Key developments since May 2005: There were two isolated instances of farmers using antipersonnel mines to protect crops. Clearance of the Victoria Falls-Mlibizi minefield was completed in October 2005. A total of 25,959 mines were destroyed in the minefield, including 6,959 in 2005. In May 2006, Zimbabwe reported that only half of its minefields had been cleared, leaving a significant challenge in meeting the 1 March 2009 treaty deadline. Mine risk education in mine-affected areas resumed in 2006. In 2005, 14 new casualties including seven children were recorded. Seven Zimbabweans were also involved in landmine accidents in Afghanistan and Taiwan in 2005.
The Republic of Zimbabwe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 18 June 1998 and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. In January 2001, Zimbabwe enacted the Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act 2000, which incorporates the treaty into Zimbabwe’s domestic law.[1]
On 5 December 2005, Zimbabwe submitted its sixth Article 7 transparency report, covering calendar year 2005.[2] It included voluntary Form J.[3]
Zimbabwe attended the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb in November-December 2005, and made a statement on its mine clearance activities. It was also present at intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in June 2005 and May 2006, where it made presentations on mine clearance.
In May 2006, Zimbabwe provided additional details to Landmine Monitor regarding its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3. With regard to Article 1, “Zimbabwe made it quite clear that in the event that she is involved in joint operations with a non-State Party, her forces will not assist or participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines. She also made clear that her troops remain bound by our domestic laws even if they are operating beyond our borders. If they violate this or any other act while on external operations, they are liable for prosecution in Zimbabwe.”[4]
Commenting on the issue of foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, Zimbabwe stated that “the Convention clearly bans this activity.... Zimbabwe will therefore not under any circumstance assist, stockpile or allow transit of antipersonnel mines by non-state actors or foreign stockpiles on its territory.”[5]
Regarding Article 2, “Zimbabwe’s view is that since an antivehicle mine with an antihandling device is designed to be exploded by contact of a person rather than a vehicle, this is banned under this convention. The fact that the mine is labeled antivehicle does not exempt it from the category of mines banned by the convention if an antihandling device or sensitive fuse is used.... Therefore, any mine with sensitive fuses that can function as an antipersonnel mine is banned unless it is used in the remote control mode.”[6]
With respect to Article 3 and mines retained for training, “Zimbabwe made it quite clear that she agrees with most States Parties that these mines should be in the hundreds or thousands and not in tens of thousands. Zimbabwe actually set an early example by retaining only 700 mines, we think this is a clear statement of our view. Zimbabwe also supports and will adopt the new and voluntary expanded reporting format for form D on mines retained. In the future, we will give additional information on the actual use of these mines.”[7]
In February 2006, a national newspaper reported that local farmers were using antipersonnel mines in Mukoso village, Rushinga district, along the country’s northeastern border with Mozambique.[8] According to the report, an unnamed 40-year-old man was killed in 2005 when 12 antipersonnel landmines he had collected in Mozambique exploded as he carried them across the border. His wife stated that they used mines to scare warthogs off their farmland. A week after the incident, another farmer told local police that he had planted 28 antipersonnel mines around his maize crop. According to the director of the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), a demining team was sent to inspect and demine the area where the incident occurred and mine risk education (MRE) teams conducted an awareness campaign in the area.[9] The ZIMAC director stressed that these were isolated incidents, and not a widespread practice among farmers.[10]
The government opted not to take measures to prosecute the farmer who confessed to laying 28 mines in his fields under the domestic law prohibiting any use of antipersonnel mines. The director of ZIMAC explained to Landmine Monitor that the decision by the police not to prosecute the farmer was based on a number of factors: the farmer volunteered the information and prosecuting him would send a wrong message to others not to volunteer information in the future; the farmer had no criminal intent and did not realize he had committed a crime, and the police and ZIMAC felt that carrying out intense MRE campaigns in the area in order to discourage such practices would be more beneficial than to prosecute one individual. He said that, funds permitting, posters similar to those used in Cambodia explaining the penalties for possession and use of antipersonnel mines would be printed and posted in police stations, schools, business centers and elsewhere. He also stated that after the MRE campaigns “earmarked for the area and similar places that are already taking place, future violations will be prosecuted accordingly.”[11]
The government now maintains that there has been no mine production since independence.[12] Previous official sources indicated Zimbabwe was a past producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, but not a significant one.[13] On 15 November 2000, Zimbabwe destroyed its stockpile of 4,092 antipersonnel mines.[14]
Zimbabwe has retained 700 mines for training purposes (500 PMD-6 and 200 R2M2 mines). According to its Article 7 reports, none of the retained mines have been consumed (destroyed) during training activities. Zimbabwe has stated, “The mines will be used during training of our troops and deminers in order to enable them to identify and learn how to detect, handle, neutralize and destroy the mines in our minefields.”[15] But, Zimbabwe has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines―a step agreed to by States Parties in the Nairobi Action Plan that emerged from the First Review Conference in November-December 2004. Zimbabwe did not use the new expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines, which States Parties agreed to at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005.
