Key developments since May 2005: Documents for Poland’s ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty have been undergoing interministerial consultations. Poland declared a stockpile of 984,690 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2005; it dismantled 12,990 expired stockpiled mines in 2005. In 2005, Polish military teams carried out 7,698 responses to mines and explosive remnants of war, clearing 6,138 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and 39,160 explosive remnants. In addition, the police disposed of 281 grenades, 828 fuzes and detonators, 1,642 items of unexploded ordnance and 26,029 pieces of ammunition.
The Republic of Poland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify. From 1997 to 2003, Polish officials insisted that a series of preconditions must be met before Poland could ratify.[1] However, Poland changed this position in 2004.[2] At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November-December 2004, Poland officially announced for the first time that “Poland is ready to initiate the process of ratification of the Ottawa Convention.”[3] It also stated, “Although not all of the preconditions for the ratification specified by Poland in 1997 are fulfilled, we hope that in the future all main state actors and our neighbors will join this important treaty of international humanitarian law.”[4]
By June 2005, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense had prepared all the formal documents required for the ratification process.[5]
In September 2005, parliamentary elections were followed by a change of government. The new government has not indicated any change in landmine policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently submitted the ratification documents for interministerial consultations.[6] As of June 2006, the consultations were ongoing; when they have concluded, the documents will be submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers which will then pass them to parliament. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were no difficulties which could delay ratification, but timing would depend on parliament.[7]
However, in February 2006, the Minister of Defense said that the ministry was still in the process of “working on new possibilities of implementing alternative operational and technical solutions, which would make up for the weakening of Poland’s defensive potential as a result of giving up antipersonnel mines. Once the process is completed, the Ministry will be able to specify its final position on the required pace and period of the ratification process of the Ottawa Convention.”[8]
On 8 December 2005, Poland voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80, which calls for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Poland has voted for each of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolutions since 1996.
Poland attended the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, but did not make any statements. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2005 and May 2006, but again did not make any statements.
Poland submitted its fourth voluntary Article 7 transparency report on 3 May 2006, covering calendar year 2005.[9] New information is presented on stockpiled mines in Form B and its international mine clearance activities in Form J.
Poland is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Poland attended the Seventh Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2005 and submitted an annual report in accordance with Article 13. Poland has initiated preparations for ratification of the Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.[10]
In September 2002, Poland confirmed that it was already complying with the Mine Ban Treaty prohibitions on production and transfer of antipersonnel mines.[11] In the past, Poland produced three types of antipersonnel mines and imported a fourth type.[12] Poland exported antipersonnel mines until 1993.[13] An export moratorium in 1995 was made permanent by a cabinet decree on 7 April 1998,[14] which was then superseded by a law adopted in September 2002.[15]
In March 2006, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that current military doctrine does not foresee the use of antipersonnel mines, including in joint military operations or exercises with other states.[16]
The Ministry of Defense informed Landmine Monitor in March 2006 that Poland possessed 984,690 stockpiled antipersonnel mines at the end of 2005.[17] This was a decrease of 12,990 mines from previous reports. Poland stated that the 12,990 mines “were decommissioned and dismantled after their life cycle had expired in 2005.”[18]
Poland reported that it had a stockpile of 997,680 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2003 and 2004.[19] It initially reported 1,055,971 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2002.[20] During 2003, 58,291 POMZ-2(2M) mines were dismantled due to expiry of shelf life.[21]
In March 2006, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that “Polish Armed Forces will destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines in accordance with the Convention’s provisions” and that “there are no technical, organizational, nor financial constraints” to do so within the deadline specified in the convention. The MoD indicated that the process could be completed within one year once destruction starts. The plan is to dismantle all mines and utilize the components. The MoD believes it will be an inexpensive and ecologically safe operation, and noted that metal and wooden elements of the mines could be sold to generate some income for the MoD.[22] In May 2005, defense officials told Landmine Monitor that destruction will not start before ratification.[23]
In May 2005, representatives of the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that Poland planned to keep about 5,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes.[24]
In February 2001, the Ministry of Defense confirmed that Poland possesses Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, and said that these are “meant exclusively for mine-controlled detonation...[which] excludes the possibility of accidental detonation.” The MON-100 is described in Poland’s first Article 7 report as a “Directional fragmentation mine, if equipped with a MUW fuse attached to a trip wire.”[25]
Poland remains contaminated by large quantities of explosive remnants of war (ERW)[26] and, to a much lesser extent, by mines, as a result of World War II.
