Key developments since May 2005: In July 2005, Venezuela provided for the first time a timetable for clearance of the antipersonnel mines laid around its six naval posts. In May 2006, Venezuela declared that it would not initiate clearance operations before 2007 because Navy combat engineers needed demining equipment and additional training.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 14 April 1999, and became a State Party on 1 October 1999. Venezuela has maintained that domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is not necessary because international treaties ratified by the government automatically become national law.[1] Venezuela’s penal code was reformed on 16 March 2005, without any reference made to antipersonnel mines.[2]
Venezuela submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 26 April 2006. It covers the period from April 2005 to April 2006.[3]
In April 2006 the Coordinator of Mine Clearance and Training informed Landmine Monitor that the Venezuelan Army, Air Force and National Guard had each designated a representative to assist in mine action in Venezuela.[4]
Venezuela participated in the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005 in Zagreb, Croatia, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2005 and May 2006, but did not make any statements.
Venezuela has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. Thus, it has not made known its views on the issues of joint military operations with non-States Parties, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training.
Venezuela joined the Convention on Conventional Weapons and Amended Protocol II on landmines on 19 April 2005. It participated in the Seventh Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2005 in Geneva. It did not submit the annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol.
Venezuela reports that it has not produced antipersonnel mines.[5] It is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Venezuela obtained antipersonnel landmines in the past manufactured by Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United States and the former Yugoslavia.[6] Venezuela has reported that it laid 1,074 antipersonnel mines around six Navy posts between April 1995 and March 1997.[7]
Venezuela completed destruction of its stockpile of 47,189 antipersonnel mines on 24 September 2003.[8] It has never specified the types of antipersonnel mines that were destroyed.[9]
Venezuela’s April 2006 Article 7 report indicates it is retaining 4,960 PMA3 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, held by the Ministry of Defense.[10] The number is unchanged from the previous report.[11]
Venezuela did not use the expanded Article 7 Form D for reporting on retained mines adopted at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, and has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines ― a step agreed by States Parties in the Nairobi Action Plan that emerged from the First Review Conference.
Venezuela’s mine problem consists of 1,073 antipersonnel mines laid by government forces around six naval posts along the border with Colombia (at Atabapo, Cararabo, Guafitas, Isla Vapor, Puerto Páez and Río Arauca Internacional).[12] No clearance operations have been undertaken since Venezuela became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. One mine was accidentally detonated by a marine at Guafitas in September 2004; this is the only confirmed reduction in the number of emplaced mines.[13] There are also unconfirmed reports that a marine at Río Arauca Internacional detonated a mine several years ago (see section Landmine/UXO Casualties).
According to Venezuela’s Article 7 transparency report of 26 April 2006: 58 mines were laid in March 1997 in three areas inside Guafitas naval post; 43 mines were laid in one area in Isla Vapor in March 1996; 77 were laid in one area in Río Arauca Internacional in May 1995; 299 were laid in three areas in Atabapo in April 1995; 281 mines were laid in two areas in Puerto Páez in April 1995; and 316 mines were laid in three areas in Cararabo in April 1995.[14]
Venezuela noted in its 2006 Article 7 report that emplaced mines do not represent a danger to the civilian population, as they are only placed around navy posts and therefore not in areas where people “can transit freely.”[15]
There is no national mine action authority or mine action center in Venezuela. On 19 August 2004, a Ministry of Defense resolution assigned Rear Admiral Alcibíades Jesús Paz, the current Commander of the Engineering Corps of the Naval Infantry (Marines), as General Coordinator of mine clearance operations and training.[16] Rear Admiral Paz also has other functions and responsibilities.[17]
In July 2005, for the first time, Venezuela provided a timetable for clearance of the antipersonnel mines laid around the naval posts. The mines around Guafitas naval post are to be cleared in February 2007; Puerto Páez in April 2007; Atabapo in February 2008; Isla Vapor in April 2008; Río Arauca International in February 2009; and Cararabo in April 2009. Information on the criteria chosen to prioritize one base over another was not provided to Landmine Monitor. However, the Navy reported that operations would take place during the “summer months” (December to May) so as to take advantage of better weather conditions.[18]
As reported in last year’s Landmine Monitor report, a military official indicated that Venezuela would not begin clearing the minefields until another protection system for the naval posts could be established, such as an “early-warning” alarm system that did not include weapons or explosives.[19 ] In April 2006, the Navy confirmed that purchase of this equipment had been approved by the Armed Forces and that a tendering process was being planned, which would be open to national and international companies. The Navy also stated that the system would be sensitive to movement and sound, and would not contain explosives. [20]
Subsequently, in May 2006, Venezuela declared that it would not initiate operations before 2007 because demining equipment was needed and the Navy Combat Engineers required training in demining.[21] Yet, according to Venezuela’s April 2006 Article 7 report, a Navy combat engineering company was trained in the use of mine detection equipment in 2005.[22] However, the Navy claimed that the training was “routine,” and of a sort that takes place each year.[23] Most of Venezuela’s Article 7 reports have stated that training in demining had been conducted during the previous year.[24]
The Navy reported that the budget for clearance was still not established as of May 2006; however, it claimed that “what can be anticipated is that the operation will be delicate and dangerous,” and therefore costly.[25]
The Mine Ban Treaty requires that Venezuela destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 October 2009. According to Venezuela’s Article 7 report of April 2006, the country plans to demine all its minefields by April 2009, but states that “the program could be extended until the end of the period allowed by the Mine Ban Treaty,” meaning by 1 October 2009.[26]
Although it is welcome that Venezuela intends to meet its final deadline, Article 5 requires States Parties to complete clearance as soon as possible, clearly implying that any unjustified delay in initiating the demining process is not consistent with the treaty.[27] Venezuela has made very little effort to comply with Article 5 in the almost seven years since it became a party to the treaty.
