Key developments: Panama’s National Environmental Authority declared in September 2005 that it would clear former US military ranges contaminated by unexploded ordnance.
The Republic of Panama signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 7 October 1998, and became a State Party on 1 April 1999.
There is no specific legislation in place to enforce the antipersonnel mine ban domestically, but Panama states that provisions in the national penal code, such as Article 237, are applicable to antipersonnel mines.[1] The government’s Permanent Commission for the Application of International Humanitarian Law (Comisión Nacional Permanente Para la Aplicación del Derecho Internacional Humanitario, CPDIH) has worked since February 2002 to incorporate a “Crimes Against Humanity” provision into the penal code, including specific reference to antipersonnel mines.[2] In May 2006, CPDIH informed Landmine Monitor that a final draft of the provision had been sent for review to a commission in the executive branch that is drafting a new penal code. The draft penal code, including CPDIH’s provision, will be sent to the legislative branch to review and enact.[3]
Panama has not attended a Mine Ban Treaty meeting since the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2003.
Panama has submitted two Article 7 transparency reports, but has not provided updates for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006.[4] In May 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the UN Secretary-General that Panama does not intend to continue submitting formal reports because it has no new information to provide.[5] The Executive Secretary of CPDIH, Janio Tuñón, confirmed this position with Landmine Monitor in March 2006, but noted that in place of a full report, a message would be sent stating that Panama is in full compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty because it does not possess, use, stockpile or produce landmines, including in areas formerly under the control of the US Army.[6]
Panama has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, it has not made its views known on the issues of joint military operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.
Panama is a State Party to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It did not attend the Seventh Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2005 and did not submit in 2005 the annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol.
Panama has stated that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines and that it holds no stockpile.[7]
Panama is not believed to be mine-affected, but has a problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily unexploded ordnance (UXO),[8] as a result of US military exercises and weapons testing on military ranges in the Canal Zone during the three decades prior to 1999.[9]
In its Article 7 reports, Panama has formally declared that it is not mine-affected.[10] In 2004, however, Landmine Monitor reported that, before 1997, a very small number of antipersonnel mines were tested by the US in military ranges. Information gathered in 1999 by a contractor to the US-managed Tropical Test Center indicated that the center reportedly tested one antipersonnel mine and one antivehicle mine. In May 1998, consultants from Wolf’s Flat Ordnance Disposal Company surveyed a section of one of the military ranges and found a World War II-era M2 antipersonnel mine.[11] An assessment by the US Department of Defense in 1997 revealed the presence of various types of munitions, including Claymore mines, but not other antipersonnel mines.[12] Landmine Monitor has not received reports of the presence of antipersonnel mines on the military ranges in 2005 or up to May 2006.
In February 2004, the head of the national border police had told Landmine Monitor that the communities of Capurganá, Jaqué, La Miel, Puerto Obaldía and Zapsurro, along the southern border with Colombia may be mine-affected.[13] However, in May 2006, UNICEF Panama reported that it had no knowledge of any mine-affected areas on the country’s southern border.[14]
UXO contamination in Panama is limited to three former US military bases along the Panama Canal, which are said to still contain a total of around 110,000 pieces of UXO.[15] According to a UN 2002 report, approximately 3,250 hectares of land (32.5 square kilometers) in the Piña, Balboa West and Emperador areas are contaminated, putting more than 100,000 individuals in 81 communities at risk.[16] Panama reports that areas formerly used for military purposes are demarcated and it is prohibited to enter or use any of these areas.[17] A decree was issued in 2001 making it illegal to enter the ranges. However, according to one study, Panama cannot afford to fence off the land or guard it.[18]
In June 2005, US media reported on national concerns regarding the July 2005 opening of the second fixed bridge over the Panama Canal. One access road to the bridge runs along a UXO-contaminated area and officials worried that “unsuspecting motorists who wander off the roadway for a breath of fresh air could get blown up; so could residents of low-income housing units that are expected to be constructed near the new bridge and access roads.”[19]
Since the US handed over the Canal to Panama, both countries have disagreed on who was responsible for responding to the UXO problem left on the former US Army military ranges. In the past, the Panamanian authorities have claimed that it is the responsibility of the US to remove the UXO as the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty says distinctly that, “the US has responsibility for turning previously-held territory free of every hazard to human life.”[20] However, in 1998, a US Department of State’s Interagency Working Group on Demining stated that the ranges are not fit to be developed for commercial or residential purposes and should be therefore sealed off. Moreover, the “US humanitarian demining funds should not be used to clear current or former US military ranges, since this would set a precedent of using humanitarian assistance to clear former US military bases and ranges around the world.”[21]
