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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and is a formal program of the ICBL-CMC.
For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor2@icblcmc.org.
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes an effort to limit the environmental footprint of reports by publishing all of our research reports online. This report is available online.
Detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org/cp

CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions and prevent further harm from these weapons. The CMC works through its members to change the policy and practice of governments and organizations and to raise awareness of the devastation that cluster munitions cause.

The CMC is committed to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions and for destroying stockpiles, clearing contaminated areas, and assisting affected communities.

The CMC calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of cluster munitions;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants in cluster munition-contaminated areas; and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all cluster munition and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims.
PREFACE

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions pose significant dangers to civilians for two principal reasons: their impact at the time of use and their deadly legacy. Launched from the ground or dropped from the air, cluster munitions consist of containers that open and disperse submunitions indiscriminately over a wide area, claiming both civilian and military victims. Many explosive submunitions, also known as bomblets, fail to detonate as designed when they are dispersed, becoming *de facto* landmines that kill and maim indiscriminately long after the conflict has ended and create barriers to socio-economic development.

To protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions, Norway and other like-minded countries initiated a fast-track diplomatic process in 2006 aimed at creating a new international treaty. Working in partnership with United Nations (UN) agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and civil society organizations grouped under the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), the fast-track Oslo Process resulted in the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008.

The tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions was marked on 1 August 2020. The convention prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. It also requires destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years, clearance of cluster munition remnants within 10 years, and assistance to victims, including those injured by submunitions as well as the families of those injured or killed, and affected communities.

The convention’s First Meeting of States Parties was held in November 2010 in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic—the country with the highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions. States Parties adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, a 66-point action plan to guide their work until the convention’s First Review Conference. The 2015 Dubrovnik Action Plan and 2021 Lausanne Action Plan were respectively adopted at the first and second review conferences, listing concrete steps to further implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions in the periods from 2015 to 2020 and from 2022 to 2026.

CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

Launched by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in November 2003, the CMC plays a crucial facilitating role in leading global civil society action in favor of the ban on cluster
munitions. With campaign contacts in more than 100 countries, the CMC works for the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In January 2011, the CMC merged with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for both the CMC and the ICBL, on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty respectively. Created by the ICBL as Landmine Monitor in June 1998, the initiative became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC in 2008 and changed its name in 2010 to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, known simply as "the Monitor."

The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems. Established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation, the Monitor has put into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts. It has become the de facto monitoring regime for both treaties, monitoring and reporting on States Parties' implementation and compliance, and more generally, assessing the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor's reporting complements transparency reporting by states required under the treaties, and reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable for the legal obligations they have accepted with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection and analysis of publicly available information, including via field missions in some instances. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring in order to benefit the international community as a whole. It aims to promote and advance discussion in support of the goal of a world free of landmines and cluster munitions.

A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of all the ICBL-CMC’s research and monitoring, including the Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Editorial Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all the Monitor research products. To prepare this report, an Editorial Team gathered information with the aid of a global reporting network comprised of more than a dozen researchers with the assistance of CMC campaigners.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved, and as was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought in the spirit of dialogue and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on this important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 13th annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Landmine Monitor report, which has been issued annually since 1999.

Cluster Munition Monitor 2022 covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally; and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. While its principal frame
of reference is the Convention on Cluster Munitions, other relevant international law is reviewed, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The report focuses on calendar year 2021, with information included up to August 2022 where possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors with the support of a significant number of donors. Country-specific contributions were received from a network of at least 20 Monitor researchers covering more than 30 countries. The researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org.

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their review of the content of the report and their assistance in the release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of six NGOs, as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s members include: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Danish Refugee Council (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Monitor research team leaders (Ban Policy: Stephen Goose; Impact: Loren Persi Vicentic; and Support for Mine Action: Marion Loddo), and relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer, Hector Guerra, and Marion Loddo).

From January to August 2022, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for Cluster Munition Monitor 2022. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban Policy**: Mary Wareham, Susan Aboeid, Stephen Goose, Mark Hiznay, and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan;
- **Impact**: Loren Persi Vicentic, Ruth Bottomley, and Audrey Torrecilla; and
- **Support for Mine Action**: Marion Loddo.

This edition also comprises and builds on earlier contributions from Éléa Boureux and Jacqulyn Kantack.

Marion Loddo (Monitor Editorial Manager) provided final editing in July and August 2022 with assistance from Michael Hart (Publications Consultant).

Report and cover design was created by Michael Sherwin. Maps were created by Maria Angela Torri. ATAR printed the report in Switzerland. The front cover photograph was provided by Sergey Bobok/Agence France Presse (AFP) and back cover photographs were provided by Syria Civil Defence (also known as the White Helmets). Additional photographs found within Cluster Munition Monitor 2022 were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor financial contributors. In 2022, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 1 August 2022):

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- Government of Canada
- Government of Germany
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of New Zealand
- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Holy See

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor's supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.
### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>cluster bomb unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>confirmed hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>cluster munition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPICM</td>
<td>dual-purpose improved conventional munition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EORE</td>
<td>explosive ordnance risk education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Humanity &amp; Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>non-technical survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>technical survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**GLOSSARY**

**Battle area clearance (BAC)** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cluster bomb** – Air-dropped cluster munition.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

**Confirmed hazardous area (CHA)** – An area where the presence of landmines, mine, unexploded submunition or bomblet, and other ERW (mines/ERW) contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Convention on Cluster Munitions** – An international convention adopted in May 2008 and opened for signature in December 2008, which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The United Nations Secretary-General is the depository. The convention prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. It also requires stockpile destruction, clearance, and victim assistance.

**Diversity** – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person's social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

**Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM)** – A type of cluster munition that can be used against both personnel and material targets, including armor.

**Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising the awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

**Explosive remnants of war (ERW)** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Gender** – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

**Humanitarian mine action (HMA)** – All activities aiming at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes: survey and assessment, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

**Interoperability** – In relation to Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, interoperability refers to joint military operations with states not party to the convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.

**Intersectionality** – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to create layers of inequality.
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) – For the Monitor’s purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.


Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Self-destruct mechanism – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an “incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated.”

Self-deactivating – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, automatically rendering a munition inoperable by making an essential component (e.g. a battery) non-functional.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded submunitions or unexploded bomblets – Submunitions or bomblets that have failed to explode as intended at the time of use, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were prepared to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalization or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities.”
## Table Key

<table>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>Countries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 August 2022</td>
<td>Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 August 2022</td>
<td>Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 August 2022</td>
<td>Tajikistan, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan</td>
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- Mauritius
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- Namibia
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- Gabon
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Cluster Munition Monitor 2022
Syrian boys receive explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) from a Syria Civil Defence clearance team in the city of Azaz, Aleppo governorate, Syria.

© Syria Civil Defence, August 2021
MAJOR FINDINGS

As of 1 August 2022

STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- The convention is in good standing, with a total of 110 States Parties and 13 signatories. The last ratifications and accessions were in 2020, which shows how the pace of universalization has slowed.
- A resolution by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) promoting the convention was adopted in December 2021 by 146 states, including 36 non-signatories to the convention. Russia was the only country to vote against it.

USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- There have been no reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the adoption of the convention in May 2008.
- Ukraine is the only country in the world where cluster munitions are being used as of August 2022. Russia has used cluster munitions extensively since invading Ukraine on 24 February 2022, while Ukrainian forces appear to have used them at least three times in the war. Neither Russia nor Ukraine have joined the convention.
- There were no reports of new cluster munition use in any other country during the reporting period (from August 2021 to July 2022). The last reported cluster munition use in Syria was in March 2021, but attacks could have gone unrecorded.

CASUALTIES AND CONTAMINATION

- Globally, 149 new cluster munition casualties were recorded in 2021, killing 59 and leaving 90 injured. This is a sharp decline compared to the 360 casualties in 2020.
- All casualties reported in 2021 were caused by cluster munition remnants, marking the first year since 2011 that there were no new casualties resulting from cluster munition attacks.
• The significant reduction in the number of casualties observed in 2021 has been overshadowed by the devastating number of cluster munition attacks during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Preliminary data indicates at least 689 casualties reported during cluster munition attacks in Ukraine for the first half of 2022. Many casualties may have gone unrecorded.
• Unexploded submunitions disproportionally harm civilians, with children particularly at risk. In 2021:
  • Civilians represented 97% of all casualties, with 144 civilians killed or injured by cluster munitions.
  • Children accounted for 66% of all casualties where the age group was known, with 90 child casualties recorded. Lao PDR and Lebanon saw tragic incidents where groups of children playing with submunitions were killed and injured.
• A total of 29 countries and other areas are known or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, including 10 States Parties with clearance obligations.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
• Since the convention’s adoption in 2008, States Parties have collectively destroyed 99% of the total global cluster munition stocks that they declared, destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and 178 million submunitions.
• States Parties Bulgaria, Peru, and Slovakia destroyed a total of at least 1,658 stockpiled cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions during 2021 and the first half of 2022.
• Only 11 States Parties are retaining live cluster munitions for permitted research and training purposes, of which Belgium has the highest number.

CLEARANCE OF CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS
• In 2021, States Parties reported clearance of approximately 61km² of cluster munition contaminated land and the destruction of more than 81,000 submunitions. This is slightly below the 63.4km² reported cleared and similar to the 80,900 submunitions destroyed in 2020.
• Only Iraq and Somalia are working towards their original respective clearance deadlines, but neither is on target to meet them. The number of States Parties on track to achieve their obligations to clear all contaminated areas is decreasing.
• Three States Parties requested an extension to their clearance deadlines in 2022: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) until 2023, Chad until 2024, and Chile until 2026. Extension requests will be considered during the Tenth Meeting of States Parties.

RISK EDUCATION
• In 2021, the majority of affected States Parties provided risk education specifically targeting groups vulnerable to the threat of cluster munition remnants, including children, refugees, and hard-to-reach pastoral and nomadic groups.
• Age- and gender-disaggregated data on risk education beneficiaries was provided by Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia.
  • Men represented more than half of all direct beneficiaries of risk education (54%) in these six States Parties, with at least 472,400 men reached.
  • One-third of all direct beneficiaries were children (36%), with nearly 314,000 boys and girls reached.
• The socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic appeared to increase risks, with people forced to rely on harmful coping mechanisms. In Lao PDR and Lebanon, economic hardship was believed to have encouraged risk-taking as people tried to supplement diminishing livelihoods.

• Risk education continued to be carried out to alert communities to the risks of contamination from recent or ongoing conflicts in non-signatories Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other area Nagorno-Karabakh.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE
• Efforts to address the gaps in the accessibility and sustainability of rehabilitation services have been reported in most of the States Parties acknowledging responsibility for cluster munition victims. However, funding remains inadequate and insufficient to effectively implement victim assistance. Progress in the rehabilitation sector, the strongest area of assistance, was undermined by the economic situation and collapsing health systems in Afghanistan and Lebanon.

• Some limited progress was reported in ensuring survivor inclusion in social, economic, and educational activities in BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon.

