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LM Report 2006 

Latvia

Key developments since May 2005: Latvia became a State Party on 1 January 2006. It submitted its initial Article 7 report, which indicates a stockpile of 2,410 mines will be destroyed in 2006, while 1,301 mines will be retained for training. During 2005, more than 8,000 explosive remnants of war including 200 antitank and antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed. In August 2005, Latvia’s explosive ordnance disposal school was formally accorded the status of a national educational institution with the right to issue state diplomas. In early 2006, a private store of explosive ordnance was found in a farm in eastern Latvia; one civilian was injured trying to neutralize one of the devices.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Latvia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 July 2005. The treaty entered into force for Latvia on 1 January 2006. Latvia has not yet reported what national measures it will take to implement the treaty domestically. As of April 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not able to provide any information on national implementation measures.[1]

Latvia submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 28 April 2006, covering calendar year 2005. It previously submitted three voluntary (pre-accession) reports.[2]

Latvia participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005 and made an intervention stating that, “existing stockpiles will be destroyed in due time.”[3] It participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2005 and also in May 2006, where the delegation made a statement on its stockpile destruction plans.

Latvia has not yet made its views known on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, and the issues of joint military operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.

Latvia joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines on 22 August 2002. Latvia attended the Seventh Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2005 and submitted a national annual report in accordance with Article 13. In terms of compliance with Amended Protocol II, Latvia states, “All mines and other military devices in the Republic of Latvia inventory comply fully with the technical provisions of Amended Protocol II. Latvia has ratified all points of the Amended Protocol II, only point 2 section b will come into force on December 2, 2007.”[4] In this statement Latvia refers to the requirement that all non-remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines produced before 1 January 1997 shall be made detectable prior to their use.[5] This deferral is now presumably irrelevant due to Latvia’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, which prohibits the use of such mines and requires their destruction.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction

Latvia has declared “no APM production facilities” in its Article 7 reports.[6] Latvia has prohibited export and transit of antipersonnel mines since 1995. The Law on the Circulation of Arms was passed on 6 June 2002 and entered into force on 1 January 2003, which prohibits the export and transit of antipersonnel mines.[7]

Latvia inherited a small stockpile of Soviet antipersonnel mines. In its initial Article 7 report in 2006, Latvia declared a stockpile of 3,791 antipersonnel mines: 2,910 PMN-2 blast mines and 881 OZM-4 bounding fragmentation mines.[8] In its 2005 voluntary report, Latvia had declared the same number of PMN-2 mines, but 996 OZM-4s.[9] Each of Latvia’s reports has had a different number for stockpiled mines.[10]

In its April 2006 Article 7 report, Latvia did not include in its stockpile the MON-50, MON-100, MON-200 and “Defense Charge-21” Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines listed in its previous voluntary reports, stating that “they are defence charge and not observed by the Ottawa Convention. Latvia is committed not to use them as APM.”[11] A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official reconfirmed that the four types of mines “have disappeared [from the report], because they are command detonated fragmentation defence charges and not anti-personnel mines, thus not subjected to the convention. In previous years they were included in our reports by mistake.”[12]

Use of Claymore-type mines in command-detonated mode is permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty, but use in victim-activated mode (with tripwires) is prohibited. The ICBL has urged States Parties to report on steps taken to ensure that these types of mines can only be used in command-detonated mode.

As of April 2006, Latvia had not destroyed any of its stockpiled mines. However, its 2006 Article 7 report states, “Destruction of all stockpiled APMs is planned in 2006” at a “military area in Zvarde region.” It lists burning of PMN-2 and demolition of OZM-4 as methods of destruction, and reports on applicable safety and environmental standards.[13]

In its 2006 Article 7 report, Latvia indicated it intends to retain 1,301 mines for research and training, including 420 PMN-2 and all of its 881 OZM-4 mines.[14] In 2005 Latvia did not transfer or consume any of its mines retained for training.[15] In previous years, Latvia has inconsistently reported on the number of antipersonnel mines it intended to retain, declaring numbers between 0 and 4,500 mines.[16]

Latvia has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines. Latvia did not utilize the new expanded Form D on retained mines agreed to by States Parties at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005.