Zimbabwe has acknowledged that it also stockpiles Claymore-type mines, but without tripwire fuzes because Zimbabwe considers these illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty.[16]
Zimbabwe’s remaining landmine problem is primarily the legacy of minefields laid between 1976 and 1979 by the Rhodesian army along the northern and eastern borders of the country to disrupt the supply lines of liberation movements operating out of Zambia and Mozambique. Combat between the two sides also resulted in a large amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[17] Zimbabwe’s Five-Year Mine Action Plan (2005-2009) declared that four provinces were affected by landmines while all nine provinces were affected by UXO.[18]
It is estimated that between 1.5 and 1.8 million mines were emplaced along 700 kilometers, affecting a total area of 210 square kilometers.[19] The minefields were laid in standard patterns and were marked with warning signs.[20] ZIMAC estimates that 45 percent of the contaminated areas have since been cleared.[21] Zimbabwe’s Article 7 report of December 2005 detailed the location of seven minefields, including Victoria Falls to Mlibizi area, for which clearance was completed at the end of October 2005. The remaining mined areas are Msengezi to Nyamapanda South (205 kilometers), Stapleford Forest to Mutare (50 kilometers), Burma Valley (three kilometers), Junction Gate to Jersey Tea Estate (75 kilometers), Malvernia (Sango) to Crooks Corner (50 kilometers) and Kariba power station where mines were laid in an area of just over 1 hectare (10,000 square meters) in 1966 to protect it.[22]
The Msengezi to Nyamapanda South, Stapleford Forest to Mutare and Burma Valley minefields were all reported to have been partially cleared in the past.[23] In addition, an area described as Lusulu in Gwayi, Matabeleland North, is suspected to be mined. The area was partially cleared in 2002, but still remains dangerous.[24] In a statement made at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005, Zimbabwe declared that a stretch of land “over 350 kilometers long, or covering an area of about 110 square kilometers, still needs to be cleared.”[25] In April 2006, ZIMAC reported that after a field visit to the Malvernia to Crooks Corner area at the end of 2005, a small, parallel minefield was discovered, raising estimates of the contaminated area from 50 to 70 kilometers.[26]
Zimbabwe’s minefields have been reported as hampering development in the country. In certain areas, farming activities, tourism, mining and agro-forestry industries have failed to expand or even commence, and some communities have been denied distribution of electricity or access to water. The construction of bridges, schools, roads and boreholes has also been hindered.[27]
Zimbabwe’s mine action bodies were established in early 2002, though no national legislation was adopted. According to the director of ZIMAC, they were established “through an internal communication from the Ministry of Defence.”[28]
National Mine Action Authority: The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAZ), responsible for policy-making and the regulation of mine action activities, is chaired by a deputy secretary in the Ministry of Defence and comprises representatives from various ministries, including the ministries of health, environment, tourism, foreign affairs, local government, public service, labor and social welfare. NAMAZ last met in June 2005 to review the progress of mine action activities and discuss the mine action plan. According to ZIMAC’s director, as of April 2006, no new meetings had been scheduled “as no new decisions need to be taken by NAMAZ.”[29]
Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre: The Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre implements, coordinates and manages all mine action activities.[30] The National Demining Office (NDO) was established in 1998 with the assistance of the United States to coordinate all demining activities and conduct mine risk education under the supervision of ZIMAC. ZIMAC has also established a victim assistance office and a mine risk education (MRE) office.[31] ZIMAC claims that due to lack of funding, the Centre is not fully staffed and most employees have other unrelated responsibilities. The victim assistance office did not conduct any activities in 2005.[32]
ZIMAC does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). As of April 2006, it used a database created locally with assistance from the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Technical Committee on Mine Action.[33] However, ZIMAC states that it would adopt IMSMA if assistance and training were provided.[34]
ZIMAC reported in April 2006 that it is not using the appropriate standards to conduct clearance operations and that it was in the process of drafting international mine action standards, which will have to be approved by NAMAZ.[35]
In August 2004, in preparation for the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Zimbabwe drafted a five-year mine action plan for the period 2005-2009. The plan had three main objectives: clearance of all mined areas by 2009, depending on adequate national and international funding; MRE in all schools in the four affected provinces throughout the five years and to initiate community-based MRE programs in all mine-affected districts by 2009; and basic assistance to mine victims/survivors as part of their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.[36]
The plan sets clearance targets for each year: 2005―clearance of the 50 kilometer Gonarezhou National Park (including the Malvernia to Crooks Corner minefield);[37] 2006-2007―clearance of the 205 kilometer Rwenya-Musengezi minefield; 2008―clearance of the 50 kilometer Sheba Forest to Beacon Hill minefield;[38] and 2009―clearance of the 78 kilometer minefield in Manicaland province.[39] According to the director of ZIMAC, the priorities have been set on the basis of the threat to communities and the impact on economic development.[40]
Clearance of the remaining portion of the 220 kilometer minefield from Victoria Falls to Mlibizi, scheduled for completion in 2004, was not achieved until the end of October 2005 due to delays in the availability of resources. Clearance of the Malvernia (Sango) to Crooks Corner minefield in Gonarezhou National Park was reported to have started in early May 2006.[41]
The 2005-2009 plan does not refer to the Burma valley minefield and the Kariba power station. In April 2006, ZIMAC explained that demining in Burma Valley will take place at the same time as the Stapleford Forest to Mutare (Sheba Forest-Beacon Hill) clearance operations, as it is relatively close and a small minefield.
ZIMAC has also claimed that the Kariba power station was never considered as a major minefield―“it was suspected to contain mines a few years ago, but not to the extent of other minefields” ―and was not therefore part of the plan.[42] The UNMAS assessment carried out in 2000 stated that “the team was advised that details on mined locations inside the Kariba power station area remain classified. The team was also advised that the military will clear these mines once the capacity exists and priorities change. As this area is an access-restricted military location, any mines that remain there do not pose a problem to the civilian population.”[43] In May 2006, ZIMAC explained that clearance of the Kariba power station would be dealt with after all other areas have been cleared, as it is not affecting the civilian population; it plans to do so within the timeframe of the Mine Ban Treaty, subject to funding.[44]
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Zimbabwe must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2009.
