Key developments since May 2005: In July 2005, Laos confirmed its intention to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty in the future. Donor concerns over the institutional structure led to a drop in financial support in 2005; the government appointed the National Regulatory Authority’s first director in December. UXO Lao reported a sharp increase in productivity in 2005, demining 15.7 square kilometers of land. Two demining organizations received authorization for clearance operations in 2005 and one more in early 2006. There were 164 new casualties in 91 incidents (54 percent were children), fewer than reported than in 2004. Two studies were conducted, on the impact of the scrap metal trade on casualties from unexploded ordnance, and on victim assistance.
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, in recent years, Laos has shown increasing interest in joining the treaty.[1] In a July 2005 letter to Landmine Monitor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that, “the Lao Government has already expressed its intention to accede to this Convention. However, in order for the Lao PDR to fully become party to the Ottawa Convention, it requires some time to prepare necessary steps in meeting its obligations.”[2]
Laos did not attend as an observer the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, or the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2005 or May 2006. Laos was absent during the vote on 8 December 2005 on UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has been for similar annual resolutions since 1996.
Although Laos is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines, it has not agreed to be bound by Amended Protocol II and did not attend the annual meeting of Amended Protocol II States Parties in November 2005.
In its July 2005 letter to Landmine Monitor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Laos does not produce antipersonnel mines and has no production facilities. It also stated that Laos “does not buy or sell the said mines.”[3] Similarly, in February 2004, the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare stated, “Laos does not buy or sell mines.”[4] It is unclear whether these statements reflect an official policy prohibiting the import or export of antipersonnel mines.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that Laos has a “relatively small stockpile acquired many years ago.” These mines are likely of Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese origin. According to the ministry, “Given a small population and inadequate border guards to patrol the border, these mines are used in some border points in order to defend the nation.”[5] In February 2004, the Foreign Minister said that once the demarcation process of the country’s border with Thailand was completed, “There will be no more need to use landmines.”[6]
Landmine Monitor did not receive any allegations of use of antipersonnel landmines by any entity in Laos in 2005 or 2006.[7]
Laos is affected by landmines, but the problem is overshadowed by the much greater threat to the population from unexploded ordnance (UXO). This dates back to the Indochina War of the 1960s and 1970s when Laos experienced the heaviest aerial bombardment in history. US Congressional records show US aircraft averaged 176 sorties a day over nine years and dropped more than two million tons of bombs between 1964 and 1973.[8] Clearance teams have found at least 186 types of munitions, including 19 types of cluster bomblets.[9]
A national survey conducted by Handicap International (HI) in 1996, which remains the primary data source on contamination in Laos, found that 15 of the country’s 18 provinces―all those it surveyed―had districts significantly or severely affected by UXO. The survey found 2,861 villages, a quarter of the total in Laos, with a continued UXO presence, including 1,156 villages with large bombs ranging from 100 kilograms up to 1,000 kilograms. The survey concluded that the presence of UXO “has a significant impact in terms of personal suffering, loss of productive labor force and adding a burden on the over-taxed health care system. It also limits agricultural and forest-based activities and increases the cost of rural infrastructure projects.”[10] Subsequent analysis has shown that “high levels of poverty in rural communities in Lao PDR often correlate with high levels of UXO contamination.”[11] The UN Development Programme (UNDP) asserts that “UXO/Mine Action is the absolute pre-condition for the socio-economic development of Lao PDR.”[12]
All sides in the war laid antipersonnel landmines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. The HI survey reported that landmines (as opposed to UXO) were present in all of the 15 provinces it surveyed and continued to contaminate 214 villages.[13] Clearance operators have estimated Laos may have 1,000 minefields,[14] yet because of the remote location of many of these, operators say they pose little immediate threat to the population and are not a clearance priority.[15]
The presence of UXO has also posed a significant threat because of its value as scrap metal. UNDP reported a sharp rise in UXO-related casualties in 2004 and commented that “the growing scrap trade, facilitated by the ubiquitous presence of cheap and effective Vietnamese metal detectors, often rented out by scrap merchants, is a significant driver of this change.”[16] The increase in casualties continued to the mid-2005 (see Landmine/UXO Casualties section in this report). In Savannakhet, Houaphan and Xieng Khouang, three of the worst affected provinces, a high percentage of the UXO-related casualties are believed to be linked to scrap metal collection.[17]
After donor frustration earlier in 2005, progress in establishing a national authority in late 2005 and early 2006 gave renewed momentum to what is termed “UXO action” in Laos. This progress, combined with UXO Lao’s interest in moving from a mine clearance methodology for dealing with UXO to battle area clearance, raised hopes among some donors that 2006 might prove a turning point in efforts to tackle UXO contamination in Laos.[18]
The Lao National UXO Programme (UXO Lao), the national clearance agency established in 1996, has had primary responsibility for clearance, coordinating and regulating all UXO action. In 2001, UXO Lao took over management of the national staff of all clearance operations, increasing its workforce to 1,156.[19] However, financial difficulties the next year caused it to lay off half the clearance staff. By January 2004, UXO Lao had 21 of 24 clearance teams in operation again.[20] In 2004, the Lao government adopted a 10-year strategic plan for 2003-2013, “The Safe Path Forward,” which provided a basis for renewed donor support. The plan provided for creation of a implementing partners managing control of their operations, under NRA supervision.[21]
The government approved the creation of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) in March 2004,[22] assigning it responsibility for setting policy, accreditation, licensing and oversight of all clearance operators, management of a national database, conducting periodic reviews of the strategic plan, prioritizing clearance tasks and coordinating UXO/mine action.[23] In 2005, donor concerns over delays in implementing the decree led to a reduction in funding for UXO Lao. Donors were also concerned that the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, the government department in charge of UXO Lao, also had oversight of the NRA.[24]
In June 2005, eight major UXO program donors made a démarche to the government urging the appointment of an NRA director “as soon as possible” and a review of the institutional structure in order to “ensure a true separation” of powers between the NRA and UXO Lao.[25]
The government appointed a new NRA director in December 2005.[26] The new director, Maligna Saignavongs, a former ambassador to Germany and a Swiss-trained lawyer, was regarded by donors and operators as an experienced and competent professional. Changes to the institutional structure of the NRA, however, only partially allayed donor concerns about its independence; the NRA was placed under the supervision of the Deputy Prime Minister, but the Vice Chairperson in charge of the NRA was the Vice Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, the ministry which oversees UXO Lao.
