Key developments since May 2005: In 2005, the two international demining NGOs Danish Demining Group and HALO Trust demined more than 18 square kilometers of land, the great majority of which was battle area clearance by HALO; 602 antipersonnel mines, 99 antivehicle mines, over 20,000 explosive remnants of war and large quantities of ammunition were destroyed. In March 2006, Danish Demining Group ceased all mine clearance in Somaliland. In 2005, 93 new landmine/UXO casualties were recorded; two-thirds were children and almost one-third were female; casualties occurred in all six regions. Mine risk education increased, reaching at least 30,000 beneficiaries from January 2005 to June 2006.
The Republic of Somaliland proclaimed independence from Somalia in 1991 after the fall of the government of Siad Barre. However, Somaliland is not recognized by the international community as an independent state, thus it is not in a position to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. In January 2006, Somaliland submitted a membership application to the African Union.
Somaliland authorities have frequently expressed their commitment to the ban treaty since 1997, and on 1 March 1999, the House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution calling for a total ban on landmines. In November 2004, the Vice President of Somaliland spoke of “our already declared unilateral compliance” with the Mine Ban Treaty. Somaliland officials have in the past indicated willingness to sign the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment for non-state actors, or some version of it.[1] However, no formal measures have been taken yet to prohibit use, production, trade or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines.
Somaliland does not produce landmines and there have been no indications that it has exported or acquired landmines since proclaiming independence.
Officials have acknowledged the existence of stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, but have not provided information on numbers or types. In 2003, Somaliland said there were plans for the destruction of all existing stockpiles, but it has not reported any progress. Demining organizations operating in Somaliland, including the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust, have periodically destroyed antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines provided to them by the Ministry of Defense from its stockpiles, by local police that have confiscated mines from individuals or militias, and by villagers and other individuals.[2]
In 2005 and 2006, DDG shifted its focus from mine clearance to village-by-village collection and destruction of stockpiled mines and unexploded ordnance.[3] DDG reported that in 2005, it made 1,206 community visits, destroying 56 antipersonnel mines, seven antivehicle mines and 2,595 items of unexploded ordnance; 27 of the antipersonnel mines and four antivehicle mines came from “formal storage” (army/police/militia/community stores); 29 antipersonnel mines and three antivehicle mines were “abandoned” (left lying around villages).[4]
There were no reports of use of landmines in Somaliland in 2005 or early 2006.
Somaliland is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the legacy of the 1964 and 1977-1978 border wars with Ethiopia, and the 1988-1991 civil war between the army of the regime of Siad Barre and the Somali National Movement. Most of the mine-laying was carried out by troops of the Siad Barre regime, which used mines to protect static military and main civilian infrastructure as well as to terrorize the civilian population.[5]
Results from the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in four regions of Somaliland in 2003 showed 357 communities were affected by 772 suspected hazard areas (SHAs). Of these, 45 were deemed to be high-impact, 102 medium-impact and 210 low-impact. The LIS estimated the affected population at 1.3 million and, in the two years preceding the survey, there were 276 casualties―the majority of which were the result of handling mines or UXO.[6] DDG believes, however, that the LIS inadvertently over-reported the scale and significance of explosive ordnance and the related accidents.[7] The LIS also reported that while the “most prevalent resource blockages” are of roads and pastureland, the “most serious blockages in terms of safety and socioeconomic security are of drinking water sources and irrigated cropland.”[8]
It was not possible to obtain details on how many of the SHAs affecting highly-impacted communities have since been cleared. In the view of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) chief technical adviser for mine action, the impact of landmines throughout Somaliland is not as severe as has sometimes been claimed, and the greater threat comes from ERW.[9] According to UNDP, “A ... major concern is the amount and availability of stored or stockpiled ordnance and explosives which, if not controlled, could be used for lethal, unlawful means.”[10]
A feasibility study conducted for UNICEF in 2000 concluded that Somalia (including Somaliland) is “...sometimes described as one of the world’s most heavily mined countries. On the balance of evidence, it is not. Some numerical estimates of mine contamination here...are questionably calculated and implausibly high...The number of landmines deployed in Somaliland is often quoted at between 1 and 2 million; the reality may be as low as 50,000-100,000.”[11]
These views of the extent and impact of mine and ERW contamination are also shared by demining operators. DDG, for instance, reduced its demining capacity in April 2006 as “a direct reflection of the need,” and will not seek any further funding after March 2008, following which their program in Somaliland will close.[12]
In Somaliland, the Government Committee for Mine Action (the “Inter-Ministerial Committee”) functions as the national mine action authority. In accordance with a 2004 decree, the Inter-Ministerial Committee is chaired by the Vice President and includes the ministers of defense, education, foreign affairs, health and labor, information, planning, and resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction.[13] There is no evidence that the Committee met in 2005 or made any decisions.[14]