In a visit to Panama in November 2004, US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said that, “the US apparently has assumed its obligation under the [1977] treaty, and the matter has been closed.”[22] In June 2005, US Embassy spokesman Will Ostick reportedly stated that, “further cleanup of the former Canal Zone was not practical, for environmental, safety and cost reasons...fully removing the arms would require forest clearing in the former Canal Zone, which in turn would endanger the watershed that supplies the canal and makes the operation of its locks possible.” Retrieval of the munitions would also cost lives and “millions, if not billions, of dollars.”[23] In November 2005, US media reported that during his visit to Panama, President Bush had endorsed the idea of widening the Panama Canal but “had rejected the country’s request that the US remove thousands of unexploded munitions it left behind when it turned over control of the waterway in 1999.”[24] President Bush was reported to have told Panamanian President Martín Torrijos Espino that the “US had met its obligations on the munitions,” adding that, “we have a disagreement that we will continue to discuss.”[25]
In September 2005, according to a media report, after several years of discussions between Panama and the US and given the lack of response from the US, the administrator of the National Environmental Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, ANAM) declared that Panama would clear the military bases left by the US. Clearance would be under the responsibility of ANAM, the Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Panamá, ACP) and the Ministry of Public Health. The areas under ANAM’s responsibility would be put to tender nationally and internationally. Once cleared, those areas would be used for ecological tourism.[26]
Panama has been considering expanding the Canal by adding a third set of locks. This project would entail major and numerous excavations. Preparatory studies have indicated that one of the areas least costly to receive all the waste and excavation material would be the former military range of Emperador, as it is close to operations.[27] A national referendum was expected to take place in late 2006 to approve the expansion of the Canal.[28] If approved, ACP would issue a request to other companies to tender for the clearance of the former military range.[29] Estimates of the costs of removing UXO from all military ranges have varied. According to a November 2003 media report, the government of Panama estimated that the cost would be of the order of US$600 million.[30] In March 2004, a member of the parliamentary committee investigating the clean-up estimated the cost at $688 million.[31] A 2005 media report stated that cleaning the military bases would cost $350 million to $500 million.[32]
Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty obliges Panama to clear all suspected and known mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 April 2009. At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2003, Ambassador Xiamara de Arrocha stated that Panama had no knowledge of the existence of mines laid in the country; however, zones affected by UXO left by the foreign occupation had been reported.[33]
Landmine Monitor found no evidence of clearance operations taking place in Panama in 2005 and January-May 2006. It was reported in April 2004 that a contractor had cleared UXO on the western side of the second fixed bridge under construction across the canal, which also cut through part of the former US Army Emperador Range. Fourteen items of UXO were encountered during the operation.[34] No landmines were found.[35]
In May 2006, UNICEF reported that no UXO risk education campaigns have been conducted in Panama since 2004.[36] According to UNICEF, the government was recently considering reactivating an interministerial commission on risk education; if that occurred, UNICEF could support the commission in carrying out risk education campaigns through schools, in coordination with the Ministries of Education and Health and the National Environmental Authority. UNICEF also noted that media continued to report the discovery of UXO near Isla Iguana (Los Santos), Rio Hato (Cocle), San José (Islas Perlas), and in Darién. UNICEF sees a need for the UN to update its information on the UXO problem in those places. UNICEF indicated that the following communities could benefit from risk education: Jaqué, Boca de Cupe, Paya, and Púcuru in Darién province, and Puerto Obaldía on the Caribbean coast.[37]
Landmine Monitor received no reports of mine/UXO casualties in Panama in 2005 and January-May 2006.
[1] This article provides for a prison sentence of two to six years for “anyone who attempts to commit a crime endangering collective security by manufacturing, supplying, acquiring, removing or possessing bombs and explosive materials, or materials intended for their preparation.” Article 7 Report, Form A, 16 April 2002; statement by Amb. Xiamara de Arrocha, Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Bangkok, 15-19 September 2003.
[2] Chapter II of the proposed legislation’s first draft states, “Anyone who develops, produces, stockpiles, conserves and transfers bacteriological and toxic weapons, chemical weapons or antipersonnel mines prohibited by International Conventions or treaties of which Panama is part, will receive prison sentences of 10 to 15 years.” Interview with Angela Healy, President, CPDIH, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Panama, 31 January 2003.
[3] Telephone interview with Janio Tuñón, Executive Secretary, CPDIH, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 May 2006.
[4] The reports were submitted on 16 April 2002 and 7 May 2003. The initial report did not specify the reporting period and the update was in the form of a letter.
[5] Letter to Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, from Harmodio Arias Cerjack, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ref. AJ/DH/No. 969, 7 May 2003.
[6] Telephone interview with Janio Tuñón, Executive Secretary, CPDIH, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 May 2006.
[7] Article 7 Report, Forms B, D and H, 16 April 2002.
[8] Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
[9] Under the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, three military bases were returned to Panamanian control in 1999; see Keith Feigenbaum, “UXO in Panama,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 5.2, August 2001.