The NRA held its first coordination meeting on 3 February 2006. A chief technical advisor was in place since mid-2005, and by the end of the year it expected to recruit three more international technical advisors for quality assurance and operations, victim assistance, and community awareness, and a manager for its information department. By mid-2006, however, the hiring of staff and equipment was behind schedule due to delays in delivery of donor funds.[27]
The NRA commissioned the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to draw up an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) risk management/mitigation model which is intended to define different categories of risk and recommend appropriate clearance strategies for dealing with them. The NRA envisaged the model would “serve as the basis for developing strategic plans and priorities as well as operational plans, work plans and processes” that would raise efficiency and productivity and better address the impact of UXO in Laos.[28]
Other objectives included the creation of a national database and the drafting of national UXO action standards. At present, UXO Lao’s database comprises US bombing records and the results of the 1997 HI survey. Clearance records are retained by individual operators who should provide Completion (Level 3) Reports to UXO Lao. UXO Lao reports casualties in its area of operation; no comprehensive national victim data exists. Implementation of these priorities remained contingent on donors providing additional funding.[29]
Laos has yet to draft national standards for UXO and mine action. Humanitarian and commercial clearance agencies set their own standing operating procedures. The NRA’s technical advisor for quality assurance and operations was expected to draft standards after completion of the risk management/mitigation study; however, the NRA did not expect that these would be ready until 2007.[30]
The Safe Path Forward, Laos’ strategic plan for 2003-2013, “assumed” that its implementation would be composed of “a full range of autonomous, UXO/mine clearance operators.”[31] The plan’s primary objective, in line with priorities established by the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP), was for “people from the most highly impacted communities to live free of the impacts of landmines and UXO.” Other objectives included:
The plan set other objectives for UXO Lao, including improved planning, prioritization and tasking of clearance assets; increased emphasis on technical survey; improved internal management and streamlining of procurement, maintenance and other support functions; an increase in deminer productivity from an average of 133 square meters a day (when the plan was drafted in 2003) to 235 square meters a day by 2005; and introduction of new clearance methodologies, such as “villager assisted clearance” (villagers hired to undertake tasks such as cutting scrub), explosives detection dogs and new detection technologies.[33]
Evaluations: Two one-year pilot projects undertaken for UXO Lao by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and due for completion in June 2006, attracted attention from stakeholders in UXO action in Laos as providing a basis for improving deminer efficiency and productivity. UXO Lao said the reviews could lead it “to completely modify its approach to its humanitarian mandate.”[34]
NPA undertook a clearance system review, evaluating the performance of different makes and models of detectors for UXO clearance in Lao and optimum operating methodologies for using this equipment in the varying terrains and conditions found in Laos.[35] As of mid-June 2006, the report was being drafted.[36]
NPA also carried out an “enhanced” technical survey study, intended to improve task assessment and planning and lay down guidelines for area reduction, enabling UXO Lao to focus its clearance activities more precisely on contaminated land and achieve greater productivity.[37] The study was expected to lay the basis for converting UXO Lao from the mine clearance methodology, which it has used to deal with UXO contamination, to using battle area clearance.[38]
The study pointed out that the quality of requests from provinces is poor, reflected in the fact that a high percentage of sites being cleared by UXO Lao turn out to have no UXO contamination.[39] An analysis of UXO Lao’s 2006 workplan for Sekong province found that one-fifth of the clearance tasks (covering 330,000 square meters) could potentially be cancelled.[40]
The NPA report proposed introduction of a simple information management system―a file for each village―as a basis for task assessment. It would contain information on UXO contamination and impact from diverse sources, a contamination map based on US bomb data and with subsequent clearance information added, and operational data that it was not practical to enter on the map. The report then proposed a four-step process of assessing tasks, including office research analyzing available data, field research interviewing villagers, site search including visual checks for evidence of contamination and sampling of metal contamination levels, and a final decision on clearance.
The study also proposed that clearance requests should in future be accompanied by information on the likely contamination of the land in question and whether or not the land is already in use.
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) has provided technical assistance to UXO Lao in efforts to update and transition the existing landmine and UXO data and maps into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). [41]
Laos’ main UXO/mine clearance capacity resides in UXO Lao, which was set up in 1996 and operates in nine provinces.[42] As of 2005 it employed 1,094 staff, including 915 in operations, 37 at its headquarters in Vientiane and 133 in provincial offices.[43] Clearance operations in 2005 were also conducted by the international NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG), two commercial companies, Milsearch BPKP and MineTech International, and by the Lao military.[44] The German NGO Potsdam Kommunikation, which began working in Laos in 1996 with German demining company Gerbera as its implementing partner, ceased operations in Laos at the end of June 2005.[45]
Two other organizations, Handicap International and a New Zealand-registered commercial company, Phoenix Clearance Ltd., received government approval to engage in UXO/mine clearance in 2005, but had not started operations.
The survey of the socioeconomic impact of UXO contamination completed by HI in 1997 remained the only comprehensive survey of affected areas. It collected detailed information from 7,675 villages determining the presence of UXO, the type of land contaminated and types of UXO observed, the number of casualties caused by UXO and their impact on affected communities. However, it did not attempt to detail locations or assess the extent of the area contaminated, and it has not been updated, limiting its present value as a tool for planning or prioritizing UXO action.