In 2005 alone, more than 39,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found and destroyed by the armed forces as a result of reports from the civilian population.
In addition, thousands of antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines are found every year in Poland. According to the Ministry of Defense, some are scattered “single” mines emplaced on the ground, but most are the remnants of stockpiles dating back to World War II.[27] Based on annual statistics, antipersonnel and antivehicle mines have presented less than 0.1 percent of all explosive and dangerous objects found each year on Polish territory. Most of the mines discovered are antivehicle. The Ministry of Defense noted that time and climatic factors (which leads to corrosion) make it very rare for mines from World War II to still function, which “can be confirmed by the statistics on mine/UXO casualties ... which are only caused as a result of the manipulation of those devices.”[28] This applies in particular to antipersonnel mines.[29]
It was estimated that at the end of the war, in 1945, 80 percent of Poland’s territory (or 250,000 square kilometers) was mine- and UXO-affected, with about 2 percent of land highly contaminated. Just after the end of the war, Poland embarked on an extensive national clearance operation; the operation ended in 1956 and resulted in the destruction of nearly 15 million landmines and more than 60 million items of ERW.[30] The most contaminated areas were the Vistula and Odra drainage basins, and forest areas in the southeast of the country. Although these areas were cleared before 1955, the probability of finding an old item of UXO or a mine during agricultural or construction work, or after a flood, remains significantly higher than in any other region. However, the ministry also reiterated that these areas “had been carefully cleared before 1955.”[31]
Poland has strongly disputed that it is mine-affected in the sense of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.[32] Its representatives state that “there are no mine-contaminated areas or areas which would be suspected of being contaminated [by mines].”[33] Similar statements regarding Poland’s status have been made in its Article 13 reports in accordance with Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.[34]
Poland does not have a formal civilian mine/ERW action program. Clearance operations by the Army in respect of mine/ERW contamination are said to be regulated by Ministry of Defense Order No. 508/OPER/P3, dated 21 December 2002, as well as other guidelines based on this order.[35] Only manual clearance techniques have been used.[36]
Special Forces of the Engineer Corps are responsible for clearance of explosive objects from former military facilities being handed over to local civilian administration. They also conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations in response to reports from the population.[37] In 2005, 41 teams (37 from the land forces, two from the air forces and two teams specialized in the clearance of underwater mines) conducted EOD tasks and clearance of military bases.[38]
In addition, the police had special units of “pyrotechnicians” (EOD teams), which were in charge of destroying improvised explosive devices, reported to be used “to commit illegal acts” or for “terrorist acts.”[39] However, the police was also the major channel of information regarding discoveries of mines and UXO, as 80 percent of all army EOD responses have been processed by the police first. Cooperation between the army and the police has been regulated by the “Agreement on the cooperation of the armed forces with the Police in regard to crisis situation prevention,” dated 20 April 2005.[40]
Data on military clearance and EOD is recorded by the Command of Military Engineering Forces.[41] The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database has not been used and the Polish Ministry of Defense reported that clearance data conducted by the police has not been centralized into a single information management system.[42]
Poland’s deminers have followed internal military procedures that were developed by the Ministry of Defense, but which were not based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Polish EOD teams operating abroad on joint missions have followed NATO standards.[43]
There has been no strategic plan for clearance operations; the armed forces and police respond to emergency requests for EOD. In addition, the armed forces conducted “routine checking”[44] in accordance with Ministry of Defense internal regulations, before handing over former Soviet military bases and Polish military bases deemed “superfluous,” to local civilian administration. Military training grounds that are still operational also need to be checked, both after “live firing or bombardments,” and also twice a year, as routine procedure. [45]
Poland is a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, so it does not have a treaty-mandated deadline for destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Based on current available information, it does not appear that Poland can be considered mine-affected in the sense of Article 5.
