting period (May 2001-July 2002) in Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Abkhazia.
In a response received in August 2001, Russian officials acknowledged to Landmine Monitor that, “From May 2000 to date the Russian Federation has employed anti-personnel mines (hereinafter ‘APMs’) in the Chechen Republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border but APMs have not been emplaced in Abkhazia (Georgia).”[22] Russia described its mine use in Chechnya and Tajikistan: “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base areas used by [rebel] units and to close movement routes and convoy paths across the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in [Amended Protocol II].... Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local inhabitants and to protect and guard positions and places where border divisions are stationed.”[23]
At the third annual conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Russia stated, “The requirements of Amended Protocol II are taken into account when minefields are put in place in the course of counter-terrorist operations in Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, and when service and combat objectives are implemented to safeguard the Tajik-Afghani border.”[24] The August 2001 Foreign Ministry letter states, “Mines are emplaced in observance of requirements to prohibit or restrict the use of anti-personnel mines...as set forth in the supplemented ‘mine’ Protocol II, with the exception of requirements in point 2a of Article 5 Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered mines in that part relating to perimeter-marked areas; anti-personnel mines are marked and fenced along the entire perimeter of the area except the part of the perimeter on the side of the state border.”[25]
Russian officials admit the large-scale use of mines in Chechnya, but have repeatedly rejected allegations of the indiscriminate use of mines. [26] In early 2001, a Russian military official reportedly said at a press conference that Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in Chechnya.[27] In July 2002, a Chechen official claimed that Russia had sharply increased its use of mines in 2002, planting as many as one million mines in the past five to six months; he claimed Russia has planted a total of approximately three million mines during the second Chechen war.[28]
In early 2002, Russian officials again asserted that in Chechnya all minefields are fenced and marked to prevent civilian casualties, and that once active military operations are over, minefields are cleared.[29] Neither past nor current reports coming out of Chechnya substantiate these claims.[30]
Details regarding ongoing use of mines and improvised explosive devices by Chechen rebel forces are detailed in the Landmine Monitor entry for Chechnya. During a June 2002 trip to Chechnya, Olara Otunnu, the United Nations special representative for children and armed conflict, said that “insurgent groups continued to enlist children, paying them to plant landmines and other explosives, and to target civilians perceived to be cooperating with the government administration.”[31]
In Tajikistan, Russian border guards and Russian peacekeepers have used antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan, on the border with Afghanistan.[32] It is unclear if there was new use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces in Tajikistan in the most recent Landmine Monitor reporting period. While the Foreign Ministry letter to Landmine Monitor indicated that mines had been laid since May 2000, another Russian official said that information was incorrect. In December 2001, a senior official in the Russian Federal Border Service confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian troops had laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan. He said that the mine-laying operations had been carried out with the full knowledge and consent of the Tajikistan government, and in accordance with a military cooperation agreement signed in 1993. After Landmine Monitor pointed out that this could constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by Tajikistan, he said that the mines were laid prior to October 1999 when Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.[33]
The USSR was heavily affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) after World War II and there are still problems in some areas. There are requests for mine/UXO clearance from ten territories in Russia where World War II battles took place.[34] For details on ongoing mine clearance programs inside Russia, see past Landmine Monitor reports. [35]
There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations underway in Chechnya, but Russian engineering troops conduct military mine clearance operations on a daily basis, to support the safe movement of Russian troops along the roads and railroads, and the safe operation of field water supply points.[36] In December 2001, Russia reported that in Chechnya and Dagestan, Russian mine engineers had cleared over 600 square kilometers of land, about 2,000 buildings and structures, 200 square kilometers of agricultural fields, and 700 kilometers of electric power transmission lines. More than 170,000 explosive objects had been detected and destroyed.[37] From January to mid-June 2002, Russian engineers reportedly defused 417 landmines and 944 explosive devices in Chechnya.[38]
Russia is increasing its participation in international mine action programs. Russia began mine clearance in Afghanistan and announced it would begin work in Croatia. Russia also completed its mine clearance mission in Kosovo, discussed possible demining activities with Iraq, and continued demining in Tajikistan, Georgia and Abkhazia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in other countries. In recent years, Russians have neutralized 18,000 pieces of ordnance in Tajikistan, 23,000 in Georgia and Abkhazia, and 13,500 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[39]
In late November 2001, Russia sent demining experts to Afghanistan to establish a humanitarian center in Kabul, as well as reopen the Russian Embassy.[40] Russian engineers have reportedly destroyed 8,000 explosives in Afghanistan since they began work in late 2001. In April 2002, specialists from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations began a three-month training course for 50 Afghan sappers in Madrid, Spain. All costs were paid by Spain. Russia reportedly will open a similar training center in Kabul.[41]
Russia announced in May 2002 that engineers from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations will help with mine clearance operations in Croatia.[42] In return, Croatia will forgive a portion of the debt it is owed by the former Soviet Union. Croatian authorities suggested that Russian engineers commence their operation in the settlements of Sisak and Karlovets. According to Russia’s Emergencies Minister, Russia has been preparing for mine clearance operations in Croatia since August 2001.[43]
A team of 28 deminers and 11 mine detecting dogs from the Ministry of Emergency Situations finished its mission in Kosovo on 6 December 2001. During its nine-month mission, the team surveyed 324,213 square meters of territory and cleared 467 antipersonnel mines, 17 antivehicle mines, and 109 UXO.[44]
The creation of a “joint training center for humanitarian demining” was discussed during March 2002 talks between Iraqi Vice-Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Minister for Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu.[45]
Currently there are no federal-level mine risk education activities in the areas of ongoing conflict in Chechnya and neighboring territories. International aid organizations such as UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are responsible for the bulk of mine risk education activities in affected areas in Russia. IPPNW/CBL-Russia also made a number of contributions to mine awareness efforts during the reporting period. (For details of UNICEF’s program, see the report on Chechnya.)