At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Zimbabwe noted that only half of its minefields had been cleared, leaving a significant challenge in attempting to clear all mined areas by 1 March 2009.[45] Clearance of the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield took seven years. Zimbabwe stated that it remains committed to meet its 2009 deadline and is prepared to work with any State Party or organization that shares the same vision.[46] However, it claimed that lack of funds remain the major obstacle to complying with the treaty deadline.[47]
The only organization which undertook demining activities in Zimbabwe in 2005 was the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). The ZNA demining corps consists of a full “squadron” of between 150 and 200 people, deployed in three teams.[48] It also has a survey team.[49] Only manual demining is conducted in Zimbabwe as “the minefields are old and therefore, it would be too difficult for dogs to detect mines.”[50] ZIMAC reports that quality assurance is conducted internally. When operations are completed, the cleared land is first officially handed over to the central government (Ministry of Local Government), which then hands it on to the local administration.[51]
ZIMAC has eight explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, one in each of Zimbabwe’s major cities. They respond to requests from the police, who are called by local communities when UXO or mines are found.
At least two other demining organizations are based in Zimbabwe, though neither conducts clearance in the country.[52] MineTech International, a commercial demining company, recruits locally and sends deminers to operations around the world for short contracts. When in Zimbabwe, they often work as security guards. In January 2006, about 100 staff were deployed by MineTech around the world.[53] ECOMINE, which was set up in 2004, is subcontracted by a South African company to recruit and train staff to work in Sudan and Eritrea. In January 2006, it had 14 deminers in Sudan and 27 in Eritrea.[54]
No survey has been conducted since January 2004.[55] Previously, two surveys were carried out by MineTech: a technical survey in 2001 in the Malvernia to Crooks Corner area and an extensive nationwide general survey in 1994 (this excluded the Kariba power station). In 1997, a survey was also completed by a demining contractor sponsored by the UN in preparation for clearance of the Rwenya-Msengezi area.[56]
The UNMAS joint assessment report concluded in 2000 that “due to the fact that the locations of the minefields are well known and well documented, a Level 1 ‘Impact Survey’ is not required in Zimbabwe. The existing Level 1 ‘General Survey’ conducted by MineTech provides sufficient information to meet the requirements of current and future planning.”[57] However, Zimbabwe reports that the minefield in Lusulu, referred to above, was discovered in 2002 by ZNA deminers and remains to be surveyed.[58] A general survey of an area of seven kilometers in Lusulu was planned for 2006, as well as a re-survey for Burma Valley.[59] Neither of these activities had started as of April 2006.[60] The Kariba power station also remains to be surveyed.[61]
ZIMAC reported that the Zimbabwean minefields were previously fenced, but this was removed by locals for their own use. However, ZIMAC stated that boundaries of minefields are still visible, given that posts were placed in concrete, and warning signs on beacons also mean that the population is well-informed. ZIMAC does not intend to put any other fencing or marking as it believes that this will be removed by locals.[62]
Clearance of the 220 kilometer Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield, which started in 1998, was completed in October 2005. A total of 25,959 mines were destroyed in this minefield, 6,959 of them in 2005.[63] On 4 March 2006, a ceremony to hand over this area to local communities took place with the participation of the President of Zimbabwe. Clearance of the minefield is said to have led to the release of vital natural resources for the tourism industry, land for resettlement, grazing areas for domestic animals, as well as the development of infrastructure.[64] Land was reported to be used by the local population as soon as clearance operations were completed on some stretches of the minefield.[65] According to ZIMAC, this included agricultural activities; it claimed that timber would soon be exploited in the region.[66]
Clearance teams were deployed to begin operations in the Malvernia to Crooks Corner minefield on 8 May 2006.[67] In May 2006, Zimbabwe declared that the national budget for 2006 had allocated US$270,000 for demining operations.[68]
In February 2006, the ZNA Engineers Squadron and police destroyed 28 antipersonnel mines that a farmer had planted to protect his maize crops.[69] ZIMAC reports that 147 pieces of UXO were found by EOD teams in 2005. A total of 1,753 UXO have been reported destroyed since 1995.[70]