According to the UN, a proposed strategic plan for Somaliland lays out the future structure for mine action; it includes a “mine action commission” (presumably a replacement for the moribund Inter-Ministerial Committee) and a board of donors.[15]
The local coordination body is the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC), which is supported by UNDP.[16] The 2004 decree clarified the respective roles of SMAC and the National Demining Agency (NDA), which previously had been unclear. According to the decree, the NDA “is responsible for the national mine clearance capability. It is an executive organ responsible for mine clearance, mine risk education and technical survey.” SMAC is the “technical coordination body.”[17] UNDP is keen for SMAC to be funded in future years by the Somaliland authorities.[18]
According to UNDP, SMAC has proven to be an effective coordination mechanism.[19] It is reported, for example, that SMAC organizes monthly mine action coordination meetings where “all aspects of mine action coordination are discussed.”[20] Participants include the police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, DDG and HALO Trust. HALO points out, however, that of the 56 tasks that HALO has completed since 1999, only five have been issued with acceptance certificates (all in 2006). It has found that tasking is issued with little regard for priority or capacity and often for tasks that have not been surveyed.[21]
SMAC uses version 3 of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which was due to be upgraded to version 4 before the end of November 2006.[22] IMSMA use, which was interrupted in 2004 following a reduction in funding and change of personnel, was said by one operator to have been fully resumed in 2005.[23] However, it was feared that much of the data needed to run it properly has been lost, and HALO reports that it has not received any information from the database.[24]
The 2004 Vice Presidential decree is believed to be the only legislation directly applicable to mine action in Somaliland. SMAC has developed its own standing operating procedures for mine clearance and EOD, which were due to be reviewed by UNDP during 2006.[25] HALO operates its own standing operating procedures in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and approved by SMAC.[26]
A national mine action strategy and policy, which was developed “in line with the national development plan drafted in 2003,”[27] and presented to parliament in 2004, awaited approval after elections in September 2005. The current status of the strategy and policy is not known. According to UNDP, the main goals for Somaliland for the period 2006-2010 are to:
The overall aim is that SMAC should be fully supported by the government by 2010.[29]
HALO believes that the mine problem in Somaliland, with the deployment of mechanical assets, is now at a manageable level despite continued casualties (both human and animal). HALO considers it possible that “priority” clearance will be finished within four to five years, provided funding continues at current levels.[30] This refers to all tasks with a negative impact on the lives or economy of a given area due to the presence of mines or the “harvesting” of explosives for the second-hand market. HALO notes that the priorities often change as nomadic groups range further afield in search of grazing land, those involved in the second-hand explosive market “harvest” new areas, or the UN or international NGOs implement projects or support repatriation.[31]
In light of the demining work that has been done since 1998 and the reduction of viable demining activities, SMAC and DDG have agreed that as of 31 March 2006, DDG would concentrate on its Village by Village Clearance (VBVC) project started in 2003 and that all other mine clearance work will be handled by HALO Trust.[32] DDG’s VBVC program was planned to continue for two years until 31 March 2008. At that point, and providing present security is maintained, DDG intends to close its program in Somaliland. In the meantime, DDG planned a gradual handover of clearance responsibilities to the local police EOD team.[33]
In September 2005, 20 Somaliland police officers were trained and equipped in EOD at the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Nairobi, Kenya. It is not known to what extent these have been deployed in functioning police EOD teams. There were, however, plans to train and equip a further 40 police officers in EOD in 2006.[34]
No overall evaluation has yet been conducted of the mine action program in Somaliland. HALO, however, reports that it has conducted numerous internal evaluations of its program, and a number of donor visits have also been hosted.[35]
In Somaliland, there are two international demining agencies, Danish Demining Group and HALO Trust, and a national police EOD capacity.[36]
The National Demining Agency is ostensibly the responsible local body for building local capacity for clearance, survey and mine risk education.[37] In 2005, the NDA was incorporated into the Ministry of Defense and charged to create a local mine clearance capacity. There is no evidence of any progress in this regard. According to UNDP, any mine clearance capacity does not need to be “large, however, to be effective it must be appropriately trained and equipped in order to operate in accordance with accepted international standards.”[38]
Danish Demining Group has worked in Somaliland since 1999. Following reorganization in March 2006, DDG had 54 local staff organized into a headquarters in Hargeisa and four mobile VBVC teams.[39] DDG’s mine clearance activities ceased on 31 March 2006. Previously, clearance had aimed to open up areas for repatriation by clearing roads in and around towns, rural areas, and essential infrastructure, such as schools. It carried out clearance in connection with the rehabilitation of the road connecting Ethiopia and Somaliland, Puntland and the rest of Somalia, and around the airport in Hargeisa. DDG also persuaded the army to hand over almost 4,000 stockpiled landmines for demolition. In total, as of 31 May 2006, DDG had destroyed 108,000 pieces of UXO, more than 10,000 mines and released almost 180 hectares (1.8 square kilometers) of land to the civilian population.[40]
HALO’s program was established in Somaliland in 1999. In 2005-2006, it had a local staff of more than 440 people. HALO fields eight manual/ battle area clearance teams, four EOD/survey teams, three mechanical teams (double shifted) and one mine risk education team, making a total of 440 local staff and two expatriates.[41] These are deployed across Somaliland from Awdal region in the northwest to Sool region in the east.[42]