Former military bases are fenced and the fencing is regularly checked. In the case of finding an item of UXO or a mine, the location is marked with signs by the police until an EOD team removes the dangerous items.[46]
In 2005, further clearance of former military training grounds was conducted in order to hand them over to local civil administration. In previous years, Poland provided Landmine Monitor with the number of mines and UXO as well as the location of the military ground and the total area cleared. Poland decided not to do so for the 2006 report as it considers it “not to be the subject matter of Landmine Monitor” and deemed that this information gave an unfounded impression that Poland was mine-affected.[47] However, Poland reported that ammunition shells and other metal objects were the items mostly found in 2005. The cost of these activities in 2005 was PLN1.965 million (some US$600,000).[48]
In 2005, 37 demining and EOD teams were involved in 7,698 responses to mines and UXO, clearing 6,138 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and 39,160 items of UXO.[49] The Ministry of Defense could not provide a breakdown between the numbers of mines that were found emplaced on the ground or those found in caches, as this kind of detailed reporting “is not conducted.”[50] A breakdown between antipersonnel and antivehicle mines was also not recorded.[51] In 2005, the EOD response is said to have cost PLN9.9 million (some $3 million).[52]
Almost 5,000 more mines were found and destroyed in 2005 than in 2004.[53] The Ministry of Defense explained that various factors influence the number of items found and destroyed in a given year, including infrastructure development and the increase in former military grounds being checked and handed over to the population.[54] In March 2003, the Ministry of Defense had predicted that the number of World War II UXO and mines would increase due to the planned construction of motorway systems across the country.[55]
In the course of its interventions in 2005, the police disposed of a wide variety of explosive ordnance, including 281 grenades, 828 fuzes and detonators, 1,642 items of UXO and 26,029 pieces of ammunition.[56]
Engineering Forces are responsible for carrying out activities to raise awareness about the dangers of explosives and other dangerous objects. The forces draw public attention to the threat of UXO contamination through television and radio programs, as well as through the press. The Engineering Forces conduct awareness-raising presentations at schools upon invitation, or in areas where EOD activities are being carried out. Similar activities are also carried out by Polish soldiers taking part in overseas missions.[57]
Poland continued to provide in-kind assistance for mine action in other mine-affected countries in 2005. A total of 137 Polish deminers were engaged in peacekeeping and stabilization missions abroad, including, under the auspices of the UN, UNDOS in Syria (four deminers); under the auspices of NATO, KFOR in Kosovo (12 deminers); under the auspices of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (15 deminers); within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (28 deminers); and within the framework of the Stabilization Forces in Iraq (78 deminers).[58] Their tasks included marking of suspected areas, mine/UXO clearance, EOD and mine risk education. Poland estimated the value of this in-kind assistance in 2005 at €1.6 million ($1.98 million). In 2005, Poland also donated mine detection equipment (a W-4P mine detector) to Lebanon.[59]
In 2005, police sources reported 44 new civilian casualties from explosive materials in Poland, including six people killed and 38 injured as a result of handling UXO.[60]
For 2005, the definition under which casualties are reported has been expanded to include casualties from all explosive materials, including people involved in illegal acts and industrial incidents.[61]
Information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Landmine Monitor stated that there were no incidents involving ERW in Poland. Incidents in 2005 that resulted in injuries included: one person injured in a bomb explosion; two people injured while manufacturing explosive devices; six people injured while handling explosive devices; 13 people injured in unspecified grenade explosions; and 15 people were injured at explosives production facilities.[62]
In 2005, there were no mine/UXO casualties among the Polish Armed Forces abroad.[63] Since 1999, seven Polish nationals have been killed and nine injured by mines while engaged in military, peacekeeping or mine clearance operations and other activities outside of Poland.[64]
The total number of mine/UXO casualties in Poland is not known. Between 1944 and 1994, 658 soldiers were killed and several thousand injured in clearance operations, and between 1945 and 1973, 3,833 civilians (including 3,189 children) were killed and 8,221 (including 6,656 children) injured in mine/UXO incidents.[65]
The Ministry of Health noted that disabled landmine/UXO survivors did not constitute a separate group from other people with disabilities, and the situation did not indicate a need for adopting specific regulations aimed exclusively at this group.[66] The ministry reported that mine/UXO survivors were entitled to the same standards of public healthcare as all other insured persons. All necessary surgical and rehabilitation services were provided free of charge, including prostheses and most orthopedic equipment. Military casualties were entitled to medicine and orthopedic equipment free of charge. People permanently unable to work as a result of war-related injuries, including mine and UXO survivors, were entitled to compensation, amounting to 50 percent of the lowest monthly pension for people with disabilities.[67]
Although there was not a single organization with a mission to provide assistance exclusively to mine survivors, the Charter of People with Disabilities has aimed to ensure equal status and opportunities for this group through the office of the Plenipotentiary to People with Disabilities.[68]
On 21 January 2005, the lower house of parliament passed an amendment to more clearly define the government’s role in financing vocational and social rehabilitation. However, the lower house committee rejected an additional bill to reform compensation and vocational rehabilitation for people with disabilities on 4 May 2005.[69]
[1] The main pre-conditions were that all permanent members of the UN Security Council and countries neighboring Poland should first join the treaty, and that the Polish Armed Forces should be supplied with alternative weapons.