ICRC mine risk education efforts were focused on Ingushetia, Dagestan, and the region including North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and other areas. Internally displaced people (IDPs) from Chechnya were the main target group in Ingushetia.[46] (For details of this ICRC program targeting Chechens, see the Landmine Monitor entry on Chechnya.)
After a needs assessment that revealed a low level of awareness in Dagestan, the ICRC launched a mine risk education program in January 2002 in the Botlikh and Novolak regions of the republic, targeting resident and IDP children.[47] As of March 2002, over 3,000 children in Dagestan had attended ICRC presentations.[48] At least 110 children participated in the child-to-child program.[49] Children are directly involved in the creation of mine leaflets and posters.[50] Mine awareness materials for adults, such as leaflets, posters, and comic books, were also distributed during the reporting period. Mine presentations were given to at least 226 adults.[51]
The Mine Action Center Foundation, in cooperation with specialists of the RF Engineer Forces, medical experts, and IPPNW/CBL-Russia produced a mine awareness lecture course for 12- to16-year-old students. The course was based on informational materials from IPPNW/RPPNW, ICRC, ICBL, and Handicap International. The lecture course incorporates video, CD-based visuals as well as mock-ups of the most common landmines and UXO.
During the Soviet era, district military recruiting offices carried out dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas.[52] Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities halted, although the secondary school courses have been reinstated.[53] However, since 2000, instead of the Soviet-era primary military training, a new compulsory course has been introduced in the RF secondary education entitled “Basics of Life Safety.”
There have been a significant number of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999.[54] There is no complete official data on mine casualties or incidents among the Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians.
In 2001, based on various sources, 279 Russian armed forces (including army, police and interior ministry) were reported killed in landmine incidents; 684 were reported injured. In 2000, approximately 300 Russian servicemen were reported killed in landmine incidents and over 1,000 servicemen were reported injured. [55] It is not certain whether casualties are actually decreasing, or whether fewer casualties are being reported.
No ministry of the Russian government was able to provide any information on civilian casualties of the current war. (See Chechnya report for more information on civilian mine casualties).
Two major landmine blasts in Dagestan claimed close to 50 lives in the first half of 2002. The first blast came on 18 January 2002, when a car carrying servicemen set off a landmine in Makhachkala, Dagestan’s capital, killing seven of the servicemen.[56] The second, more deadly blast, came during Victory Day celebrations in Kaspiysk, near the border with Chechnya on 9 May 2002. Dagestani pro-Chechen rebels reportedly detonated a MON-90 mine via remote control, killing 43 people.
On 8 June 2002, one Russian peacekeeper was killed and another wounded by a landmine in the Kodori gorge of Georgia’s separatist Abkhazia region. The peacekeepers were patrolling the gorge near the village of Zemmo-Lata when the mine exploded.[57]
Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in the treatment of blast injuries. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia.[58]
Several international agencies and local and international NGOs support the health infrastructure in Ingushetia with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise, and training for local staff through hospitals, health posts, and mobile clinics in four towns and 40 villages. These organizations include WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, ICRC, Medecins du Monde, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Islamic Relief, International Medical Corps, Hammer Forum, VESTA, and People in Need Foundation.[59]
There are about seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the Russian Federation. Some mine survivors receive assistance in Moscow and others travel to Baku (Azerbaijan) within the framework of a joint program of the Ministries of Social Insurance of both republics; details on the number of mine survivors benefiting from this program was not available.