HALO’s main demining tasks continue to be the minefields along the Ethiopian border or around former military positions. This benefits not only the local communities for farming, grazing or water access, but also allows safer repatriation of refugees from Ethiopia to Somaliland. The battle area clearance teams usually work around population centers; HALO believes they have been very successful in clearing sites in and around the city of Hargeisa, allowing the repatriation of thousands of returnees from Ethiopia.[43]
Phase I of the LIS, carried out by DDG, identified 357 of Somaliland’s 588 communities in the regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Sahil and Togdheer as affected by landmines, of which it classified 45 as high-impact, 102 as medium-impact, and 210 as low-impact. There were 772 suspected hazardous areas. It also revealed an acute need for clearance around water reservoirs.[44]
The eastern half of Sanaag and the entire Sool region, which Somaliland claims as its territory, were not included in phase I of the LIS. As noted above, phase II covered mine-affected areas of the Puntland region of Somalia. Phase III will cover the disputed areas of Sool and Sanaag, and the southeast part of Togdheer region; it was expected that phase III would take seven to nine months to complete. Preliminary opinion collection was due to take place in August 2006 through the Somaliland Mine Action Center. According to the Survey Action Center (SAC) the LIS will be implemented through the two regional MACs with a two-person SAC team on the ground managing the survey, the same model as used in Puntland in phase II.[45]
UNDP has expressed concerns about the political consequences of attempting to conduct a survey in contested land.[46] SAC accepts that, due to a mixture of clan groups, there are “logistical challenges for the LIS to meet,” but thinks that the political consequences may be overstated.[47]
In 2005, SMAC quality management teams were said to have been trained before being deployed to verify, map and mark SHAs identified by the LIS in Awdal region.[48] During the year, the teams surveyed 11 impacted communities (six high-impact, three medium-impact, four low-impact, and five battle area clearance) and confirmed 27 SHAs and discredited seven.[49] .
In 2005, DDG teams visited 20 high- and medium-impact communities identified by the LIS and the 28 associated SHAs. The teams identified 6 high priority clearance tasks, 6 medium priority clearance tasks and 7 low priority clearance tasks. Nine SHAs were discredited and removed from the database.[50]
According to DDG, phase I “technical” survey[51] of high-impact LIS communities showed a large proportion of extremely low priority roads (suspect road sections with long-established detours), while phase II in 2006 identified six genuine high-priority minefields in southern Togdheer region that DDG and HALO began clearing in mid-2005. These represent the final meaningful demining tasks currently identified in Somaliland.[52]
In August 2005, the UNDP office in Somaliland reported that no formal marking or fencing of mined areas is possible due to materials being stolen. However, local marking is said to be carried out by communities, and most dangerous areas are known to local communities.[53] HALO notes that mine warning signs are used for roofing, or fencing around livestock or crops. Similarly, benchmarks and completion marking (even when buried) have also been removed.[54]
In 2005, DDG and HALO demined more than 18 square kilometers of land, destroying in the process 602 antipersonnel mines and 99 antivehicle mines. The overwhelming majority of the demining was battle area clearance by HALO. The police EOD Teams in Hargeisa are said to have visited 67 villages and destroyed 1,463 items of UXO, while the three new teams for Awdal, Togdheer and Sanaag visited 31 villages in Awdal and Togdheer regions and destroyed during their training 732 items of UXO.[55]
Clearance data reported by SMAC is not consistent with data reported by the operators themselves. HALO also notes that data reported by DDG and the police EOD teams include both UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), of which most are probably AXO. Common practice seems to be to report both as UXO.[57]
SMAC is responsible for quality assurance of demining operations. In 2005, SMAC quality control teams are said to have physically checked 9,551 square meters of land in eight areas cleared by HALO and DDG.[58] HALO points out, however, that SMAC teams often quality assure a task eight months after its completion; it has never received a copy of any quality assurance or quality control report.[59]
There are no reports of informal (“village”) clearance being conducted in Somaliland, although HALO said that people have been involved in the “harvesting” of mines for their perceived value, and there is now strong evidence to suggest that an active second-hand market in explosives (particularly antivehicle mines) has been operating for years. There is equally strong evidence to suggest that some of this explosive has found its way into the hands of rebel groups in Ethiopia and warring factions in Somalia. HALO makes the handover of “harvested” mines held by villagers a pre-requisite of clearance and deploys teams to remove remaining antivehicle mines from areas targeted by those involved in this trade.[60]
According to the UN, based on data from SMAC,[61] there were four demining accidents in 2005.[62] HALO had three accidents during manual clearance, all of which involved the accidental detonation of P4 antipersonnel mines. DDG reported that there had been two demining accidents, but that they did not result in any casualties.[63] It is not clear who suffered the fourth reported accident. Two of the accidents involving HALO demining personnel occurred in Halimale, Awdal region; and the third in Jeenolayne, Togdheer region. All three deminers were insured. Investigations, carried out within 24 hours, concluded that personal protective equipment had been properly worn and no changes to standing operating procedures or equipment were necessary. HALO notes that there is evidence to suggest that the P4 mine becomes more sensitive or less stable over time.[64]
