Key developments since May 2005: In May 2006, Afghanistan reported that since signing the Mine Ban Treaty, 65,973 stockpiled mines had been destroyed, including 44,819 since the beginning of 2005. Afghanistan served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration from December 2005 to September 2006. The pace of demining accelerated in 2005; the amount of land demined increased by over one-third to almost 140 square kilometers, despite deteriorating security. Mine clearance operations ran into severe funding shortfalls in mid-2006; the laying-off of demining personnel was announced in July, with further cuts expected. Mine risk education reached over 1.8 million Afghans and 2,365 communities in 2005. There were 848 new casualties recorded in 2005, maintaining the relatively constant casualty rate of recent years; however, child casualties continued to increase.
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2003. Afghanistan has yet to adopt new national implementation legislation, including penal sanctions, for the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2005, it “worked toward the development of a national mine action law,” but this apparently would not serve as comprehensive implementation legislation.[1] Afghanistan has stated that the new constitution adopted in January 2004 requires the country to respect all international treaties it has signed.[2]
Afghanistan submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 1 May 2006, covering calendar year 2005.[3] The report included voluntary Form J with information on victim assistance and mine awareness activities.
Afghanistan has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration since December 2005, having served as co-rapporteur of the committee for the previous year. Its term will end in September 2006.
At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, Afghanistan made presentations on stockpile destruction, mine clearance and victim assistance. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 (in addition to its role co-chairing the victim assistance Standing Committee), it made interventions on universalization, stockpile destruction, mine clearance and victim assistance.
Afghanistan has not yet made known its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, and in particular issues related to joint military operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.
Mine action has been fully integrated into Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals as part of the efforts to enhance human security.[4] Mine action is also included in the UN Development Assistance Framework for Afghanistan for 2006-2008 as an activity that improves the welfare of Afghans and leads to more development.[5]
The Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) has continued to raise public awareness of the mine ban issue. It helped to sponsor Afghan Mine Action and Awareness Month from 25 March to 24 April 2006. During the month, activities were held in nine major cities, and the ACBL helped to organize conferences, mine awareness exhibitions, rallies, sports tournaments (including for the disabled), and a disabled wheelchair race.[6]
Afghanistan is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines in the past, though there have been reports of non-state armed groups from Afghanistan smuggling mines into other countries such as Pakistan. Large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan during the many years of armed conflict, but there have been no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to government or opposition forces in recent years.[7]
Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Afghan government forces since Afghanistan decided to join the Mine Ban Treaty and became a State Party.
Despite the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, there have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines—or mine-like victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—in 2005 or early 2006 by opposition forces.[8]
Local and international media have continued almost every day to report attacks by Taliban and other opposition groups. Attacks with explosive devices appeared to increase in 2005 and early 2006. But instead of antipersonnel mines, these incidents most commonly involved IEDs and antivehicle mines, in the form of remote-controlled roadside attacks. They target not only international and national troops, but also government officials, national and international aid workers, including mine action personnel, and other civilians.[9]
According to the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA), IEDs are manufactured by government opponents in the south and southeastern parts of the country.[10] Antivehicle devices are often made from shells, rockets, mines and other munitions, and are transported to the site by bicycle or donkey, placed and detonated from a distance once a target comes into sight.[11]
In 2005, there were six IED incidents affecting staff of mine action agencies which killed five and left five people injured. The incidents took place in Farah, Helmand, Paktia and Nangarhar provinces while the teams were working in support of reconstruction projects.[12]
The US government has justified the enemy combatant status of some Guantanamo Bay detainees with allegations of landmine use and training in Afghanistan. An enemy combatant is defined by the US government as “an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Between August and December 2004, at least nine Guantanamo Bay detainees were found to be enemy combatants by the Combatant Status Review Board in part because of antipersonnel landmine use and/or training.[13]
Summary of Evidence reports released by the Combatant Status Review Board make specific allegations against individual detainees, stating in one instance, “On July 20, 2002 detainee planted 10 mines against US forces in the mountain region between Khost and Ghardez.” Another report said, “The detainee received...mine training in a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba training camp.” Another said, “Other detainees are accused of recruiting individuals to lay antipersonnel landmine against US and Afghan forces.”[14]
In May 2006, Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs told States Parties that, “locating and destroying the stockpiles of anti-personnel mines that have accumulated throughout the country over the past two decades is a major challenge. In some ways, the stockpiles are even more difficult to locate than the mines in the ground. We cannot rely on metal detectors or mine sniffing dogs. Instead we have to convince local commanders and villagers to voluntarily give up their stockpiled caches of weapons and or disclose their locations.”[15]
He went on to say, “Despite these challenges we are committed to meeting our obligations by March 2007.... As the deadline for the destruction of all anti-personnel mines approaches, we can say with confidence that all known stockpiles in Afghanistan are or will be destroyed by our deadline of March 2007. However, because of various factors like the ones mentioned above, there exists the possibility that more stockpiled mines will be discovered after March 2007.”[16]
The precise size, location and composition of antipersonnel mine stockpiles in Afghanistan remains to be established.[17] In December 2004, the Ministry of Defense started a nationwide survey of explosive remnants of war including stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[18] The survey was still ongoing in mid-2006 in conjunction with Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, a UN Development Programme (UNDP)-supported program of demobilization of ex-combatants.[19]
As of 31 July 2005, destruction of stockpiled mines became the responsibility of the New Beginnings Programme and the Ministry of Defense, with assistance from UNMACA. Afghanistan states that stockpiled mines are removed whenever possible to demolition sites in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat for destruction.[20]
In May 2006, Afghanistan reported that since signing the Mine Ban Treaty, 65,973 stockpiled mines had been destroyed, including 44,819 since the beginning of 2005.[21] Afghanistan’s 2006 Article 7 report indicates that from 30 April 2003 to 31 December 2005, a total of 58,056 stockpiled mines were destroyed.[22] The report gives extensive details on types, numbers, locations and dates of destruction, as well as the agency carrying out the destruction.[23]
Afghanistan reported that, at the end of 2005, it retained 1,887 antipersonnel mines for training purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.[24] This is an increase of 811 mines from the total reported as of April 2005.[25] An additional 505 mines were retained by UNMACA from a stockpile destruction held on 9 November 2005 in Kabul. Another 306 mines that had been used by the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META) for training were handed over to UNMACA after META’s training program ceased. In 2005, retained mines were used for mine dog accreditation sites.[26]
Afghanistan states that only UNMACA can retain antipersonnel mines, and that the precise number is based on the needs of the program. The Ministry of Defense approves the number. UNMACA can disburse mines “to select MAPA implement [sic] partners for training purposes,” but the mines remain under the control of UNMACA.[27]
Afghanistan emerged from more than two decades of conflict, starting in the 1970s, as one of the countries most contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Security forces have continued to discover huge quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and unexploded ordnance (UXO).[28] The Landmine Impact Survey, which completed fieldwork in January 2005, reported 2,245 casualties in the two years before the survey, including 922 people killed and 1,323 injured. It also found 2,368 communities and more than four million people affected by mines and identified some 715 square kilometers of hazardous areas.[29]
Most of the landmines in Afghanistan were laid in the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet occupation in 1979, but significant contamination also occurred during the civil war (1992-1996) and during the Taliban regime (1996-2001). The US-led coalition’s intervention in late 2001 added considerable quantities of UXO to the problem, including large quantities of cluster munitions, and this was followed by further landmine use by non-coalition forces.[30]
Landmines were used by Soviet occupation forces both for conventional military purposes, as defensive barriers around military installations and to protect communications, and as part of a strategy to depopulate villages, placing mines in houses, irrigation systems and agricultural and grazing land. Mines were also scattered from helicopters and other aircraft; huge quantities of UXO remained in areas of conflict. Afghan guerrilla forces also used mines to block roads and harass movement of enemy forces.[31] More mines were laid during the civil war by the Northern Alliance.