In 2005, some 17 square kilometers of land was cleared and at least 67,783 items of UXO were destroyed; complete clearance data for 2005 was not obtained from all operators in Laos in 2005. The great majority of clearance was carried out by UXO Lao.
UXO Lao reported that its area clearance teams cleared 15.7 square kilometers of land in 2005, 25 percent more than the previous year and double the amount cleared in 2000. Other operators cleared more than 1.3 square kilometers. In total, 25,351 items of UXO, including 41 large bombs, were destroyed.[46] In addition, roving teams performed 1,219 clearance tasks in 749 villages, destroying 40,576 items of UXO, including 402 big bombs.
In reporting these productivity gains, UXO Lao gave no explanation of how they had been achieved, but said its support functions, including administration, logistics, procurement and finance had been “streamlined.”[47] After a KPMG audit in 2005, UXO Lao’s procurement staff and functions were transferred to UNDP where a decision was pending in 2006 on the duration of this arrangement.[48] UXO Lao planned to undertake further reforms in support functions and clearance methodologies that were expected to increase cost efficiency and to generate substantial gains in productivity. It set area clearance teams a target of clearing 18.24 square kilometers in 2006, 23 percent more than the 2005 target and 16.5 percent higher than the actual clearance in 2005.[49]
Donor concerns over delays in reforms of UXO Lao in 2005 caused its budget for that year to be reduced from a proposed US$4.96 million to $3.64 million and the procurement budget to be cut from $1.2 million to about $174,000.[50] Increased donor support in 2006 resulted in a budget of $4.66 million, including over $304,713 for procurement of equipment. The budget looked set to rise further if the government approved a pay increase for staff of UXO Lao, which it proposed in a bid to stem the loss of competent staff to other operators.[51]
MAG, which handed over operations to UXO Lao in 2000 but continued to provide technical support to UXO Lao in both Xieng Khouang and Saravane Provinces, resumed clearance as an independent operator in 2003. In 2005, MAG cleared 300,193 square meters and 443 items of UXO in three districts of Khammouane province and two districts of Xieng Khouang province, concentrating on land used for agriculture and rural development projects, including primary healthcare projects and schools. By March 2006, MAG had trained three community liaison and survey teams which it planned to use for task assessment and post-clearance impact studies.[52]
Milsearch, an Australian commercial company, worked in partnership with the Ministry of Defense until 2005, and then with a commercial partner, Latvisahakit Phathana Khet Phoudoi, under the Prime Minister’s office. In 2005, the company reported it cleared 10 square kilometers of land, disposing of 1,413 items of UXO.[53] Milsearch is engaged in clearance for the Xepon gold mine in Savannakhet province and has three projects related to the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project, including work on the dam site, powerlines and downstream channel clearance. However, Milsearch also started competing for humanitarian work and in 2005 took on clearance contracts for Christian Reformed World Relief Committee, which is engaged in small village development projects in Xieng Khouang province.[54]
MineTech worked for the joint Italian Thai Development PLC and Nishimatsu Construction Company Ltd. Venture on tasks in Khammouane province also related to the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project, employing 275 staff (206 in 16 UXO clearance teams―119 Lao nationals, 48 Bangladeshis and 39 Zimbabweans). MineTech also operated an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team led by a Zimbabwean and with three Lao personnel. From August 2004, when operations started, to the end of February 2006, MineTech cleared 13.9 square kilometers of land and destroyed 8,477 items of UXO. Its operations were externally quality assured by European Land Solutions on behalf of the client.[55]
Gerbera, working for Potsdamm Kommunikation in Houaphan and Luang Prabang provinces, reported clearing 5,720,000 square meters of land and providing management and EOD training to Lao staff before concluding operations at the end of June 2005.[56]
No casualties were reported among UXO clearance personnel in 2005.
UXO Lao’s productivity appeared to continue rising in the first three months of 2006, when it reported manually clearing 7.5 square kilometers of land.[57] MAG in this period cleared 78,215 square meters of land and destroyed 514 items of UXO.[58] At the same time, competition in the UXO action sector increased with government approval since the start of 2005 of three other clearance operators, who were due to begin operations in 2006.