Mine/ERW Problem and Mine Action

Latvia is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from World War II.[17] Every year, according to the authorities, about 5,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) are found and destroyed; these include a small number of landmines.[18] In 2005, the total figure rose to more than 8,000 as a result of the destruction of old stockpiled ammunition.[19] Reportedly, the total included 200 antitank and antipersonnel mines.[20]

Mine and ERW clearance is the responsibility of the Latvian Armed Forces. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations are performed by a company of 84 people, divided into a command unit of nine people and three platoons of 24 EOD specialists and one communications officer each. Platoons are located in Ogre, Saldus and Rezekne; on average, they receive six calls a day.[21]

On 1 April 2002, an EOD school was established in Adazhi as part of a bilateral project with Norway that ended on 28 April 2006. As a result of the centralization of EOD personnel (previously dispersed among Home Guard units), an EOD center was established in 2003, which the following year was reorganized into a platoon basis. The center received substantial assistance from Austria, Denmark and Sweden.[22] In 2005, Latvia signed a bilateral agreement with Sweden on technical cooperation and assistance.[23]

On 18 July 2005, the EOD school started its first international program―a joint training course for Latvian and Lithuanian EOD specialists carried out in English. In August 2005, Norwegian personnel arrived at the school for training in dealing with improvised explosive devices.[24] Also in July, the Latvian Cabinet decided to assign the status of national education institution to the EOD school; it formally opened under its new status on 8 August 2005.[25] The school is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, with funds provided from the national budget. It is expected that EOD specialists from other countries will be trained there in 2006, starting with a group of Iraqis due to come to the school mid-year.[26]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Latvia stated in 2006, as in previous years, that there are no known or suspected minefields under its jurisdiction or control, and no mine clearance programs.[27] It has, however, acknowledged the presence of mines left over from earlier wars and the Soviet occupation.[28] Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Latvia must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 January 2016.

Demining

A Latvian newspaper claimed that in 2005, Latvian EOD specialists destroyed 4,589 artillery shells, 200 antitank and antipersonnel mines, 1,616 mortar shells, 47 aviation bombs, 1,814 grenades and a large number of other explosives.[29] The largest single amount of UXO found in one place was in Saldus district in southwestern Latvia where 119 mortar shells were found.

In July and August 2005, training of EOD specialists was performed in a former Soviet ammunition depot in Lilaste in Riga district. The exercises resulted in the disposal of more than 2,000 different explosive devices: 1,455 artillery shells, 30 aerial bombs, 411 fuzes, 39 mortar shells and two mines. In addition, in a 20,000 square meter section of the military training area, four 100 kilogram aerial bombs were found.[30]

In early 2006, a private store of explosive ordnance was found on a farm in Daugavpils district in eastern Latvia by EOD specialists in a joint operation with state police. The farm owner, a former EOD specialist in the Soviet army, had stored World War I and II explosives. His son was injured while attempting to neutralize one of the explosive devices; this led to an explosion and a fire. During two searches, the authorities found a large quantity of munitions, including 18 artillery shells, 42 grenades, three mortar shells, two home-made antipersonnel mines, 175 fuzes and 15 kilograms of explosives.[31]

No mine risk education or other measures to warn the population are noted in any of Latvia’s Article 7 reports. The EOD center previously reported conducting mine risk education.[32] Latvian newspapers reporting on discoveries of UXO now include phone numbers for the public to call when suspicious objects are found.[33]

There were no injuries or deaths among Latvian clearance personnel in 2005 or January-March 2006.[34] No reports of civilian mine/UXO casualties during 2005 and January-May 2006 were received by Landmine Monitor.