No deminer injuries were reported in Zimbabwe in 2005.[71] In April 2005, two deminers from MineTech were killed and one was seriously injured while working on Kinmen Island, Taiwan. Also in 2005, two other staff were killed and a third injured during clearance operations in Afghanistan.[72]
Between 1998 and 2005, 13 deminers have been injured while demining the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield.[73] ZNA deminers get the same compensation and medical coverage as other soldiers in the army. They are not covered by any other specific insurance.[74]
HIV/AIDS among ZNA deminers was said by ZIMAC not to constitute a problem since “deminers are from the military and therefore obey certain codes of conduct.”[75]
Zimbabwe reported on MRE activities in its Article 7 report for 2005, as in previous years.[76] It reported that in 2005, MRE was carried out at “growth points,” schools, agricultural shows, cattle dip tanks and health institutions. However, due to lack of financial resources, most activities were restricted to trade fairs and provincial and district agricultural shows. The director of ZIMAC noted, “People who live in far remote border areas do not benefit from these campaigns yet they are the most vulnerable since they live closer to the mined areas.”[77]
In October 2005, ZIMAC invited the local office of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for a briefing on MRE operations. As a result, it donated $10,000 for MRE in Zimbabwe; the funds were used to produce materials such as T-shirts, rulers, exercise books, pens and pencils, and to provide per diems for MRE teams including officers from the Civil Protection, local authorities and ZIMAC members.[78]
ZIMAC has 15 qualified MRE personnel. Initial MRE training-of-trainers was provided by US Army personnel and civilians in 1998. ZIMAC regularly undertakes refresher trainings facilitated by its own training staff.[79]
In February 2006, a 10-day campaign was conducted in communities living along the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield on the border with Mozambique and South Africa where clearance operations were due to begin in May 2006. Audiences totaling 1,864 persons attended 11 sessions; MRE was planned to continue during clearance operations. A second campaign was scheduled for May 2006 at Mukumbura on the northeastern border with Zambia and Mozambique, for communities living in the area of the Mukumbura to Rwenya minefield, in view of casualties occurring there in 2005-2006.[80]
Zimbabwe’s mine action plan 2005-2009 set key objectives for MRE: “To initiate and provide comprehensive and effective MRE programmes in all schools in the four affected provinces throughout the 5 years, initiating community-based MRE in all villages, business centers and towns in all mine-affected districts by 2009.”[81] According to ZIMAC’s director, “the biggest challenge is funding especially the provision of fuel. The other challenge is the non-availability of four-wheel drive vehicles to negotiate rugged terrain in remote areas. Production of campaign products is another area of concern. Visual aids like televisions, videos and public address systems are also necessary aids which are not adequately provided for.” Training of additional MRE officers was needed due to staff turnover, and “assistance in this regard will be welcome especially on the methodologies evolving elsewhere in the world just to keep in step.”[82]
In 2005, ZIMAC recorded 14 new mine/UXO casualties; however, it notes that several cases have likely not been reported because of remoteness of areas where incidents occur. Four men were killed and five people injured in mine incidents, including a seven-year-old boy who suffered facial injuries, and three teenagers under 18 years who had leg amputations. Most mine incidents occurred in Mukumbura region. One incident involved an 80-year-old man who died in the Chilohlela minefield.[83] Additionally, three children were killed and two men were injured in three UXO incidents as of September 2005.[84] This is a significant increase compared to 2004, when ZIMAC reported four men injured in two UXO incidents, but no landmine casualties. However, the 2005 casualty rate is lower than the 26 casualties recorded in 2003.[85]
Casualties continued to be recorded in 2006, with three people killed in landmine incidents as of May 2006. ZIMAC recorded a landmine incident resulting in the death of two children whose ages and sex were not specified.[86] In March 2006, at the Msengezi to Rwenya minefield, a 40-year-old man was killed by the explosion of 12 antipersonnel mines he had collected.[87]
The total number of mine/UXO casualties in Zimbabwe is unknown as no comprehensive records are available. Zimbabwe has reported that nationwide casualty data is being collected in order to establish a database, but that lack of funding is preventing completion of the project.[88]
In 2005, four Zimbabweans were killed and three were seriously injured while conducting mine clearance operations in Taiwan and Afghanistan.[89]
