Key developments since May 2005: Although there are no recorded mined areas in mainland UK, it has treaty obligations in respect of any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control elsewhere. More than seven years since becoming a State Party, the UK has not initiated clearance of mined areas on the Falkland Islands. The UK and Argentina met five times in the reporting period to discuss implementation of a feasibility study, which was expected to take place between November 2006 and March 2007.
The 1982 conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina resulted in thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines being laid on the Falkland Islands, most by Argentina.[1] Different estimates have been provided of the number of mines and mined areas remaining on the Islands. The UK and the Falkland Islands government have stated on different occasions that there are between 101 and 120 minefields.[2 ] The total mine-affected area is believed to cover 20 square kilometers and to contain approximately 16,000 mines.[3 ] According to Argentina’s Article 7 transparency report, however, a total of 20,000 mines remain on the Falklands.[4]
Minefields are said to be surrounded with a three-strand fence and marked with “Danger Mines” signs at regular intervals around the perimeter, in addition to the NATO standard mine warning triangles.[5 ] The UK Ministry of Defence reported in 2004 that the mine contamination includes four types of antipersonnel mine and four types of antivehicle mine.[6 ] A number of items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) are also lying in the mined areas; however, in June 2006, the UK reported that “we have no way of knowing how many UXO remain inside.”[7 ] The mined areas are mainly beaches and peat areas.[8 ] Three minefields are said to be within one mile of the capital, Port Stanley.[9 ] When depositing its initial Article 7 report in August 1999, the UK included minefield maps for the Falkland Islands.[10]
Some clearance operations were conducted immediately after the 1982 conflict, resulting in the destruction of 1,400 mines; operations were halted after several of the soldiers engaged in clearance were injured.[11 ] In 2005, one antipersonnel mine was destroyed after it became exposed on the surface.[12 ] In 2003, 16 antipersonnel mines that had become exposed were destroyed within or on the boundaries of marked minefields.[13 ] Between 1997 and 2002, 248 antipersonnel mines were similarly destroyed in the Falklands.[14]
No human casualties from mines or UXO have been reported in the Falklands since the 1982 conflict ended.
Clearance of mines in the Falklands is said to be hampered by the weather and ground conditions; high winds, soft ground and sand make detection and removal difficult.[15]
Following three and a half years of negotiations, on 11 October 2001, the UK and Argentina signed an Exchange of Notes Agreement on the establishment of a feasibility study on mine clearance in the Falklands. Three phases were established by the agreement: a preliminary study consisting of an initial assessment to determine objectives, methods, timetable and resources needed; a main study to conduct an analysis of the minefields, their locations, soil conditions, suitability of techniques, the priorities to be set and procedures to follow; and a final report, which would include recommendations to both governments regarding future action.[16 ]
Both the UK and Argentina’s Article 7 reports state that, “In the preliminary phase of the Study, both Governments will provide any documentation and information at their disposal needed for carrying out the Study, in particular records of minefields.”[17]
A joint working party (JWP) to carry out the feasibility study was created in 2001, composed of diplomats and experts from the UK and Argentina. It has met eight times since its creation.
In March 2003, the UK announced the creation of a national mine action authority to oversee future clearance work.[18 ] However, in June 2006, the UK reported that “in order to carry out the Feasibility Study, there is no requirement to create a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA). Once the clearance phase is started, the NMAA will be formally created.”[19 ]
The first two meetings of the joint working party were held in Buenos Aires in December 2001 and in London on October 2004.[20 ] In 2005, it met three times. The outcome of each of these meetings was explained in a joint statement made at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, in November-December 2005. The statement indicated that during the third meeting in April 2005, “both parties considered a draft report of the preliminary study and agreed to move forward in defining legal, technical and financial details for the future implementation of the feasibility study.”