Phoenix Clearance Ltd. (PCL), a commercial operator registered in New Zealand, received a license to operate in September 2005 and signed an agreement with the Lao Armed Forces under which it can hire army clearance technicians. By March 2006, PCL employed some 80 staff, including 60 technicians in 10 clearance teams and it planned to add 10 more clearance teams in 2006.[59] In December 2005, PCL started work for the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project clearing land for resettlement of villagers. By the end of May, PCL had cleared 5.7 square kilometers, disposing of 664 items of UXO, including three 500lb bombs, and an estimated four to five square kilometers remained to be cleared.[60] In April 2006, PCL signed another contract with Nam Theun 2 to operate a roving response team undertaking mine awareness training in villages and destroying ordnance reported outside areas already cleared. In May, PCL also won a contract from China National Electric Wire & Cable Import/Export Corporation to identify safe ground for survey teams preparing the laying of a 280-kilometer powerline. The project involved no UXO clearance, but was expected to be followed by a contract for clearing project sites.[61]
HI, already active in Laos, received approval to work as a UXO clearance operator in October 2005. It planned to start working on clearance and MRE in Nong district of Savannakhet province with a team of 25 Lao national clearance technicians by mid-2006.[62]
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) received government approval in January 2006 to operate in Laos and planned to undertake clearance for the World Food Programme and other development agencies. FSD expected to start work in Khammouane province in the second half of 2006 and in two other provinces in 2007. FSD together with MAG and Handicap International provided a senior EOD technicians’ training course for UXO Lao in 2006.[63]
UXO Lao and World Education/Consortium Laos with the Ministry of Education were the major organizations conducting UXO and mine risk education in 2005. MAG provided community liaison. UNICEF supported the technical working group for community awareness, the term used for UXO/mine risk education in Laos.[64]
In June 2006, UNICEF started a UXO risk assessment, in cooperation with MAG and with AusAID, UNICEF and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention funding; results were expected by the end of September 2006. This was intended to be followed by a strategy development workshop in October, conducted jointly with GICHD, and development of new safety messages; all activities were undertaken in cooperation with the NRA and its technical working group.[65]
In 2005, MRE/community awareness was carried out by UXO Lao teams in nine provinces, concentrating on UXO; in Xieng Khoung and Houaphan provinces, the dangers of mines are also covered.[66] In 2005, UXO Lao visited 535 villages, reaching 131,618 beneficiaries. In January-May 2006, UXO Lao visited 241 villages, reaching 63,874 beneficiaries.[67]
The American NGO, Consortium Laos (World Education, Inc./ World Learning) continued working with counterparts in the Lao Ministry of Education and the education offices of 25 districts in eight provinces to implement the in-school UXO education and awareness curriculum for primary school students in grades 1 to 5 and in multi-grade classrooms. In school-year 2005-2006, some 110,000 students, 3,750 teachers and 1,250 schools participated in the program. In 2006-2007, expansion was planned in eight more districts of nine provinces. The program’s goal is to reduce and prevent UXO accidents among schoolchildren, their out-of-school peers and their families; activities include skill-building of advisors and teachers through a monthly in-service training program. Classroom materials supplied by the project include posters and story-books created by students in creative arts workshops. The program has also helped establish more than 75 student puppetry troupes that spread messages about UXO in schools and at festivals and other events in villages and district centers. The program collaborates with the NRA, UXO Lao and local government officials to bring UXO awareness to all people in villages highly impacted by UXO.[68] UNICEF completed its support to Consortium in 2005.[69] A UNICEF/GICHD evaluation in 2005 observed that the geographical selection of target areas should have focused more on areas with the highest risk.[70]
MAG does not carry out MRE, unless an unmet need is identified, as UXO Lao Community Awareness activities are nationwide. In 2005, MAG undertook community liaison data-gathering activities in Khammouane province. This information will inform MAG’s operations in the province in 2006. In 2006, MAG formalized its community liaison processes with the appointment of an international community liaison manager development of standing operating procedures based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and an integrated approach to UXO clearance.[71]
MAG community liaison officers were trained in early 2006 to support all MAG technical teams; they were expected to be fully operational by the end of March 2006, as an integral part of MAG Lao’s prioritization and risk assessment process as well as supporting the rights of affected communities and individuals to information and participation in the UXO clearance process. Community liaison also serves as the main mechanism through which MAG Lao gathers information on pre- and post-clearance impact. Where MAG community liaison teams identify a UXO survivor or family of a UXO casualty requiring assistance, they pass this information to the relevant bodies and direct families to appropriate services where such services exist.[72]
Evaluations: In September 2005, in response to an increase in the number of reported UXO casualties, particularly children, UNICEF/GICHD published a study of the impact of the scrap metal trade on children. The study found that the scrap metal trade is economically very strong; safety messages could be improved―a merely “message-based approach” was likely to have little impact; “greater emphasis should be placed on supporting communities to manage these risks for themselves;” controls over scrap metal trade were needed; and improved EOD response was needed.[73]
In October 2005, UNICEF/GICHD released an evaluation of UNICEF’s UXO risk education projects, Sport-in-a-Box and UXO primary school curriculum.[74] The evaluation formulated four key recommendations: UNICEF should advocate and work with the NRA and others to develop a multi-province UXO risk education needs assessment as soon as possible; based on the needs assessment, all stakeholders should engage in strategic planning; UNICEF should provide more support for the creation of a national casualty surveillance system which includes data-collection on risk-taking and identifies risk education needs; and UNICEF should continue supporting the effective establishment of the NRA, providing, if requested, technical assistance and training to develop NRA’s capacity to coordinate UXO risk education in Laos.[75]
In 2005, a total of $7,231,485 was contributed by 10 countries for mine action in Laos, including funds for the UNDP Trust Fund and other bilateral donations. This was a decrease from 2004 ($8,130,130 donated by nine countries and the European Commission).[76] Donors reporting funding in 2005 were:
According to UXO Lao, donor contributions to the UNDP Trust Fund totaled $2,242,210 in 2005. For 1996-2005, contributions to the Trust Fund totaled $27,841,061.[87]
Laos reported receiving $5,527,093 in 2005 for its appeal through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action (some 77 percent of its total appeal for $7,204,025).[88] Although Laos received more than three-quarters of its appeal through the UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, some survivor assistance activities experienced serious funding shortfalls in 2005. The Portfolio End-Year Review for 2005 stated that in December lack of funding halted the production of prosthetics and orthotics.[89]
FSD received CHF541,500 ($419,540) for its operations in Laos in 2005, from AusAID ($915,240) and public and private sources ($47,649).[90] This was the first funding for the FSD Laos program, which established permanent representation in Vientiane to mobilize resources in December 2004.[91]
In 2006, UNDP reported that “a few donors” had expressed reluctance to continue assisting mine/UXO action in Laos because it is not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. UNDP also reported that the UK may reduce its support to UXO Lao by 2008.[92]