• Measures to address the trauma and ongoing mental health impacts on cluster munition victims remain scarce and under-funded. Peer-to-peer support was among the most needed and least supported activities.

• The International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) on Victim Assistance was fully adopted in 2021. According to the standards, national authorities should play a role in monitoring and facilitating multisector efforts to address the needs of survivors and ensure their participation in the development of relevant national legislation and policies. These new standards were under consideration for use in Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon.

PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER
• None of the 16 countries that still produce cluster munitions, or reserve the right to do so, are party to the convention.

• Russia has continued to produce new cluster munitions and its armed forces have used at least two newly developed types of cluster munitions in Ukraine in 2022.

• There is no evidence to suggest that cluster munitions have been transferred among the weapons provided to the Ukrainian government in 2022.

• In the past, at least 15 countries have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
• A total of 102 States Parties have submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report as required by the convention, but eight have not done so, of which Cabo Verde and Comoros are more than a decade late.

• Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been sporadic as more than half of States Parties do not provide transparency reports annually.
NATIONAL LEGISLATION

- Niue enacted specific legislation to govern its implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty in 2021, making a total of 33 States Parties with specific implementation laws for the convention.
- Another 20 States Parties are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention, while 43 States Parties regard their existing laws and regulations as sufficient.
- Italy enacted legislation in December 2021 to prohibit companies from funding manufacturers of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.
The tail section of a cluster munition rocket embedded in the ground on a wheat field in Mykolaiv, Ukraine, amid the Russian invasion. The region is facing increased missile attacks and shelling as Russian forces bolster their military presence in the neighboring Kherson region.

© Maciek Musiałek/NurPhoto via APF, July 2022
INTRODUCTION

The Convention on Cluster Munitions seeks to prevent human suffering from cluster munitions, which are indiscriminate explosive weapons that impact a wide area and disperse multiple submunitions, many of which fail to detonate and pose a threat long after conflict ends.

The convention entered into force on 1 August 2010 and is in good standing, with a total of 110 States Parties and 13 signatories. There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use, production or transfers of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in Dublin, Ireland on 30 May 2008.

Upon adopting the convention, one government found that the strict new standard set by the agreement’s prohibitions would have “an immediate impact on the international cluster munitions market” and directly impact its own acquisition plans. There is increasing evidence that this has happened as cluster munitions are being phased out of service in many of the 47 countries with stocks that have not joined the convention.

The notable exception is Russia, which has used both old stocks of cluster munitions and newly developed ones extensively in Ukraine since its invasion of the country began on 24 February 2022. In a short period this new use has caused hundreds of civilian casualties and is destroying and damaging civilian infrastructure including homes, hospitals, and schools.

1 Only 16 of the 107 governments that participated in the Dublin negotiations and adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 May 2008 have not joined the convention: Argentina, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Adoption does not carry any legal obligations.

2 Finland stated that the convention “will have an immediate impact on the international cluster munitions market and, consequently, it will also affect Finland’s acquisition plans.” Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, “Agreement reached in cluster munitions negotiations,” 29 May 2008, bit.ly/FinlandPressRelease29May2008.

3 In 2013, there was reportedly “intense debate” in the General Staff of the Greek armed forces over procurement efforts to modernize the country’s ammunition for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) due to the apparent requirement that Greece “select and implement a solution...required by international treaty to ban cluster munitions.” See, “US-German ‘battle’ for Greek MLRS,” Defence Point, 19 December 2013, bit.ly/DefencePoint19Dec2013.
There have been some recorded instances of cluster munition use by the government of Ukraine during the 2022 war. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that cluster munitions, as defined by the convention, have been transferred among the artillery, rocket systems, and other weapons that the Ukrainian government has received from third parties in 2022.

The lack of cluster munition transfers to Ukraine reflects how three-quarters of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states have banned these weapons. It also shows how other states that have not banned cluster munitions are nonetheless quietly taking significant steps to align their policies and adapt their military practices to adhere with the convention’s prohibitions, including on assisting with any banned activities.

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine was roundly condemned at the May 2022 intersessional meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Held for the first time since 2015, the intersessional meetings provided an important opportunity to hear from Bulgaria, Peru, and Slovakia on their ongoing destruction of cluster munition stocks, which has resulted in the destruction of at least 1,658 cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions in 2021 and the first half of 2022. South Africa was notably absent from the updates, which is worrisome given that its November 2023 stockpile destruction deadline is fast approaching.

The intersessional meetings held in 2022 helped keep the spotlight on universalization challenges between formal annual meetings of the convention. This is essential, as the convention risks significant loss of momentum as the COVID-19 pandemic continues into its third year. No country has ratified or acceded to the convention since 2020.

The pace of national implementation legislation, required by some states to accede, has also been slow; although during the reporting period, Niue adopted the first such law reported in any state in two years. Compliance with the annual transparency reporting requirement has been sporadic.

The hybrid intersessional meetings showed how the convention’s community of states, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), United Nations (UN) agencies, institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) are adapting and continuing their collaborative work to promote implementation and universalization.

The same principles of inclusiveness and partnership have characterized the development of a political declaration, agreed at the UN in Geneva on 17 June 2022, that seeks to prevent civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in towns, cities, and other populated areas. The declaration will help strengthen the emerging norm against cluster munitions and positively shape behavior, if its signatories interpret it as requiring them to refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas.

This ban overview covers activities during the second half of 2021 and the first half of 2022. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles, which are available on the Monitor website.

**UNIVERSALIZATION**

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to it, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.

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4 All of the 30 NATO member states have signed or ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions except Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Türkiye, and the United States (US).
5 “Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences arising from the use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” 17 June 2022, bit.ly/PoliticalDeclaration17June2022.
7 Accession, ratification, and other methods of joining the convention usually require parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.
ACCESSIONS

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it, but must join through a process known as accession.8

Saint Lucia was the last country to accede to the convention, in September 2020.

In states that remain outside the convention, there was little evidence of movement to accede to the convention during 2021 or in the first half of 2022. One positive highlight was seen in the participation of South Sudan and Zimbabwe at a regional universalization workshop on the convention held in March 2022 in Abuja, Nigeria, as it signaled an interest from both states in acceding to the convention.

In Argentina, a cross-party group of 13 parliamentary representatives from the Chamber of Deputies recommended in May 2022 that the government accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions without delay. In Brazil, a parliamentary committee rejected a legislative proposal recommending accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in January 2022.9

Support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions by regional body

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional body</th>
<th>Support (%)</th>
<th>Support (number of states)</th>
<th>Non-signatories to the convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union (AU)</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>48 of 55</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, South Sudan, Sudan, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of American States (OAS)</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>27 of 35</td>
<td>Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Dominica, Suriname, US, Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>3 of 10</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 Accession is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.

9 Most recently, in 2019, Rubens Bueno reintroduced legislation to ban cluster munitions, which he first proposed in February 2012. The bill was again rejected by Brazil’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense on 14 January 2022. See, Agência Câmara de Notícias, "Comissão rejeita projeto que proíbe produção e exportação de bombas de fragmentação" ("Commission rejects bill banning production and export of cluster bombs"), 14 January 2022, bit.ly/BrazilCommittee14Jan2022; and Stefano Salles and Lucas Janone, "Exporter, Brasil se recusa a aderir convenção contra uso de bombas de fragmentação" ("Exporter, Brazil refuses to adhere to convention against the use of cluster bombs"), CNN Brazil, 5 March 2022, bit.ly/CNNBrazil5March2022.
### RATIFICATIONS

During the reporting period, no signatory has ratified the convention. São Tômê and Príncipe was the last country to ratify it, in January 2020.

Of the 13 signatories still to ratify the convention, nine are in Sub-Saharan Africa, two are in the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from the Asia-Pacific.\(^{10}\)

Nigeria’s Federal Executive Council reportedly approved a memo recommending ratification of the convention in June 2021.\(^{11}\) All African signatories to the convention, except Djibouti, attended the regional workshop on universalization co-hosted by Nigeria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK), in Abuja, on 23–24 March 2022.\(^{12}\)

The vast majority of signatories have ultimately followed through on their pledge to ratify, though it is clear that the pace of ratifications has slowed significantly.\(^{13}\) Most signatories do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval. Cyprus remains the last European Union (EU) member state to have signed but not ratified the convention, after its parliament put the ratification "on hold" in 2013.\(^{14}\)

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional body</th>
<th>Support (%)</th>
<th>Support (number of states)</th>
<th>Non-signatories to the convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1 of 11</td>
<td>Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>21 of 27</td>
<td>Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>10 of 18</td>
<td>Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{10}\) Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that "would defeat the object and purpose" of any treaty they have signed. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is considered customary international law and binding on all countries.


\(^{13}\) A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, while 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference in September 2015. Another 10 states ratified the convention in the five years leading to the Second Review Conference, held in November 2020. No further states have ratified since 2020.

\(^{14}\) Letter from Basil Polemitis, Security Policy Director, Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 24 April 2013.
MEETINGS AND ACTIONS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The final part of the convention’s Second Review Conference took place in a hybrid format in Geneva on 20–21 September 2021, under the presidency of Ambassador Félix Baumann, the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN in Geneva. A total of 87 countries attended either the first part of the conference on 25–27 November 2020 and/or the second part in September 2021.\(^\text{15}\)

At the conclusion of the Second Review Conference, States Parties adopted the 50-point Lausanne Action Plan, which lays out actions for them to undertake over the period 2021–2026.\(^\text{16}\) They also adopted the Lausanne Declaration, which states:

“We underscore our obligation never under any circumstances to use cluster munitions and, in accordance with the object and provisions of the Convention, we condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor, remaining steadfast in our determination to achieve a world entirely free of any use of these weapons.”\(^\text{17}\)

The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument to eliminate these weapons and the unacceptable harm they cause. During the reporting period there were no formal proposals for the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to consider cluster munitions again, after its failure in 2011 to adopt a new protocol that aimed to legitimize them.

\(^\text{15}\) A total of 76 countries attended the first part of the Second Review Conference: 60 States Parties, three signatories, and 13 non-signatories, in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC. A total of 87 States Parties attended the second part of the Second Review Conference: 66 States Parties, five signatories, and 16 non-signatories, in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.


UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 76/47

The annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is a useful tracker to gauge interest in and support for the convention, particularly from states that have not joined. Since its introduction in 2015, support for the annual UNGA resolution on the convention has grown steadily.

A total of 146 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 76/47, on the implementation of the convention, on 6 December 2021, including 36 non-signatories. This was the second-highest number of votes in favor of the annual UNGA resolution on the convention to date.

After abstaining from the vote in 2020, Russia returned to its original practice of voting against the resolution, making it the only country to do so in 2021. In stark contrast, China voted for the resolution for the first time, as did Lao PDR and Lebanon.

All except three of the 37 states to abstain from voting on the 2021 UNGA resolution are non-signatories to the convention. Zambia was the only State Party to abstain from the resolution, along with signatories Cyprus and Uganda.

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>In Favor</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Abstained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>70/54</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>71/45</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>72/54</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>73/54</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>74/62</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>75/62</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>76/47</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several states not party explained their vote on the 2021 UNGA resolution. Russia repeated its argument that cluster munitions are “legitimate weapons” that are “only harmful...”

