| <SWITZERLAND | TANZANIA> |
Key developments since May 2001: Although the United Nations records that Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999, it is not clear that Tajikistan considers itself a State Party formally bound by the treaty. Russia has reconfirmed that it has laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan, reportedly with the consent of the Tajik government. Following the completion in July 2001 of a needs assessment, the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan has initiated a mine risk education program with the help of the ICRC. Uzbek-laid antipersonnel mines continued to kill and injure civilians and livestock in Tajikistan in 2001.
Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999.[1] The treaty entered into force for Tajikistan on 1 April 2000. However, there seems to be some question about whether Tajikistan considers itself to be formally bound by the Mine Ban Treaty.
In a January 2002 response to a questionnaire on landmines from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Tajikistan said that President Rakhmanov “signed a decree on Tajikistan’s accession to the Ottawa Convention” on 22 September 1999. But Tajikistan seemed to suggest that its parliament had not yet ratified the convention. The questionnaire asks: “If the Convention was signed, but not ratified, what phase is the process of formal ratification in?” Tajikistan answered that “the given act must be ratified by the country’s parliament, about which the depository of the Convention—the Secretary-General of the United Nations—was informed at the time. Consultations in Parliament are now occurring regarding this issue.”[2]
The Head of the Treaty Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan claimed in June 2001 that Tajikistan had merely given notification of its intention to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty and had not deposited its instrument of ratification.[3] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed to have informed the United Nations Treaty Section in New York of the alleged error.[4] Subsequently, at a July 2001 roundtable of government ministries organized by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Dushanbe, the Head of the Treaty Law Department informed participants that the Tajik parliament was concerned about the impact of the Mine Ban Treaty on mine use along the border with Afghanistan.[5]
A neighboring government has expressed its belief that Tajikistan has withdrawn from the Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated, “Tajikistan withdrew its participation from the Ottawa Convention because it couldn’t fulfill its conditions and also because of the presence of threats to national security.”[6]
Previously, at the January 2000 summit of the CIS states, the Tajik government reportedly indicated a possible review of its decision to join the treaty, based on an evaluation of the consequences of clearing minefields from the Tajik-Afghan border.[7] At the April 2000 CIS summit in Moscow, the Tajik Minister of Defense and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov apparently again expressed doubts about the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2000, a Russian official said that Tajikistan had communicated these same views regarding the Mine Ban Treaty in correspondence with the Russian Foreign Ministry.[8]
Tajikistan is not known to have enacted any domestic legislative implementation measures for the Mine Ban Treaty, as required by Article 9. Tajikistan has not submitted its transparency reports to the United Nations, as required by Article 7. Its initial Article 7 Report was due by 28 September 2000, and annual updated reports were due 30 April 2001 and 30 April 2002. Tajikistan has not participated in any of the three annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has not attended any of the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, nor any of the other international and regional diplomatic landmine meetings in 2000 and 2001.
Tajikistan was absent during the November 2001 vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, but had previously co-sponsored the draft resolution.
On the same day it acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, 12 October 1999, Tajikistan acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original and Amended Protocol II on landmines. In June 2001, the Head of the Treaty Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Tajikistan had adhered to both protocols after a law on ratification had been duly passed by the Tajik Parliament in accordance with internal procedures.[9]
Tajikistan is not believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears that Tajikistan has stockpiles of antipersonnel mines that the former Soviet Union stored in the republic. It is not known to be taking any steps toward destruction of those stocks. The Mine Ban Treaty mandated deadline for Tajikistan to complete its stockpile destruction is 1 April 2004.
Based on the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian border guards and peacekeeping forces, it would appear that Russia maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan.
Landmine Monitor has not received reports of use of antipersonnel mines by Tajik forces in recent years. However, as reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2001, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan, as have Uzbek forces.