Funding and Assistance

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Latvia reported that it contributes to mine action in other countries to the extent of its resources. Latvian EOD personnel have participated in international missions in Afghanistan (14 personnel in 2006) and in Iraq until May 2003 and Kosovo until July 2003.[35] In Afghanistan, the main tasks of the Latvian mission were to patrol and to secure airfields; during this work, 13.8 tons of ERW were destroyed. EOD specialists from Latvia have applied to participate in the NATO Response Force.[36]


[1] Email from Sanita Krumina, Third Secretary, Department of Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 27 April 2006. Latvia’s initial Article 7 report cites as national measures Protocol II and Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Article 7 Report, Form A, 28 April 2006.
[2] Article 7 Report, 28 April 2006; the report was due on 30 June 2006. Latvia submitted voluntary reports on 1 May 2003, 14 May 2004 and 16 June 2005, each for the previous calendar year.
[3] Statement by Andris Pelšs, Acting Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 29 November 2005.
[4] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 26 September 2005. Latvia stated the same information in the previous year’s report.
[5] Latvia exercised its right for a nine-year deferral of the detectability requirement upon its adoption of Amended Protocol II on 22 August 2002. However, none of the antipersonnel mines declared by Latvia in its Article 7 reports are known to be of low metal content and are listed in international reference publications as “easily detectable.”
[6] See Article 7 Report, Form E, 28 April 2006.
[7] Letter from Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia, to Jody Williams, ICBL, Riga, 16 July 2004; Latvia Response to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Questionnaire, 20 December 2002, p. 3.
[8] Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2006; statement by Latvia, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[9] Article 7 Report, Form B, 16 June 2005.
[10] Latvia inconsistently reported the total number of mines in each of its three voluntary Article 7 reports. In 2005, it declared a stockpile of 4,666 mines of six types; in 2004, it declared 4,447 mines of six types; in 2003, it declared 2,980 mines of one type. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 403, for details.
[11] Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2006.
[12] Email from Sanita Krumina, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 27 April 2006.
[13] Article 7 Report, Forms F and G, 28 April 2006.
[14] Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 April 2006; statement by Latvia, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[15] Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 April 2006. During 2004, 21 antipersonnel mines were transferred for research and training purposes (two PMN-2; one OZM-4; 14 Defence Charge-21; two MON-100; and two MON-50). During 2003, 36 mines were transferred (15 Claymore-types and 21 MON-50s). Article 7 Reports, Form D.2, 16 June 2005 and 14 May 2004.
[16] In its Article 7 report submitted on 16 June 2005, Latvia did not list any mines as retained for training; in July 2004 Latvia told ICBL it planned to retain about 4,500 mines; in its Article 7 report submitted on 14 May 2004, Latvia declared 2,912 mines retained for training. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 403.
[17] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 403-404. Under Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
[18] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 September 2005.
[19] Interview with Dainis Silins, Head of Administration and Planning Department, EOD School, Adazhi, 25 May 2006.
[20] “Numbers and facts,” editorial in Latvijas Vēstnesis (weekly newspaper), 4 January 2006, p. 5.
[21] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 September 2005; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 404.
[22] Interview with Dainis Silins, EOD School, Adazhi, 25 May 2006.
[23] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form E, 29 September 2005.
[24] Email from Capt. Andris Rieksts, Commander of EOD Company, National Armed Forces, 19 September 2005.
[25] The decision was needed in order to formally assign the title of educational institution, which gives the school the right to issue state diplomas and entitles students to continue their education in other colleges. Telephone interview with Dainis Silins, EOD school, Adazhi, 17 May 2006.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Article 7 Report, Forms C and F, 16 June 2005; CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 September 2005; statement by Latvia, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[28] Previous reports referred to mine/UXO contamination from World War II and the Soviet occupation existing in some areas “in considerable quantities” and gave more details. Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 403-404; Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 830-831.
[29] “Numbers and facts,” Latvijas Vēstnesis, 4 January 2006, p. 5.
[30] Aina Trasune, “Training of EOD specialists,” Ogres ziņas (Ogre district newspaper), 9 August 2005.
[31] Ilze Apine, “House on a ‘powder tank’,” Latvijas vēstnesis, 8 February 2006, p. 2.
[32] Email from Capt. Andris Rieksts, National Armed Forces, 19 September 2005.
[33] Email from Igors Tipans, Baltic International Centre for Human Education, 5 May 2006.
[34] Interview with Dainis Silins, EOD School, Adazhi, 25 May 2006.
[35] Email from Sanita Krumina, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 27 April 2006.
[36] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 29 September 2005.