[2] In September 2004, the Ministry of Defense changed its position on ratification based on a study completed by a group of military experts and approved by the General Staff in August 2004. The study concluded that the role of antipersonnel mines in the country’s defense system and in operations outside Poland in which Polish Armed Forces might participate is diminishing. The study also concluded that while the development of alternative means to antipersonnel mines would be a long, costly and difficult process, it would be realistic to introduce in a relatively short time solutions regarding doctrine, training and organization, as well as modified means of warfare, which could, at least partly, substitute for antipersonnel mines. Letter from Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Minister of Defense, to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 21 September 2004.
[3] Statement by Poland, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 3 December 2004.
[4] Ibid. The Minister of Defense declared on 21 September 2004 that “the MoD sees no obstacles for initiating a process of ratification of the Ottawa Convention in our country.” He added that the ratification should be initiated “under the assumption that it will be completed no sooner than in 2006...so the destruction of Polish stockpiles would then, according to Art. 4 of the Convention, be finished in 2010.” Letter from Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Minister of Defense, to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 21 September 2004.
[5] The documents include a draft implementation plan prepared by the Polish Armed Forces and a draft ratification law with two articles. Interview with Andrzej Misztal, Deputy Director, Legal and Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 9 August 2005; interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny and Maj. Zbigniew Ciolek, Department of International Co-operation, Ministry of Defense, Col. Slawomir Berdak, Head Expert of the General Board of Support, General Staff, and Lt. Lech Gawrych, Senior Expert, Command of Military Engineering Forces, Warsaw, 31 May 2005.
[6] Letter from Radoslaw Sikorski, Minister of Defense, to Jaroslaw Pinkas, President of the Polish Red Cross, 22 February 2006.
[7] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[8] Letter from Radoslaw Sikorski, Minister of Defense, to Jaroslaw Pinkas, President of the Polish Red Cross, 22 February 2006. In its statement to the First Review Conference in Nairobi, Poland said, “The role of antipersonnel mines in the Polish defense system has been recently and comprehensively reviewed and redefined. Polish Army experts came to the conclusion that there are no obstacles to resign from this type of military equipment. It is also possible from a technical and financial point of view to provide the Army with an alternative weapon systems.” Statement by Poland, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 3 December 2004.
[9] Poland submitted an initial voluntary Article 7 report on 5 March 2003, revealing for the first time details of Poland’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines, a second report on 12 May 2004, and a third on 11 May 2005.
[10] “OSCE Questionnaire on Explosive Remnants of War,” 31 May 2005; letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[11] Statement by Poland, Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16-20 September 2002.
[12] Production of the PMD-6 ceased in 1957, the POMZ-2 in the 1960s and the MON-100 in 1988. The PSM-1 was last imported in the 1980s from Bulgaria. Article 7 Report, Forms B and H, 5 March 2003; interview with Col. Lech Zajda, Military Engineering Command, General Staff, and Maj. Artur Talik, Engineering Corps Command, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw, 20 March 2003.