In August 2001, Russia again acknowledged that its troops stationed along the Tajik border with Afghanistan have emplaced antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan.[10] A Foreign Ministry letter to Landmine Monitor indicated that mines had been laid during the Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000. In December 2001, a senior official in the Russian Federal Border Service confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian troops had laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan. He said that the mine-laying operations had been carried out with the full knowledge and consent of the Tajik government, and in accordance with a military cooperation agreement signed in 1993. After Landmine Monitor pointed out that this could constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by Tajikistan, he said that the mines were laid prior to October 1999 when Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.[11]
It was first reported in October 2000 that Russian border guards were deploying antipersonnel landmines on the Tajik side of the Pyandge River to protect the Tajik-Afghan border from invasion by the Taliban.[12] When asked about this, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan, in order to stop real and potential “terrorist attacks” and to block illegal drug trafficking.[13]
In addition to use by Russian border guards on the Afghan border, Russian peacekeeping forces have also used antipersonnel mines to protect their posts and for other purposes. A November 2000 report stated that “the peacekeeping forces of Russia in Tajikistan employ mine weaponry in accordance with the provisions of international law, and primarily for the protection of border outposts.”[14]
In August 2001, Russia described its mine use in Tajikistan and Chechnya to Landmine Monitor: “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base areas used by [rebel] units and to close movement routes and convoy paths across the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in [Amended Protocol II].... Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local inhabitants and to protect and guard positions and places where border divisions are stationed.”[15]
As a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Tajikistan is obliged under Article 9 to “to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.” In addition, Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that a State Party may not “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.”
Despite requests for clarification of its position from Landmine Monitor, Tajikistan has made no public statements about Russian mine use. It would appear, at the least, that Tajikistan has acquiesced to use of antipersonnel mines by the Russian Federation inside Tajikistan. In contrast, Tajikistan has protested the use of antipersonnel mines by Uzbekistan, allegedly inside Tajik territory.
Uzbekistan began to mine border areas with Tajikistan in 2000 and continued mining until at least June 2001.[16] While there have been no confirmed instances of landmine use by Uzbekistan since June 2001, a media report in March 2002 included a claim “by a government source” that Uzbekistan would “continue mining its borders.”[17] Uzbekistan has previously justified the use of antipersonnel mines along its borders as a defense against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and to prevent drug traffickers and weapons traders from entering Uzbek territory.[18]
Uzbekistan’s borders with Tajikistan remain in dispute; consequently, the location of the landmines is also contested. Tajikistan claims that Uzbek antipersonnel mines have been laid up to 500 meters inside Tajik territory.[19]
Tajikistan’s landmine problem stems primarily from Uzbek-laid minefields along border areas, and mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from the Tajik civil war. There have also been past allegations of limited use of mines by criminals and other armed elements.[20]
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the more recently laid minefields around the Uzbek-Tajik border are of greater concern as they pose a direct threat to people living in the area, where land is used for grazing livestock, hunting, and collecting wood, and to people traveling through on their way to visit relatives on the other side of the border.[21] Minefields laid during the civil war are located in less populated areas, primarily in mountain passes.
A local media report claimed in May 2001 that 70 percent of the Tajik-Uzbek border was mined, with mines laid along, and possibly within, the following Tajik districts: Isfarinskii, Kanibadamskii, Zafarabadski, Ashtski, Pendzhikentski, Shakhristanski, and Nauski.[22] A mission carried out by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) found that the more mountainous regions in southern areas of the border in the Tursanzade district are particularly contaminated; this includes the villages of Shulum, Noabad, Chuzhaley, and Samarkhand.[23] The US State Department and the GICHD report that some Uzbek mines were laid on Tajik territory.[24]
Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense claims that all minefields are marked clearly and that it has informed the Tajik government of their location.[25] However, the GICHD mission concluded that Uzbekistan has so far only sporadically marked minefields laid by its armed forces.[26] The US State Department has reported that Uzbek mine-laying along the border with Tajikistan “included some populated areas and is not demarcated clearly in most places.”[27] The mother of an Uzbek mine casualty told a journalist in July 2001: “The small boards with the word ‘mines’ cannot be seen—they are hidden with grass.”[28]
Tajikistan, too, has not systematically marked mine-affected border areas with Uzbekistan. The GICHD writes that “there is a generalized reluctance on the part of all actors in Tajikistan to mark affected areas, on the basis that it is the responsibility of Uzbekistan to mark the minefields it lays.”[29]
Shepherds and people engaged in hunting, collecting wood, and traveling to visit relatives on the Uzbek side of the border are most at risk.[30] Adult males usually carry out these activities, although women collect firewood as well.