Zimbabwe submitted the voluntary Form J with its annual Article 7 report for 2005, to report on victim assistance activities.[90]
Zimbabwe’s healthcare system has reportedly deteriorated due to poor funding and a lack of qualified medical staff, putting pressure on limited available resources and impacting access and quality of services.[91] Access to health services is difficult for mine survivors living in remote areas. Emergency medical care and basic prostheses are provided free of charge, but follow-up medical services and replacement of mobility devices are paid for by survivors and their families.[92] The government allocated 12 percent of the national budget to the Ministry of Health for 2006, the same amount as in 2005.[93] Budget priorities include hospital construction and rehabilitation, provision of ambulances, drugs and medical equipment. The government was reported to have approved $2 billion for the Health Services Board, which aims to improve salaries and conditions of health workers. However, government officials and health experts consider that the budget will not be able to address the “brain drain” affecting the sector.[94]
ZIMAC includes a Victim Assistance, Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Resettlement Office; however, there is no comprehensive landmine survivor assistance program. Assistance for all people with disabilities is the responsibility of the Social Dimension Fund of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, with some activities implemented through the National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped.[95]
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) supports two rehabilitation centers, the Bulawayo Orthopaedic Centre and the Parirenyatwa Orthopaedic Centre. In 2005, Bulawayo provided 80 new prostheses and 536 new ortheses to people with disabilities. SFD sponsored a Zimbabwean technician from the Bulawayo Centre on a three-year degree course in prosthetic/orthotic technology at the Tanzania Training Centre for Orthopaedic Technologists. It also sponsored a technician and manager of the center to participate in courses on clinical methods of lower-limb prosthetic fitting and management at the regional SFD regional training center in Addis Ababa.[96]
In 2005, Parirenyatwa Orthopaedic Centre provided 308 new prostheses and 432 new orthoses. SFD provided polypropylene components and raw materials and organized follow-up visits. Two technicians and a deputy manager participated in training courses at the SFD regional training center in Addis Ababa on clinical methods for lower-limb prostheses fitting, production of upper-limb prostheses in polypropylene and management. One technician was also sponsored to attend a three-year diploma course at the Tanzania Training Centre.[97]
In March 2005, the Cuban government, through a bilateral agreement, sent 50 medical doctors to work in eight provincial health centers in Zimbabwe. This group joined the 175 Cuban health workers based in Zimbabwe since 2004.[98]
Other organizations working with people with disabilities include the Dorothy Duncan Center for the Blind and Physically Disabled, Ruwa Rehabilitation Center and Danhiko Rehabilitation Center.[99]
Zimbabwe has legislation to protect the rights of people with disabilities. However, lack of resources for training and education has severely limited job placement for the disabled.[100]
[1] Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 December 2003. The ICBL expressed concern about a provision in the Act relating to joint military operations with a country not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 176.
[2] Zimbabwe submitted Article 7 reports on 11 January 2000, 4 April 2001, 13 February 2003, 1 December 2003 and 8 July 2005.
[3] A revised Form J (15 May 2006) was subsequently submitted to Landmine Monitor; see Mine Risk Education section of this report.
[4] “Response to LM Draft Report for Zimbabwe,” from Col. J. Munongwa, Director, Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), 30 May 2006. Zimbabwe made a similar statement at the intersessional meetings in May 2002, when it informed States Parties that it would not participate in planning and implementing activities related to antipersonnel mine use in joint operations, and that its troops remained bound by “our domestic laws even if they are operating beyond our borders.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 532, for more detail on Zimbabwe’s statement.
[5] “Response to LM Draft Report for Zimbabwe,” from Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 30 May 2006.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Tawanda Kanhema, “Farmers turn to landmines to protect crops from animals,” The Herald (Harare) via COMTEX, 18 February 2006.
[9] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[10] “Response to LM Draft Report for Zimbabwe,” from Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 30 May 2006.