As a result, although Afghanistan has the oldest, biggest and most richly resourced mine action program in the world, mines and ERW continue to pose a formidable challenge to social and economic reconstruction, which is critical to the country’s political stabilization and to the return of refugees. Contamination affects towns and urban commercial areas as well as villages, farmland, grazing land and roads, with particularly heavy concentrations and the most impact in the central, northern and southeastern regions.[32]
National Mine Action Authority: Afghanistan does not have a national mine action authority, but has been in the process of creating one since late 2004. A Mine Action Task Force comprising representatives of the government, the UN, donor countries and implementing partners, completed preparation of a draft national mine action law in November 2004, which set out “the roles and responsibilities of the national mine action institutions, including a new National Mine Action Agency” directly under the office of the president.[33] The government noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had expected the law to be issued by presidential decree in 2005, but with the election of a parliament in that year, the draft had to follow new procedures for passing legislation and this would take longer than projected.[34] As of June 2006, it appeared likely that the bill would be presented to parliament in September or October 2006.[35]
Transition to full national ownership of the program started in June 2005, and was expected to take two years. The Afghan government reported that in 2005 it worked with UNMACA and other stakeholders on revising the law and the regulatory framework for a national mine action authority, and on developing a timetable for a phased transition of UNMACA’s role to the government. They also prepared capacity-building programs and recruitment mechanisms needed for a successful transfer to full government ownership. In 2006, UNMACA and UNDP started setting up a joint Mine Action Transition Coordination Office to assist the government in developing policies and structures to facilitate the transition.[36]
Mine Action Center: UNMACA, on behalf of the government, is responsible for managing, planning and coordinating all aspects of mine action undertaken by the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). From the creation of MAPA in 1989 until June 2002, it was administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA). Since then, MAPA has been the responsibility of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), with technical support from the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS).[37]
Until 2006, overall policy for mine action was provided by the Mine Action Consultative Group (MACG), chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and including representatives of other government departments concerned with mine action, as well as representatives of donors, UN agencies and implementing partners.[38] The MACG oversaw preparation of an annual Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Public Investment Programme, and budget.[39]
Management of mine action was reorganized after the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2006 when the government adopted a new approach to development set out in the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. The new strategy provided for seven consultative groups, one for each of the seven sectors in the Compact. Mine action falls under CG1–Security, but was made the focus of a separate Consultative Working Group, still chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the same participants as the MACG; this new mechanism for coordination and monitoring replaced the MACG from May 2006.[40]
UNMACA’s coordination activities include updating strategic and operational mine action plans and policies, developing the national operational workplan, providing technical assistance to help Afghanistan meet its treaty obligations, and coordinating the monitoring of mine risk education. It is also responsible for maintaining the mine action database, resource mobilization, support to and coordination of implementing partners, oversight of national mine action standards, and assistance in developing a comprehensive antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction strategy.[41] In 2006, UNMACA expanded its management team by adding a Chief of Staff with a view to strengthening operations, and freeing the Program Manager to attend to transition issues. The appointment was also expected to facilitate a separation of UNMACA’s roles as regulator and implementing agency.[42]
UNMACA has seven Area Mine Action Centers, which coordinate, oversee and monitor demining activities at regional and provincial levels. Regional coordination meetings are held once a week. National coordination meetings are held every one or two months. Afghanistan uses a decentralized data entry system, which operates in the seven area centers. The centers report to UNMACA, which is responsible for quality control, updating of information and sending these updates to the area centers, so that each one has data for all of Afghanistan. The advantage of this decentralized system, according to MAPA, is that the centers have to check the data on the activities of demining NGOs working in their areas for accuracy and completeness, to eliminate discrepancies between the UNMACA database and demining agencies.[43]
In February 2006, quality assurance previously outsourced to the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META), which had been set up in 1989, was moved into UNMACA. META had been primarily responsible for monitoring, evaluating and quality assurance of demining operations; investigating demining accidents; testing demining equipment and procedures; producing technical and reference materials; and providing mine action technical and management training courses. In 2004, META employed 241 staff, including 188 in operations; following META’s closure, its staff were rehired as employees of UNMACA.[44]
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) have been translated into both national languages (Dari and Pashtu) and Afghan mine action standards based on IMAS have been produced and released by UNMACA as a provisional working document pending government approval.[45]
The MAPA adopted a 10-year strategic plan in 2003, which set the targets of clearing all high-priority mined areas in the first five years until 2007, medium-priority areas between 2007 and 2009 and all low-priority mined areas by 2013. The plan was revised by the MACG in 2005 to take account of several new factors: the findings of the Afghan Landmine Impact Survey, the expectation that UNMACA would transition in this period to a national program, and the requirement for mine clearance to support rehabilitation of national infrastructure as well as humanitarian needs.[46]
A revised strategy, The Way Ahead, released in draft form in April 2006, set out planning assumptions and factors and some end-goals for mine action. The assumptions included improved security and continued international donor funding for a number of years. The “influencing factors” included Afghanistan’s international obligations, firstly, under the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 2007 and to clear all known mined areas by 2013, and secondly, in accordance with its Millennium Development Goals, to destroy all other explosive contaminants by 2015 and all other abandoned or unwanted explosive stocks by 2020.[47]
UNMACA remains confident that the deadline for destruction of all known stockpiles of mines by 2007 will be met, but notes that prospects for completing clearance of all high-priority mined areas by 2007 are contingent on the security situation. An increase in attacks on civilians, particularly through the use of roadside IEDs, raised the security threat for humanitarian demining efforts.[48] Approximately one-quarter of high priority hazardous areas are in locations where the deterioration in security in 2005 and 2006 has restricted access by humanitarian demining agencies.[49]
The strategy called for UNMACA to draw up a three-year plan of action for 2006-2009 and for UNMACA or, subsequently, the national mine action authority, to set annual integrated work plans to implement the strategy. The new authority would draw up subsequent medium-term plans.[50] As of June 2006, UNMACA was still drafting the three-year plan.
The Afghanistan Compact, published after the London Conference on Afghanistan on 31 January to 1 February 2006, also sets out a number of key targets for mines action:
These targets were re-stated in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy published in January 2006, which called for an investment program for mine action to ensure implementation.[52]
UNMACA’s more immediate mine action targets for the year 1385 (2006/2007) were:[53]
Two major evaluations of mine action in Afghanistan have been performed in recent years, the first by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), and the second by UNDP and the World Bank. Both found significant economic benefits from mine action in the country, although they differed as to the type of land that generates the greatest benefit from clearance.[54]
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2013. This obligation is recognized as an influencing factor in The Way Ahead draft strategy for mine action, which sets the target of completing clearance of all known mined areas by 2013, and is incorporated into the national Public Investment Program.[55] UNMAS has warned that Afghanistan’s ability to meet its treaty commitments, as well as its Millennium Development Goals and other targets, would be affected by cuts in the MAPA’s capacity resulting from shortfalls in donor funding.[56]
Afghanistan has the world’s longest established and biggest mine action program, with some 9,500 Afghans working for organizations coordinated by the MAPA.[57] These include seven national NGOs: the Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan, Afghan Technical Consultants and its offshoot Community Based Mine Action Program, Demining Agency for Afghanistan, the Mine Clearance Planning Agency, Mine Detection and Dog Center and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation. Foreign demining organizations include the international NGOs HALO Trust and Danish Demining Group (DDG). META provided quality assurance until its closure in February 2006.
International commercial companies active in Afghanistan include, MineTech International, RONCO Consulting Corporation and DynCorp International. RONCO provided humanitarian demining services under contract to the US Department of State for three years until August 2005, and now conducts demining for coalition forces at Bagram air base, as well as commercial explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) work.[58] DynCorp International has conducted stockpile destruction, and from September 2005, took on humanitarian demining and EOD under contract to the US Department of State.[59]
The first survey was conducted in 1990 by Mines Advisory Group (MAG).[60] Since then, surveying of mine/ERW-affected areas became an integral part of the Mine Action Program in Afghanistan conducted principally by MCPA and HALO. MCPA conducted a general survey in 2003 and since then has carried out general, technical, battle area, and socioeconomic impact surveys on behalf of all of MAPA’s implementing partners. HALO has carried out surveys in its own areas of operation in central and northern Afghanistan, and DDG reported that it started to conduct general and technical surveys in September 2004.[61]
In 2005, MCPA and HALO conducted surveys on a total of more than 14 square kilometers of mined areas and over 28 square kilometers of battlefield areas. MCPA, with 537 staff (427 field staff and 110 administrative staff), deployed 41 technical survey teams and 16 landmine impact assessment teams which engaged mainly in surveys, but also undertook limited clearance as part of minefield boundary marking and reduction of mined areas. In 2005, MCPA marked and mapped 25,056,000 square meters of mined areas and 22,680,000 square meters of battlefield. It also resurveyed 164,778 square meters of mined areas.[62] In the same period, HALO surveyed 15,811,817 square meters of former battlefield areas and 892,429 square meters of minefields. DDG surveyed 157,626 square meters of minefields.[63]
The Ministry of Defense, in collaboration with UNMACA, UNDP, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), launched a survey of landmine stockpiles in December 2004, implemented by nine survey teams composed of representatives from UNDP’s Afghan New Beginnings Program, HALO, DynCorp International, the Ministry of Defense and UNMACA.[64] By the end of 2005, the survey had located 25,475 landmines in 16 of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces and was continuing.[65]
The Afghan Landmine Impact Survey, completed in January 2005 and certified by the UN on 30 September 2005, provided a basis for significantly refocusing mine action. The survey, implemented by MCPA according to Survey Working Group protocols, identified 2,368 landmine and UXO-impacted communities in 259 districts, and found that 4.2 million people, about 15 percent of the population, are affected by mines and UXO, including 1.6 million people living in high- or medium-impact communities. It also confirmed the existence of 4,514 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), of which 281 (12 percent) were high-impact, 480 (20 per cent) medium-impact and 1,607 (61 percent) low-impact.[66]
Beyond this baseline data, the survey yielded some significant findings and established benchmarks against which to measure the progress of Afghanistan’s mine action program. Survey teams visited 324 of Afghanistan’s 329 districts in 32 provinces, carrying existing database records for the areas they were surveying.[67] In the course of the survey they were able to discount approximately half of the UNMACA database as no longer valid and obtained a similar volume of new information about suspected contamination. As a result of the survey, the total area of SHAs in the UNMACA database fell from 850 square kilometers to 715 square kilometers, a drop of 15 percent.[68]
The Afghan Landmine Impact Survey found that Afghanistan’s mine and UXO contamination is more geographically concentrated than previously thought. The survey found all but two (Oruzgan and Daykondi) of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces are mine-affected, but three-quarters of SHAs and the same proportion of recent casualties are located in only 12 provinces and half the SHAs are located in just six provinces, led by Kabul.[69] Also, 45 percent of the recent casualties recorded by the survey were in just the three provinces of Kabul, Parvan and Takhar. (See Landmine/ERW Casualties section in this report).