In 2005, UXO Lao reported 164 new mine/UXO casualties in 91 incidents: 36 people were killed (two women and 15 children) and 128 injured (16 women and 73 children); one person was injured by an M14 antipersonnel mine.[93] This would represent a decrease from 194 new mine/UXO casualties in 90 incidents in 2004, however, data collection and reporting of casualties is not comprehensive and likely under-represents the casualty rate.[94]
Activities at the time of incidents include building a fire over buried ordnance, agricultural activities, tampering with UXO, and playing (45 percent). The highest number of casualties (55) occurred in Xieng Khouang province, as in previous years, where 58 percent (32) of casualties were children.[95]
Reported casualties rose sharply from January to July 2005: UXO Lao reported 76 mine/UXO incidents in eight provinces, resulting in 127 casualties (31 people killed and 96 injured), including 12 children killed and 63 injured.[96] But from August to December, only 36 casualties (four killed and 32 injured) were recorded.[97] Organizations attributed the dramatic rise in casualties in 2004 and January-July 2005 to increased processing capacity in the scrap metal trade, population pressure, and poverty.[98] A GICHD study found that limited agricultural production and an expanding cash economy, as well as improved technology used in the scrap metal trade, were driving the trade and increasing exposure of people to its hazards.[99] This was thought to represent a growing crisis that neither increasing clearance nor MRE were adequate to address.[100] In 2006, the NRA planned to undertake a risk management mitigation study that was expected to indicate policy and practices needed to address the scrap metal problem.[101]
In 2005, at least one Lao national, injured by UXO in Lao, received treatment at Quang Tri General Hospital in Vietnam.[102] Reportedly, other Lao nationals have crossed the border from Saravane into A Luoi district of Thua-Thien Hue province in Vietnam for medical treatment at the district hospital after landmine/UXO incidents in the border area; however, exact figures were not available.[103]
Casualties continued to be reported in 2006 with 32 as of May: 13 were killed (three women and seven children) and 19 injured (six women and seven children); the highest number of casualties (15) occurred in Attepeu province.[104] A report that a large scrap metal foundry in Xieng Khouang had closed could not be confirmed and generally, survivor assistance actors and others agreed there was no clear indication of a downward trend in casualties.[105] Mine/UXO casualty data is certain to be under-reported as there is no comprehensive nationwide data collection mechanism. UXO Lao collects casualty information only in the provinces and districts where it works.[106] The GICHD study identified factors adversely affecting accurate data-collection such as insufficient tick boxes and closed questions in forms, so that “substantial interpretation is needed to establish a workable data-set.” It was concluded that currently available data was only indicative of “possible patterns and issues but provides a poor basis for substantive understanding of the extent or reality of the problem.”[107] The National Strategic Plan gives priority to the development of a national database on mine/UXO incidents covering all 18 provinces. In 2005 and early 2006, the NRA made progress toward establishing the Victim Information System for nationwide data collection.[108]
The total number of landmine/UXO casualties in Laos is not known. Between 1999 and 2005, there were at least 902 casualties (263 killed, 639 injured).[109] The 1997 HI survey recorded detailed interview data for 10,649 casualties (5,495 killed, 5,154 injured) between 1973 and 1996. The majority of incidents were caused by UXO; however, landmine casualties were recorded in every province and accounted for 11 percent of reported incidents.[110]
Survivor assistance in Laos is included in the National Strategic Plan, which states that the specific needs of survivors and their dependents “will be factored in all national [and] local public health initiatives.”[111] Resources from the UNDP Trust Fund were to be available for both physical rehabilitation and socioeconomic integration through the NRA.
In early 2006, the first disbursements (totaling $13,200) from the UNDP Trust Fund were transferred to the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) through the NRA, to assist with a severe financial crisis; however, similar support to government agencies had not been provided as of 19 June.[112] The NRA has a mandate to provide victim assistance policy, strategy, and a national Victim Information System through its technical working group on victim assistance. The NRA was officially operational in April 2006, but not fully functional for its survivor assistance responsibilities. The working group is intended to include all stakeholders and meet regularly to determine the structure, resource requirements, best practices, and standards for assistance and rehabilitation programs, and to develop a national victim assistance strategic plan and program. One priority will be to eliminate gaps in data collection, and duplication of services to survivors.[113]
The working group’s role includes coordinating the survivor assistance programs of independent operators, resource mobilization, and facilitating relations among the government, independent operators, and donors.[114] Until the Victim Information System is in place, planning data will continue to be obtained from UXO Lao,[115] whose data remains incomplete owing to its limited operational area.
In April 2006, UNICEF in cooperation with Handicap International completed a 10-week study in Xieng Khouang and Savannakhet to identify UXO victim assistance systems and activities, analyze gaps in those services, and describe an efficient system with recommendations for strengthening and enhancing victim assistance. The study found that government agencies, institutional infrastructure, and local and international NGOs provide a variety of services; hospital and health center capacity improved through provision of emergency medical equipment, training, and monitoring and evaluation. The study found gaps in services which affect immediate and long-term health, specifically: underutilization of village health volunteers; lack of accessibility to health centers; low quality of curative care; inconsistent support to survivors; no consistent quality of patient monitoring in district hospitals; limited provincial management and technical capacity; and lack of central policy, coordination and capacity-building. There were also inadequate referral and reporting systems and a lack of rehabilitation and reintegration of people with disabilities in general. However, the study found that where funding existed and activities functioned in a coordinated and comprehensive manner, synergies had been achieved. It recommended an integrated approach to assistance, which requires coordination and long-term planning; development of a sustainable and integrated national survivor assistance program, including continued development of medical infrastructure and staff capacity; expansion of emergency transport and first aid capacities; improved information sharing and referral networks; accurate incident reporting; funding for more emergency and ongoing care; and implementation of provincial needs assessments.[116]
Healthcare facilities in Laos are limited, and access for survivors who generally live in remote areas is further limited due to poor communications infrastructure, lack of information on available services and language barriers for ethnic groups. However, both the quality and reach of medical care available to UXO/mine casualties is reportedly improving with UXO/mine casualty mortality rates dropping from 39 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in January-March 2005. District and some sub-district health stations possess basic equipment for first aid and amputations. Casualties requiring more complex surgery, including severe burns and shrapnel wounds, are referred to provincial and national-level hospitals. As local capacity grows, fewer survivors are transferred to the central level.[117]
The Consortium War Victims Assistance Project, which ended in 2005, provided medical training, medical equipment, a management system for revolving drug funds, and renovation of hospital emergency and surgical areas in Xieng Khouang, Houaphan, Savannakhet and Saravane provinces; 300 doctors, nurses and administrators participated in training and working groups in 2005.