[10] Letter AJ/DH/No. 969 from Minister of Foreign Affairs Harmodio Arias Cerjack, to the UN Secretary General, attached to Panama’s Article 7 Report, 7 May 2003; Article 7 Report, Form C, 1 August 2001. In the 2001 Article 7 report, Panama claimed that there were no minefields under its jurisdiction, as the US government denied placing mines in the country.
[11] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 652; email to Landmine Monitor from John Lindsay-Poland, Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 September 2004.
[12] PRC Environmental Management, Inc. for Panama Canal Treaty Implementation Plan Agency, Department of Defense, “Unexploded Ordnance Assessment of US Military Ranges in Panama: Empire, Balboa West, and Piña Ranges,” Final Report, January 1997, Appendix A, p. A-15.
[13] Interview with Guillermo Pimentel, Director, Police Service of Borders of Panama (Servicio Policial de Fronteras de Panama), 15 February 2004. La Miel is a forested area near the border where frequent confrontation between non-state actors and border police has been reported.
[14] Email from Raisa Ruíz, Project Officer, UNICEF Regional Office for the Americas and Caribbean, Panama, 10 May 2006.
[15] The US reportedly cleared 80 percent of the range land, removing 8,500 UXO and 2.1 million pounds of scrap metal before withdrawing from Panama in 1999, leaving behind hundreds of thousands of UXO. Before withdrawing from the country, the US recommended that “high impact areas” totaling more than 8,000 acres (32.34 square kilometers) remain permanently closed to humans. To assess the clearance, Panama hired a Washington law firm whose report included photos of unexploded mortar shells and rocket warheads on the firing ranges and outside the high impact areas; see section on Panama by John Lindsay-Poland, “Communities in the line of fire: the environmental, cultural and human health impacts of military munitions and firing ranges,” Military Toxic Projects, June 2002, www.miltoxproj.org, accessed 20 May 2006.
[16] UN, “Portfolio of Mine-related Projects 2003,” October 2002, p. 213; Ricardo Leal, “Los Polígonos de Tiro y Áreas de Bombardeo de las Fuerzas Armadas Norteamericanas en la República de Panama,” Instituto del Canal y Estudios Internacionales, 16 July 2002. Estimates of the contaminated areas vary. For example, according to Autoridad de la Región Interoceánica, 22,000 hectares (220 square kilometers) are contaminated; see “A licitación internacional limpieza de polígonos,” Panama América, 3 September 2005, http://elpanamaamerica.terra.com.pa, accessed 20 May 2006.
[17] Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 April 2002.
[18] See section on Panama by John Lindsay-Poland, “Communities in the line of fire: the environmental, cultural and human health impacts of military munitions and firing ranges,” Military Toxic Projects, June 2002.
[19] Chris Kraul, “Issue of U.S. Ordnance Shadows New Panama Bridge,” Los Angeles Times, 23 June 2005.
[20] Panama’s former Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Office of Treaty Affairs, quoted in Vanessa Hua, “Lethal Legacy: Panama wants U.S. to clear explosive from former ranges,” San Francisco Chronicles, 27 May 2002.
[21] Statement made by the US Department of State Interagency Working Group on Demining in 1998, reported in Keith Feigenbaum, “UXO in Panama,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 5.2, August 2001.
[22] Chris Kraul, “Issue of U.S. Ordnance Shadows New Panama Bridge,” Los Angeles Times, 23 June 2005.
[23] Chris Kraul, “Issue of U.S. Ordnance Shadows New Panama Bridge,” Los Angeles Times, 23 June 2005.
[24] Edwin Chen, “Bush’s Trip Ends With Discord,” Los Angeles Times, 8 November 2005.
[25] Edwin Chen, “Bush’s Trip Ends With Discord,” Los Angeles Times, 8 November 2005.
[26] “Panama limpiará polígonos dejados por estadounidenses,” Comunidades y Biodiversidad, 13 November 2005, biodiv-mesoam.blogspot.com, accessed on 21 May 2006.
[27] Golder Associates, Moffat & Nichols, Louis Berger Group, “Feasibility Study of Island Development at the Pacific Entrance of the Panama Canal, Site Characterization Study,” Volume 1 of 4, Final Report, May 2004, p. 2-5.
[28] “Panama floats canal expansion,” Associated Press, 25 April 2006.
[29] Telephone interview with ACP employee, 20 May 2006.
[30] “US Considers Additional Aid to Panama for Firing Range Clean-Up,” Agence France-Presse (Panama City), 3 November 2003.
[31] Urania Cecilia Molina, “Una Vía Por Terrenos Minados,” La Prensa, 19 March 2004.
[32] “Bush pide modernizar el Canal de Panama,” BBC Mundo, 8 November 2005.
[33] Statement by Panama, Fifth Meeting of States Parties, Bangkok, 15-19 September 2003.
[34] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 652–653.
[35] Telephone interview with ACP employee, 20 May 2006.
[36] Email from Raisa Ruíz, UNICEF Panama, 10 May 2006; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 653.
[37] Email from Raisa Ruíz, UNICEF Panama, 10 May 2006.