RKK “Energia” has developed standardized prosthetic workshops, including mobile units. Eight experimental mobile workshops (based on PAZ-3205 bus) have been produced to provide operative prosthetic aid in remote areas. According to the Federal State Institution “Glavorgpomosch” Russia manufactures about 600 types of prosthetic devices. Lower limbs devices comprise 90 percent of all prostheses.[60]
The International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, have been assisting mine survivors with surgical and rehabilitation assistance and vocational training since 1998.[61]
In August 2000, UNICEF commenced its Mine Action Program in the North Caucasus with survivor assistance being one of the main components. The program, which focuses on mine-injured children and women from Chechnya, includes physical rehabilitation, the fitting of prostheses, psychosocial counseling, and vocational training. The program also established two amputee football clubs for about 120 child mine survivors in Grozny and the IDP camps in Ingushetia.[62]
Since 1995, mine survivors in Russia have been under the protection of the Federal Law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped.”[63]
The All-Russian Public National Military Foundation is focusing its efforts on the support of military personnel injured in Chechnya. On 21 February 2002, at a session of the Foundation Charity Council attended by RF President Vladimir Putin, two major directions for the Foundation's efforts were identified: the purchase of flats for the families of the servicemen killed in Chechnya; and ensuring medical aid to servicemen wounded in Chechnya, especially to those who need prosthetic aid. According to the Chairman of the Council, state agencies including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will provide the Foundation with verified lists of persons needing medical or other aid. The Foundation will then arrange and finance the necessary aid.[64]
On 31 May 2001, the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005” was approved by a resolution of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries.[65] Among the CIS countries taking part in the realization and financing of the program are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine. The budget for 2001 was 35,738,000 Roubles (about US$1.2 million).[66] In 2001, prioritized targets of Section I on “Medico-Social Aid” included: facilitating the work of rehabilitation centers in ensuring qualified and effective medical, social, psychological, and professional rehabilitation of war-wounded; medical examinations, consultations of specialists, verification of medical diagnosis, hospitalization, elaboration of individual rehabilitation programs; provision of prostheses, wheelchairs, rehabilitation means and medicine; and, medical and psychological rehabilitation and treatment in specialized sanatoria.[67]
Within the framework of the Program, support was provided to 45 veterans’ organizations. In addition, direct support was provided to 15,896 people, mostly from the Russian Federation and Belarus. Altogether, in 2001, 37,009 people benefited from the program: 36,281 received medicines, 42 were provided with wheelchairs, 440 with prostheses and other assistive devices, 140 received hospital and outpatient treatment, and 106 received specialized treatment and rehabilitation in sanatoriums.[68]
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[1] For past descriptions of Russian policy and statements made by Russian officials, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 894; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 833-835; and Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 802-804.
[2] Statement by Ambassador Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Geneva, to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[3] For more information on the Working Group, its composition, and aims, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 894-895.
[4] Interview with Counselor Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2001.
[5] The formal statement to the Annual Conference said, “At present the necessary conciliatory work is underway in the State Duma with the participation of the Government of the Russian Federation.” Statement by HE Ambassador Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Geneva, to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001. Identical language was used in Russia’s Response to the annual OSCE Questionnaire on Antipersonnel Landmines, dated 7 February 2002.
[6] Statement by Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[7] Interviews with Counselor Andrei Malov, 29 November 2000, 18 December 2000, 23 January 2001.
[8] For more detail on mine types and production sites, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806. See also, Russia’s Arms Catalogue, Army 1996-1997, published by “Military Parade,” JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, Vol. 1, pp. 276-83. See also, Landmines: Outlook from Russia, report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.
[9] Presentations by B. Schiborin, Chief Counselor, Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky, Deputy-Commander, Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, at the Moscow Landmine Conference, 27 May 1998.
[10] Landmine Monitor notes on remarks of Russian delegation in the plenary session, Second Annual Meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 11 December 2000.
[11] Statement by Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[12] Interview with Counselor Andrei Malov, 13 May 2000.
[13] Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.
[14] NIMI's stand at the RDE-2001 in Nizhny Taghil, 3-6 July 2001. All the information in the section on alternatives comes from this source.
[15] Yu. G. Yeremeev, Ly.-Colonel (Rt.) of Engineer Forces, Engineer munitions section of the website “Sapper,” at: http://tewton.narod.ru/mines/m-225.html.
[16] ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock. One news article cites a stockpile of 60 million. Andrei Korbut, “Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost” (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could Undermine its Defense),” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 39, p. 6. For information on types and locations of stocks, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809.
[17] Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[18] Official response #335/1/556 to IPPNW/ICBL-Russia from Lieutenant-General Anatoly Muzurkevich, Head of the Chief Division for International Military Cooperation, RF Ministry of Defense, based on information provided by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, RF Ministry of Defense, 27 July 2001.
[19] Presentation by Canadian Lt. Col. John McBride to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2001.