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20 The 37 states that abstained from the vote are: Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates (UAE), US, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


22 See, UNGA First Committee, video record, 2 November 2021, bit.ly/UNGAFirstCttee2Nov2021. Notably, there was again no group statement from Estonia, Finland, Greece, Poland, and Romania explaining their vote and lack of accession to the convention, after these states had previously made a joint statement every year from 2015 – 2018.
when misused.” Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia, as well as other non-signatories, reiterated their long-held objections over how the convention was negotiated and adopted outside of UN auspices, due to their firm opposition to creating new international law.

## USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

### GLOBAL OVERVIEW

Since the end of World War II in 1945, at least 23 governments have used cluster munitions in 41 countries and five other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

**Past use of cluster munitions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>User state</th>
<th>Locations used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Chad, Iraq, Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Georgia, possibly Abkhazia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iran, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Egypt, Lebanon, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Chad, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Mauritania, Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, Chechnya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Admitted past use, but did not specify where</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia), Falklands/Malvinas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (former Socialist Republic of)</td>
<td>Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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23 This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete, as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes use in Angola, Armenia, DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia.
Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention’s core preventive measures designed to eliminate future humanitarian problems, most crucially the absolute ban on the use of cluster munitions.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new cluster munition use by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.\textsuperscript{24} Several past users and producers of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK, are now States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Most states outside the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.\textsuperscript{25}

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, cluster munitions have been used in eight non-signatories: Azerbaijan in 2020; Cambodia in 2011; Libya in 2011, 2015, and 2019; South Sudan in 2014; Sudan in 2012–2015; Syria in 2012–2021; Ukraine in 2014–2015 and 2022; and Yemen in 2015–2017.

**NEW USE**
Cluster munitions were used in Ukraine during the reporting period (August 2021–July 2022). Ukraine is the only country in the world where cluster munitions are being used as of August 2022.

**USE IN UKRAINE**
The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions extensively since Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, causing civilian casualties and damaging civilian infrastructure including homes, hospitals, and schools. Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions at least three times during the conflict.

Russia has used at least six types of cluster munitions in Ukraine during 2022:

- 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rockets, which have a range of 10–35km and deliver 30 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
- 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rockets, which have a range of 20–70km and deliver 72 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions;
- 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missiles, which deliver 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions (9M544 model) or 72 antipersonnel submunitions (9M549 model);
- 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missiles, which are equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions;
- A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile;
- RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bombs, which contain 268 PTAB-1M high explosive antitank submunitions.

As of 1 July 2022, hundreds of cluster munition attacks by Russian forces have been documented, reported, or are alleged to have occurred in at least ten of Ukraine's 24 provinces (or oblasts): Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Odesa, and...
Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia. Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in the conflict and has sought to draw attention elsewhere, alleging that Ukrainian forces were responsible for several possible cluster munition attacks.

Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions, including Uragan cluster munition rockets, in at least three locations that were under the control of Russia’s armed forces or affiliated armed groups at the time. Such use was reported in Husarivka, in Kharkiv oblast, on either 6 or 7 March; in Yenakiieve, in Donetsk oblast, on 22 March; and in Kherson on 14 June. Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces previously used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine from July 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire. Ukraine has not denied using cluster munitions in the 2022 conflict, but says that "the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law." 27

Russia has stated that it regards cluster munitions as "a lawful form of munitions" that "are only harmful when misused." 28 Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in Ukraine and has accused Ukraine of using the weapons, for example in the city of Donetsk on 14 March in an attack that has not been independently confirmed. 29

Ukrainian officials have expressed grave concern over Russia’s use of cluster munitions during the 2022 conflict. Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova told a UN Security Council debate on 27 April that Russia’s use of cluster munitions in populated areas is proof that it "blatantly disregards international humanitarian law." 30 In March 2022, she had described cluster munitions as "one of the most treacherous weapons, operating indiscriminately and causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering among civilians." 31

The new use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 40 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council, the Security Council, and the General Assembly. 32 The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the EU, the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the CMC.


29 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council, 15 March 2022, bit.ly/LetterRussia15March2022.


31 Venediktova, Iryna (VenediktovaIV), "On March 1, Russia fired cluster bombs at civilian targets in the village of Chernomorske (Kherson region). Cluster munitions are one of the most treacherous weapons, operating indiscriminately and causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering among civilians." 7 March 2022, 15:51 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/VenediktovaTweet7March2022.

32 Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia; Norway, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.
ALLEGATIONS OF USE

Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions since 2012, but the Monitor is not aware of any credible evidence of cluster munition attacks in Syria during the reporting period. The last recorded cluster munition attacks were by government forces near Aleppo on 14 March 2021. Subsequent use may have gone unreported, and the Monitor has not been able to independently verify allegations, such as one alleging that a Turkish-backed armed group used cluster munitions when shelling the village of Um Kef, near Tal Tamir in al-Hasakah governorate, on 4 June 2022.

Previously, Armenia (or forces backed by Armenia) and Azerbaijan used cluster munitions during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, in September–October 2020. There have been no reports or allegations of new cluster munition use in the region since then.

USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used cluster munitions—due in part to the relative complexity of these weapons and their delivery systems. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance; in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by ethnic Croat and Serb militias; in Croatia by an ethnic Serb militia; in Israel by Hezbollah; in Libya by the Libyan National Army (LNA); in Syria by the Islamic State; and in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatist rebels.

UNILATERAL RESTRICTIONS ON USE

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The United States (US) maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but has not used them since 2003 in Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a Department of Defense directive, which had required the US to no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside their own territories. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Since World War II, at least 34 states have collectively developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. This includes 18 countries that ceased manufacturing these weapons prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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33 According to Syria Civil Defense, cluster munitions were used in attacks on Al-Hamran and Tarhin villages, east of Aleppo, on 14 March 2021. See, Syria Civil Defence (SyriaCivilDef), “The regime and Russia’s shelling on Tarhin and Al-Hamran villages east of #Aleppo yesterday has left unexploded cluster bombs that threaten the lives of civilians in the area. The #WhiteHelmets UXO teams scan the area to locate and destroy any unexploded cluster bombs.” 15 March 2021, 16:31 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/WhiteHelmetsTweet15March2021.


35 The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers’ delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.
PRODUCERS

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Cluster munition producers

| Brazil | Korea, South |
| China | Pakistan |
| Egypt | Poland |
| Greece | Romania |
| India | Russia |
| Iran | Singapore |
| Israel | Türkiye |
| Korea, North | US |

In 2022, Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions, while Russian forces used at least two newly developed cluster munitions during the conflict in Ukraine. Russian forces have used the 500mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions. The same company is producing guided 9M54-series cluster munition missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system. Russia has also used a cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile.

Iranian state-owned media reported in August 2021 that the domestically produced Qadr S ballistic missile, which has a range of 2,000km, carries a cluster munition warhead. The exact type of submunition has not been publicly disclosed.

Few of the remaining producer countries are known to have manufactured cluster munitions either during 2021 or in the first half of 2022. This is largely due to a lack of transparency and available data as well as disinvestment measures aimed at financial institutions. For example:

- After acquiring Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer—Israel Military Industries (IMI)—in late 2018, Elbit Systems Ltd. announced that it would discontinue the production of cluster munitions. In October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. confirmed that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”

- Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it no longer produces cluster munitions, stating, “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”

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38 According to Elbit Systems Ltd. vice president David Vaknin, “As part of the Elbit Systems organization, IMI Systems will not be continuing its prior activities with respect to cluster munitions. All of Elbit Systems activities relating to munitions, including those activities to be continued by IMI Systems, will be conducted in accordance with applicable international conventions or US law.” See, Tovah Lazaroff, “Elbit rejects HSBC’s BDS disclaimer stating: ‘We don’t produce cluster bombs’,” Jerusalem Post, 3 January 2019, bit.ly/JerusalemPost3Jan2019; and PAX Stop Explosive Investments, “Elbit Systems confirms munitions exit,” 23 January 2019, bit.ly/PAXElbitSystems23Jan2019.
39 Email to PAX from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., 14 October 2020.
In South Korea, Hanwha Corporation shareholders approved a proposal in September 2020 to end the company’s production of cluster munitions by shifting this activity to the Korea Defense Industry Corporation, a new company affiliated with Hanwha.\(^1\)

The last US manufacturer of cluster munitions, Textron Systems Corporation, announced in 2016 that it was ending production.\(^2\) In January 2021, US defense contractor Northrop Grumman announced that it was ending participation in a US government stockpile management contract to test the shelf-life of cluster munitions.\(^3\)

Greece, Poland, Romania, and Türkiye have also indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.\(^4\) States that say their policy is aligned with the convention’s prohibitions should elaborate how specific policies, practices, and doctrine have changed in this regard, and detail any measures in place to deter and prevent such activities in future.

### Former Producers of Cluster Munitions

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party.

Eighteen states have ceased production of cluster munitions. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period. All former producers are now States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, except non-signatory Argentina.

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including BiH, Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.\(^5\)

### Transfer of Cluster Munitions

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile

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\(^4\) For example, in April and October 2021, Türkiye informed the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that “Turkey has never used, produced, imported or transferred cluster munitions since 2005 and does not intend to do so in the future.” Letter to Amb. Aidan Liddle of the UK, President of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, from Amb. Sadik Arslan, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the UN in Geneva, 5 October 2021.

\(^5\) Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of the former Yugoslavia, has declared that “There are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.
destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.  

There were no recorded exports or imports of cluster munitions by any state during the reporting period.

A handful of mainly state-owned companies still promote their cluster munitions at various defense industry arms fairs. In June 2022, Munitions India Ltd. displayed the cluster munition variant of the Pinaka missile system at the Eurosatory arms fair, in violation of Eurosatory rules.

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Despite this challenge, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.

While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was probably the world’s leading exporter as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries and other areas.

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

STOCKPILES OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION

GLOBAL STOCKPILES

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 95 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions, containing more than one billion submunitions, as shown in the table on the following page.

46 States Parties Chile, France, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purposes of destruction: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.


48 There is no comprehensive accounting available of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK), in addition to exports by non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, US, and the former Yugoslavia.

49 Recipients of US exports include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, the UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

50 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mongolia, Mozambique, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, Soviet cluster munition remnants have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

51 The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW provided the first list identifying 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, ‘Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions,’ 20 May 2002.
Countries that stockpiled cluster munitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Signatories</th>
<th>Non-signatories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Cent. African Rep.</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Rep. of</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td>Korea, North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>Oman</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Qatar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>Türkiye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
<td>UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Countries in **bold** still possess stockpiles.

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52 This information is drawn from Monitor Ban Policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as statements and other sources. Armenia has been added to the list of stockpilers following evidence of its use of cluster munitions in 2020.
STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY STATES PARTIES

In the past, the convention’s States Parties stockpiled a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions, containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 40 countries—37 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munition stocks have now destroyed them.

Four States Parties have cluster munition stocks still to destroy, as listed in the following table.