The War Victims Medical Fund, which pays for all medical and transportation costs for acute treatment needed by people injured by UXO/landmines, assisted 74 survivors as direct beneficiaries and 400 indirect beneficiaries in 2005. From April 1996 to March 2006, it provided funding for medical treatment to 359 survivors. Consortium estimated that 80-90 percent of survivors in Xieng Khouang had been served by the fund. The Quality of Life Rehabilitation Fund provides financial support, education and vocational training opportunities. As of March 2006, it had assisted 30 survivor families. In July 2005, Consortium’s new UXO Survivor Assistance Project started in Saravane, providing technical and project management and health worker first-aid training at the village level. In March 2006, Consortium conducted a comprehensive patient survey for Xieng Khouang and Houaphan provinces.[118]
The National Rehabilitation Center (NRC) implements or facilitates most survivor assistance and disability projects in cooperation with the main victim assistance actors.[119]
COPE, a partnership of the Ministry of Health, World Vision Laos, Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR-Japan), and the Singapore-based Leprosy Mission International-Southeast Asia, continued to provide support to NRC and four provincial prosthetic and orthotic centers in Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Savannakhet and Champassak. The Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthotics (CSPO) left the partnership in July 2005, and POWER International left in November owing to the expiration and subsequent non-renewal of its 10-year Memorandum of Understanding with the Lao government. Discussion was underway in May 2006 with three other organizations to join the COPE partnership.[120]
Occupational therapy and physiotherapy mentoring programs begun in 2004 to enhance the quality of care available had ceased as of May 2006 due to funding issues. COPE hoped to resume them in June-July 2006. COPE also ceased its cost recovery efforts due to declining returns, coupled with a funding crisis that highlighted the cost of management oversight.
Three Laotian prosthetic/orthotic technicians graduated from CSPO in October 2005, and to May 2006, 14 of 16 students sent to CSPO for Category II training have graduated. [121]
HI’s survivor assistance activities include a physiotherapy and community-based rehabilitation support program, through ongoing cooperation with the NRC. In May 2005, HI extended its community-based rehabilitation program to one more district of Vientiane province, to serve of 69 communities in four districts and the capital, assisting about 1,200 adults and children with disabilities and their families. HI also extended the program to the province of Savannakhet, initially targeting 30 communities in the three most affected districts, with the planned addition of three more districts after completion of a pilot phase. Due to a delayed Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Health, the project did not start as planned; however, the baseline study was conducted in mid-2005 and provided information to about 260 people with disabilities in the target area. The full project was expected to begin operations in the second half of 2006.
HI continued to provide various income-generating activities and disability awareness raising activities conducted with the Lao Disabled People’s Association; in mid-2005 control of the micro-credit fund component passed from HI to local partners. An evaluation of the program in June-July 2005 found that the small ($50) loans were highly valued and had a “significant positive impact,” on the lives of those who received them.[122] An occupational therapy component was added to the HI program; training of trainers is provided through the University of Medical Rehabilitation in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where four physiotherapists participate in three-month training modules over three years, dealing with positioning, daily activity and communication. Village-level capacity to provide assistive devices through carpenters was developed.[123]
The Lao Disabled People’s Association, with over 1,700 members (147 UXO/mine survivors and 146 other survivors of war), supports people with disabilities by protecting their rights, and promoting access to education and employment in six provinces.[124]
NRC developed the Sikeud Vocational School for the Disabled operated by the Thai congregation of the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul in cooperation with the Ministry of Health. Between January 2004 and January 2006, 158 people (77 women) graduated in four classes. Twelve graduates work as trainers in provincial branch schools, where in 2006, 10-month courses were begun in wood-carving, motorcycle and electronic appliance repair, as well as six-month courses in the branch schools for tailoring and motorcycle repair.[125]
Other Lao government-sponsored organizations concerned with disability issues and international organizations identified supporting CBR are described in the Landmine Monitor Report 2005.[126]
One mine/UXO survivor participated in the War Legacies Survivor Assistance Workshop for the Mekong Sub-Region in Hue, Viet Nam, 19-20 December 2005.
Lao PDR has legislation and policies to protect the rights of people with disabilities. Though the constitution provides citizens with protection against discrimination, it does not specify that these protections apply to people with disabilities. Responsibility for providing services to people with disabilities is divided between the Ministry of Health, which manages the national and provincial rehabilitation centers, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which oversees the National Commission for Disabled People. Regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and the Lao National Commission for the Disabled protect such people against discrimination; however, the regulations lack the force of law.[127] UNICEF has supported the Ministry of Justice in the development of a children’s law, the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Children; it was planned that the law would be submitted to the Lao National Assembly near the end of 2006. The draft law contains two articles related to children with disabilities, on primary healthcare and on education.[128]
[1] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1033-1034, for statements supportive of joining the treaty in 2003 and 2004.
[2] Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Vientiane, 19 July 2005, to Stephen D. Goose, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Landmine Monitor Ban Policy Coordinator.
[3] Ibid. It also noted that Laos has “legislative and executive” measures preventing the sale and use of antipersonnel mines: Articles 70 and 71 of the Penal Code “impose serious punishments on those who unlawfully possess, produce and use any ammunition and mines [and] Regulations issued by the Ministry of Commerce number 0284/MC.FT, dated 17 March 2004, prohibit any export and import of ammunition.”
[4] Interview with Somphanh Phengkhammy, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Vientiane, 6 February 2004.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Interview with Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vientiane, 9 February 2004.