In terms of HIV/AIDS among deminers in Somaliland, HALO has never had a case identified since operations began in 1999.[65]
In 2006 to the end of May, HALO cleared 75,181 square meters through manual mine clearance, 49,362 square meters through mechanical clearance and 5,485,000 square meters through battle area clearance; 197 antipersonnel mines, 61 antivehicle mines, 3,986 items of stray ammunition and 1,312 items of UXO were destroyed.[66]
There were no reports of demining accidents from January to 15 June 2006.[67]
Handicap International (HI), UNICEF, DDG and HALO were the main organizations providing mine risk education (MRE), working in collaboration with SMAC, local partners and the police EOD response teams. UNDP’s mine action support for Somalia including Somaliland includes the goal of building national MRE capacity.[68] The IMAS for MRE have not been directly applied in Somaliland, although operators seek to ensure that activities conform to best practice. An MRE advising committee met during March-April 2005. MRE matters are generally addressed in monthly coordination meetings of all mine action operators.[69]
In 2005 and through May 2006, HALO and DDG provided basic MRE and community liaison as part of their operations. UXO reports have been forthcoming as a result of increased MRE activities in 2006.[70] UNDP reported that the police EOD response teams inform locals about the dangers of storing ammunition at home and thus have provided limited MRE during their 98 visits in 2005. One of the stated objectives of the police EOD teams for 2006 was to “continue MRE tasks.”[71]
DDG’s four village EOD teams target particular at-risk groups such as children. This process is seen “as completely complimentary with the EOD process.”[72] DDG stated that, “the most effective remedy for Somaliland remains physical clearance with MRE being very much a secondary, but nonetheless complementary, activity.”[73] In 2005, MRE community visits were undertaken in 86 communities, reaching 5,301 people with a focus on children under 16 years. By 4 June 2006, 74 communities with 6,651 beneficiaries had already been visited; about half of the audience being under 16 years of age. In total, DDG teams reached 160 out of 204 communities it considers at a high threat level from mines/ERW.[74]
DDG concentrates on a practical “Don’t touch, Report” message through which it encourages (in particular) children not to tamper with ERW and adults not to engage in “explosive harvesting.”[75] Data shows that by far the main cause of accidents is UXO and not mines. DDG’s database from 2005 through May 2006 lists 19 accidents, 15 of those involving ERW. Additionally, it lists one mine related accident with livestock. (See section on Casualties that generally confirms these trends.)[76]
DDG senior local staff in 2004 had already conducted community liaison in tandem with SMAC staff for the local community prior to its clearance work, “so that the full implications of the clearance work are well understood by all.”[77]
HALO’s mine clearance program includes one mine risk education team of two staff (originally it numbered five and had its own vehicle, but after a traffic accident it redeployed in June 2005 with only two staff, now moving with existing teams). It received MRE training from HI in 2005. The MRE team works together with EOD teams and local liaison officers “to encourage the handover of stored ammunition and mines and safer practices by rural communities.” [78] The aim of this is to encourage local communities to hand over stray ammunition or mines being stored within the village while manual and mechanical teams deal with those items remaining in minefields or former battle areas. EOD teams are capable of dealing with these when allowed to but the particular skills of the MRE team are better suited to negotiate its release. The MRE staff act as negotiators and information gatherers. “All of this is done in conjunction with traditional MRE presentations.” From June to December 2005, 9,311 persons received basic MRE (4,932 male and 4,379 female; 3,968 were children younger than 16 years); in the first quarter of 2006 the team reached 8,833 people (5,282 male and 3551 female; 3,697 under 16 years). Between January and December 2004, a total of 19,379 (11,803 male and 7,576 female) had received MRE.[79]
HALO has no accurate statistics for the number of EOD calls as a direct result of the MRE teams involvement but as a guide since their involvement the following items have been handed over by local communities and destroyed by HALO: in 2005, 124 antipersonnel mines, 62 antivehicle mines and 1,596 “stray ammunitions” (not all hand-ins); from January 2006 to 20 June 2006 62 antipersonnel mines, 43 antivehicle mines and 345 “stray ammunitions” (not all hand-ins).[80]
In January 2005, HI started an MRE program, with funding from UNICEF and Ireland, which targets child and adult herders aged five to 29 years in affected communities in four regions of northwest Somaliland (Awdal, Togdheer, Sahil and Woqooyi Galbeed) as well as the general population. The overall goals of the project “are on one hand to contribute to the national mine action efforts in decreasing socio-economic impact of landmine and UXO and on the other hand to participate to the reduction of mines/UXO related accidents in the affected communities of Somaliland.” [81] The assistant project manager received training in March 2006 in Lyon, France. The project is funded until May 2007.[82]
In 2005, HI and its local partners produced and distributed 20 sets of educational banners, 2,000 posters and 10,000 leaflets to SMAC Liaison Officers, DDG, police EOD teams and HALO Trust. In 2006 by May, an additional 7,000 leaflets were produced. In cooperation with mine action partners, it is planned to erect six billboards in the six most affected villages.[83]
In 2005, after developing a training curriculum on MRE safety messages, community mobilization, communication methods and community participatory approaches and translating it into Somali, “Community structure trainings” were provided during two days in 32 of the most affected villages in four regions, reaching 216 participants.[84] In 2006, 15 communities from three districts were trained during three days in 2006 (Gabiley, Burao and Odwayne districts).