The survey estimated that up to 100 square kilometers would have to be cleared to get rid of all SHAs associated with recent casualties. However, “based on current clearance rates of 30 square kilometers per annum, it is not inconceivable that the most dangerous 20 percent of SHAs could be cleared in three years.” It also concluded that “considerably less than half” the number of SHAs would have to be cleared to make significant reductions in casualties and to enable major infrastructure projects to go forward.[70]
After completion of the survey, UNMACA converted the survey teams into Landmine Impact Assessment Teams and deployed them to regional Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs) to continue community visits in order to validate and update the findings. Their monitoring is intended to ensure that the database is kept up-to-date, that high-impact communities remain at the top of the agenda and that priorities take account of communities newly categorized as impacted owing to recent victims or new blockages. These updates are intended to maintain the critical two-year window of information that drives community scoring and allows UNMACA and MAPA to base annual and quarterly planning on current information.[71]
The Afghan Landmine Impact Survey reported that of 4,514 SHAs in Afghanistan, only 10 were fenced and only 542 had warning signs. A total of 3,962 SHAs, or 87 percent, were not marked or fenced.[72]
Mine action in Afghanistan accelerated in 2005 when the total amount of land reported cleared by UNMACA increased by over one-third to 139.3 square kilometers, despite constraints imposed by deteriorating security, notably in the south of the country. This total included 39.8 square kilometers of mined area clearance, 19 percent more than in 2005, and 99.7 square kilometers of battle area clearance, 45 percent more than in 2005.
Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), one of the largest Afghan humanitarian and reconstruction mine clearance organizations, employed 1,825 administrative and field staff working in all areas of Afghanistan undertaking manual and mechanical clearance and EOD. ATC operations in 2005 included commercial work clearing 1.8 million square meters of land. In addition, ATC cleared 516,270 square meters of mined area under its community-based mine clearance program in 2005.[74]
Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA) operated for one month of 2005, after which ATC absorbed AREA’s community-based assets as the Community Based Mine Action Program (CBMAP). It works in the eastern province of Nangarhar and aims to provide local inhabitants with the capacity to clear their own land. In 2005, it cleared 14,416 square meters of mined areas and destroyed one item of UXO.[75]
Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) started working in June 1990 and planned to continue until 2013. In 2005, it operated with 1,092 staff, including 652 in field operations, conducting mine and ERW clearance, mainly in western and southern provinces, including Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Oruzgan and Nimruz. DAFA cleared 9.5 million square meters, including 4.5 million square meters of agricultural and grazing land, 2 million square meters of access roads and 1.8 million square meters of residential areas.[76]
Danish Demining Group increased its workforce by nearly one-third in 2005, to 402 people, including 362 field staff (up from 282 in 2004), and at the same time sharply raised productivity. DDG’s battle area clearance more than tripled from 803,378 square meters in 2004 to 3.3 million square meters in 2005, and mined area clearance rose from 119,308 square meters in 2004 to 172,718 square meters in 2005.[77]
HALO Trust, the biggest mine action NGO in Afghanistan, also reported large increases in productivity in 2005 and planned to push clearance rates up further in 2006. HALO employs more than 2,600 people deployed in 54 manual, 21 mechanical, 16 battle area clearance, 13 technical survey, six general survey, two mine risk education, 23 weapons and ammunition disposal and six ammunition survey teams.[78] Its operations supported repatriation of refugees and poverty elimination by releasing land for agriculture and rebuilding infrastructure. HALO’s total battle area clearance of 86.4 square kilometers in 2005 was 83 percent higher than the previous year; it included 60.5 square kilometers of agricultural land, 17.3 square kilometers for infrastructure and 8.7 square kilometers for social uses. Mined areas cleared in 2005 increased 88 percent to 3.96 square kilometers in 2005, from 2.1 square kilometers in 2004. HALO was also involved in a project for the disposal of weapons and ammunition.[79]
Mine Detection and Dog Center (MDC) set out to virtually double the amount of land it cleared to 18 square kilometers in 2005, and achieved, or even surpassed, its target. In addition to clearing 6.7 square kilometers of mined areas, MDC reported clearing 11.4 square kilometers in support of reconstruction. Nearly two-thirds of MDC clearance was roads and 17 percent was grazing land. MDC had a total staff of 1,610 people and deployed 33 mine dog groups, each with 29 people and four dogs, and 47 mine dog sets, each with five people and two dogs. MDC keeps its headquarters in Kabul city and has five site offices in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif.[80] MDC also undertook training of mine detection dogs on behalf of Tajikistan’s mine action program.
Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), set up in 1990, undertakes manual and mechanical mine clearance and EOD across the country, closely linking its clearance operations to mine risk education. In 2005, it employed a staff of 935, including 829 in operations, and reported clearing 17.2 square kilometers, almost double the clearance recorded by UNMACA. OMAR said it gave priority to clearing residential land followed by agricultural land, irrigation canals, roads and grazing land.[81]
Handicap International, previously engaged in mine risk education, participated in EOD for the first time in 2005, deploying two teams in western Afghanistan, focusing mainly on Herat.[82]
RONCO’s main activity was demining at Bagram air base for US Central Command, where it started in February 2002 under a contract until February 2007. As of June 2006, RONCO employed 174 expatriates and third country nationals at Bagram, including Bosnians, Mozambicans and South Africans, deploying about 100 manual deminers, 22 mine detection dog teams and four mechanical teams using Casspir mine clearance vehicles. For more than three years until August 2005, RONCO provided technical support to Afghan demining NGOs; under this contract, RONCO also operated a specialized EOD unit with five teams in Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif which cleared more than 1.6 million mines and UXO items in 2005. When the contract expired, RONCO retained most of the personnel for commercial work in which, as of June 2006, it employed three internationals and 380 national staff. In 2005, these personnel conducted 25 short-term commercial mine/UXO clearance tasks, clearing 6.4 million square meters of land and destroying 89,775 mines and UXO.[83]
Deminer Safety: In 2005, nine deminers were killed and 21 injured in 15 incidents, nine of them involving mines and six involving UXO. The agencies affected included ATC, HALO, MineTech, OMAR and RONCO. By mid-June 2006, another six incidents occurred in which one deminer was killed and five injured.[84] The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reported in May 2006 that a French engineer died of injuries sustained in a mine explosion during demining operations near Kabul airport.[85]
From 1990 until the end of 2005, almost all demining NGOs experienced mine/UXO accidents in which 79 deminers were killed and 620 injured.[86] Investigations by META in previous years found that 75 percent of accidents occurred during prodding. All deminers are insured in Afghanistan.[87]
In addition to the danger posed by mines and UXO, deminers faced a growing threat from declining security. In 2005, seven deminers were killed and five injured by IEDs.[88] In June 2006, one deminer was killed and two injured by an IED on the road between Kandahar and Herat.