[7] Landmine Monitor Report 2004 noted unconfirmed allegations in late 2003 and early 2004 of new mine use by the Lao military in conflicts with ethnic groups, mainly Hmong. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said these allegations “were untrue and fabricated with an objective to mislead the public about the reality in the Lao PDR.”
[8] US bombing records in Laos, 1964-73, Congressional Record, 14 May 1975.
[9] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 789.
[10] HI, “Living with UXO, National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR,” 1997, pp. 7, 9, 20.
[11] UXO Lao, “Annual Report 2001,” p. 6.
[12] UNDP, “UNDP in Lao PDR,” www.undplao.org/uxolao.htm, accessed 28 June 2006.
[13] HI, “Living with UXO, National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR,” 1997, p. 7.
[14] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1036-1037.
[15] Interview with John Dingley, Chief Technical Advisor, UXO Lao/UNDP, Vientiane, 9 March 2006.
[16] UNDP Press Release, “Sharp rise in UXO deaths for 2004,” Vientiane, 8 July 2004, www.undplao.org, accessed 28 June 2006.
[17] Interview with Martin Dunn, Country Representative, Consortium in the Lao PDR, Vientiane, 10 March 2006, and email, 28 March 2006.
[18] Interview with Kristen F. Bauer, Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy, Vientiane, 10 March 2006.
[19] UXO Lao, “Annual Report 2001,” Vientiane, 2002, p. 8.
[20] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1040.
[21] Resolutions of the Lao PDR Government on National Strategic Plan for the UXO Programme in the Lao PDR 2003-2013, “The Safe Path Forward,” Ref.01/PM, Vientiane, 29 April 2004, pp. 2-3.
[22] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1038.
[23] Decree on the establishment of The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for the UXO Programme in Lao PDR, 17 March 2004.
[24] Interviews with donors, Vientiane, 8-11 March 2006.
[25] Démarche submitted to Somsavat Lengsavad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 June 2005. Signatories included Australia, Canada, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, UK and US. The démarche noted UXO Lao’s funding crisis was partly the result of “continued institutional weakness” and drew attention to an audit of UXO Lao in 2004 that identified procurement irregularities.
[26] Interviews with donors, Vientiane, 8-11 March 2006.
[27] Telephone interview with Joseph Wenkoff, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/NRA, Laos, 21 June 2006.
[28] Ibid; NRA, “Development of an EOD Risk Management/Mitigation Model in the Lao PDR, Scope of Work,” March 2006.
[29] Interview with Joseph Wenkoff, UNDP/NRA, Vientiane, 8 March 2006.
[30] Telephone interview with Joseph Wenkoff, UNDP/NRA, Laos, 21 June 2006.
[31] “Safe Path Forward, National Strategic Plan for the UXO Programme in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 2003-2013,” Vientiane, 2004, p. 2.
[32] Ibid, pp. 2, 4.
[33] Ibid, pp. 2, 4, 5.
[34] Bounpheng Sisavath, Chief of Public Information Unit, UXO Lao, “UXO Lao’s fight against Unexploded Ordnance,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.2, February 2006.
[35] Telephone interview with Leonard Kaminski, Senior Technical Advisor, NPA, 18 April 2006.
[36] Telephone interview with Olivier Bauduin, Finance Advisor and Country Coordinator, NPA, Vientiane, 15 June 2006.
[37] Interview with Olivier Bauduin, NPA, Vientiane, 8 March 2006.
[38] Telephone interview with Leonard Kaminski, NPA, 18 April 2006.
[39] Leonard Kaminski, “NPA-Lao PDR Enhanced Technical Survey Project Report, Executive Summary,” June 2006, p. 1.
[40] Ibid, p. 2.
[41] Email from William Barron, Director, Information Management and Mine Action Program, VVAF, 21 July 2006.
[42] The provinces are Savannakhet, Xieng Khouang, Saravane, Khammouane, Sekong, Champassak, Houaphan, Attapu and Luang Prabang.
[43] UXO Lao, “Work Plan 2005,” undated but 2005, p. 10.
[44] Email from Katja Weger, Task Force Humanitarian Aid, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, 5 July 2006.
[45] Ibid.
[46] UXO Lao, “Programme Progress Report 2005,” (draft), March 2006.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Interview with Mariko Harada, Chief of the UXO and Disaster Management Unit, UNDP, Vientiane, 10 March 2006.
[49] UXO Lao, “Programme Work Plan and Budget 2006,” (draft), March 2006.
[50] UXO Lao, “Programme Progress Report 2005,” (draft), March 2006.
[51] Emails from Mariko Harada, UNDP, 18 and 20 June 2006.
[52] Telephone interview with Jo Durham, Country Programme Manager, MAG, Vientiane, 13 March 2006, and email, 17 March 2006; email from Stefan De Coninck, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, 28 June 2006.
[53] Emails from Ron Hawkins, Manager, Milsearch LPKP EOD Ltd., 5 and 6 April 2006.
[54] Interview with Ron Hawkins, Milsearch, Vientiane, 9 March 2006.
[55] Email from Peter Fuyane, Project Manager, MineTech International, 31 March 2006.
[56] Email from Katja Weger, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, 5 July 2006.
[57] Email from Edwin Faigmane, Technical Advisor, UXO Lao/UNDP, 9 June 2006.
[58] Email from Stefan De Coninck, MAG, 30 June 2006.
[59] Interviews with Michael Hayes, Managing Director, and J.J. Hay, General Manager, Phoenix Clearance Ltd., Vientiane, 9 and 10 March 2006.
[60] PCL cleared 49,485 square meters of land under this contract in December 2005; emails from Paul Stanford, Technical Operations Officer, PCL, 13 and 14 June 2006.
[61] Emails from Paul Stanford, PCL, 13 and 14 June 2006.
[62] Interview with Chris Bath, UXO Coordinator, HI, Vientiane, 9 March 2006.
[63] Interview with Tony Fish, EOD Technical Advisor and Project Manager, FSD, Vientiane, 9 March 2006.