Cluster munitions held by States Parties still to complete stockpile destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Cluster munitions</th>
<th>Submunitions</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6,905</td>
<td>190,919</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2,012</td>
<td>162,417</td>
<td>1 April 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>299,187</td>
<td>1 January 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>99,465</td>
<td>1 November 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,637</strong></td>
<td><strong>751,988</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions remain over whether Guinea knowingly possesses cluster munitions, as it apparently imported them in the past and may still possess them. Guinea must report any stocks in its Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was due in April 2015 but still has not been submitted.

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY SIGNATORIES

At least three signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

- Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles, containing 2,559 M20G submunitions, to Bulgaria in 2014. By August 2019, they had been destroyed by private company EXPAL Bulgaria. Cyprus has never made a public statement or provided a voluntary transparency report to confirm if it has now destroyed all its stockpiled cluster munitions.
- Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions, but has not shared information on its plan to destroy them under the convention. In June 2022, an Indonesian official told the Monitor that the stockpile consists of approximately 150 “very old” cluster bombs.
- Nigeria has appealed for cooperation and assistance to destroy its stockpile of cluster munitions, which includes UK-made BL755 cluster bombs.

53 This table lists the total number of cluster munitions declared by these States Parties, and does not reflect the cluster munitions destroyed to date.
Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:
- Angola stated in 2017 that all of its stockpiled cluster munitions had been destroyed in or by 2012.\(^{58}\)
- The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a "considerable" stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.\(^{59}\)

**STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY NON-SIGNATORIES**

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

The US reported in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of "more than six million cluster munitions."\(^{60}\) However, the US appears to have made significant progress since then to remove cluster munitions from its active inventory and place them in its demilitarization inventory for destruction. In April 2022, Expal USA was awarded a contract for the demilitarization and disposal of US cluster munition stocks.\(^{61}\)

Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs, containing 320,375 submunitions, in 2013.\(^{62}\) Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.\(^{63}\) Greece and Ukraine have disclosed partial figures on their stockpiled cluster munitions.\(^{64}\)

**STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION**

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force for that State Party.

**STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE COMPLETED STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION**

Of the 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, at least 37 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Switzerland was the last State Party to complete stockpile destruction under the convention, in March 2019.

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60 Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUSStatement14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the "active" or "total" inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.
62 "Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4," undated. This document was provided by the press office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, 7 May 2014.
64 Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, 14 June 2011; and presentation of Ukraine, "Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version) on Ukraine's Defense Capability," slide 2, Geneva, 1 April 2011.
States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party (year of completion)</th>
<th>Cluster munitions</th>
<th>Submunitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria (2010)</td>
<td>12,672</td>
<td>798,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2010)</td>
<td>115,210</td>
<td>10,138,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH (2011)</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>148,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (2018)</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon (2017)*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (2014)</td>
<td>13,623</td>
<td>1,561,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (2013)</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>25,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia (2009)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (2013)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>10,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia (2018)</td>
<td>7,235</td>
<td>178,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (2017)**</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (2010)</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>16,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (2014)</td>
<td>42,176</td>
<td>2,440,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador (2004)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>17,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2016)</td>
<td>34,876</td>
<td>14,916,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2015)</td>
<td>573,700</td>
<td>62,923,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (2011)</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>3,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2015)</td>
<td>4,963</td>
<td>2,849,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (2015)</td>
<td>14,011</td>
<td>2,027,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova (2010)</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>27,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro (2010)</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>51,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (2015)</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>12,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2012)</td>
<td>193,643</td>
<td>25,867,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia (2013)</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>39,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (2010)</td>
<td>52,190</td>
<td>3,087,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (2011)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (2011)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (2017)</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>52,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2018)</td>
<td>6,837</td>
<td>293,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (2015)</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>20,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (2019)</td>
<td>206,061</td>
<td>12,211,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (2013)</td>
<td>190,832</td>
<td>38,759,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,478,151</strong></td>
<td><strong>178,311,493</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/R = not reported.

*Cameroon did not destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but instead retained them all for research and training.

**Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Some quantities of cluster munitions and/or submunitions have changed since previous reports due to adjusted information provided in Article 7 reports. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a collective total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions.
Five States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the overview table, due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

- Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions found in abandoned arms caches.
- The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.\(^66\)
- Guinea-Bissau initially reported possessing cluster munitions in 2011, but did not provide information on the types or quantities.\(^67\) It subsequently clarified in May 2022 and reported in July 2022 that it does not possess any stocks.\(^68\)
- Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions as it had destroyed its stockpile long before the convention’s entry into force.\(^69\)

### DESTRUCTION UNDERWAY

During 2021 and the first half of 2022, three States Parties destroyed a total of at least 1,658 cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions from their stocks, as shown in the following table.

#### Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2021–mid-2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Cluster munitions destroyed</th>
<th>Submunitions destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>41,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,658</strong></td>
<td><strong>46,733</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^66\) In September 2011, the Republic of the Congo stated that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory. In May 2013, it reported that it had destroyed its remaining 372 antipersonnel landmines that were held for training and research purposes, following the massive explosions at a weapons depot in Brazzaville in March 2012. It reported that it was now a country free of landmines and cluster munitions. Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementRepCongo15Sep2011; statement by Col. Nkoua, National Focal Point of the Struggle Against Mines, seminar to mark the 20th Anniversary of the ICBL hosted by the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs, Kinshasa, 19 December 2012; and statement of the Republic of the Congo, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).


\(^69\) According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munition were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007, and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.
Peru and Slovakia destroyed a total of 355 cluster munitions and 5,238 submunitions during 2021. Bulgaria did not destroy any cluster munitions in 2021, but has destroyed 1,303 cluster munitions and 41,495 submunitions in February–May 2022. Previously, in 2020, four States Parties destroyed a total of 2,277 cluster munitions and more than 52,000 submunitions.

Bulgaria had destroyed 48% of its overall cluster munition stocks and 44% of its submunitions by May 2022. An accidental explosion at a contractor's stockpile destruction facility in December 2020 put the project on hold until February 2022, but since then the destruction of cluster munitions has scaled up considerably. Due to the delay, Bulgaria has requested a third extension of its stockpile destruction deadline, which will be considered at the convention's Tenth Meeting of States Parties in August–September 2022.

Slovakia reiterated at the convention's intersessional meetings in May 2022 that it has "an ongoing plan and is doing its best to fulfil its Article 3 obligation" by the end-of-year deadline. Peru also reported that it was on track to meet its April 2024 deadline despite the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw a lower number of cluster munitions destroyed than planned in 2021.

South Africa did not provide an update at the May 2022 intersessional meetings, which the CMC said was "highly disturbing" since its stockpile destruction deadline is in 2023 and the convention has received no updates from South Africa for the past five years.

RETENTION

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

A total of 11 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes.

Belgium retains the highest number of cluster munitions of any State Party and reported consuming 14 cluster munitions in 2020. Germany comes second and consumed 36 cluster munitions and 2,909 submunitions in 2021. Bulgaria also consumed cluster munitions while training explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel in 2021.

Spain increased its stockpile of retained cluster munitions, from three in 2020 to seven in 2021.

BiH, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland did not consume any retained cluster munitions in 2021. Cameroon has not provided a transparency report detailing the status of its retained cluster munitions since 2017.

71 Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 3 deadline Extension Request, April 2022, bit.ly/BulgariaArt3ExtRequestCCMApr2022; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2022.
75 Email from Vincent Bodson, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Belgium to the UN in Geneva, 4 August 2022; and Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C,1, April 2022.
76 Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, April 2022.
77 Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, April 2022.
Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2021)78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)</th>
<th>Year first reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retained in 2021</td>
<td>Consumed in 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>175 (16,368)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>151 (13,587)</td>
<td>36 (2,909)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>42 (2,097)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7 (522)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6 (300)</td>
<td>1 (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>6 (906)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3 (189)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0 (2,816)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0 (1,854)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0 (113)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>0 (30)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have reduced their stocks significantly since making their first declarations, indicating that the initial amounts retained were not the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for the permitted purposes under the convention.

Some States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, Moldova, and the Netherlands have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which are no longer considered to be cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

A majority of States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for training purposes, including 28 States Parties that once possessed stocks.79 Guinea-Bissau reported in July 2022 that it has no stockpiled cluster munitions, including for research and training purposes.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.80

States Parties with initial Article 7 deadlines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Date due</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>28 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>30 June 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Rep. of</td>
<td>28 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>19 April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>30 April 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>31 July 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>28 December 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>29 May 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78 For more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained by each country, see Monitor country profiles, www.the-monitor.org/cp; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM. The totals may also include individual submunitions retained which are not contained in a delivery container.

79 Afghanistan, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Slovenia, and UK.

80 The transparency report should be emailed to the UN Secretary-General via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs at ccm@un.org. For more information, see: www.clusterconvention.org/reporting-forms.
As of 1 August 2022, 102 States Parties had submitted an initial transparency report. Of the eight States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 reports, Cabo Verde and Comoros are more than a decade overdue.

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year.

Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been sporadic, as more than half of States Parties do not provide Article 7 reports annually. A total of 12 States Parties have not provided an annual update since submitting their initial Article 7 report. South Africa’s lack of annual reports is concerning given its stockpile destruction obligations.

During 2022, signatory the DRC submitted its fourth voluntary transparency report since 2011, while non-signatory South Sudan provided its third such report since 2020. Canada and Palau provided voluntary reports prior to ratifying the convention.

The CMC continues to encourage states to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.

**NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION**

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 22 states have done so since.

81 Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

82 Benin, Burundi, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Iceland, Lesotho, Mali, Nauru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Sri Lanka.

83 Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable.” States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J.
The pace of the adoption of new legislation has slowed. However, on 17 March 2021, Niue enacted specific legislation to govern its implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty. Niue’s Anti-Personnel Mines and Cluster Munitions Prohibition Act enforces the two conventions with penal sanctions and fines.

Another 20 States Parties have indicated that they are either planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.

A total of 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Other States Parties are still considering whether specific implementing legislation for the convention is needed.

Several guides are available to encourage the preparation of robust legislation. The CMC prepared model legislation in 2020. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation. The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states. New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.

### INTERPRETIVE ISSUES

During the Oslo Process and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform

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85 Under the Act, any person convicted of violating the law’s prohibition on cluster munitions can be imprisoned for up to seven years or fined up to NZ$500,000, or both. A body corporate can also be fined $500,000, and individuals holding office at the company are subject to the penalties referred to above if they consented to the offense or acted negligently.

86 Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zambia.

87 Albania, Andorra, Benin, BIH, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.


view on certain important issues relating to states' interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions ("interoperability");
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and,
3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties have not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period. Please refer to previous Cluster Munition Monitor reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks, and foreign stockpiling.

### INTEROPERABILITY AND THE PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties “never under any circumstances to...assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on "Relations with States not Party to this Convention" was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate States Parties’ obligation under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by those not party, and to encourage them to join the convention.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

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92 The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritania, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of Moldova, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

93 As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions, that originated from 100 locations between 2003 and 2010.
The CMC’s position is therefore that States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention’s Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.94

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention’s Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties and Lithuania used Article 21 as a justification to argue forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

TRANSIT AND FOREIGN STOCKPILING

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.95

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view—that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US STOCKPILING AND TRANSIT

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

The US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.