At the fourth joint working party meeting in July 2005, both parties “confirmed that they had arranged for sufficient funds to be available throughout the current calendar year to meet the estimated costs of the feasibility study.” At the fifth meeting, in October 2005, said to be “in keeping with the Nairobi Plan of Action,” both parties agreed to use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) as the basis to achieve International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). At the sixth meeting, in November 2005, both delegations were reported as continuing to make progress on financial, legal and technical aspects of the feasibility study. They also agreed to recommend to the two governments that they should extend the scope of the Exchange of Notes of 2001 to include UXO that might remain inside the minefields.[21 ]
At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Argentina and the UK issued another joint statement, stating that at its seventh meeting on 27-29 March 2006, the joint working party “continued to negotiate a way forward on the legal and technical aspects of the feasibility study aiming to complete a joint survey visit to the Falkland Islands during the austral summer of 2006/2007 (November to March).”[22 ] The UK reported to Landmine Monitor that in the eighth meeting, on 17-19 May 2006, “the JWP considered the overall aims of the feasibility study, its technical and financial aspects, as well as management and contractual issues. The JPW also agreed to move forward on several tasks during the intersessional period with a view to fulfilling the shared commitment to carry out the study within the framework of the Ottawa Convention (on anti-personnel mines). The next meeting of the JWP was agreed to take place on 27-29 June 2006, in Buenos Aires.”[23 ]
The UK indicated to Landmine Monitor in June 2006 that the field survey planned on the Falklands is part of the main study (phase 2) given that the preliminary study was “more or less complete.” No further details were given on the purpose and results of the preliminary study. The UK also repeated that the aim of the field survey is to identify suitable methods for demining, including costs, logistics and environmental impacts of each of the methodologies recommended.[24 ] A process of tendering was planned to be issued to a “number of demining consultancy companies with relevant expertise,” at an unspecified future date. Monitors from both the UK and Argentina would accompany the field survey and the “project in all its aspects will be overseen by the Joint Working Party.” The UK estimated that the field survey would last about 18 to 21 days, but that “the total time including research before and the written report afterwards would take approximately six months.”[25]
According to the Exchange of Notes Agreement of 2001, the costs of the feasibility study will be shared by both countries, in proportion to the number of mines laid by each party during the 1982 conflict.[26 ] Therefore, it was expected that Argentina would be responsible for most of the financial costs, while the UK would take care of the technical aspects of the study.[27 ] In June 2006, the UK reported that “the budget for the field survey has been agreed between UK and Argentina and has been approved by both governments. For commercial reasons, the details of this budget have not been released yet.”[28 ] The proposed share of the budget between each country is not known. An official from the Argentinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated in 2002 that the total costs of the feasibility study would be US$2 million.[29]
Argentina reported that in early April 2006 staff from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining visited Buenos Aires to install the IMSMA system and transfer software and geographical databases, as well as carry out training.[30 ] In December 2005, US Southern Command also offered Argentina training on use of IMSMA, and visited in February 2006. Data from the feasibility study will be entered into IMSMA.[31 ]
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, the UK must clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but no later than 1 March 2009. The Falkland Islands are the only mined areas under the UK’s “jurisdiction or control,” in the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty. In June 2006, the UK stated that it was committed to fulfilling its treaty commitment.[32 ]
Argentina has claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, which it calls the Malvinas. In its Article 7 reports, Argentina states that “in its territory, the Malvinas Islands, antipersonnel mines exist. ... Since this part of the Argentinean territory is subjected to the illegal occupation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Republic of Argentina sees itself prevented from the access to the antipersonnel mines emplaced on the Malvinas Islands in order to fulfill the commitments of the Convention.”[33 ]
In February 2005, the UK sent a mission to the Falklands as part of its ongoing feasibility study which included the deputy director of the NGO Landmine Action UK (LA-UK).[34 ] LA-UK issued a Falklands Initiative, following the assessment mission, which stated that, “though clearance is feasible it would be extremely expensive. The economic, social and humanitarian impact of the minefields is negligible and is likely to remain so.” The UK could apply for a 10-year extension of the March 2009 clearance deadline, but this would send the wrong signal to countries that needed quick mine clearance.[35 ] Instead, LA-UK proposed “an exchange by which the UK can secure an extension only in return for clearing an equal area of minefields somewhere else in the world in time for their existing March 2009 deadline. The UK would still be under an obligation to clear the Falkland minefields eventually but this proposal would see them invest in a much more worthwhile activity first.”[36 ] In June 2006, the UK stated that “we will not be in a position to decide how best to fulfill that commitment until we have results of the feasibility study. Nor to decide whether the Falkland’s initiative proposed by Landmine Action would help.”[37 ]
In May 2006, LA-UK made the following statement on the UK’s compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, “the Convention is very clear that these minefields are the responsibility of the UK but the Government has still not taken any substantial action to address the issue. Landmine Action’s assessment is that there is no way that the UK will now be able to meet its obligation to destroy all of the landmines in these identified areas. Given the long history of inaction on this it is very hard to see that the UK has worked in good faith towards this legal obligation. This disregard of legal requirements does nothing to promote adherence by other States Parties. Whilst NGOs are working to encourage severely mine affected countries to meet their Article 5 deadlines so as to protect vulnerable populations, the UK is effectively saying these obligations do not need to be taken seriously. Unless it takes radical action to resolve this problem, the UK should not be granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline and should be held to be in breach of the Convention when the current deadline is reached.”[38]
While Article 5 of the treaty sets a deadline for destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas, it requires States Parties to complete clearance as soon as possible.[39] Seven years after becoming a State Party, the UK has not initiated clearance operations, nor even developed a clear timetable and operational plan.