[11] Ibid; interview with Col. J. Munongwa, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[12] The government stated, “Rhodesia, before Zimbabwe became independent, had the capacity to manufacture claymores. The processing plant was decommissioned before independence in 1980. Zimbabwe never had any capability to produce any type of anti-personnel or any other mine.” Article 7 Report, Form E, 5 December 2005. Similar language is contained in previous Article 7 reports.
[13] Earlier statements by Zimbabwe government sources and others indicated that production of two types of Claymore mines, the Z1 and ZAPS, ended when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, while production of PloughShare mines was stopped between 1990 and 1993. For more information on past production and export, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 97-99. The UN monitoring mission (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo seized Z1 Claymore mines from non-state armed groups in 2003. Landmine Monitor has photographs of the mines, provided by Amnesty International during a 2005 field mission.
[14] Zimbabwe destroyed 3,846 PMD-6 mines and 246 R2M2 mines. Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 July 2005.
[15] Article 7 Report, Form B, 5 December 2005.
[16] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Geneva, 4 February 2003.
[17] UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “Joint Assessment Report on Zimbabwe,” 15 February 2000, p. 4.
[18] ZIMAC, “Zimbabwe’s Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005-2009,” p. 1. Landmine Monitor Report 2005 mentioned both a “Five-Year action Plan 2004-2009” and an “Implementation Plan 2005-2009.” ZIMAC reported that their current strategy was drafted in preparation for the First Review Conference, for the period 2005–2009.
[19] UNMAS, “Joint Assessment Report on Zimbabwe,” 15 February 2000, p. 3; ZIMAC, “Zimbabwe’s Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005-2009,” p. 1.
[20] Martin R. Rupyia, “Landmines in Zimbabwe: a Deadly Legacy,” (Harare: Sapes Books, 1988), p. 20; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 635.
[21] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 January 2006.
[22] Article 7 Report, Form C, 5 December 2005. In this report, the spellings Stapleford and Stappleford are both used.
[23] Almost half of the area (130 kilometers) of Msengezi to Nyamapanda South is said to have been cleared by a commercial company; the contract ended in December 2000 and no further clearance has since been conducted. On the Stapleford Forest to Mutare area, some “minor gaps” were cleared, including a 1.5 kilometer stretch at Forbes Border Post in Mutare. The Burma Valley minefield was once partially cleared (mechanically), but is still dangerous. Article 7 Report, Form C, 5 December 2005.
[24] Article 7 Report, Form C, 5 December 2005.
[25] Statement by Zimbabwe, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb 28 November-2 Devember 2005.
[26] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006.
[27] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 27 March 2005; see also Zimbabwe, “Communicating elements of plans to implement Article 5,” August 2004, p. 1.
[28] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 15 May 2006.
[29] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006, and interview in Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[30] ZIMAC, “Zimbabwe’s Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005–2009,” p. 5.
[31] Interviews with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 January, and in Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[32] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006.
[33] For more information on the SADC database, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 882.
[34] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006.
[35] Ibid.
[36] ZIMAC, “Zimbabwe’s Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005–2009,” pp. 6-9.
[37] After a field visit at the end of 2005, this minefield was estimated to be 70 kilometers in length.
[38] Also referred to as the Stapleford Forest to Mutare minefield. Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006.
[39] ZIMAC, “Zimbabwe’s Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005–2009,” p. 6.
[40] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 January 2006.
[41] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006, and interview in Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[42] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006.
[43] UNMAS, “Joint Assessment Report on Zimbabwe,” 15 February 2000, p. 10.
[44] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[45] Statement by Zimbabwe, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[46] Statement by Zimbabwe, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, Croatia, 28 November-2 December 2006.
[47] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 January 2006.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 April 2006.
[50] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 January 2005.
[51] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 April 2006.
[52] A third operator, South African Demining Service, has a functioning headquarters in Harare, but has not carried out any operations in the last two years. Interview with staff at South African Demining Service, Harare, 20 January 2006.