[20] Presentation by Canadian Lt. Col. John McBride to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 31 January 2001. A Russian company involved in PFM destruction has stated that “in the year 2000 the guaranteed shelf life of existing stocks of cluster ammunitions KSF-1 based on PFM-1 APL mines expired.” Research and Production Association “Ecodem,” “Appeal for a Credit Emergency Humanitarian Appeal,” received by Landmine Monitor on 15 August 2001; the contact point is moscow@bazalt.ru.
[21] Research and Production Association “Ecodem,” “Appeal for a Credit Emergency Humanitarian Appeal,” received by Landmine Monitor on 15 August 2001; the contact point is moscow@bazalt.ru.
[22] Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation. Sent by Fax to Landmine Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications LLC, Washington DC. The response arrived after the Landmine Monitor Report went to print, and thus could not be included in last year’s edition.
[23] Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, 16 August 2001.
[24] Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[25] Response by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation., 16 August 2001.
[26] See, for example, Remarks of Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Major General A. Nizhalovskii, in roundtable discussion of engineer equipment and military operations in Chechnya, reported in Armeyskiy sbornik (Army collection), No. 6, June 2000, pp. 35-40. Armeyskiy sbornik is a specialized monthly analytical periodical covering a wide range of military-related issues and problems. It contains a “roundtable section” in which military authors may publish articles on a given subject. See also, “Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines,” Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June 2000; interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999; “Night Patrol of ‘Fittermice,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000.
[27] “Russia Admits: Land Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucasus, 10 January 2001. Lyoma Usamov, Chechen representative in Washington, DC, in a letter to Jody Williams, ICBL, dated 19 June 2001, stated that “the Russian command, several months after the beginning of war, ‘boasted' about its 'achievements,' declaring that they planted half a million mines against 'the Chechen terrorists.’”
[28] Umar Khanbiev, Minister for Health of the Chechen republic, citation translated from the Russian by Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2002, www.chechenpress.com.
[29] Interviews with officials from the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs during January-March 2002.
[30] See separate Landmine Monitor Report entry on Chechnya. For details on past use, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 898-903; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 839-842. Also, available through Landmine Monitor researcher is “The Chronicle of Mine War in Chechnya: Year 2000,” which gives a month-by-month snapshot of mine-related operations/incidents in the war, gleaned from a survey of the media throughout the year.
[31] Press Briefing by Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, 1 July 2002, available at: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2002/otunnu.doc.htm.
[32] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 903, for details.
[33] Meeting with Col. Mikhail Zenkin, Federal Border Service, and Vladimir Kurikov, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, at the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 13 December 2001. Notes by Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor/HRW.
[34] For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 811-812.
[35] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 814-816; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 842-844.
[36] Landmine Monitor researchers prepared a 30-page list of these efforts in Chechnya during 2001, using Russian media reports and other sources.
[37] Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[38] “Over 1,000 Explosive Devices Said Defused In Chechnya This Year Moscow,” (in English), ITAR-TASS, 18 June 2002.
[39] Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.
[40] Steven Mufson, “U.S. Talks To Moscow About Force In Kabul; Russia Is Urged Not to Undertake Any Abrupt Moves,” Washington Post, 29 November 2001, p. A25.
[41] “Russian specialists to train Afghan sappers,” ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Russia, 22 April 2002.
[42] Alexei Rubtsov, “Russia will help Croatia with removal of landmines: vice-premier,” ITAR-TASS, 17 May 2002.
[43] “Russian sappers to clear mines in Croatia,” ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Russia, 14 June 2002.
[44] Russian Information Agency RIA "OREANDA," 6 December 2001.
[45] “Russian Emergencies Ministry ready for mine-clearing in Afghanistan,” AFP, 14 March 2002.
[46] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 893-908.
[47] Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia (March 2002), at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5AF95E?OpenDocument&style=custo_final.
[48] Ibid., January-February 2002 and March 2002.
[49] Ibid., March 2002.
[50] Ibid., April-May 2002.
[51] Ibid., March 2002.
[52] This was the so-called “District Military Committee” (“raivoenkomat”).
[53] V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.
[54] For casualties post-WW II, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 814.
[55] Data collated by Landmine Monitor from media reports, human rights reports, RF MoESDC, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Health.
[56] “A car bomb defused in Dagestan,” AFP/ Times of India, 17 May 2002.
[57] “Russian peacekeeper killed in breakaway Georgian province,” Associated Press, 9 June 2002.
[58] For more information see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p 845.
[59] UN OCHA website; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 907.
[60] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 907-908.
[61] See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 908; see also ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victims Assistance Programs, available at www.landminevap.org.
[62] ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs.
[63] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 908.
[64] RIA NOVOSTI, 21 February 2002.
[65] Resolution of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries, dated 31 May 2001.
[66] Report on the fulfillment of the "International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of the War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005" in 2001.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