DISINVESTMENT

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention’s Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Lausanne Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention’s Second Review Conference in September 2021, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investment in producers of cluster munitions.96

Since 2007, 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions.

Italy enacted legislation in December 2021 to prohibit companies from funding manufacturers of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.97 Law No. 220 applies to all companies, regardless of whether they are registered in Italy or abroad.98

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.99

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

Several private companies in non-signatory states have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments for prohibited weapons. These companies include Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.

### Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Year enacted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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97 Previously, Law No. 95 was enacted in 2011 to ban financial assistance to anyone for any act prohibited by the convention. This provision supports a ban on investment in the production of cluster munitions. However, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines advocated for a separate, more detailed law.


99 Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, and Zambia.
NPA deminer searching for explosive ordnance using a small hand-held metal detector in a coffee farm in Lao PDR. The country has the world’s highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions.

© NPA Lao PDR, March 2022
THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

This summary reports on the impact of cluster munitions globally. It charts the efforts and challenges to address the impact in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with responsibility for clearance of cluster munition remnants and for assistance to victims.

As of the end of 2021, the total number of cluster munition casualties for all time, recorded by the Monitor, reached 23,082 including casualties from both cluster munition attacks and unexploded submunitions. Estimates calculated from various sources range from 56,500 to 86,500 casualties for all time, globally.

The Monitor recorded a total of 149 cluster munition casualties in 2021 across nine countries and two other areas. This marked a sharp decrease from the 360 casualties recorded in 2020. All casualties reported in 2021 were caused by cluster munition remnants. This was the first year in a decade that saw no new casualties from cluster munition attacks.

This notable decline in casualties was immediately eclipsed by shocking reports of hundreds of casualties from cluster munition attacks in Ukraine, after Russia invaded the country in February 2022. Preliminary data indicates that as of July 2022, at least 689 casualties from cluster munition attacks were reported to have occurred in Ukraine, with many others unrecorded.

Children accounted for two-thirds of all cluster munition casualties in 2021, where the age was recorded. Men and boys made up 80% of casualties where the sex was recorded. While total annual casualties decreased in 2021, the number of new casualties in States Parties Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon increased, while several non-signatory countries recorded new casualties. As has been the case each year since 2012, Syria had the highest annual casualties of any country. However, the number of casualties recorded in Syria decreased, with 2021 seeing its lowest annual recorded total since 2012.

The period 2021–2022 saw some positive developments as countries began to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic, with mine action operations returning to near-normal in many states. The Lausanne Action Plan, which lays out the five-year strategic commitments of States Parties to further their efforts to address the impact of cluster munitions, was finally adopted during the second part of the convention’s Second Review Conference in September 2021.
Yet in many respects the period continued to be challenging. The longer-term socio-economic effects of the pandemic impacted state finances, in some cases changing funding priorities. Global insecurity and the outbreak of hostilities hampered progress towards a cluster munition free world. In Ukraine in 2022, conflict with Russia resulted in new cluster munition contamination.

In 2021, no States Parties completed clearance of cluster munition remnants. Ten States Parties remain contaminated with cluster munitions. Two signatories, 14 non-signatories, and three other areas have, or are believed to have, land containing cluster munition remnants.

States Parties reported clearing more than 61 km² of land and at least 81,043 cluster munition remnants in 2021. The clearance figure is slightly below that of 63 km² in 2020, although two States Parties—Croatia and Montenegro—finished clearance in 2020, contributing to that overall total. Figures for any clearance that took place in Somalia during 2021 were not reported. No clearance took place in Chile in 2021. Chile conducted technical survey of its contaminated areas during 2021 and was planning to begin clearance in 2023.

Requests to extend Article 4 clearance deadlines have been made every year since the first submissions in 2019. In 2021, extension requests were granted to Afghanistan, Chile, and Mauritania. During 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, and Chile submitted extension requests. Only two States Parties—Iraq and Somalia—remain within their original Article 4 deadlines, but neither appear to be on target to meet them.

In 2021, the ongoing socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic appeared to increase risk-taking in contaminated areas as people were forced to rely on harmful coping mechanisms. In Lao PDR and Lebanon, it was reported that economic hardship likely encouraged high-risk behaviors, as people sought to supplement falling incomes. Men remained a particularly high-risk group due to livelihood activities such as cultivation, collection of forest products, hunting, and fishing, all of which can take them into contaminated areas. Children, particularly boys, were susceptible to the lure of cluster munition remnants. Both Lao PDR and Lebanon saw tragic incidents in 2021, where groups of children playing with cluster munition remnants were killed and injured.

Risk education continued to be conducted in non-signatories Libya, Syria, and Yemen, often in the context of ongoing conflict and insecurity. The outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine in early 2022 prompted operators to increase the provision of risk education via digital means, to reach as many affected people as possible. COVID-19 restrictions continued to impact the delivery of risk education in some countries.

Victim assistance efforts, under Article 5, faced increasing challenges. Slow progress in many States Parties was apparent, while such efforts in Afghanistan and Lebanon faced drastic crises in resources. In several States Parties, local and international partners worked to address major gaps in the availability, accessibility, and sustainability of healthcare and rehabilitation services. Limited progress was reported in access to economic inclusion programs and in the provision of financial assistance to victims. As in previous years, psychological support was severely lacking given the high level of need for such services.

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1 Cluster munition remnants include abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions, and unexploded bomblets, as well as failed cluster munitions. Unexploded submunitions are “explosive submunitions” that have been dispersed or released from a cluster munition but failed to explode as intended. Unexploded bomblets are similar to unexploded submunitions, but refer to “explosive bomblets,” which have been dispersed or released from an affixed aircraft dispenser and failed to explode as intended. Abandoned cluster munitions are unused explosive submunitions or cluster munitions that have been left behind or dumped, and are no longer under the control of the party that abandoned them. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 2 (5), (6), (7), and (15).

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CONTAMINATION

GLOBAL CONTAMINATION

The number of states and other areas affected by cluster munition remnants remains unchanged from 2020. In total, 26 states and three other areas were known or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants as of 1 August 2022. Ten are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and have clearance obligations, while two are signatories. Fourteen non-signatories and three other areas are also affected by cluster munitions.

Estimated cluster munition remnants contamination (as of 31 December 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massive (more than 1,000km²)</th>
<th>Large (100–1,000km²)</th>
<th>Medium (10–99km²)</th>
<th>Small (less than 10km²)</th>
<th>Residual contamination/Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR Vietnam</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>Iran</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are *underlined*; and other areas are in *italics*.

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

States Parties that have completed clearance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention.

No States Parties reported completion of clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2021.

A total of 10 States Parties have reported completing clearance of cluster munition

<table>
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<th>States Parties that have declared fulfilment of clearance obligations</th>
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<tr>
<td>2020 Croatia, Montenegro</td>
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<td>2016 Mozambique</td>
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<td>2012 Republic of the Congo, Grenada</td>
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<td>2010 Palau, Zambia</td>
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<td>2009 Albania</td>
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<td>2008 Guinea-Bissau</td>
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remnants as required by the convention.³ Mauritania, which had reported fulfilment of its clearance obligations in September 2013, reported finding new cluster munition remnants contamination in 2019.⁴

Extent of contamination in States Parties

Action 18 of the Lausanne Action Plan requires States Parties to identify the precise location, scope, and extent of cluster munition remnants contamination in areas under their jurisdiction or control. It also requires contaminated States Parties to establish evidence-based accurate baselines to the fullest extent possible, no later than the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2022, or within two years after entry into force of the convention for new States Parties.

As of the end of 2021, five States Parties—BiH, Chile, Germany, Iraq, and Lebanon—had a clear understanding of their contamination based on the conduct of evidence-based surveys. Survey was ongoing in Lao PDR, while Mauritania had conducted an initial assessment of contamination. State Party Chad submitted an extension request in 2022 for the conduct of survey in the northern province of Tibesti. Afghanistan had a clear picture of contamination in accessible areas in 2021, but reported the need to survey previously inaccessible areas. Somalia had yet to conduct a survey of contamination and provided no updates on progress for 2021.

Massive cluster munition remnants contamination (more than 1,000km²) exists in one State Party, Lao PDR, while large contamination (between 100–1,000km²) exists in one State Party, Iraq. Two States Parties—Chile and Mauritania—are believed to have medium contamination (between 10–99km²). Five States Parties—Afghanistan, BiH, Germany, Lebanon, and Somalia—each have less than 10km² of contaminated land. The extent of remaining contamination in Chad is unknown as survey has yet to be conducted.

Lao PDR is the State Party most heavily contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Though the full extent of contamination is not known, 15 of Lao PDR’s 18 provinces are contaminated, with nine heavily contaminated.⁵ As of the end of December 2021, the total extent of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in surveyed areas totaled 1,522.79km², across 10 provinces.⁶ Clearance operators have reported the presence of at least 186 types of munitions in Lao PDR.⁷

In Iraq, the Regional Mine Action Center for the south of the country (RMAC South), reported that as of the end of 2021, cluster munition remnants covered a total area of 178.14km² across the north, center, and south of the country.⁸ The majority of contaminated

⁴ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F.
areas were found in southern Iraq (157.68km²), though contamination is also found in the Middle Euphrates region (10.11km²) and in the north, including in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (10.35km²). In 2021, 29.32km² of new cluster munition remnants contaminated areas were identified through non-technical survey in the north, center, and south of Iraq. An environmental sanctuary in Basra province was found to have 10km² of contamination following initial surveys.9

Contamination in Chile is limited to land that was used for military training, in three ranges belonging to the Chilean Air Force and on one army base.11 In its revised Article 4 deadline extension request, submitted in June 2020, Chile stated that its estimate of contamination was 64.61km² across the four sites, according to non-technical survey completed in 2019.12 During 2021, a total of 33.84km² was cancelled after technical survey, leaving 30.77km² of CHA across the four sites.13

In 2019, Mauritania discovered previously unknown contaminated areas, dating from 1980 and 1990.14 After an initial assessment in February 2021, 14.02km² was found to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants. These areas are all located in the region of Tiris Zemmour in the north, bordering Western Sahara.15 In April 2022, Mauritania reported that cluster munition remnant contamination comprised 10 areas totaling 14.41km², contaminated with BLU-63 and Mk-118 submunitions.16

The Taliban-led government in Afghanistan stated that as of April 2022 there was a total of 9.9km² of contamination remaining in the country. This consisted of 16 areas: 11 surveyed in 2021 and five uncleared in previous years. These areas are located in four provinces, reported as Faryab, Nangarhar, Paktya, and Samangan. A nationwide survey was needed for Afghanistan. This was considered possible due to newly available access to areas that had previously been difficult to reach, due to security concerns and the need for complex negotiations.17

The Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) told the Monitor that as of the end of 2021, cluster munition remnants contamination in Lebanon totaled 6.27km² of CHA in three areas: Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and southern Lebanon.18 This included 0.12km² of new contamination across 11 sites in the northeast of the country, and 0.11km² of hazardous areas found across three sites elsewhere and as a result of corrections to the perimeters of six existing sites.19

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9 Ibid.
10 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 28.
13 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, April 2022, pp. 8 and 11–15, bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequestApril2022.
14 Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F.
17 Afghanistan reported that due to "the change of government and takeover of new regime, all the area is fortunately secure now and ready for conducting survey and clearance operations." In the same statement it was also reported that according to Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) data, there was 9.7km² remaining to be cleared in May 2022. Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022, bit.ly/AfghanistanStatement16May2022.
18 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2022; and Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 16.
19 Ibid.
Cluster munition remnants contamination in Germany comprised an area not exceeding 11km² in Wittstock—in a former military training area located 80km northwest of Berlin.\(^\text{20}\) As of March 2022, Germany reported clearing 4.73km² since 2017, leaving 6.27km² still to be cleared. Germany has provided slightly different figures as to its extent of contamination remaining.\(^\text{21}\)

Cluster munition remnants contamination in BiH primarily results from the 1992–1995 conflict related to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.\(^\text{22}\) BiH reported in 2022 that the remaining area contaminated with cluster munition remnants totaled 0.77km², across 13 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Eight of these areas were already in the process of being cleared.\(^\text{23}\)

In June 2021, the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND) in Chad reported that the last area known to be contaminated—742,657m² in Delbo village, West Ennedi province—had been cleared and was awaiting quality assurance to complete the land release process.\(^\text{24}\) Yet Tibesti province in the northwest of the country had not been subject to survey, and in 2017–2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had indicated the possibility that cluster munition remnants could be found there, particularly near former Libyan military bases.\(^\text{25}\) In 2022, Chad submitted an Article 4 deadline extension request in order to conduct non-technical survey of 19.05km² of land in Tibesti province to confirm any contamination.\(^\text{26}\)

The extent of contamination in Somalia is unknown but believed to be limited to border areas with Kenya, in the north of Jubaland state. No survey of contaminated areas has been possible, primarily due to a lack of funding and inaccessibility amid armed conflict.\(^\text{27}\) Somalia had not provided any updates on contamination as of 1 August 2022.

**Unconfirmed contamination in States Parties**

State Party Colombia may have a small amount of residual contamination, though it states that no known evidence has been found.\(^\text{28}\) A World War II-type “cluster adapter” of United States (US) origin was used during an attack at Santo Domingo in 1998.\(^\text{29}\) The Inter-American

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\(^{21}\) Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 17; and presentation of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16–17 May 2022, bit.ly/GermanyPresentationMay2022. Remaining contamination can be estimated in a margin ranging between 5.85km² and 6.62km². At the convention’s intersessional meetings in May 2022, Germany reported that 6.62km² remained to be cleared as of January 2022. Whereas in its most recent Article 7 report for calendar year 2021, Germany reported 5.85km² remaining, based on a total of 5.15km² cleared between 2017 and 2021. In the same report Germany reported clearance of a cumulative total of 5.09km², which would leave 5.91km² left to clear.


\(^{24}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahım, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form F, p. 5.

\(^{25}\) Emails from Romain Coupez, Regional Security Manager, MAG, 10 May 2017 and 31 May 2018; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Romain Coupez, Regional Security Manager, MAG, 3 May 2017.

\(^{26}\) Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2022, p. 6, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequestMay2022.

\(^{27}\) Somalia draft Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), provided to the Monitor by Dahir Abdirahman Abdułe, National Director General, Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA), 17 July 2021; and responses to Monitor questionnaire and follow-up questions by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 27 August and 21 September 2021.

\(^{28}\) Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

\(^{29}\) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Masacre de Santo Domingo, Colombia, Caso 12.416” (“Massacre of Santo Domingo, Colombia, Case 12.416”), 22 April 2011.
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) found that the Colombian Air Force had used an AN-M1A2 bomb, which it said meets the definition of a cluster munition.\textsuperscript{30}

In the United Kingdom (UK), it is estimated that more than 2,000 crates of AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 “cluster adapter” type bombs remain in UK waters at Sheerness, off the east coast of England, in the cargo of a sunken World War II ship.\textsuperscript{31} In February 2022, it was reported that Royal Navy specialists were undertaking survey and risk assessments of the site before any further work can be conducted to remove the ship and its contents.\textsuperscript{32}

**CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CONTAMINATION IN SIGNATORIES**

Two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—remain listed as having cluster munition remnants contamination. Signatory Uganda completed clearance in 2008.\textsuperscript{33}

Angola has no confirmed contamination, but there may remain abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions. In past years, some cluster munition remnants have been found and destroyed through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs.\textsuperscript{34}

In August 2020, the DRC reported to the Monitor that several areas contained cluster munition remnants, although these areas had not been surveyed and their size was yet to be determined.\textsuperscript{35} In May 2022, the DRC submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, in which it reported that survey had confirmed six CHAs totaling 0.16km². The contamination was reported to comprise cluster munition remnants dating from 1998. Four provinces in the DRC contained contaminated land: Equateur (120,398m²), Ituri (3,406m²), South-Kivu (718.8m²), and Tanganyika (37,000m²).\textsuperscript{36} The six CHAs were reported to be marked, but were located in difficult-to-access areas.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{32} “SS Richard Montgomery: Tourists flock to Sheerness wreck,” BBC, 17 February 2022, bbc.in/3OmKdHV.

\textsuperscript{33} Email from Vicent Woboya, Director, Uganda Mine Action Center (UMAC), 8 April 2010.

\textsuperscript{34} Email from Robert Iga Afedra, Capacity Development Advisor, National Intersectoral Demining and Humanitarian Assistance Commission (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), 12 August 2020.

\textsuperscript{35} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 18 August 2020.

\textsuperscript{36} DRC Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 1 January 2013–31 December 2021), Form F, p. 14. DRC reported the contamination as being Mk7, the dispenser component of the MK20 cluster munition, containing Mk118 “Rockeye” submunitions.

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CONTAMINATION IN NON-SIGNATORIES AND OTHER AREAS

Fourteen non-signatories and three other areas have, or are believed to have, land containing cluster munition remnants on their territories. The only non-signatory to have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants is Thailand, in 2011.

The full extent of contamination in many of the non-signatories and other areas is not known. However, Vietnam is believed to have massive cluster munition remnants contamination (more than 1,000km²), while Cambodia has large contamination (between 100–1,000km²). Four non-signatories and two other areas are each believed to have between 10–99km² of contamination, while seven non-signatories and one other area are each thought to have less than 10km². The extent of contamination in Armenia is not known.

Vietnam is massively contaminated by cluster munition remnants, but no accurate estimate of the extent exists. In 2022, Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC) reported to the Monitor that areas contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), of all types, comprised more than 5.6 million hectares (56,000km²). This represents more than 17% of Vietnam’s total land area. The contamination is concentrated mostly in the central provinces of Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Quang Ngai.38

Cambodia has raised its overall estimate of cluster munition remnants contamination in recent years after the implementation of survey. The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) reported 698km² of total contamination, as of the end of December 2021. This represents an increase on the 658km² reported at the end of 2020.39 Most contamination is concentrated in the northeastern provinces, along the borders with Lao PDR and Vietnam.40

New cluster munition remnant contamination occurred in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, as a result of use of cluster munitions during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in October 2020.41

In Armenia, new contamination from the conflict was identified in the Syunik region, bordering Azerbaijan, in 2021. During the conflict, Davit Bek, in Kapan municipality of Syunik province, was also contaminated with explosive ordnance, including cluster munitions.42

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38 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nguyen Hang Phuc, Deputy Director General, VNMAC, April 2022.
39 Emails from Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, 18 April 2022 and 3 June 2021.
42 Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), “The specialists of the ‘Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise’ are in Davit Bek,” 26 February 2021; and CHDE ‘The Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise’ (CHDE) SNCO summarizes the work done in 2021,” 28 December 2021. Hazard areas thought to include cluster munition remnants in Korndzor village, in the Syunik region, were identified via non-technical survey in 2017, but none were found during clearance in 2020. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Margaret Lazyan, Head of Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance, CHDE, 22 March 2021.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, the HALO Trust has worked to clear areas under the control of ethnic Armenian authorities, while the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has carried out clearance in areas controlled by Azerbaijan. A survey by the HALO Trust estimated that more than 16km² of land was contaminated, while almost 2,000 unexploded submunitions were cleared from November 2020 to November 2021. The survey found that 68% of inhabited settlements had either cluster munition contamination or evidence of cluster munition use. After the ceasefire in November 2020, more than 20% of land in Stepanakert, the capital of Armenian-controlled areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, was initially contaminated with unexploded items. By May 2022, the HALO Trust had completed clearance of all known contamination in the city. Clearance of Armenian-controlled areas in Nagorno-Karabakh was estimated to require at least another four years, yet funding was lacking and staff capacity required an increase of 40%.43

The extent of contamination in both Azerbaijan, and the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh controlled by Azerbaijan, was not reported in 2021.44 However, casualties from cluster munition remnants continued to be reported in Azerbaijan into 2022, evidencing contamination.45

Cluster munitions have been used extensively in Syria, across 13 of its 14 governorates, since 2012. Cluster munition attacks in Syria have decreased since mid-2017,46 yet the weapons were still in use throughout 2019 and 2020, with the last attack recorded in March 2021. Subsequent attacks may have gone unrecorded.47 From late April until June 2019, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported attacks on opposition-controlled areas of Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib governorates on a daily basis.48 Prior to that, cluster munition use and contamination was reported in the governorates of Aleppo, Dar’a, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, Idleb, and Quneitra, as well as in the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta.49

Extensive cluster munition attacks, resulting in contamination, were reported in Ukraine during 2022 amid the Russian invasion of the country. In 2021, the full extent of contamination from unexploded submunitions was unknown, but was limited to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east and dated from conflict in 2014–2015.50 Since Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, at least 10 other regions have been affected by cluster munitions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.

In 2014, Yemen identified approximately 18km² of suspected cluster munition hazards, though the escalation of armed conflict since March 2015 has increased the extent of contamination.

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49 Ibid.

contamination in northwestern and central areas of the country.\textsuperscript{51} The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) confirmed in 2020 that cluster munition and other ERW contamination is widespread in the north.\textsuperscript{52} In southern Yemen, with the exception of a few areas where the frontlines have shifted, there is no cluster munition remnants contamination.\textsuperscript{53}

In Kosovo, as of the end of 2021, the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) reported 11.37\,km$^2$ of cluster munition remnants contamination, across 44 affected areas.\textsuperscript{54}

Non-signatories Georgia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and the area of Western Sahara are known or believed to each have less than 10\,km$^2$ of cluster munition remnants contamination.

Georgia is thought to be free of contamination, though South Ossetia—a disputed territory not controlled by the government—is a possible exception.

The extent of contamination in Iran is not known but is believed to be small.