Demining operations in the early months of 2006 were largely on course to achieve targets set in UNMACA’s annual workplan, but by mid-year they faced increasing constraints from financial shortfalls and deteriorating security.[89] In the first quarter of 2006, the seven most established NGOs completed 10,358,016 square meters of battle area clearance and 6,246,520 square meters of mined area clearance.[90] In the process they disposed of 3,318 antipersonnel mines, 93 antivehicle mines and 108,714 UXO.[91] RONCO completed 11 short-term commercial contracts and in addition, took on five clearance and one survey project which required 463,000 square meters of clearance and 151 kilometers of road surveys. As of June, RONCO teams had cleared 4,184,000 square meters, destroying 743 mines and UXO, and had surveyed 23 kilometers of road.[92]
The UN mine action program had budgeted for US$76.1 million in 2006, including $53 million for mine/UXO clearance and stockpile destruction.[93] In April 2006, UNMAS Deputy Director John Flanagan appealed for donor support warning that impending funding shortfalls would cause cuts in the workforce.[94] The problem was partly due to substantial numbers of NGO deminers having been employed on reconstruction projects that reached completion in mid-2006. UNMACA faced a shortfall of approximately $5 million for the third quarter of 2006.[95]
In June 2006, UNMACA announced to its implementing partners that shortfalls in funding necessitated the loss of 1,130 jobs. Without an improvement in funding, it expected to cut another 1,300 jobs in August and 1,500 jobs in September―a total of 3,930 jobs representing approximately 41 percent of the some 9,500 strong workforce.[96]
Afghanistan provided a summary of mine risk education (MRE) activities in 2005 in its Article 7 report submitted on 1 May 2006.[97]
In 2005, over 1.8 million people attended MRE sessions across the country; some 43 percent were female and 61 percent children. MRE was provided by 12 organizations, coordinated by UNICEF for UNMACA; in 2006, UNICEF ceased funding MRE in Afghanistan and the coordinator was integrated into UNMACA.[98] MRE is coordinated at the field level by Area Mine Action Centers; in 2006, MRE quality assurance was integrated into the quality assurance teams of each Area Mine Action Center, which has one focal point for MRE.[99] META provided MRE capacity-building in 2005. IMAS for MRE have been translated into the two national languages, and are used by implementing NGOs.[100]
MAPA’s community-based MRE is designed to respond to the needs of communities through emergency response, community liaison networks, teacher training, and community monitoring of risk (victim and incident data collection) and of the impact of MRE activities. The program has been based on the Landmine Impact Survey.[102] In 2005, the program, implemented by MAPA partners Handicap International, Afghan Red Crescent Society, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), OMAR, and for the first time by ATC, reached over 2,365 communities. Over a million posters and brochures were produced and distributed through the UNMACA regional offices in 2005. A UNICEF peer education program and a mobile cinema MRE program were piloted to enhance community-based activities.[103]
The Afghan Red Crescent Society MRE teams, with financial and technical support and training from ICRC, continued its program in 2005. A total of 8,652 sessions in 2,544 locations provided MRE to 259,256 people (34,869 men, 69,793 women, 91,496 boys and 63,098 girls) in 2005, mainly in central regions. Over 100 community volunteers in 10 provinces conducted 1,858 sessions in 526 locations for 58,976 people (12,442 men, 18,755 women, 15,748 boys and 12,031 girls).[104] In 2005, the Afghan Red Crescent Society and ICRC also provided 211 reports on mine/ERW-contaminated areas.
ICRC teams in the northern and eastern regions, combining MRE and data gathering, delivered 1,903 MRE sessions in 1,374 locations to 25,016 people (8,994 men, 3,739 women, 7,447 boys and 4,836 girls), including 268 MRE sessions for 4,537 people driving to remote areas. The incident and casualty data collected is complemented by information from more than 500 healthcare facilities and accounts for 90 percent of all data available on new injuries.[105]
During 2005, nearly 240,000 MRE materials were distributed. ICRC organized 13 training workshops and one review meeting; 190 people were trained in mine action and data collection; 24 attended the review meeting.[106]
Teacher training has been an integral part of UNICEF MRE programming, in coordination with the Ministry of Education. A total of 63,000 teachers received MRE training during 2004 and 2005. An evaluation on school-based MRE was due in 2005, but was not undertaken due to lack of resources. A new community-based teacher training program, which targets non-formal teachers (religious and community leaders, and women) to provide educational opportunities to children outside the formal school system, included MRE.[107]
MRE for returning Afghan refugees was provided in UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation centers on the borders of Pakistan and Iran, which “provided an introduction to the risks associated with mines and ERW and promoted safe behaviors to assist with travel and the possible resettlement in communities with a mine/ERW risk.” As of December 2005, over 725,000 people had returned to Afghanistan through eight repatriation centers; all were provided with MRE. UNICEF and AARJ produced more than 1 million brochures and posters for distribution through these centers. Handicap International, HALO and OMAR implemented MRE activities in seven out of the eight UNHCR centers, and the Afghan Red Crescent Society covered the remaining center.[108]
MRE is also provided by clearance and survey organizations, including AREA, MCPA, DDG and HALO.[109]
In 2005, DDG had one team conducting stand-alone MRE in communities before EOD teams are deployed. Training for DDG MRE staff was provided by UNMACA through META. In May 2006, DDG recruited two new MRE teams to be based with its EOD teams in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif; the teams underwent refresher training in June.[110]
HALO had two MRE teams operating in 2005 in the northern and central regions, conducting MRE at UNHCR encashment centers and in villages.[111]
Public information on MRE continued to be spread in 2005 by the BBC Afghan Education Project. In January 2006, the BBC introduced City Voice, which also included MRE messages. It continued publishing the magazine New Home, New Life, and a monthly cartoon that includes MRE stories.[112]
In March 2006, MAPA published a comprehensive MRE impact monitoring study based on two surveys in 2004-2005, to guide future MRE programming.[113] The first survey was reported in last year’s Landmine Monitor.[114] In 2005, a Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Beliefs survey covering all eight regions of Afghanistan included questions on cultural issues; 800 people from nine provinces were interviewed, including mullahs and female teachers, half from rural and half from urban areas; 48 percent of those interviewed were female. The two surveys showed that the overwhelming majority of people are fully aware of the dangers posed by mines and UXO, but when asked about appropriate behavior in the case of being trapped in a minefield, only a quarter responded correctly; one-third considered retracing their steps. In the second survey, 42 percent said that if they saw a friend or family member lying injured in a minefield they would run to their assistance.[115]
Belief questions in the second survey revealed that mine incidents have a different impact according to age; each new incident evokes traumatic war memories in older people, while younger people feel they can change risky behaviors to avoid risks. The MRE knowledge level among boys and young men was higher than among women and girls. Nevertheless, most mine/UXO incidents involve boys and young men which, the survey report concluded, confirms that MRE as a stand-alone activity is not sufficient to change dangerous behavior: “Economic necessity leads to this subconscious ignoring of danger.”[116]
UNMACA commented that providing MRE to women is difficult as female MRE teams are unable to be as mobile as their male counterparts.[117] DDG commented that, “The challenges faced by the MRE teams include the need for female MRE facilitators to work with acceptable male counterparts such as brothers or husbands or be chaperoned by such a person.”[118]
However, the MAPA objective of reducing casualties from mines and UXO by raising awareness, especially among women, children and youth, and promoting safe behavior in affected communities was revised at the end of 2005, as women are not one of the highest at-risk groups. The MRE end-goal of the draft mine action strategy was stated as, “a comprehensive and sustainable system ... to educate the population within Afghanistan regarding the residual mines/ERW threat. This education would include sufficient training to recognize and report these items to the appropriate authorities.”[119]
In 2005, donations totaling $66.8 million for mine action in Afghanistan were reported by 16 countries and the European Commission (EC), a decrease of some 27 percent from 2004 ($91.8 million provided by 16 countries and the EC).[120] Donor countries reporting funding in 2005 were:
In addition, Adopt-A-Minefield reported donating $663,218 to UNDP for mine action in Afghanistan.[139] The German NGO, Kindernothilfe (Help for children in Need) reported providing €18,900 ($23,529) for rehabilitation for children with disabilities including landmine survivors in 2005.[140] Including these contributions, international funding in 2005 totaled some $67.5 million.