When asked why the process was taking so long, the UK answered that “this is a complex bilateral negotiation conducted against the background of a sovereignty dispute. This is a very complicated and intricate process.”[40]
[1] “Mine Action in Central and South America, Falkland Islands Profile,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.2, November 2004.
[2 ] For views on the number of mines remaining in the Falkland Islands, see Landmine Action UK, “The Falklands Islands,” www.landmineaction.org, accessed 20 June 2006. The different numbers may be attributed to the fact that several mined areas can be grouped into one. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 952.
[3 ] “Mine Action in Central and South America, Falkland Islands Profile,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.2, November 2004; Landmine Action UK, “The Falklands Islands.”
[4] Argentina Article 7 Report, Form C, 8 May 2006.
[5 ] UK Article 7 Report, Form I, 12 April 2006.
[6 ] Antipersonnel mines present include: P4B (Spanish origin), SB33 (Italian), FMK1 (Argentine) and No. 4 (Israeli). Antivehicle mines present include: C3B (Spanish), SB81 (Italian), No. 6 Mk1 (Israeli) and Mk1/6 (US). Fax from UK Ministry of Defence, 9 February 2004.
[7 ] Email from Guy Pollard, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.
[8 ] UK Article 7 Reports, Form I, 15 March 2005 and 12 April 2006.
[9 ] Simon Conway, “The Falkland Islands - a get out clause for the unscrupulous?,” Campaign Newsletter, Issue 10, Summer 2005, p. 3.
[10] UK Article 7 Report, Enclosure 2, 26 August 1999.
[11 ] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 953.
[12 ] UK Article 7 Report, Form F, Table 2, 12 April 2006.
[13 ] In its Article 7 report for 2005, the UK reported that after re-checking records, only 16 antipersonnel mines that had become exposed were destroyed in 2003 within or on the boundaries of marked minefields, not 50 as had been reported in its Article 7 report of 30 April 2004. UK Article 7 Report, Form F, Table 2, 12 April 2006.
[14] Fax from the UK Ministry of Defence, 9 February 2004.
[15] “Mine Action in Central and South America, Falkland Islands Profile,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.2, November 2004.
[16 ] Falklands Islands Information Portal, “2001 Agreement on Mine Clearance Feasibility Study,” www.falklands.info, accessed 20 June 2006.
[17] UK Article 7 Report, Form C, 12 April 2006; Argentina Article 7 Report, Form C, 8 May 2006.
[18 ] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 855, citing a parliamentary answer by UK Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 5 March 2003, col. 1069W.
[19 ] Email from Guy Pollard, Permanent Mission of UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.
[20 ] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 953, for more information on the outcome of the meetings.
[21 ] Statement by Argentina and the United Kingdom, “Information on the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention,” Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 30 November 2005.
[22 ] Statement by Argentina and the United Kingdom, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[23 ] Email from Guy Pollard, Permanent Mission of UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.
[24 ] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26 ] Falkland Islands Information Portal, “2001 Agreement on Mine Clearance Feasibility Study.”
[27 ] See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 747.
[28 ] Email from Guy Pollard, Permanent Mission of UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.
[29] See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 747.
[30 ] Email from Mariela Fogante, Direction of International Security, Nuclear and Spatial Affairs, Ministry of External Relations, Buenos Aires, 4 April 2006.
[31 ] Email from Capt. Carlos Nielsen Enemark, Director, Humanitarian Demining, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces, Buenos Aires, 18 April 2006.
[32 ] Email from Guy Pollard, Permanent Mission of UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.
[33 ] See, for example, Argentina Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 May 2006.
[34 ] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 953.
[35 ] Landmine Action UK, “The Falklands Initiative.”
[36 ] Ibid; Simon Conway, “The Falkland Islands – a get out clause for the unscrupulous?,” Campaign Newsletter, Issue 10, Summer 2005, p. 3.
[37 ] Email from Guy Pollard, Permanent Mission of UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.
[38] Statement from Richard Moyes, Policy and Research Manager, Landmine Action UK, provided to Landmine Monitor on 10 May 2006.
[39] ICBL statement, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 11 May 2