Cluster munition remnants contamination in Libya is primarily the result of armed conflict in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014, particularly in urban areas. In 2019, there were several instances or allegations of cluster munition use by forces affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA), including an attack on Zuwarah airport in August 2019 where RBK-500 cluster munition remnants were found, and during attacks in and around Tripoli in May and December 2019.\textsuperscript{55} However, contamination was reported to be lower than that from other victim-activated explosive devices such as booby-traps, antipersonnel landmines, and improvised mines.\textsuperscript{56}

Three municipalities in Serbia remain contaminated with cluster munition remnants.\textsuperscript{57} Serbia reported 0.99\,km$^2$ of contamination—made up of 0.41\,km$^2$ of CHA and 0.58\,km$^2$ of SHA—as of the end of 2021.\textsuperscript{58}

South Sudan reported 5.49\,km$^2$ of contamination, with 4.84\,km$^2$ CHA and 0.65\,km$^2$ SHA.\textsuperscript{59}

Sudan reported 0.14\,km$^2$ of cluster munition remnants contamination as of the end of December 2021, with 5,820\,m$^2$ CHA and 136,582\,m$^2$ SHA.\textsuperscript{60}
Tajikistan reported 2.07km² of cluster munition remnants contamination, all classified as CHA. This is up from the 0.79km² reported in 2020 due to the discovery of new hazard areas.61

Western Sahara was reported to have 2.09km² of contamination as of December 2021.62

**CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES**

The Monitor gathers data on cluster munition casualties recorded each year in affected states, and compiles annual casualty totals. The Monitor also records available data on past casualties, to update all-time casualty totals at the national level, and to revise aggregated global historical data on cluster munition casualties.

As of the end of 2021, the Monitor has identified a total of 23,082 cluster munition casualties, across 39 countries and other areas, for all time. However, a better indicator of the number of casualties is derived from various state estimates, which collectively place the total up to, or more than, 56,500 global casualties.

The 149 cluster munition casualties recorded in 2021 marked a sharp fall from the 360 recorded in 2020. Notably, 2021 was the first year in a decade that saw no new recorded casualties due to cluster munition attacks.63 Casualties from cluster munition attacks had been recorded each year from 2012, when cluster munitions were used in Syria.

Yet this progress in 2021 has been overshadowed by the devastating number of cluster munition attacks causing casualties during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. There have been reports of hundreds of casualties from such attacks, as well as emerging reports of casualties from contamination left by unexploded submunitions due to this new use. While these early reports do not yet represent a full or precise account of the situation, they clearly indicate the extensive and horrendous impact of cluster munitions in Ukraine.

Since the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, preliminary data compiled by the Monitor indicates that 689 casualties were reported during cluster munition attacks in Ukraine as of July 2022.64 These reported casualties, which sometimes occurred during indiscriminate shellings involving other weapons alongside cluster munitions, included 215 people killed and 474 injured. All of the casualties in Ukraine were civilians, where their status was reported.

In addition to local and national media reporting, HRW and Amnesty International documented extensive casualties through July 2022.65 In June 2022, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine was reported to be investigating cluster munition attacks

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61 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 20 April 2022.


63 It is possible that some casualties may have occurred that were not yet reported or recorded.


65 Ibid.
that had caused 317 casualties (98 killed and 219 injured). Among those casualties, seven children were killed and 25 wounded. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported in June 2022 that there had been extensive use of cluster munitions in Ukraine, mostly from Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, though it focused specifically on casualties from attacks with Tochka-U short-range ballistic missiles carrying cluster submunitions. Among some 20 such ballistic missile strikes with cluster munitions recorded by OHCHR, 10 of the attacks resulted in a collective total of at least 279 civilian casualties (83 killed and 196 injured).

Cluster munition use in Ukraine mostly affected civilian infrastructure, with attacks damaging homes, hospitals, schools, playgrounds, and in one instance a cemetery where mourners were among the casualties. Cluster munition attacks also threatened internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those seeking humanitarian aid outside improvised shelters.

Data on the types of unexploded ordnance causing casualties in Ukraine was limited, yet local media reported that casualties from cluster munition remnants occurred as a result of the new contamination. At least 10 casualties (seven killed and three injured) of unexploded submunitions were reported: nine occurred in Kryvorizka district of Dnipropetrovsk province, where thousands of submunitions were cleared by the end of April. Another casualty was reported in Mykolaiv.

GLOBAL CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

As of the end of 2021, the total number of cluster munition casualties recorded by the Monitor globally for all time reached 23,082. The total includes casualties resulting directly from cluster munition attacks (4,656) and casualties from unexploded remnants (18,426). Data begins in the mid-1960s amid extensive cluster munition attacks by the US in Southeast Asia, and continues to the end of 2021. The three countries with the highest recorded numbers of cluster munition casualties for all time are Lao PDR (7,793), Syria (4,318), and Iraq (3,134).

As many casualties go unrecorded, global casualties may be as high as 56,500; a figure that has been calculated from country estimates. Some estimates put the total number of casualties for all time at 86,500 to 100,000, yet these are based on extrapolations from limited data samples, which may not be representative of national averages or the actual number of casualties.

Casualties directly caused by cluster munition attacks before the convention entered into force have been grossly under-reported. For example, no data or estimate is available for Lao PDR, the most heavily bombed country. Thousands of cluster munition casualties from past conflicts have gone unrecorded, particularly those that occurred during extensive use in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East (notably in Iraq, where there have been been

67 OHCHR did not document all instances of cluster munition use. Instead OHCHR focused on documenting emblematic cases, where the use of such munitions appeared to be in violation of IHL.” See OHCHR, "Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation, 24 February–15 May 2022; 29 June 2022, pp. 6–7, bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine29June2022.
68 Neither the Office of the Prosecutor General nor the OHCHR total casualty figures were included in the Monitor’s preliminary findings on cluster munition casualties in Ukraine in 2022 as they were not disaggregated by date and location. Some specific attacks reported by OHCHR were included, where details were available.
70 Monitor media scanning of Ukrainian language media for the period February–July 2022.
estimates of between 5,500 and 8,000 casualties since 1991). However, since the entry into force of the convention in 2010, reporting on the impact of cluster munition attacks has improved significantly.

Prior to the adoption of the convention in 2008, data on casualties from cluster munition attacks was severely lacking, including those among military personnel and other direct conflict actors, such as non-state armed group (NSAG) combatants and militias. However, even with improved reporting, the disproportionately high ratio of civilians among casualties of cluster munitions—identified during the Oslo Process which created the convention—has remained apparent.

Before 2008, a total of 13,306 cluster munition casualties had been identified globally. Since then, the total number of recorded casualties has increased due to updated surveys identifying more pre-convention casualties; new casualties from historical cluster munition remnants; and due to new cluster munition attacks and further casualties from the remnants they left behind.

Cluster munition casualties have occurred in 15 States Parties to the convention, four signatory states, 17 non-signatories, and three other areas as of the end of 2021.

States and other areas with cluster munition casualties (as of 31 December 2021)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>More than 1,000 casualties</th>
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<th>Less than 10 casualties/Unknown</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*. *Casualties in Ukraine have increased drastically since the end of 2021 as a result of cluster munition attacks after the Russian invasion in February 2022.

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74 No precise number, or estimate, of casualties is known for Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, or Mozambique. No cluster munition victims have been reported by Chile. However, media reporting in 2021 on two survivors of a military ERW accident in Chile in 1995 described the item as a cluster munition remnant. These would be the first recorded cluster munition casualties for Chile. It is possible that cluster munition casualties have occurred but gone unre corded in other countries where cluster munitions were used, abandoned, or stored in the past, such as State Party Zambia, and non-signatories Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. Better identification and disaggregation of cluster munition casualties is needed in most cluster munition affected states and areas.
The first cluster munition casualties in Mauritania were reported in 2021. Although no casualties were identified in Mauritania before 2021, it is possible that cluster munition incidents occurred in the past that were not disaggregated from casualties caused by landmines and other ERW.

Among the 15 States Parties that had cluster munition casualties recorded up to the end of 2021, 13 have a recognized responsibility for victims under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Colombia and Mozambique have had cluster munition casualties reported, but have not recognized having any victims and therefore their responsibility to assist victims under the convention. Both are also party to the Mine Ban Treaty and have recognized their responsibility to assist mine survivors.

The majority of recorded cluster munition casualties for all time (57%, or 13,090) occurred in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

A total of 604 casualties have been recorded in signatories Angola, the DRC, Liberia, and Uganda.

In non-signatory states, 8,971 cluster munition casualties have been recorded for all time. Since 2010, casualties from cluster munition attacks have only occurred in non-signatory states, with these casualties recorded in Azerbaijan, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

In other areas where cluster munition casualties have occurred—Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara—a total of 417 casualties were recorded for all time up to the end of 2021.

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2021

The Monitor recorded a total of 149 cluster munition casualties in 2021 across nine countries and two other areas, including four States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and five non-signatories. There was a marked decline in total global casualties in 2021, from 360 in 2020.

All casualties reported in 2021 were caused by cluster munition remnants. Casualties of cluster munition attacks had been recorded every year from 2012 when cluster munitions were used in Syria, up to 2020. However, 2021 was the first year in a decade that no new annual casualties from cluster munition attacks were recorded.
Cluster munition casualties in Syria and all other states and areas 2012–2021

Cluster munition remnants pose an ongoing threat. Unexploded submunitions disproportionately harm civilians, with children particularly at risk. In 2021, cluster munition remnants caused all 149 casualties attributed to cluster munitions globally, killing 59 people and injuring 90.

The actual number of new global cluster munition casualties each year is likely to be far higher than recorded. Inconsistency in reporting, a lack of available data due to insufficient resources, and limited access to conflict-affected areas mean that annual comparisons do not necessarily represent definitive trends. However, casualty data is adjusted over time when new information becomes available and specific patterns of harm are able to be discerned.

In 2021, as in previous years, Syria had the most recorded cluster munition remnants casualties of any country, with 37. This was a significant decrease from the 147 casualties from cluster munition remnants recorded in Syria for 2020 and the lowest annual total recorded since 2012. A further 35 casualties during cluster munition attacks were also reported in the country in 2020. Despite a relative annual decline in casualties recorded for Syria, this continued the trend of Syria having the most annual casualties recorded each year since 2012.81

Iraq reported 33 cluster munition remnants casualties in 2021, up from 31 in 2020. This marked the highest annual total recorded in Iraq since 2010.

Lao PDR recorded 30 cluster munition remnants casualties in 2021; a significant increase from eight in 2020, but still fewer than the 51 casualties recorded in 2016.

In Yemen, 29 cluster munition remnants casualties were recorded in 2021, up from 11 in 2020. Data collection challenges meant that casualties were likely significantly under-reported.

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold; other areas in italics.

Cluster munition remnants casualties in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Area</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in the top section of each bar indicate the total number of casualties.

81 This data includes casualties both directly from cluster munition attacks and due to cluster munition remnants.
In Lebanon, eight casualties were recorded in 2021, all of whom were children. This marked a sharp increase on 2020, when for the first time since 2006 no casualties were recorded.

While the number of cluster munition casualties decreased globally in 2021, casualties in States Parties Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon increased. For these countries, annual casualties recorded in 2021 contrasted sharply with the totals recorded when the convention entered into force in 2010, when eight casualties were recorded in Lao PDR, one in Iraq, and 14 in Lebanon.