Between July 2005 and June 2006, three workshops were organized for local partners of the Scottish NGO VETAID[85] to train veterinarians and community animal health workers in MRE in the various regions. MRE training will be integrated into their standard training program. The local economy is largely based on livestock.[86]
To distribute MRE leaflets widely, SMAC’s regional liaison officers use the “milk channel” (women in rural areas receive milk from milk trucks and distribute it in the villages). HI planned for June 2006 to use this very effective channel to distribute its leaflets and posters. It will also make use of the pharmacy networks of the United Lifestock Pastoral Agencies and the community animal health workers of VETAID.[87]
Starting from June 2005, a MRE radio program of traditionally adapted Somali drama features consisting of interviews (of victims, mine action organizations and authorities) and safety messages was broadcast through the Somaliland government-owned shortwave station in cooperation with the Ministry of Information. Following training by HI, the program is prepared by the local youth organization HAVAYOCO, working on educational projects, and Radio Hargeisa. A 28-minute program is broadcast weekly. Eight spots of eight key safety messages are also aired regularly. Quarterly field visits are undertaken by two teams to assist radio production and to monitor the outreach and impact of the radio program; during two visits in 2006, the two teams collected information from 26 villages and interviewed the affected community members and elders. A three-day refresher course was held in early 2006.[88]
HI also claims to have strengthened the capacities of mine action partners through training DDG, HALO, police EOD response teams and SMAC staff in MRE techniques and teaching skills. HI reported that initially operators were not enthusiastic to include additional MRE activities into their work program; however, training activities for 24 participants took place in June 2005. In 2006, HI started conducting monitoring visits of mine action teams undertaking MRE and providing on-the-job training.[89] DDG and HI designed a guideline on MRE activities and reporting; DDG, HALO and HI also adapted the MRE reporting format for IMSMA to improve on monitoring.[90]
Six donor countries reported providing US$3,729,030 for mine action in Somaliland (as distinct from Somalia) in 2005, a decrease from 2004 ($4,107,787 provided by six countries and the European Commission).[91] Donors in 2005 included:
UNDP reported that there was a critical shortfall in financial support for SMAC for the period May to December 2006. The EC was reported to have provided €1.8 million for mine action in Somalia/Somaliland for 2006.[98] By July 2006, the EC had contributed $1,028,388 for mine action in Somaliland, consisting of $488,910 for institutional support and capacity building to SMAC, and $539,478 for LIS phase III in the Sool and Sanaag regions.[99]
In 2005, SMAC recorded 93 new landmine/UXO casualties in 79 incidents across all six regions of Somaliland, of which 19 were killed and 74 injured. Sixty-one of the casualties were children (66 percent) and 27 (29 percent) were female. Antipersonnel mines caused 24 incidents (30 percent), antivehicle mines caused 10 incidents (13 percent), and UXO caused 45 incidents (57 percent). Casualties were reported in Hargeisa (36), Togdheer (30), Awdal (15), Sanaag (five), Sahil (four) and Sool (three).[100] This is an increase from 2004, when SMAC recorded 63 new mine/UXO casualties (19 killed and 44 injured) in four of the six regions of Somaliland; 73 percent of casualties then were children.[101]
In 2005, the Somali Demining and UXO Action Group Centre (SOMMAC) also recorded 11 mine casualties on Somaliland territory in three landmine incidents, including seven killed and four injured. At least four of the casualties were children.[102]
DDG recorded one antipersonnel mine casualty in Bisiqa minefield, Togdheer region in March 2005.[103]
In 2005, no deminers were killed or injured while working on clearance tasks. According to SMAC, there were four demining accidents involving HALO and DDG staff resulting in minor injuries.[104] DDG reported that there had been two demining accidents, but that they did not result in any casualties.[105] HALO had three demining accidents all resulting in minor abrasions on the hands, two were in Halimale in Awdal region and one in Jeenolayne in Togdheer region. The deminers were back to work after a few days rest. Investigations concluded that P4 antipersonnel mines possibly became sensitized over time.[106]
Casualties continue to be reported in 2006, with 37 new mine/UXO casualties in 24 incidents recorded by SMAC through to the end of May, including seven killed and 30 injured. Six casualties were female (31 males); and 21 were children. Five incidents were caused by antipersonnel mines, three by antivehicle mines and 16 by UXO. Most casualties (18) occurred in Hargeisa, followed by nine in Togdheer, eight in Awdal and two in Sanaag.[107]
SMAC is collecting and recording casualty data using IMSMA, and, according to the UN, data collection improved in 2005. Local and international NGOs provide information to IMSMA.[108] However, comprehensive data on new mine/UXO casualties is not available and a lack of funding continues to limit activities. SMAC priorities for 2006 are to continue registration of all mine casualties and to “develop and implement a mine victim assistance database.”[109]
The total number of landmine casualties in Somaliland is not known. The most comprehensive information on casualties is the Landmine Impact Survey, completed in March 2003. Phase I of the LIS recorded 276 recent casualties (92 killed and 184 injured) between March 2001 and March 2003 in Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Sahil and Togdheer regions.[110] In total, 2,927 mine/UXO casualties (1,206 killed and 1,721 injured) were identified.[111]
In July 2005, DDG started to collect casualty data through its MRE program; all of this information is reported to SMAC and included in the IMSMA database. Between July 2005 and May 2006, DDG recorded four mine incidents and 15 ERW incidents.[112]