As reported previously in the Landmine Monitor,[28] Venezuela was initially planning to start clearance operations in 2002. Various reasons have been given for the failure to do so: in February 2003, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that the clearance delay was due to a lack of specialized equipment;[29] in 2005, Landmine Monitor was told that an alarm system was required before clearance could be initiated; and in May 2006, lack of equipment and training was given as a reason.
The Navy reported to Landmine Monitor in April 2006 that since the mines were laid, it has maintained “standard” marking and “double protection” fences around the perimeters of each mined area. No further details were provided.[30]
In April 2006, however, Landmine Monitor visited the hamlet of Santa Rosa, near La Victoria, in Páez municipality, Apure state, where the naval post of Río Arauca Internacional is located. Landmine Monitor interviewed local inhabitants who reported that the minefield had been installed about 11 years ago, which coincides with the information provided by Venezuela in its Article 7 reports (1995). Local residents told Landmine Monitor that “everyone in the community knows that there are mines there.”[31] Although Landmine Monitor was unable to interview personnel at the naval post, it did observe the closest part of the minefield. The minefield is approximately five meters wide, and located in front of the base, separated from the Arauca River by a narrow dirt road. The fencing is approximately one meter in height and in poor condition, and there are four small “minefield” warning signs of approximately 30 centimeters by 20 centimeters that are also in poor condition.
Venezuela’s 2006 Article 7 report included information on mine risk education (MRE). It stated: “It is important to note that the mines laid by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela do not represent a danger to the civilian population, since they are not laid in areas of public transit, but rather in defensive patterns around the various border naval posts, complying with internationally established norms for security and mine laying.”[32]
On 6 September 2004, a 19-year-old marine serving at the Guafitas Navy post stepped on a mine, after a group of 12 marines entered a minefield to clear bush; his leg was amputated above the knee. The Armed Forces continued to pay his salary and provided medical care and rehabilitation. In September 2005, his family told Landmine Monitor that this support had been discontinued.[33 ] But in April 2006, it was said that the army gave him a monthly pension of VEB531,000 (approximately US$247), but no transportation, so he was not able to obtain rehabilitation services, prosthesis repair or psychological counseling.[34]
Following a criminal investigation, and a dispute whether a military or civil court should judge the case, the Supreme Court announced on 1 November 2005 that the military commander responsible would be processed through the civil judiciary system.[35]
Venezuela has acknowledged one other military mine survivor although it has not provided his name, details and location of the accident, nor his current condition. There are no known civilian landmine survivors in Venezuela.[36]
During a visit to the Río Arauca Internacional navy post, local residents told Landmine Monitor that there had been another incident involving a marine “years ago.” Prior to the incident, the fencing around the minefield had been poor and the warning signs were not visible, but after the incident fencing was improved.[37]
Although Landmine Monitor has requested information on the current condition of those two marines and the support provided to them by the Armed Forces, no information has been made available.
Venezuela has a national health system with specialized services located in main urban centers, including rehabilitation services.
[1] Telephone interview with Victor Manzanares, First Secretary, Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Caracas, 4 February 2000.
[2] Partial Reform to the Penal Code, Official Gazette, Number 38.148, 16 March 2005.
[3] Venezuela submitted previous reports on 10 September 2002, 15 May 2003 and 4 July 2005. It also submitted a one-page letter to the UN on 25 November 2003, confirming completion of stockpile destruction. The 2005 report did not indicate the reporting period, did not cover all the required information, and did not utilize the standard forms. Venezuela did not provide an update in 2004. The initial report, due 1 March 2000, was two and one-half years late.