Cross-border travel is a particularly complex problem. Uzbek restrictions on travel between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan create an incentive for crossing the border illegally, increasing the danger from antipersonnel mines. In addition, Uzbekistan has closed some major border checkpoints. A senior Tajik border official said that the closure of the Panjakent-Samarkand highway in 2001 was a reason for an increase in the number of mine casualties.[31] The GICHD stressed the need for better mine risk education efforts, especially in border communities, to avoid this risky behavior.[32]
The GICHD reports that Uzbekistan has laid OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines along its border with Tajikistan, and that there are reports of Uzbek-laid POMZ fragmentation mines and PMN blast mines as well.[33] Italian mines produced in 1948 were reportedly found in a minefield in the Shakristan district.[34]
Tajikistan is still affected by mines and UXO resulting from the 1992-1997 civil war. The major areas affected by landmines are the central Tavildara region, the Garm Valley, Khalaikhum, and the border with Afghanistan.[35]
The minefields laid during the civil war are situated in less populated areas in central Tajikistan, predominantly mountain passes, and do not pose as significant a threat to the civilian population as those on the border with Uzbekistan.[36] However, the US State Department reports that landmine explosions in some unmarked minefields in the Karetegin Valley killed civilians during 2001.[37] The ICRC has initiated data collection in this area, using a form from Azerbaijan.[38]
There is as yet no national mine action center in Tajikistan, and no clear division among ministries of mine action tasks. The GICHD reported in mid-2001, “There is a general need to consolidate all mine action data in Tajikistan in an electronic database that will be open to all concerned ministries and organizations.”[39] The GIHCD suggested that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) or the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) facilitate the establishment and maintenance of such a database.[40]
UNDP subsequently reported in July 2002 that it has been working closely with Tajikistan to establish a “mine action cell” and “develop a framework for a comprehensive program that will include setting up information management systems and supporting mine awareness activities as priority tasks.”[41]
Limited mine clearance has taken place on both the Uzbek and Afghan borders. Tajik border guards have conducted demining in Uzbek border areas near or in the Nauski region of Tajikistan; they reportedly have some mine clearance expertise, but are not equipped with metal detectors.[42] The head of the border guard committee, Anoyatbek Sulaimonbekov, believes that landmines are no longer necessary. He said, “The threat of infiltration by Afghan terrorists into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has almost been eliminated.”[43]
There have been occasional reports of ad hoc mine clearance on the Afghan border of mines laid by elements hostile to the Russian presence on the border. For example, on 28 February and 1 March 2002, Russian border guards reportedly defused two mines. One was an antipersonnel fragmentation mine, discovered two meters away from a Russian border guard facility. The next day, an officer found a PFM-1 antipersonnel mine by the entrance to the headquarters of a Russian border guard educational center.[44]
There is no indication that demining of Russian-laid mines on the Tajik-Afghan border has occurred.
The ICRC/Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan (ICRC/RCST) has initiated mine risk education in Tajikistan. Following a July 2001 needs assessment by the ICRC, RCST, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense (MESCD), a mine/UXO risk education strategy was developed. It will be implemented by the RCST volunteer network with help from the MESCD and border guards. The program was developed with a “community-based approach” in mind. During initial stages of the program, ideas were collected from the community to determine how activities should be carried out and how materials should be used.
The ICRC and the RCST identified the following target groups for mine risk education: affected communities living with the danger of mines (group at greatest risk); people traveling through mined areas; the border guards (group at risk and channel of information); the MESCD (responsible for mine action and channel of information); local administrations, or hukhomats (channel of information); and, the local media (channel of information).[45]
The ICRC/RCST then developed, field-tested, produced, and distributed
teaching aids.
Two posters (one version for adults, another for children)
were developed for the program with community input, then the RCST printed and
distributed 1,000 copies of each poster. Jamoat village authorities, schools,
border guards, and local MESCD representatives served as the main
distributors.[46]
The MESCD appointed a coordination officer to serve as the focal point for data collection and mine/UXO risk education.[47] Border guards, who carry out mine awareness activities where accidents occur, have reportedly requested the provision of materials and activities to continue informing people of the mine threat. According to the ICRC, border guards “are aware that they have a key role to play in marking mined areas.”[48]
Following the assessment mission conducted on its behalf by the GICHD in the summer of 2001, UNICEF was expected to start mine risk education activities in Central Asia in January 2002. But as of July 2002, there were no reports of UNICEF mine risk education activity in the region.