Public health facilities in Somaliland with the capacity to assist landmine casualties are reportedly minimal, with hospitals poorly equipped and staffed. Mine casualties are often treated at Hargeisa General Hospital, the largest in Somaliland. It is also said to be poorly equipped, but both deminers and local civilian casualties are treated there. UNDP/UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) identified building national MRE and mine victim assistance capacity as a priority area for mine action for SMAC in 2006.[113]
A surgical hospital in Berbera, which used to treat many mine casualties from the Sahil and the heavily mine-affected Togdheer regions, has witnessed a sharp deterioration of all services following the end of assistance from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and later the Italian NGO Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI).[114] COOPI supported several hospitals in Somaliland until early 2005, including the one in Berbera and the Burao regional hospital in Togdheer region. COOPI remains active in Awdal region, where an 18-month project to financially and technically support the health program started in May 2004. At the end of 2004, COOPI started a two-year project to provide technical and managerial support to the Annalena Tonelli center, which provides community support, including education to children with disabilities in Borama.[115] COOPI declined to provide updated information.[116]
Generally, first-aid is available and there is transport to take casualties to the nearest medical facility. However, the average travel time to a suitably equipped hospital is over six hours. Mine clearance organizations (HALO, DDG and the Saint Barbara Foundation) train paramedics to work with their mine clearance teams, and have medical equipment and ambulances for use in emergencies.[117] In 2004, DDG provided emergency care for one mine casualty.[118]
The Edna Adan Maternity and Teaching Hospital provides a variety of medical services, including emergency care and first aid training programs since 2002. Reportedly, the hospital is the first non-profit health facility in Somaliland, treating poor patients free of charge.[119]
UNICEF Hargeisa provided some equipment for Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) clinics in Somaliland and the World Health Organization provided technical training to staff of the Hargeisa hospital as well as medication, surgical supplies and wound dressings.[120] USAID supported the expansion of the health sector reform in 16 of the health centers in Somaliland through capacity building, technical support and support to policy development.[121] Kings College Hospital in London supports the Hargeisa and Edna Adan hospital as well as the Institute of Health Science in Hargeisa, which provides nursing training, and the New Medical School in Borama, which teaches a university degree in medicine.[122]
SMAC’s 2006 objective in the field of victim assistance is to “select regional hospitals for victim assistance and provide adequate technical support.”[123]
The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) continues to support rehabilitation centers run by SRCS in Hargeisa in Somaliland, Mogadishu and Galkayo (see the Somalia report). The centers provide physiotherapy, prostheses, orthoses, crutches, a repair service, and also training for physiotherapists. NRC provides supplies and consumables, and training, and covers all the administration and personnel costs. The lack of trained staff has been a challenge for the centers. As of 2005, the situation improved and the three centers now have four qualified physiotherapists, including one in Hargeisa. The program is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD).[124]
From 15 August to 7 September 2005, an external evaluation of the rehabilitation centers was carried out. The overall conclusion was that, “A good infrastructure has been created with appropriate buildings and good equipment, and professional staff has been educated and trained at international level.” However, a number of recommendations were made, including changing the administrative set-up of Hargeisa.[125]
The SRSC rehabilitation center in Hargeisa extended its services to Awdal, Sool and Togdheer regions, which increased the workload, as did the broadcasting of awareness-raising messages through local radio and television.[126] In 2005, the center produced 213 prostheses and 107 orthoses, repaired 141 devices, and provided physiotherapy services to 1,307 people. Seventy-eight mine survivors were assisted in 2005.[127]
The Disability Action Network (DAN) runs the Hargeisa Rehabilitation Center (HRC) with support from HI. HRC works with the regional hospitals in Hargeisa, Berbera, Burao, Erigavo and Borama, and the Ministry of Health and Labor, which provides the premises and pays staff salaries. HRC also supports the social integration of people with disabilities and raises awareness on disability issues. It provides training for physiotherapy assistants, orthopedic workers and other health professionals for the regional hospitals. In 2005, 954 new patients were assisted at HRC and 7,312 physiotherapy treatments were provided, 746 orthopedic appliances were produced and 427 repaired. The center assisted six landmine survivors in 2005. DAN receives funding from the EU and DfID.[128]
HI supports local associations of, and for, disabled people, including the Somaliland National Disability Forum, providing organizational capacity-building and training in the area of socioeconomic reintegration within the framework of the project of Social Integration of People with Disabilities. The work was extended outside Hargeisa in 2006 and partnerships with three new organizations for people with disabilities have been initiated.[129]
Other organizations working with victims of conflict or people with disabilities are International Aid Services, Africa Educational Trust, and the Association of the Physically Disabled of Somalia.[130]
On 3 December 2005, Somaliland celebrated the International Day for Persons with Disabilities for the first time; the events were organized by the Somaliland National Disability Federation.[131]
[1] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 976. The Deed commits signatories to a comprehensive prohibition on antipersonnel mines. Somaliland expressed its intention to sign in 2004, but later indicated that it was unwilling to sign since it considers itself an independent state, and not a non-state actor. Geneva Call reported that, “subsequent internal differences within the government appeared to have delayed [signature] from taking place.” Geneva Call, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 10.