[13] In November 1995, Poland informed the UN that export had been halted de facto following adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 48/75 in December 1993. “Report of the Secretary-General: Moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines,” UN General Assembly, 3 November 1995, p. 15.
[14] Article 7 Report, Form A, 5 March 2003; letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 March 2004.
[15] “Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of August 20, 2002 concerning the imposition of prohibition and restriction on transfer of goods of strategic importance for the state security,” Journal of Laws, 6 September 2002. Translation by Landmine Monitor researcher.
[16] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006
[17] Ibid. The number was confirmed in Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 May 2006. The total included 680,218 PMD-6, 270,965 POMZ-2(2M), 13,585 PSM-1and 19,922 MON-100.
[18] Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 May 2006. The mines destroyed included 6,721 POMZ-2(2M), 6,265 PMD-6 and four PSM-1.
[19] Article 7 Report, Form B, 12 May 2004, which listed 997,680 mines, and Article 7 Report, 11 May 2005, which noted no change in Form B.
[20] Article 7 Report, Form B, 5 March 2003.
[21] Article 7 Report, Form B, 12 May 2004.
[22] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006. The MoD also stated in September 2004, “There are no organizational, technical, nor financial obstacles, which would prevent destruction of Polish stockpiles in the given period of 4 years since the entry into force of the Convention for Poland.” Letter from Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Minister of Defense, to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 September 2004. In July 2005, the Ministry of Defense estimated that destruction of Polish stockpiles should not take more than two years. Letter from Robert Kupiecki, Director, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 July 2005.
[23] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Maj. Zbigniew Ciolek, Col. Slawomir Berdak and Lt. Lech Gawrych, Warsaw, 31 May 2005.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 February 2001; Article 7 Report, Form H2, 5 March 2003. The “MUW” is likely the MUV fuze.
[26] Under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
[27] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006; and interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[28] Information provided by the Ministry of Defense, contained in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006
[29] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 July 2006.
[30] “Participation of Sappers in UN and NATO Mission,” presentation by Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, undated but 2005, given to Landmine Monitor by Col. Slawomir Berdak and Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, at the Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, May 2006.
[31] Email from Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, 8 June 2006; interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[32] Meeting with Tadeusz Chomicki, and Jolanta Wojcik-Niedzielska, Head of Section, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 1 February 2006; information provided by the Ministry of Defense in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[33] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006. Poland also writes “non applicable” under Form C (“location of mined areas”) in its voluntary Article 7 reports. See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 3 May 2006.
[34] See, for example, CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports, Form B, 15 October 2003 and 8 October 2004.
[35] “Plan of participation of the Polish Armed forces units in clearance of explosive and dangerous objects,” which is an appendix of the “Plan of participation of the Polish Armed forces units in emergency situations.” Information provided by the Ministry of Defense, contained in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[36] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[37] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[38] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006. Poland refers to these teams as “dangerous and explosive objects’ clearance teams.” Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 July 2006.
[39] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006; information provided by the Ministry of Defense, in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[40] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[41] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 650.
[42] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[43] Ibid.
[44] The term used in previous reports was “planned clearance.” However, the Ministry of Defense reported that the term “routine checking” was more appropriate for the type of operations carried out.
[45] Email from Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, 8 June 2006; interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[46] Email from Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, 8 June 2006.
[47] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006; letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[48] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[49] Ibid. The Ministry of Defense reported on the results of operations of 37 teams, however, it stated that 41 teams are located throughout the country to respond to EOD.
[50] Interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[51] Email from Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of Defense, 8 June 2006.
[52] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[53] In 2004, Poland reported finding 1,396 mines; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 650.
[54] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[55] See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 532.
[56] Information from police headquarters, in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[57] Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[58] Ibid; Article 7 Report, Form J, 3 May 2006.
[59] Letters from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March and 8 May 2006.
[60] Information from police headquarters, in a letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 22 March 2006.
[61] Information from police headquarters, in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Information from Ministry of Defense, in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006
[64] Information from police headquarters, in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006.
[65] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 911.
[66] Information from Ministry of Health, in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006.
[67] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 652.
[68] Information from Ministry of Health, in letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006. The Charter of People with Disabilities was adopted as a special resolution by parliament on 13 August 1997.
[69] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Poland,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006.