[4] Telephone interview with RAdm. Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Commander of the Engineering Corps, Naval Infantry (Marines), Caracas, 21 April 2006.
[5] Article 7 Report, Form H, 26 April 2006, and previous Article 7 reports. In the past, the US Department of Defense identified Venezuela as the producer of the MV-1 improvised fragmentation antipersonnel mine. In January 2002, Brig. Gen. José Esteban Godoy Peña told Landmine Monitor that Venezuela had not produced mines, and explained the MV-1 was a mine used by guerrillas in the 1960s, known as trampas caza bobos (“fool-catcher traps”).
[6] Article 7 Report, Form B, 15 May 2003.
[7] Article 7 Report, Form I (p. 10), 26 April 2006. This is the same number used in the 4 July 2005 Article 7 report, which revised the number (1,036) and some dates of emplacement as recorded in previous Article 7 reports. Most notably, Venezuela reported mines were last laid in March 1997 instead of May 1998—the latter date being five months after Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty.
[8] Letter from the Permanent Mission of Venezuela in Geneva to the UN Conference on Disarmament Secretariat, 25 November 2003. The 47,189 mines were more than previously reported as held in stock. In September 2002, Venezuela reported a stockpile of 22,136 antipersonnel mines, but in May 2003 reported a revised total of 46,136 antipersonnel mines. Article 7 Report, Form B, 15 May 2003; Article 7 Report, Form B, 10 September 2002.
[9] Venezuela’s 15 May 2003 Article 7 report, Form B, listed the types and quantities for 46,136 mines still held in stock.
[10] Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 April 2006. In 2005, it indicated that 4,950 of the mines were held by the National Armed Forces Armament Directorate and another ten were located in the Attorney’s Office in Puerto Cabello, Carabobo state. Article 7 Report, note attached to Table 1, “Minas destruidas que se encontraban almacenadas,” and Table 8, “Situación actual de las minas AP,” 4 July 2005.
[11] In its September 2002 report, Venezuela indicated it would retain 2,214 mines; in its May 2003 report, it listed 4,614 mines; in its November 2003 letter, it indicated 5,000 mines.
[12] Email from RAdm. Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Naval Infantry, 29 May 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 611.
[13] Email from Yaneth Arocha, First Secretary, Office of the Vice Minister for North America, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 June 2005. The number 1,073 is also cited in Article 7 Report, Table 2, “Cuadro de sembrado actual de minas AP,” 4 July 2005.
[14] Article 7 Report, Form C, 26 April 2006.
[15] Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 April 2006.
[16] “Se designa al Contralmirante Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Coordinador General de los Cursos y Trabajos de Desminados de acuerdo a la Convención sobre la prohibición del empleo, almacenamiento, producción y transferencia de Minas Antipersonal y sobre su destrucción,” Official Gazette, Number 38.004, 19 August 2004.
[17] For instance, RAdm. Alcibíades Paz was recently put in charge of the management of funds of the Unidad Administradora Desconcentrada of the Navy through a resolution published on 22 May 2006 in the Official Gazette No 38.444, year CXXXIII, Month VIII, www.globovision.com, accessed 5 June 2006.
[18] Email from RAdm. Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Naval Infantry, 29 May 2006.
[19 ] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 612, citing an interview with military official who requested anonymity, 20 April 2005.
[20] Telephone interview with RAdm. Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Naval Infantry, 21 April 2006, and email of 29 May 2006.
[21] Email from RAdm. Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Naval Infantry, 29 May 2006.
[22] Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 April 2006.
[23] Email from RAdm. Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Naval Infantry, 29 May 2006.
[24] See Article 7 reports, Form A, 15 May 2003, 10 September 2002 and 26 April 2005.
[25] Email from RAdm Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Naval Infantry, 29 May 2006.
[26] Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 April 2006.
[27] ICBL statement, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
[28] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 863.
[29] See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 494.
[30] Email from RAdm. Alcibíades Jesús Paz, Naval Infantry, 29 May 2006.
[31] Interview with local residents of Santa Rosa, Páez, Apure state, 11 April 2006.
[32] Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 April 2006; translation by Landmine Monitor.
[33 ] Interview with Rimy Diego Amundaray Salazar, and his mother Rosalba del Valle Salazar, Barrio Montensano (vicinity of Caracas), Vargas State, 27 May 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 612.
[34] Interview with Rosalba del Valle Salazar, Barrio Montensano, 2 April 2006.
[35] Supreme Court, “Tribunal de Apure conocerá juicio sobre infante de marina que perdió una pierna con una mina terrestre” (“Apure State Court will decide on the case of a marine who lost a leg to an antipersonnel mine”), 1 December 2005.
[36] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 864.
[37] Interview with local residents of Santa Rosa, Páez, Apure State, 11 April 2006.