[2] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1228. In 2002, DDG reported that it had destroyed 7,517 stockpiled antipersonnel mines received from the Ministry of Defense and the army. Also in 2002, HALO Trust told Landmine Monitor that it had entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Defense to destroy stockpiled mines.
[3] Email from Nick Bateman, Programme Manager, Danish Demining Group (DDG), Nairobi, 20 February 2006.
[4] DDG, “2005 Clearance Figures—QRT.xls.” The biggest categories of UXO were antiaircraft projectiles (843), fuzes (502), mortars (302), rockets (270), and artillery projectiles (250).
[5] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 977.
[6] UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” 30 December 2005, www.mineaction.org, accesssed 11 January 2006.
[7] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[8] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 977.
[9] Under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
[10] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) for Mine Action, Rule of Law and Security Programme, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006.
[11] Sebastian Taylor, “Landmines and UXO in Somaliland, Puntland and Central & Southern Somalia, A feasibility study,” 26 May 2000, p. 5.
[12] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[13] Vice Presidential Decree RSL/VP/NDA/13-01341/0304 of 27 March 2004, Point 1 (unofficial translation).
[14] Email from Neil Ferrao, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 23 June 2006.
[15] UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” 30 December 2005.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Vice Presidential Decree RSL/VP/NDA/13-01341/0304 of 27 March 2004, Point 3 (unofficial translation).
[18] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006.
[19] Ibid.
[20] UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” 30 December 2005.
[21] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[22] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006; email from Mohamed Ahmed, IMSMA Regional Coordinator for Middle East and North Africa, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 4 July 2006.
[23] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[24] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[25] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006.
[26] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[27] UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” 30 December 2005.
[28] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006. Previously, according to the UN, the aim had been to clear the high-impact areas identified by the LIS by 2006. UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” 30 December 2005.
[29] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006.
[30] HALO, “Somaliland,” www.halotrust.org, accessed 30 May 2006.
[31] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[32] Emails from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 20 February and 12 June 2006.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Interview with Lt. Col. Tim Wildish, Commandant, IMATC, Nairobi, 24 May 2006.
[35] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[36] UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” 30 December 2005.
[37] Email from John Dingley, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP Somalia, 1 August 2005.
[38] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006.
[39] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[40] DDG, “Somaliland,” www.danishdemininggroup.dk, accessed 30 May 2006; email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[41] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[42] HALO, “Somaliland,” www.halotrust.org, accessed 30 May 2006.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Survey Action Center (SAC), “Landmine Impact Survey: Phase 1: Awdal, Galbeed, Sahil, and Togdheer Regions, Executive Summary,” p. 3.
[45] Email from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 21 July 2006.
[46] Interview with Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, Nairobi, 1 June 2006.
[47] Email from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 21 July 2006.
[48] UNDP Somalia Mine Action Program, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” Nairobi, 18 March 2006, p. 3.
[49] SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 5. However, the figures provided by SMAC do not add up and no explanation was provided for the inconsistency.
[50] “DDG Somaliland Monthly Clearance Statistics Sheet 2005, Phase Two (High Priority Medium-Impacted Communities),” in email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[51] In fact, it is more of a general survey, but is termed technical survey to distinguish it from the LIS. Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[52] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 12 June 2006.
[53] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 977.
[54] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[55] UNDP, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” Nairobi, 18 March 2006, p. 6.
[56] SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 5. The clearance figures for HALO are those sent to Landmine Monitor in email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006; HALO clearance includes 73,328 square meters cleared mechanically. In addition to the AXO recorded, HALO destroyed more than 40,000 items of small arms ammunition. The total of mines destroyed by DDG includes the stockpiled and abandoned mines referred to above. SMAC does not appear to include the ordnance destroyed during on-the-job training for the EOD teams.
[57] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[58] UNDP, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” Nairobi, 18 March 2006, p. 4.
[59] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[60] Ibid.
[61] SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 3.
[62] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 181.
[63] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 13 June 2006.
[64] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 23 June 2006.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 13 June 2006; email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 15 June 2006.
[68] UNDP, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” 18 March 2006, p. 2.
[69] HI, “Mine Risk Education: Contribution to reduce the socio-economic impact of mines and UXO in North West Somalia, January 2005-June 2006, Report,” Hargeisa/Lyon, June 2006, pp. 9, 12.
[70] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 22 June 2006; HI, “Mine Risk Education, January 2005-June 2006, Report,” p. 12.
[71] UNDP, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” 18 March 2006, pp. 6-7.
[72] DDG, “Final Narrative Report on the Establishment of a Quick Response Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team in Somaliland,” covering 1 September 2004-30 September 2005, Nairobi/Copenhagen, 17 January 2006, p. 6.
[73] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 22 June 2006.