The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action received $28,673,358 for mine action in Afghanistan in 2005, less than the $31,008,267 received in 2004.[141] UNDP reported receiving $16,592,955 for mine action in Afghanistan in 2005, all contributed by the US.[142] This was also a decrease from 2004 funding (of $20,692,955).[143]
Donor information collected by Landmine Monitor indicated that from 1991 to March 2006, more than $515 million has been invested in mine action in Afghanistan.[144]
As reported by the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, total funding of $80.6 million for MAPA in April 2005-March 2006 was received for the following activities: $56,772,747 (70 percent) on mine/UXO clearance, $8,202,597 (10 percent) on survey activities, $4,414,701 (five percent) on coordination, $3,932,427 (five percent) on training and capacity-building, $2,844,418 (four percent) on MRE, $2,110,880 (three percent) on MAFP,[145] $1,897,500 (two percent) on stockpile destruction, and $463,660 (one percent) on victim assistance.[146]
The collection of comprehensive landmine casualty data in Afghanistan remains problematic, due in part to communication constraints and the time needed to centralize information. Key actors in mine action estimate that there are 70-100 new mine/ERW casualties each month, which is a significant reduction from earlier years.[147] However, many mine casualties are believed to die before reaching medical assistance and are therefore not recorded.[148] The government estimates that there are approximately 1,100 new mine/UXO casualties per year (or 92 per month), which is “a significant decrease from 1993 (600 to 720 monthly), 1997 (300 to 360 monthly) and 2000 (150 to 300 monthly).”[150]
In 2005, UNMACA recorded 848 new casualties from landmines, UXO and cluster munitions, of which 150 people were killed and 698 injured.[151] This represents a small decrease from the 857 mine/ERW casualties UNMACA recorded in 2004.[152] However, in reality, the casualty rate seems to be relatively constant, with 846 casualties recorded in 2003, when a significant decline was recorded, compared to 1,194 casualties in 2002, and 1,667 in 2001.[153] The UNMACA database is continually updated as information of recent casualties and information on casualties from prior periods becomes available. Usually there is a two-month gap between data collection and the final entry in the database, as casualty data received is sent back to the Area Mine Action Centers for verification and is then crosschecked at UNMACA in Kabul. The UNMACA database does not include casualties recorded by the Italian NGO, Emergency, or the Coalition Hospital.[154]
In 2005, 190 casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 103 by antivehicle mines, two by unspecified landmines, 17 by cluster munitions and 404 by other UXO.[155] Only 11 casualties were recorded as military personnel. UNMACA recorded at least 67 female casualties, but the vast majority of casualties are male (781 or 92 percent). With 427 recorded casualties, boys under 21 years constitute just over half of the casualties. In total, nearly 56 percent of casualties (472) were under 21 years, with the largest group of children being between seven and 14 years (274 or 54 percent); however, only 45 of the child casualties were female (32 between seven and 14 years). This is an increase compared to 449 child casualties in 2004 despite reportedly improved MRE in schools. The increase is possibly explained by the fact that the number of people returning from Pakistan and Iran forced people to utilize land that they have not used in the past. Additionally, as children traditionally tend animals and collect wood and water, they are at greater risk―particularly boys.[156] Main activities at the time of incidents were tending animals (158), tampering (155, of which 119 involved UXO), traveling (116), collecting wood, food or water (78), playing/recreation (76) and farming (46).[157]
ICRC is the main source of mine casualty data, providing the UNMACA with about 95 percent of its information on new casualties. ICRC carries out community-based data gathering in all mine-affected areas and mine casualty data is provided by 490 health facilities supported by several agencies and organizations.[158] Differences between ICRC data and UNMACA casualty data are likely due to timing differences in updating data and continuous verification of the respective databases.
In 2005, ICRC recorded 898 mine/UXO casualties (137 killed and 761 injured), a small decrease from 940 casualties recorded in 2004.[159] According to ICRC data, 272 casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 87 by antivehicle mines, 24 by cluster munitions and 420 by other UXO.[160] Fifty-six of the casualties were recorded as military personnel. At least 75 casualties were female, including 48 girls under 18 years. ICRC records show 397 casualties among children under 18 years (44 percent) and 496 under 21 years (55 percent); the age group of seven to 14 years accounted for 55 percent of casualties (272). Most common activities at the time of the incident were tampering (188 casualties), tending animals (174), playing or recreation (103), traveling (94), collecting wood or food (87), and farming (53). New mine/ERW casualties were reported in 32 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan, with 21 percent in Herat, 14 percent in Kandahar, 11 percent in Kabul and eight percent in Nangarhar; the only provinces without reported casualties in 2005 were Nimruz and Daykondi. Approximately 12 percent of the casualties reported having received MRE before the incident occurred, and about 84 percent of casualties occurred in unmarked areas. Of those injured in 2005, approximately 30 percent required an upper or lower limb amputation.[161]
Handicap International (HI) collects casualty data in the southern and western parts of Afghanistan via its Community Based Mine Action Program (CBMAP). HI recorded 201 new mine/ERW casualties (82 killed and 119 injured) in 2005, which is a significant increase from 152 in 2004.[162] The increase in casualties in the Kandahar region is reportedly due to increased tensions in the area and the return of refugees and internally displaced people to the area.[163]
In 2005, Emergency admitted 488 new mine casualties in its three surgical centers and health posts. These casualties are reportedly not sent directly to UNMACA, but to the Ministry of Public Health.[164] However, there likely is a significant overlap with other data collectors; at least in Kabul, where many people treated at the Emergency hospital would be recorded while receiving ICRC rehabilitation services.[165] According to ICRC, more than 70 people who were injured in 2005 and who received treatment by Emergency have received ICRC rehabilitation and are included in the database.[166]
Landmine Monitor media analysis identified at least 230 mine/UXO casualties, including 108 killed and 122 injured, in 2005.[167] The majority of reported casualties were foreign or Afghan military personnel. Civilian casualties included three people injured and one killed by a landmine on 22 October when they were driving to Khost city; the person killed was a radio journalist.[168] In November, six people were killed and six injured, including several women and children, when a passenger vehicle hit an antivehicle mine 70 kilometers from Dalabadin, just 100 meters on the Afghan side of the border with Pakistan.[169] Two boys between nine and 12 years old were killed and two were injured by a landmine while herding animals in Khost province in November. Reportedly the boys found the old mine, which had washed up due to the rains, and set it on fire.[170]
According to UNMACA, nine deminers were killed and 21 injured during mine clearance activities in 2005. Another five deminers were injured in mine incidents not related to their work.[171] The ICRC reported 35 demining casualties in 2005.[172] Landmine Monitor identified at least 13 deminers killed and 14 injured in demining accidents reported in the media. On 18 July 2005, two Zimbabweans were killed and one was seriously injured during a mine clearance operation.[173] On 2 October, a Zimbabwean deminer was injured during mine clearance for MineTech.[174]
Landmine Monitor identified at least 49 soldiers and peacekeepers killed, and another 61 injured in mine incidents reported in the media in 2005.[175] The majority of casualties were Afghan soldiers and police (35 killed and 32 injured). At least 14 foreign soldiers and peacekeepers were killed and 30 injured in mine incidents, including personnel from Portugal, France, Romania and the US. On 16 March, one US soldier was killed and four others were injured when their vehicle struck a mine in the western province of Herat; five Afghan civilians died when their truck hit a mine in the same area just hours later.[176] On 5 April, a US soldier, who had only been in Afghanistan for two weeks, lost part of his foot when he stepped on a landmine; in another incident in April, another US soldier was injured when a landmine exploded while he was burning garbage.[177] On 26 April, one Romanian soldier was killed and two others injured in a mine explosion in Kandahar.[178] In November, one Portuguese peacekeeper was killed and three others injured, when a landmine exploded while they were on patrol in the east of Kabul.[179] Also in November, five Afghan policemen were killed and two injured when their car hit a landmine in Omna district of Paktika province.[180]
Over the course of 2005, 15 US military personnel were killed by attacks involving IEDs in Afghanistan. As of 17 March, six US military personnel had been killed by landmines and one death was attributed to “exploded ordnance.”[181] Four Swedish soldiers were involved in an IED incident.[182]
At least five international reconstruction workers were killed and five injured in six IED incidents in Farah, Helmand, Paktia and Nangarhar provinces.[183] Seven deminers were also killed in IED attacks.[184] However, UNMACA, HI and ICRC do not collect information on IED casualties as this is considered to be a security issue.