Uzbek-laid antipersonnel mines continued to kill and injure civilians and livestock in Tajikistan in 2001. However, there is no reliable information on the precise number of casualties as there is no national mechanism for collecting data on landmine incidents. Information on mine incidents is collected by various ministries, and by the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan; however, overall responsibility for data collection lies with the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense.[49]
In 2001, at least 15 people were killed and another 14 injured in reported landmine incidents in Tajikistan near the Tajik-Uzbek border.[50] The majority of landmine casualties are believed to be civilians who were killed or injured while tending livestock, farming, hunting, collecting firewood, or trying to cross the border to trade. The ICRC collected information on around 40 mine-related incidents in 2001; no details were available on the number of people killed or injured.[51] Other media reports suggest that as many as 50 Tajik citizens have been killed as a result of Uzbek-laid mines.[52]
Between January and April 2002, at least two people were killed and three injured in reported landmine incidents.[53] However, the ICRC reports at least 15 incidents from January to July 2002. In the last six months of 2000, it was reported that 19 people had been killed in 26 mine incidents involving civilians; the number of people injured in these incidents was not reported.[54]
There have been no reported mine casualties along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.
Tajikistan has historically been one of the poorest republics in Central Asia. The health care system has few resources, with run-down facilities, equipment in poor condition, and medicine and materials in short supply. The ICRC provided five health-care facilities with medicines and supplies. In 2001, these hospitals treated 35 mine survivors.[55]
The Ministry of Health in the northern province of Sughd Oblast has trained local communities in first aid management for mine injuries, and has provided first aid kits to rural medical facilities. Transport to medical facilities is reportedly available to mine casualties if they lack the appropriate transport. The facilities and skills to treat mine casualties in Tajikistan, including in surgical amputation, are also reported to be adequate. Health care is free of charge, but patients are sometimes asked to pay for drugs and medicine, as there is a chronic shortage of such products.[56]
The Dushanbe Orthopedic Center, run jointly by the ICRC and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP), under the management of the Canadian Red Cross, is the only center producing prostheses for an estimated 3,000 amputees in Tajikistan. In 2001, the center provided physical rehabilitation services and fitted 444 lower limb prostheses, 53 of which were for mine survivors. The RCST and MLSP organized four regional orthopedic seminars and two technicians completed a one-year training course in the repair of polypropylene prostheses. There are also orthopedic satellite centers in Khojent (in the north), Kuliab (in the center), and Khorog (in the south) run by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.[57] The ICRC plans to assess the capacity of these centers to perform minor repairs to prostheses. The RCST communicates with those who need prostheses, informs patients of the availability of artificial limb-fitting, and pays for round-trip travel to the Center. As of May 2002, all landmine survivors registered with the Center needing prostheses have either been fitted or soon will be.[58]
Mine survivors are eligible for a disability pension, as are other people with disabilities who are unable to work. There are three different levels of pensions, depending on the extent and nature of the disability.[59]
| <SWITZERLAND | TANZANIA> |
[1] According to the treaty section of the United Nations, Tajikistan notified the depositary of its consent to be bound on 12 October 1999. http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.
[2] Response to OSCE Questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Tajikistan to the OSCE, Vienna, 23 January 2002. In Russian, translated by Landmine Monitor.
[3] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 26.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p. 27.
[6] “Position of the Kyrgyz Republic on the question of joining the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production And Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,” letter to the ICBL from the Division of UN Affairs, Department of International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, undated, received 29 June 2001. Unofficial translation by Landmine Monitor.
[7] Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.
[8] Ibid.
[9] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 26. However, in its OSCE response, indicated it had not signed or ratified CCW Protocol II. Response to OSCE Questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Tajikistan to the OSCE, Vienna, 23 January 2002.
[10] Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications, LLC, Washington, DC. It states, “From May 2000 to date the Russian Federation has employed anti-personnel mines (hereinafter ‘APMs’) in the Chechen Republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border but APMs have not been emplaced in Abkhazia (Georgia).” The response arrived after Landmine Monitor Report 2001 went to print, and thus could not be included in the report.
[11] Meeting with Col. Mikhail Zenkin, Federal Border Service, and Vladimir Kurikov, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, at the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 13 December 2001. Notes by Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch.
[12] Yuri Golotyuk, “Russia is just a river-far from new war,” Vremya Novostey online (News-Time online), № 137, 2 October 2000; Patrick E. Tyler, “Russia Hardens Its Positions along a Tajikistan Border,” New York Times, 3 October 2000.
[13] Andrei Malov, Counselor of the Department for Security Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, presentation to IPPNW-Russia, 19 January 2001.
[14] Georgiy Mekhov, “How to Solve the Mine Problem: Russia Supports the Aspiration of the World Community to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines, But is not Ready for it,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, November 2000.