[74] DDG, “DDG Somaliland Mine Risk Education Data Base, All Regions Summary,” provided by email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 22 June 2006.
[75] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 22 June 2006.
[76] DDG, “DDG Somaliland Mine Risk Education Data Base, All Regions Summary.”
[77] DDG, “Interim Report on the continuation of Landmine and EOD Clearance in Somaliland by Danish Demining Group (DDG) from 01st April 2004 to 31st March 2006 Under SIDA Contribution Number,” report covers 2004 only, p. 13.
[78] HALO, “Somaliland,” www.halotrust.org.
[79] Email from Southern Craib, Programme Manager, HALO Somaliland, 22 June 2006.
[80] Ibid.
[81] HI, “Mine Risk Education, January 2005-June 2006, Report,” p. 5. HI was seeking to extend the project area to neighboring Puntland in 2006.
[82] Ibid, pp. 4, 13.
[83] Ibid, pp. 9-10.
[84] Ibid, p. 10.
[85] VETAID, www.vetaid.org, accessed 21 June 2006. VETAID is a member of the international coalition Vétérinaires Sans Frontières. The VETAID project in Somaliland aimed “to improve the welfare and livelihoods of poor and disadvantaged pastoralists (nomadic herders) and agro-pastoralists.” VETAID, “Annual Report 2004/2005,” p. 5.
[86] HI, “Mine Risk Education, January 2005-June 2006, Report,” pp. 5, 10-11.
[87] Ibid, p. 12.
[88] Ibid, pp. 6, 8, 10-11.
[89] HI, “Mine Risk Education, January 2005-June 2006, Report,” pp. 8, 13; SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 3.
[90] Telephone interview with Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 22 June 2006; HI, “Mine Risk Education, January 2005-June 2006, Report,” p. 13.
[91] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 980-981.
[92] Mine Action Investments database; email from Paula Sirkiä, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: €1 = US$1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[93] Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; Mine Action Investments database. Amount reported as for Somalia.
[94] Ireland Article 7 Report, Form J, 21 April 2006; emails from Therese Healy, Department of Foreign Affairs, May 2006. Amount reported as for Somalia.
[95] Sweden Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March-May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = SEK7.4710. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006. Amount reported as for Somalia.
[96] Email from Ellen Schut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 April 2006; email from Brechtje Paardekooper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2006.
[97] Email from Andrew Willson, Department for International Development, 20 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: £1 = US$1.820. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[98] Mine Action Support Group, “MASG Newsletter-First Quarter of 2006,” Washington DC, 1 May 2006, pp. 7-8.
[99] UNMAS, “Mid-Year Project Funding Summary Chart 2006, Portfolio 2006 Chart A: Project-by-Project Funding,” 12 July 2006, www.mineaction.org.
[100] SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 6.
[101] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 981-982.
[102] Somali Demining & UXO Action Group Centre (SOMMAC), “Press Release 2005,” Somalia, 23 January 2006.
[103] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 28 July 2005.
[104] SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 3.
[105] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 13 June 2006.
[106] Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 15 June 2006.
[107] Email from Greg Lindstrom, UNDP Somalia, 15 June 2006.
[108] UNDP, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” 18 March 2006, p. 2.
[109] SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 3.
[110] SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey Phase 1: Awdal, Galbeed, Sahil and Togdheer Regions,” (final report),
pp. 20-23.
[111] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1236.
[112] Email from Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 13 June 2006.
[113] UNDP, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” 18 March 2006, pp. 2, 8.
[114] Landmine Monitor visited Berbera Hospital in April 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1236.
[115] COOPI, “Technical and financial support to the health program: Awdal Region, NW Somalia (Phase IV).”
[116] Email from Paola Grivel, COOPI Coordination Office, Nairobi, 16 June 2006.
[117] SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 3.
[118] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Nick Bateman, DDG, Nairobi, 28 July 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1236.
[119] Direct Relief International, “Somalia,” (Shipment of 15 November 2005), www.directrelief.org/sections/
information_center/countries/somalia.html, accessed on 12 June 2006.
[120] Direct Relief International, “Somalia,” (Shipment of 9 March 2006), www.directrelief.org/sections/
information_center/countries/somalia.html, accessed on 12 June 2006.
[121] USAID, “Annual Report FY 2005,” Washington DC, 16 June 2005, p. 5.
[122] Kings College Hospital, “King’s THET Somaliland Partnership (KTSP).”
[123] UNDP, “Annual Report for the Mine Action Program in Somalia 2005,” 18 March 2006, p. 5; SMAC, “Annual Report 2005,” Hargeisa, 26 January 2006, p. 3.
[124] Norwegian Red Cross, “NORAD–Country Report, 2003-2005,” p. 2.
[125] Ibid, p. 12.
[126] SRCS, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 16.
[127] Norwegian Red Cross, “NORAD–Country Report, 2003-2005,” p. 3.
[128] Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Ali Jama Hassan, Managing Director, DAN, Hargeisa, 22 June 2006.
[129] Email from Ulrike Last, Disability Project Manager, HI, Hargeisa, 22 June 2006.
[130] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 983.
[131] Disability Awareness in Action, “Somaliland celebrates International Day of Disabled Persons for the FIRST time.”