Mine casualties continued to be recorded in 2006. UNMACA recorded 194 new mine/UXO casualties as of 15 June 2006, including 32 killed and 162 injured. Antipersonnel mines caused 41 casualties; antivehicle mines, 17; cluster munitions, four; other UXO, 108; and the remainder unknown.[185]
The ICRC recorded 160 new mine/UXO casualties to the end of March, including 21 people killed and 139 injured. Antipersonnel mines caused 36 casualties; antivehicle mines, 10; cluster munitions, two; other UXO, 95; and the remainder unknown. From January to the end of March 2006, ICRC recorded three Afghan military personnel killed and five injured in seven landmine incidents.[186] HI recorded 42 new mine/UXO casualties in the Kandahar regions between January and April 2006.[187]
Landmine Monitor media analysis identified at least 67 new landmine casualties reported in the media from 1 January 2006 to 15 June 2006, including 35 killed and 32 injured. The majority were military personnel or police (31), including 18 Afghans and 13 foreign soldiers from the UK, US and France. Foreign civilians from Turkey, India and Russia were also involved in mine incidents. On 7 February, a Turkish engineer, an Indian colleague and two Afghan colleagues were killed when their vehicle struck a landmine in Farah province.[188] On 19 February, one person was killed and six injured in a landmine explosion in front of a private residence; it is believed the mine was placed there in the context of a personal conflict.[189] Also in February, two Russian embassy staff were injured when one of them stepped off the road onto a landmine in Hairatan, northern Afghanistan. They were rushed to a hospital in Uzbekistan for treatment.[190] On 12 April, three British soldiers were injured when their vehicle hit a mine in Helmand province; it is thought to be the first British landmine incident in Afghanistan.[191] On 29 April, two children were killed and two more injured when an antivehicle mine detonated while the children were herding cows in Ghazni province.[192] In May, four health workers were killed when their vehicle drove over a landmine in Vardak province.[193] Also in May, a French soldier was severely injured during a mine clearance accident near Kabul airport; he died later at the hospital.[194] In May and June, two people were killed in incidents that reportedly involved newly laid mines; on 23 May, a cyclist was killed when he cycled over a mine believed to be planted by the Taliban in Andar district of Ghazni province.[195] On 7 June, a suspected Talib was killed when the mine he was planting at the sports grounds in Sharan, the capital of Paktika province, exploded prematurely.[196] On 15 June, an ATC deminer was killed while defusing a mine in Paktia province.[197]
IED incidents occured at an increasing rate in the first five months of 2006. By 17 March, nine US military personnel had been killed in Afghanistan as a result of IED attacks in 2006.[198] Six Canadian soldiers were also involved in IED incidents, resulting in four killed and two injured.[199]
It is not possible to determine the exact number of landmine casualties or mine survivors in Afghanistan. There could be as many as 100,000 mine/UXO survivors.[200] As of November 2005, the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled had collected data on 86,354 people with disabilities in 33 provinces; however, the information available on the cause of disability was limited. In February 2004, it was reported that 18 percent of people with disabilities recorded by the ministry were mine survivors.[201] Results of an HI study on disability stated that there are between 747,500 and 867,100 people with disabilities, of whom approximately 17 percent are war disabled (126,000 to 146,000). According to HI, seven percent of those war disabled are mine survivors injured after the war; this would indicate that there are between 52,000 and 60,000 mine/UXO survivors in Afghanistan.[202]
On 31 December 2005, the UNMACA database contained information on 15,215 mine/UXO casualties since 1988 (and one from 1966), including 2,627 people killed and 12,588 injured; 1,074 (seven percent) were female. Children under 21 years account for 8,217 casualties (54 percent), making children between seven and 14 years the largest group of casualties at 4,487 (400 girls, 4,087 boys). The second largest age group is people between 27 and 40 years (3,036 casualties), followed by children between 15 and 20 years (2,967). Most casualties occurred in Kabul province (4,339), followed by Nangarhar (1,946), Herat (1,045) and Kandahar (1,043).[203] The information provides an indication of the trends in reported mine casualties but does not provide a precise representation of the true number of casualties over time. As of 30 May 2006, 15,289 casualties had been recorded in the UNMACA database.[204]
At the end of March 2006, the ICRC database contained information on 11,038 mine/UXO casualties (1,906 killed and 9,132 injured) between 1998 and 2006: 160 in 2006; 898 in 2005; 940 in 2004; 1,011 in 2003; 1,654 in 2002; 1,856 in 2001; 1,710 in 2000; 1,587 in 1999; and 1,222 in 1998. At least 4,471 casualties were children under 18 years old. Most incidents occurred in Kabul (1,810), Nangarhar (1,120), Parvan (1,057) and Herat (962).[205] The database also contains information on approximately 3,500 casualties recorded between 1980 and 1997. Data collection is an ongoing process and statistics are continually updated as new casualties, and those from previous periods, are identified.
Between 2001 and 2004, the Landmine Impact Survey identified 2,245 recent mine/ERW casualties (922 killed and 1,323 injured); 143 (six percent) were female. Of the total recent casualties: 416 (19 percent) were under 15 years; 924 (41 percent) were aged between 15 and 29 years. Sixty percent of casualties (1,336) were tending animals, farming, collecting food, water and fuel, or doing household duties at the time of the incident; only three percent (63) reported tampering with the device. No less than 45 percent of all recent casualties were in Kabul, Parvan and Takhar provinces, with 20 percent in Kabul province alone.[206] According to the Survey Action Center, this is an extraordinarily high number of victims for a young age group (mostly boys), compared to other countries where a similar survey has been conducted.[207] UNMACA and ICRC recorded even higher percentages of child casualties; UNMACA total statistics show that 35 percent of casualties since 1980 are children under 15 years (mostly boys).[208] ICRC data shows that 43 percent of casualties since 1998 are aged under 18 years; and between 2001 and 2004, 2,502 of 5,461 recorded casualties (46 percent) were boys and girls younger than 18 years.[209] According to experts, children have had, and continue to have, a traditional role in rural Afghan families supporting the home.[210]
Mines are still used in personal feuds in eastern Afghanistan, which can have grave consequences. In Nurestan, for example, an area of approximately two square kilometers is mined due to feuds and inter-clan conflicts. This has resulted in approximately 70 casualties over the years, mainly women performing agricultural activities. In the Kandahar and Herat regions, demobilization activities have caused problems as ammunition depots are left abandoned, which is responsible for increased scrap metal collection and tampering. People in the south see mines more as a risk, due to the generally more volatile situation, than people in the north, but radio messages are less effective in the southern parts of the country as there is less infrastructure. With older people, more fatalistic attitudes might lead to greater risk taking.[211]
At the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2004, Afghanistan was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate assistance for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.[212] Four mine survivors from Afghanistan took part in the conference. At the Sixth Meeting of States Parties held in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, Afghanistan became co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. Afghanistan prepared its objectives for inclusion in the Zagreb Progress Report. These included: maintaining up-to-date casualty data and expanding data collection by implementing an injury surveillance system (2005); gathering and analyzing information on people with disabilities, and establishing a database on available disability services and assistance received (2006); assessing, improving and expanding healthcare via a package of disability services and development of primary care in rural areas; increasing coordination and support services, increasing equipment, training and staff capacity, and free healthcare for mine casualties (2006); increasing access to integral rehabilitation services to 70-80 percent by increasing production of mobility devices; establishing new centers and physiotherapy services, training staff and extending the community-based rehabilitation network according to needs; addressing the gap in psychosocial support; developing an effective package of programs ensuring the sustainable livelihood of vulnerable people; finalizing, disseminating and raising awareness of the National Disability Policy for Afghanistan (2005-2006); drafting and adopting a comprehensive law, stimulating political action and establishing a Disability Desk at the government level in favor of people with disabilities; and strengthening capacity of people with disabilities through skills training, financial support and inclusion in planning and representation. In all of these objectives, interministerial coordination was noted as a priority, as was adequate attention for women with disabilities and female staff.[213]
The Afghan delegation to the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 included a mine survivor who is also a disability and survivor assistance expert. Afghanistan updated some of its objectives and presented the progress in achieving its objectives, including improved coordination, plans for the development of emergency preparedness capacities, the establishment of a Disability Task Force and drafting of a National Disability Policy. Future steps were also outlined: at least 50 trauma specialists will be trained by 2009; formal training for social workers will be started by 2007; comprehensive disability legislation will be adopted by the end of 2007; a national workshop on victim assistance was scheduled for August 2006; and a national plan of action for victim assistance was to be presented by September 2006. The plan will be “fully integrated into long-term public health and development strategies...[to] benefit all people with disabilities and lay the groundwork for Afghanistan to fully reintegrate landmine survivors back into Afghan society.”[214]
Afghanistan submitted the voluntary Form J with its 2006 Article 7 report, providing information on victim assistance issues. It stated that the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a coordination committee for VA, with Ministries of Health, Education, Martyrs and Disabled, and Labor and Social Affairs.”[215] However, the interministerial working group activities have been delayed due to the elections and the subsequent changes in personnel and ministerial responsibilities.[216]
The government’s Mine Action Strategy April 2006-March 2009 includes end-goals and specific, measurable, achievable, results-based and time-bound objectives for this timeframe. The end-goal for survivor assistance “will be achieved when mine/ERW survivors are reintegrated into Afghan society, with support provided through a national system that incorporates the rights and needs of people with disabilities.”[217]