[53] Interview with Max Dyck, Operations Director, MineTech, Harare, 20 January 2006.
[54] Interview with Normore Shanya, ECOMINE, 20 January 2006.
[55] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 January 2006.
[56] UNMAS, “Joint Assessment Report on Zimbabwe,” 15 February 2000, p. 9; ZIMAC, “Zimbabwe’s Five Year Mine Action Plan: 2005–2009,” p. 3.
[57] UNMAS, “Joint Assessment Report on Zimbabwe,” 15 February 2000, p. 9.
[58] Article 7 Report, Form C, 5 December 2005.
[59] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 January 2006.
[60] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 April 2006.
[61] Article 7 Report, Form C, 5 December 2005.
[62] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 April 2006.
[63] Statement by Zimbabwe, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Croatia 28 November-2 December 2005. Zimbabwe does not report on the number of UXO destroyed during mine clearance operations. ZIMAC’s director explained that demining teams simply did not tally the number of UXO found and destroyed. Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 21 April 2006, and interview, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[64] “President hands over demined land to Matebeleland North,” The Herald, 4 March 2006; telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 April 2006.
[65] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 April 2006.
[66] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Geneva, 8 May 2006.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Statement by Zimbabwe, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 10 May 2006.
[69] “Farmers turn to landmines to protect crops from animals,” The Herald, 18 February 2006.
[70] These figures include only the destruction of UXO reported by Zimbabwe’s EOD teams and are said to underestimate the total number of items of UXO destroyed as army personnel also conduct such activities, but do not report it. Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 21 April 2006.
[71] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 April 2006.
[72] Interview with Max Dyck, MineTech, Harare, 20 January 2006; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638.
[73] Article 7 Report, Form J (revised version of 15 May 2006).
[74] Telephone interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, Harare, 19 April 2006.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Article 7 Report, Form I, 5 December 2005.
[77] Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 May, and interview, Geneva, 12 May 2006. “Growth Points” are areas of economic growth in the rural areas of Zimbabwe. They have been developed after independence to curb rural-urban migration and facilitate development in the once neglected rural areas. Each district has a growth point and they act as development nuclei in the rural areas.
[78] Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 May 2006.
[79] Ibid, and interview, Geneva, 12 May 2006.
[80] Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 May 2006.
[81] Zimbabwe, “Communicating Elements of Plans to Implement Article 5,” August 2004, pp. 7-9; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638.
[82] Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 May, and interview, Geneva, 12 May 2006.
[83] Article 7 Report, Form J (revised version, 15 May 2006).
[84] Email to Landmine Monitor (HI) from Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, 19 September 2005.
[85] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 885.
[86] Article 7 Report, Form J (revised version 15 May 2006).
[87] “President hands over demined land to Matabeleland North,” The Herald, 4 March 2006.
[88] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638.
[89] In addition to incidents noted in Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638, on 2 October 2005 a Zimbabwean MineTech deminer was injured during clearance activities. Morris Mkwate, “Landmine shatters ex-soccer star’s leg,” The Herald, 17 October 2005.
[90] Article 7 Report, Form J, 5 December 2005, and revised version 15 May 2006.
[91] World Health Organization (WHO), “Zimbabwe Health Sector Needs Assessment,” www.who.int, accessed 19 March 2006; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638.
[92] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638.
[93] WHO, “Health in Action Crisis, Zimbabwe,” December 2005, p. 2, www.who.int, accessed 19 March 2006.
[94] Southern African Migration Project, “Health budget fails to address brain drain,” IRIN (Zimbabwe), 16 December 2005.
[95] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 885-886.
[96] ICRC, “Special Fund for the Disabled Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, 10 March 2006, p. 19.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Southern African Migration Project, “Cuban doctors working in Zimbabwean hospitals,” Zimbabwean Situation.com, 19 March 2005.
[99] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 639.
[100] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Zimbabwe,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 638.