[15] Response to Landmine Monitor by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, sent by fax to Landmine Monitor Coordinator by Vassily V. Boriak, Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, 16 August 2001. Original in Russian, translated by Global Communications, LLC, Washington, DC.
[16] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 809. See also the report on Uzbekistan in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
[17] Malik Mansur, “Uzbekistan: Calls for End to Mine Policy Rejected,” Institute For War and Peace Reporting, Tashkent, 22 March 2002, accessed at:
www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200203_109_5_eng.txt on 1 July 2002.
[18] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 816.
[19] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 17.
[20] For example, on 18 June 2000, two “anti-infantry” mines were discovered and neutralized on a railway bridge near the Dushanbe textile factory. The Tajik interior ministry said criminal elements were responsible. The next day, a mine blew up near the entrance of an apartment building. There were no casualties. A mine was also reportedly discovered in the doorway of the neighboring building. “Two anti-infantry mines have been discovered on the railway bridge in Dushanbe” and “A mine has been blown up in a block of flats doorway,” AP Blitz, News In Brief #114, Dushanbe, 19 June 2000, accessed at: www.internews.ru/ASIA-PLUS/blitz/527.html on 1 July 2002.
[21] International Committee of the Red Cross, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002, available at: www.icrc.org.
[22] Viktoriya Panfilova, “Mine War Continues,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, No. 186, 5 October 2001.
[23] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 19.
[24] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002, available at: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8353.htm; “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 18.
[25] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002.
[26] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 20.
[27] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002.
[28] Bukharbaeva, Galima, “Uzbek Mines Killing Their Own,” Institute For War And Peace Reporting, Tashkent, 19 July 2001, accessed at: www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200107_61_1_eng.txt on 1 July 2002.
[29] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 20.
[30] International Committee of the Red Cross, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002, available at: www.icrc.org.
[31] “Closure of major checkpoint on Tajik-Uzbek border creates new problems,” Asia Plus, Dushanbe, 30 October 2001, accessed at: www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/hypermail/200110/0060.html.
[32] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 19, 28.
[33] Ibid., pp. 17-18.
[34] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.
[35] Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 810.
[36] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.
[37] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—Tajikistan,” March 2002.
[38] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.
[39] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, p. 22.
[40] Ibid.
[41] UNDP, “Mine Action For Resettlement and Reintegration. Post-Crisis Recovery and the Obstacle of Landmines,” accessed at: www.undp.org/erd/archives/brochures/mine_action/reintegration.htm on 2 July 2002.
[42] Nezavisimaia Gazeta, No. 186, 5 October 2001.
[43] “Dushanbe advocates neutralization of landmines on Tajik-Uzbek border,” Interfax (Tashkent), 8 January 2002.
[44] “2 Mines Defused on Tajik-Afghan Border,” RIA Novosti, 1 March 2002.
[45] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Landmine Monitor analysis of 10 media reports between January and December 2001.
[51] “Tajikistan: Mine awareness still needed,” IRIN UNOCHA, 15 July 2002, accessed at
www.irinnews.org.
[52] In October 2001, RIA Novosti reported that according to the Tajik government press center, Uzbek mines have killed more than 50 people and injured about 50 other since September 2000. NG, a Russian journal, reported in October 2001 that 48 people had been killed and 14 injured by Uzbek mines in 2001. In March 2002, IWPR reported that Dushanbe estimates the number of Tajik fatalities at 40 and the number of injured at 42. In April 2002, the Varoud news agency reported that 53 Tajik civilians have been killed and dozens injured by Uzbek mines. It is not clear, however, whether that figure refers to just Tajik casualties or both Tajik and Uzbek casualties.
[53] Landmine Monitor analysis of 3 media reports between January and 10 April 2002.
[54] For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 811-812.
[55] “ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2001,” ICRC, Geneva, July 2002, p. 26.
[56] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 22-23.
[57] Canadian Red Cross, “Dushanbe Orthopaedic Centre, Annual Report 2001,” provided in email to Landmine Monitor (MAC) from Michael Rudiak, Canadian Red Cross, 24 July 2002.
[58] ICRC, “Mine/UXO risk education in Tajikistan,” May 2002; and “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 22-23.
[59] “Mine Awareness and Advocacy Mission to Central Asia, A Report for UNICEF,” Geneva International Centre For Humanitarian Demining, 12 September 2001, pp. 22-23.