UNMACA provides technical support to the government on victim assistance issues.[218] The main priority of UNMACA is to engage the new ministries and create national ownership of victim assistance activities by building capacity at the ministerial level, stimulating inclusion of relevant actors in decision-making processes and raising awareness of disability. It is reported that UNMACA, with its partners, is working to make victim assistance a government priority leading to integrated and coordinated action. National and international NGOs and agencies continue to play an important role in the delivery of assistance to landmine survivors and other people with disabilities in Afghanistan. However, through capacity building, it is expected that relevant ministries will gradually take over responsibilities. An important step in this process would be the August 2006 national workshop on victim assistance, which aims to finalize the national victim assistance plan of action and budget, starting in 2007. The workshop will also seek to identify focal points in every ministry to participate in the interministerial committee and duplicate this coordination process at the regional and local authority levels, as these authorities will be the main implementers. UNMACA will build on existing infrastructure such as the provincial working groups of the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, and the disability focal point in the Ministry of Public Health.[219]
Until August 2004, the UNOPS/Comprehensive Disabled Afghans Program (CDAP) served as the national coordinating body for rehabilitation services provided by NGOs, and operated a community-based rehabilitation program for people with disabilities in Afghanistan, in cooperation with relevant ministries. Following a 2003 external evaluation, UNDP took over responsibility for CDAP in September 2004 and developed a new project, the National Programme for Action on Disability (NPAD), in consultation and with inputs from key line ministries and other disability stakeholders. The NPAD program was officially launched in March 2005 in cooperation with the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled and worked mainly on capacity-building within ministries and awareness-raising. NPAD assists the government in formulating disability policy, legislation and welfare reform with the aim of establishing a government-led body that can coordinate and manage comprehensive quality disability services nationwide within three years. Additionally, NPAD was developing a database and resource center with information on disability and disability services, and provided material support to the ministries. Four provincial offices were established to assist the local government in Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. NPAD does not provide direct services as CDAP used to do, but tenders contracts to relevant partners. In 2005, the Disability Task Force and an NGO Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled were established, and a national capacity-building program was developed. The Disability Task Force, headed by the Ministry of Public Health, was formed to assist the government with the integration of disability services; NPAD, UNMACA, HI, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) and other relevant actors are members. The NGO Coordination Unit (NCU) within the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled meets monthly to discuss disability issues and coordination of NGO activities within the sector. NPAD sees the following challenges: limited understanding of disability and leadership capacity at government level, limited coordination with NGOs, lack of survivor inclusion, low funding commitments and a deteriorating security situation. NPAD’s 2005-2007 budget is $10,900,000, funded by Canada, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, France, Sweden, the US and UNDP.[220]
However, as of mid-2006, the creation of task forces and coordination initiatives had not led to concrete improvements: organizations feared duplication between the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled; operators continued to work separately; NGOs had not been involved at all stages of policy development; there remained a lack of long-term planning at the government level; and there was limited capacity at the level of disabled people’s organizations.[221]
In 2004, the Landmine Impact Survey found that only 10 percent of mine-impacted communities had healthcare facilities of any kind.[222] The government acknowledges that healthcare spending, healthcare services and rehabilitation are limited, and, “Therefore public healthcare expenditures must be targeted towards the most vulnerable. This includes landmine survivors and other disabled Afghans who are recognized as a priority in [the] healthcare system.”[223] Healthcare in Afghanistan has been severely affected by decades of conflict and ranks among the worst in the world. Health infrastructure is damaged and poorly maintained, lacks trained staff, resources and supplies, and is unable to meet the basic health needs of most of the population; 30 percent of Afghans reportedly do not have access to health facilities, despite recent improvements in geographic coverage.[224]
Healthcare services are provided through the Afghan hospital network and international NGOs and agencies.[225] But there is limited coordination between relevant actors. Reportedly, about 80 percent of public health services are run by NGOs.[226] The Ministry of Health provides free services through the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), but many people in the poorest regions of Afghanistan are not covered by the package and donors requested NGOs to assist in covering these areas. A new version of the BPHS has recently been approved including physiotherapy and disability-related services as services with the highest priority based on identified needs; however, the new package is rudimentary and needs to be properly designed, costed, approved and field-tested.[227] The Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), the national plan for provision of secondary healthcare, was developed by the Hospital Management Task Force and adopted in 2005.[228] The Disability Task Force assists the government with the integration of disability services into both the BPHS and the EPHS.[229]
First aid is available at the district level; trauma care is limited to a few hospitals in major cities and can be of questionable quality. There are very few ambulances, so that travel to hospital can take up to three days; as a result, many mine casualties may die before reaching a medical facility. Other challenges are the lack of trained staff, equipment, accommodation and centers in rural areas.[230] Reportedly, the geographic coverage of health services in Afghanistan has improved to approximately 77 percent, with support of the European Commission, World Bank and Management Sciences for Health/USAID.[231] Cultural barriers mean that women may be denied care or refused treatment by male practitioners, in a country with few female practitioners. Continuing medical care is often prohibitive due to the cost of the treatment, transport and accommodation.[232] The National Health Policy 2005-2009 prioritized disability issues in the BPHS. Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC was monitoring the performance of health facilities and services.[233]
The World Health Organization (WHO) assists the Ministry of Public Health at the national and regional levels with the planning and monitoring of healthcare delivery, by building capacity and providing technical support for data collection via the health information system.[234]
Hospitals in the Afghan healthcare network assisting mine casualties/survivors include the Indira Ghandhi Child Health Institute, the Paraplegic Hospital and the Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences. The 600-bed Armed Forces Academy, the only public hospital for emergency trauma cases in Kabul, accepts all emergency cases, including military personnel and civilians.[235] The Indira Ghandhi Child Health Institute in Kabul, one of the main hospitals for children, recorded only one boy injured by a mine in its orthopedic/surgery ward during 2005.[236] The hospital has experienced doctors but lacks resources; children admitted are often too poorly nourished to respond well to treatment.[237] Between 21 March 2005 and the end of December 2005, the Paraplegic Hospital in Kabul registered 3,801 patients with disabilities and assisted 596 of those as inpatients, including mine survivors. It also assessed the degree of disability of patients who are then referred to the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled for assistance and employment support; 2,400 people with disabilities, including 1,500 mine survivors, were assessed in 2005. The Paraplegic Hospital also has an orthopedic center that provides prosthetic and rehabilitation services to people with disabilities. In 2005, it provided 300 people with prostheses.[238]
ICRC supports hospitals, clinics, and first-aid posts in Afghanistan, providing medicines, medical and surgical supplies, training, repair and renovation of facilities, as well as support to ambulance services in Kabul. In 2005, the ICRC supported eight hospitals in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Shiberghan, Samangan, Taloqan and Ghazni. In the course of 2005, it started handing responsibility of hospitals in Ghazni, Kabul and Taloqan to the Ministry of Public Health, as the ministry has been strengthening its capacity. However, these and other hospitals receive ad hoc material assistance when necessary.[239] ICRC-supported hospitals surgically treated 2,241 war-injured, including 250 mine casualties, in 2005. ICRC conducted a seminar on war surgery in Jalalabad and an emergency room training course for government doctors in Kabul; it gave technical support to the International Federation/Afghan Red Crescent Society community-based first aid program in eastern and southern Afghanistan.[240]
Emergency provides emergency medical care, surgery, physical rehabilitation and psychological support, through its surgical centers in Kabul and Lashkargah, one general hospital in the Anabah-Panshir Valley, and 26 first aid posts and public health centers. It carries out medical visits to prisoners, operates 18 ambulances and started an income-generating project in Panshir. In 2005, a new health center was opened in Griskh (Lashkargah). The surgical hospital in Kabul has become the main trauma center for the country, as it has the only intensive care unit for civilians in Afghanistan. The center received a single-layer CT scan in 2005, and is trying to apply European standards of trauma care. In 2005, more than 418,891 people were treated, admitting 421 new landmine casualties to three hospitals and 67 to the health posts, and providing follow-up for 400 survivors. Emergency performed 1,335 surgical operations for the war-injured (including 421 for landmine casualties). Emergency does not have a waiting list and has a medical staff of 361 in the three surgical centers and 166 in the first-aid posts. Additionally, it provided 31 wheelchairs, 335 crutches and seven other mobility devices. Forty widows work in the Panshir Carpet Factory Project, either as trainers or trainees; Emergency also employs people with disabilities in its centers.[241]
The Mobile Medical Emergency Center (MMC) trains doctors and nurses at rural clinics in emergency procedures; they then train village first-aid helpers who provide the emergency response needed to increase the chances of survival for mine casualties. In 2006, the system will expand to midwives to reduce the high maternal mortality rates.[242]
International Medical Corps (IMC) runs the Paktika Provincial Hospital, which was recognized by the Ministry of Public Health in April 2005. IMC renovated the hospital, built a guesthouse, recruited staff, provided modern equipment and supplied medication; it also provides medical management training and English language training. In 2006, IMC and the Ministry of Public Health started the Master Training course, providing three-month intensive refresher courses to Afghan health professionals, sponsored by the Sager Family Foundation.[243]