[64] Emails from Amy Delneuville, Assistant Project Officer, Child Protection, UNICEF Lao PDR, 16 May and 29 June 2006.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Email from John Dingley, UXO Lao/UNDP, 27 April 2006.
[67] Email from Edwin Faigmane, UXO Lao/UNDP, 2 July 2006.
[68] Email from Arthur Crisfield, Education Advisor, Consortium, Vientiane, 30 June 2006.
[69] Email from Amy Delneuville, UNICEF Lao PDR, 29 June 2006.
[70] UNICEF/GICHD, “An Evaluation of UNICEF-supported UXO Risk Education Projects in Lao PDR,” Geneva, October 2005, p. 5.
[71] Emails from Jo Durham, MAG, 13 and 25 April 2006.
[72] Ibid.
[73] GICHD, “A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR,” Geneva, September 2005, pp. 5-6.
[74] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 793.
[75] UNICEF/GICHD, “An Evaluation of UNICEF-supported UXO Risk Education Projects in Lao PDR,” Geneva, October 2005, p. 5; email from Amy Delneuville, UNICEF Lao PDR, 29 June 2006.
[76] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 794.
[77] Email from Katheryn Bennett, AusAID, 30 June 2006. A$1 = US$0.7627. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[78] Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 26 April 2006; email from Dominique Jones, Conseiller, Ministry of Defence, 17 May 2006; email from Stan Brabant, Head, Policy Unit, HI, 26 May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[79] Mine Action Investments database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[80] Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database.
[81] Emails from Kitagawa Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated information received by JCBL from Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11 May 2005 and Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1= ¥ 110.11. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[82] Email from François Berg, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg, 30 March 2006.
[83] Email from Ellen Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006.
[84] Email from Helen Fawthorpe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006; email from Megan McCoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: NZ$1 = US$0.7049. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[85] Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 20 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: £1 = US$1.820. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[86] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 8 June 2006.
[87] UXO Lao, “Programme Progress Report 2005,” (draft), March 2006. Estimated contributions only; commitments are multiyear and have overlapping disbursement periods. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1043-1044.
[88] UNMAS, “2005 Portfolio End-Year Review,” p. 2.
[89] Ibid p. 5; response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Michael Boddington, Executive Consultant and Monitoring Officer, Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), Vientiane, 2 May 2006.
[90] FSD, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 30. FSD exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2907.
[91] FSD, “Annual Report 2004,” p. 20.
[92] Mine Action Support Group, “MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May 2006, pp.
12-13.
[93] Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by Vilaysouk Bouamanivong, Survey Database Officer, UXO Lao, 13 June 2006.
[94] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 795.
[95] Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by Vilaysouk Bouamanivong, UXO Lao, 13 June 2006.
[96] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 795.
[97] Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by Vilaysouk Bouamanivong, UXO Lao, 13 June 2006.
[98] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 795.
[99] GICHD, “A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR,” Geneva, September 2005, p. 12.
[100] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 795.
[101] Information provided by Joseph Wenkoff, UNDP/NRA, 15 March 2006.
[102] Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by Tran Hong Chi, Manager, Clear Path International, Dong Ha (Vietnam), 17 April 2006.
[103] Email from Barbara Lewis, Project Coordinator, Consortium War Victims Assistance Project, 20 June 2006; notes taken during a fact-finding meeting with A Luoi district officials by Hugh Hosman, War Legacies Program Consultant, Fund for Reconciliation and Development, A Luoi (Vietnam), 14 October 2005.
[104] Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by Vilaysouk Bouamanivong, UXO Lao, 13 June 2006.
[105] Email from Luc Delneuville, Country Director, HI, 23 June 2006; email from Joseph Wenkoff, UNDP/NRA, 19 June 2006; email from Barbara Lewis, Consortium, 20 June 2006.
[106] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1045.
[107] GICHD, “A Study of Scrap Metal Collection in Lao PDR,” Geneva, September 2005, p. 25.
[108] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 795.
[109] Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by Vilaysouk Bouamanivong, UXO Lao, 13 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 795; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1045.
[110] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1045-1046.
[111] “Safe Path Forward, National Strategic Plan for the UXO Programme in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 2003-2013,” Vientiane, 2004, p. 2; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1046.
[112] Information provided by Joseph Wenkoff, UNDP/NRA, 15 March 2006; email from Joseph Wenkoff, NRA/UNDP, 19 June 2006; response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Michael Boddington, COPE, 2 May 2006.
[113] Information provided by Luc Delneuville, HI, 23 March 2006.
[114] Information provided by Joseph Wenkoff, UNDP/NRA, 15 March 2006.
[115] Information provided by Luc Delneuville, HI, 23 March 2006.
[116] UNICEF/HI, “Victim and Survivor Assistance Study, Lao PDR,” Vientiane, April 2006, pp. 4-6, 15.
[117] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 796.
[118] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Barbara Lewis, Consortium, 1 May 2006; and email, 20 June 2006; UNICEF/HI, “Victim and Survivor Assistance Study, Lao PDR,” Vientiane, April 2006, pp. 5, 15; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 796-797.
[119] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 797.
[120] Email from Michael Boddington, COPE, 26 June 2006.
[121] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Michael Boddington, COPE, 2 May 2006.
[122] Emma Howell, “External Evaluation of the CBR Project of Handicap International Belgium and the National Rehabilitation Centre, Vientiane Capital and Vientiane Province, Lao PDR June/July 2005,” HI/NRC, Vientiane, 2005, pp. 9-10.
[123] Emails from Luc Delneuville, HI, 20 and 23 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 797.
[124] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 797; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1048.
[125] Email from Barbara Lewis, Consortium, 23 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 798.
[126] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 798.
[127] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Laos,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1048-1049.
[128] Email from Amy Delneuville, UNICEF Lao PDR, 20 July 2006.