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) German hospital in Kabul accepts up to about 10 of the most seriously injured mine casualties each month, depending on how much free capacity there is, as ISAF personnel are prioritized. Facilities are of a very high standard and well equipped to handle trauma cases. The CURE International Hospital provides general surgery, orthopedics and plastic surgery, and was scheduled to open an emergency care ward in 2006.[244] Save the Children was involved in the renovation of health centers, provision of resources and the establishment of health committees in the northern province of Jowzjan.[245] Saudi Arabia provided funding to the Qalat Hospital (Zabul province), which was completed at the beginning of 2006, however the hospital is not functioning to its full capacity due to security issues. The hospital needs 26 doctors but had found only seven, according to a June 2006 media report, although it pays double the salary for women, and 50 percent extra for men.[246]
According to the ICRC, “While no accurate figures for the number of people in need of physical rehabilitation, including those injured by landmines, are available, it is obvious that the national health system, still struggling to rebuild the country's most basic services, is not yet in a position to provide services for them.”[247]
The rehabilitation and reintegration needs of mine survivors and other people with disabilities are not being met; only about 20 to 40 percent of mine/ERW survivors have access to rehabilitation. In 2005, there were approximately 200 physiotherapists, 126 orthopedic technicians and 105 artisans providing services in 20 of the 34 provinces. Rehabilitation programs are available free of charge in several major cities, but distances, a limited number of services, transport and accommodation costs, as well as cultural barriers for women, impede access. To meet the needs, physical rehabilitation facilities should to be located in each large city or main town in at least 30 of the 34 provinces. Mobility devices are produced locally, but raw materials are often imported due to lack of quality materials on the local market. Coordination is good among disability stakeholders, but interministerial coordination and the technical capacity of the relevant ministries is said to be weak.[248]
NPAD stimulated the redrafting and implementation of a new three-year physiotherapy curriculum under the Ministry of Public Health, but carried out by NGOs. This is seen as a first step in taking national ownership, as the ministry does not have the capacity to carry out physical rehabilitation, but can start coordinating activities.[249]
There is a lack of psychosocial support activities, relevant information, and coordination; ICRC and NGOs carry out projects directed at specific needs, but not long-term programs. Formal counseling is not available and peer support mainly takes place on the work-floor of service providers who employ people with disabilities. The Ministry of Education has no separate programs of inclusive or exclusive education for children with disabilities, but NGOs provide some activities. The ministry suffers from a lack of infrastructure, trained teachers and financial means. Access to educational opportunities is limited, as most people with disabilities are illiterate, general school participation incentives are low, or survivors are limited to education available in their communities. According to the HI disability study, 70 percent of people with disabilities do not have access to schools.[250] However, the draft National Disability Plan includes objectives to increase education of children with disabilities. [251]
A survey by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the International Rescue Committee found an estimated 84 percent unemployment rate among people with disabilities. The Landmine Impact Survey indicated that unemployment among mine survivors increased by 38 percent after the incident, especially among farmers, herders, military personnel, deminers and laborers. Before the social affairs department became part of the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled in 2006, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) was the main provider of vocational training and employment services to people with disabilities, and had vocational training centers in 32 of the 34 provinces. However, results “have not been particularly good due to lack of adequate funding, lack of infrastructure and lack of employment opportunities after the training is completed.”[252] Therefore, MoLSA asked for technical assistance from NPAD to improve institutional capacity, develop policies, training materials and monitoring systems to provide vocational training and employment services to people with disabilities countrywide. This process has slowed down since the social affairs department of MoLSA moved to the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, and it is unclear how it will evolve.[253] However, it is hoped that the merger will increase the coordination and no major changes are expected.[254]
NPAD drafted a manual for inclusive vocational training, which was field-tested; 23 contracts were issued for physical rehabilitation, community-based rehabilitation, education, livelihood and awareness-raising projects to, among others, the International Rescue Committee and International Organisation for Migration.[255]
ICRC is the principal service provider to mine survivors in Afghanistan, with orthopedic centers in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Gulbahar and Faizabad, and a component factory in Kabul. The centers fit upper and lower limb prostheses and orthoses, and provide free medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, vocational training, micro-credit for small business, and public awareness services related to government rules and programs. All services are free of charge.
In 2005, ICRC assisted approximately 55,877 people with rehabilitation services. The centers fitted or provided 4,511 prostheses (3,186 for mine survivors), 9,462 orthoses (32 for mine survivors), 11,063 crutches, 927 wheelchairs and more than 150,000 physical therapy treatments. The ICRC supplied raw materials to International Assistance Mission, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and Handicap International, and the orthopedic component factory in Kabul provided 576 prosthetic knee joints and 921 prosthetic alignment systems to most other centers in the country. It operates a home-based program for paraplegics, providing medical, economic and psychosocial support; 925 paraplegics were assisted in 2005. During 2005, 19 prosthetic/orthotic students were enrolled in the ICRC-supported, nine-month upgrade training program for prosthetics and orthotics in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad. The ICRC also supported basic orthotic/prosthetic training for 14 people and training for 26 physiotherapists.[256]
ICRC’s social reintegration program assisted 2,691 people with disabilities in 2005 with vocational training, special education, job placement, and setting up or improving small businesses. Micro-credit loans were provided to 754 people and approximately 400 received vocational training. It also provided technical, financial and material support to the Afghan Red Crescent Society including 79 food-for-work projects and support to 1,285 trainees and 603 trainers in the Vocational Training Program.[257]
The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan implements the rights-based Rehabilitation of Afghans with Disabilities (RAD) Program in more than 1,500 villages in 37 districts in 13 provinces. The program has five components: community mobilization and awareness, employment support, special education, physiotherapy and orthopedic workshops. The services are provided through four orthopedic workshops, 52 physiotherapy clinics, 44 community rehabilitation and development centers, and home visits. In January 2006, RAD started a joint prosthetic workshop with Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan Appeal (SGAA) in the east. The partnership of RAD and SGAA will pave the way for a future expansion of community-based rehabilitation services in Nangarhar, Laghman, Konar and Nurestan provinces. RAD employs 412 people (102 women and 36 people with disabilities), as well as community volunteers and self-help groups of disabled people. The RAD program assists all people with disabilities, including mine survivors.[258] In 2005, RAD provided assistance to 39,839 people with disabilities (including 15,411 women and 8,000 mine survivors); 31,061 people benefited from physiotherapy services and 8,039 from the orthopedic workshops. The workshops provided 482 prostheses, 1,763 orthoses, 112 wheelchairs and 3,740 other assistive devices, and repaired 1,942 mobility aids. Two physiotherapists finished the upgrade course and 18 physiotherapy trainees graduated from initial training. Also in 2005, 2,272 disabled people received special education in their homes or at community-based rehabilitation centers; 1,586 people benefited from employment support services, 645 from income-generating projects and 91 from direct job placements. An additional 12,500 people with disabilities were referred to other organizations.
An assessment of RAD’s special educational component and advice to strengthen community-based component will be carried out by UNDP in 2006. RAD will conduct internal monitoring of the physiotherapy services and capacities of the orthopedic workshops. At the national level, the main challenge is that rehabilitation services are not integrated in general health services. There is also a lack of coordination and national policy on disability, and disabled people’s organizations are weak.[259]
In 2006, HI unified its Belgian and French operations to make its presence in the country more efficient. This has not led to the closure of any programs. HI continues to provide physical rehabilitation and prostheses through its orthopedic center in Kandahar, and collects information on people with disabilities in the Helmand, Zabul, Farah, Ghazni and Herat provinces, through a network of community volunteers. In April 2005, the Afghan NGO Guardians officially handed over full management of the prosthetic department to HI. The Kandahar center assisted 5,176 people (2,132 new patients) in 2005, provided 11,058 physiotherapy treatments, produced 388 and repaired 1,050 prostheses, produced 822 and repaired 488 orthoses, produced 215 and repaired 134 wheelchairs, and produced 3,053 and repaired 263 mobility aids. The majority of patients (4,898) received free accommodation, and 14,694 meals were prepared at the patients’ guesthouse. The Kandahar Center was evaluated in late 2005, indicating that the center is the only one in the south of Afghanistan but that the needs of people with disabilities are largely unknown. Quality of services and staff were good and internal management capacity has improved; however, there were some accessibility problems due to geography, security issues and socio-cultural perceptions of disability, and the follow-up system and physiotherapy treatment are weaker components of the center. It was recommended to strengthen referral and follow-up, provide home-based care and other victim assistance components (education, vocational training, micro-credit), upgrade staff training and improve accessibility for female patients.[260] Through the community-based mine action program, HI refers people with disabilities to rehabilitation services; however, the program was not active as of July 2006 in Ghazni, Farah and Herat. The program was scheduled t