In Azerbaijan, one casualty was recorded in 2021. In the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, five unexploded submunition casualties occurred in 2021. In the regions affected by the conflict in both Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, strenuous efforts to raise awareness among populations at risk and to conduct urgent clearance likely contributed to reducing casualty numbers. However, casualties may have gone unrecorded.

In Tajikistan, two cluster munition remnant casualties resulted from the same incident. Prior to 2021, no casualties from cluster munition remnants had been reported in the country since 2007.

Mauritania recorded two casualties in 2021. Sudan and the area of Western Sahara each recorded one casualty in 2021.\(^{82}\) None of these states or areas had recorded any cluster munition remnant casualties in 2020.

No disaggregated data was available on cluster munition remnants casualties in Afghanistan in 2021, which recorded three casualties in 2020. Cambodia recorded no casualties from cluster munition remnants in 2021, compared to one in 2020 which was its first casualty since 2017.

### 2021 Cluster Munition Casualty Demographics

Civilians accounted for 97% (144) of all casualties recorded during 2021. Three casualties were deminers, while another two casualties did not have their civilian or military status recorded.

A very high ratio of civilian casualties corresponds with findings based on analysis of historical data on cluster munition casualties. This consistent and foreseeable disproportionate impact on civilians is due to the indiscriminate nature of these weapons.

#### 2021 casualties by age group, sex, and outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This chart refers to data for casualties where the age, sex, and survival outcome was recorded in each case.

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In 2021, the proportion of child casualties of cluster munitions increased alarmingly, rising to two-thirds (66%) of total recorded casualties, where the age was known.83 Previously, children accounted for 44% of casualties from cluster munition remnants in 2020.

In Lao PDR in 2021, more than half (16) of the 30 recorded cluster munition remnant casualties were children (11 boys and five girls).84

In Lebanon, the eight child casualties of cluster munition remnants in 2021 were all boys. Seven were from Syria and were playing when the explosions occurred, while one was from Lebanon.

In Iraq, 19 (65%) of the 33 cluster munition casualties recorded in 2021 were children (17 boys and two girls).

The average age of child casualties in 2021 was 10 years old. Twenty-two of the child casualties were under 10, while the youngest was just two years old. Of the child casualties where the sex was known, 82% were boys and 18% were girls.85

Where the sex was known, 20% of casualties in 2021 were recorded as 'female' (or 23 of 114).86 Among those casualties, 52% were girls and 48% were women. Among the remaining 80% of casualties recorded as 'male,' 67% were boys and 33% were men.

In 2021, there was a marked difference in survival outcome in relation to the sex of casualties: 47% of male casualties were killed, compared to 26% of female casualties. This represented a reversal of the overall trend in 2020, when half of female casualties were killed.

MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION
COORDINATION, STRATEGIES, AND PLANNING
CLEARANCE

Strong coordination is an important aspect of national ownership of mine action programs, enabling efficient and effective operations.

In 2021, clearance programs in seven States Parties with cluster munition contamination—BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia—were coordinated through national mine action centers. In States Parties Chile and Germany, where contamination is found only on former military bases, the defense ministries are responsible for coordinating clearance.

In Afghanistan, the international community has largely suspended its support to government institutions since the Taliban took power in August 2021. This has affected the functioning of the national Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC). In September 2021, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established a United Nations Emergency Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (UN-EMACCA), to serve as an independent temporary coordination body for mine action.87 In October 2021, UNMAS reported that “all funds for the UN-EMACCA will be channeled through and controlled and managed by UNMAS and no funds will be used to support the Taliban or the de facto Government.”88

83 “Children” means persons under 18 years old, or casualties that were listed as “child” in existing data or reporting. The 66% figure represents 90 children among 136 casualties where the age group was known. The age of 13 casualties in 2021 was not recorded.
85 There were 57 boys and 12 girls. For 21 child casualties recorded in 2021, the sex was not known.
86 The sex of 33 casualties in 2021 was not recorded.
Action 19 of the Lausanne Action Plan requires States Parties to develop evidence-based, costed, and time-bound national strategies and workplans, as part of their Article 4 commitments. As of the end of 2021, seven States Parties—Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania—had strategic plans in place. Germany had a workplan for its extension period to 2025, while Chile prepared a workplan for clearance as part of its Article 4 extension request. Somalia’s mine action strategy expired in 2020. States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Mauritania updated or were in the process of updating their national mine action strategies in 2021.

With technical and financial support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Afghanistan was developing a new five-year strategic plan during 2021. It was reported that the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) would likely revise the plan towards a solely humanitarian focus, considering the governance changes in 2021.

In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) prepared the first integrated strategic plan for the mine action sector, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2022–2028, with support from GICHD and UNMAS. The plan was due to be completed in May 2022. Yet its focus was primarily to reflect the new priorities arising from landmine contamination that occurred during the conflict with Islamic State.

In Lao PDR, the national strategy, Safe Path Forward, was updated for the period 2021–2030, and was expected to be approved by mid-2022. The National Regulatory Authority for the UXO/Mine Action Sector (NRA) in Lao PDR has also developed a new five-year plan for the sector covering 2021–2025, to replace the expired 2016–2020 workplan.

Mauritania had in place a National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2021–2027, which replaced its previous plan for 2016–2020. The plan aims to strengthen the capacity of the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Démunage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) through the retraining of operational staff and deminers. It also planned for the conduct of non-technical and technical survey, and for the clearance of 27 areas.

The three States Parties submitting Article 4 deadline extension requests in 2022 are required, in line with Action 20 of the Lausanne Action Plan, to provide annual workplans which include projections of the amount of cluster munition contaminated land to be addressed annually.

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89 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.
95 Ibid.
96 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization (MIDEC), 21 March 2022; and email from Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEC, 16 June 2022.
97 Email from Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEC, 16 June 2022.
BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 was adopted in January 2019, and addresses contamination from both mines and cluster munition remnants. However, BiH did not include a detailed workplan for clearance when it submitted its Article 4 deadline extension request in May 2022.98

Chad did not include a detailed workplan as part of its Article 4 deadline extension request to conduct non-technical survey in Tibesti province.99

In 2022, as part of its Article 4 extension request and after feedback from the Article 4 Analysis Group, Chile included a detailed workplan for clearance of cluster munition remnants based on the findings of technical survey conducted during 2021.100 Clearance operations are planned to begin in 2023 and to be completed in 2026.101

RISK EDUCATION

In 2021, nine cluster munition contaminated States Parties had institutions in place which served as risk education focal points: Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Chile, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia.

In most cases, the risk education program is coordinated by the respective national mine action center. For school-based programs in Chile, Iraq, and Lao PDR, the education ministry in each country takes on a coordination role.102


Risk education is included within the national mine action strategies of Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania. The newly updated mine action strategies of Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Mauritania all included sections and objectives on risk education.103

In 2021, only Afghanistan included information on risk education activities and a budget for risk education within its extension request; while Mauritania provided limited information on risk education in response to questions from the Article 4 Analysis Group.104 In its third extension request, submitted in 2022, Chile planned to conduct risk education campaigns for civilians living in or visiting areas surrounding the military zones contaminated by cluster munition remnants.105 Neither BiH or Chad included risk education workplans or budgets in their 2022 extension requests.

99 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestApril2022.
102 Chile Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J, p. 23; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Tamsin Haigh, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020; by Shajeevdhar Mahalingam, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 11 May 2020; and by Julien Kempeneers, Mine Action Coordinator, HI, 20 May 2020.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE

States Parties with responsibility for cluster munition victims are obliged under the Convention on Cluster Munitions to develop a national plan and budget for victim assistance. Action 33 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits states to designate a national focal point, and to address the needs and rights of victims according to a measurable national plan. Among States Parties with victims, all have a designated victim assistance focal point, except Croatia and Sierra Leone. No specific victim assistance coordination was reported in Afghanistan, following the Taliban takeover in 2021.

In Lao PDR, the Victim Assistance Technical Working Group continued to be responsible for coordination. In Lebanon, 10 meetings were held in 2021, which focused on organizing a national victim survey and classifying the data collected. Somalia did not report on coordination efforts following the drafting of its victim assistance strategy. Albania and Iraq reported ad hoc coordination processes, addressing specific needs as they arose.

In BiH, no in-person meetings were held in 2020–2021 due to COVID-19 restrictions, with all coordination taking place virtually. In 2021, Guinea-Bissau was developing a victim assistance coordination mechanism. Croatia’s coordination body for victim assistance remained inactive, while Montenegro and Sierra Leone had no specific coordination mechanisms in place.

As of the end of 2021, seven of the States Parties with cluster munition victims had strategies or plans in place for victim assistance and disability rights: Albania, BiH, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon. Chad’s National Plan of Action on Victim Assistance is reported not to have been implemented since its inception in 2018, although other project-related victim assistance planning has been carried out.

In 2021, Guinea-Bissau adopted a five-year National Strategy for the Inclusion of People with Disabilities, which was discussed in early 2022 in relation to victim assistance measures.

In Lao PDR, a Victim Assistance Framework for 2021–2025 was being developed in 2021. A review of the implementation of its UXO/Mine Victim Assistance Strategy 2014–2020 was being undertaken to inform the development of the new framework, with Lao PDR’s national plan and budget to be updated once the framework is completed. This process was consultative, and included input from unexploded ordnance (UXO) survivors and stakeholders including the Lao Disabled People’s Association (LDPA), the Lao Disabled Women’s Development Centre (LDWDC), the Centre for Medical Rehabilitation, and the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE).

Afghanistan and Somalia had each developed new national disability strategies in 2019, which were pending formal approval and adoption as of the end of 2021. It was not known if the plan for Afghanistan was still under consideration after the Taliban takeover in August 2021.

Four States Parties which have reported responsibility for cluster munition victims did not have an active strategy or draft plan in 2021. Croatia has not yet replaced its Action Plan to Help Victims of Mines and UXO, which expired in 2014. Mauritania did not have a specific victim assistance strategy; however, victim assistance is included in its five-year mine action strategy. Montenegro and Sierra Leone did not have victim assistance plans, yet both had a comparatively small number of recorded victims and have broader disability legislation.

### Summary of mine action management and coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine action coordination mechanism</th>
<th>Clearance strategy/plan</th>
<th>Risk education coordination</th>
<th>Risk education strategy</th>
<th>Victim assistance coordination</th>
<th>Victim assistance strategy/plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)</td>
<td>National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2021–2026</td>
<td>DMAC through RE-TWG</td>
<td>Included in mine action strategy</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Disability strategy pending approval or not adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense/General Staff of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Protection</td>
<td>National Action Plan for Persons with Disabilities (NAPPD) 2016–2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BiH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC)</td>
<td>National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025</td>
<td>BHMAC</td>
<td>Included in mine action strategy</td>
<td>BHMAC Victim Assistance Working Group</td>
<td>Included in mine action strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chad</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chile</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Defense</td>
<td>Workplan included in 2022 Article 4 extension request</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense in coordination with Ministry of Education</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine action coordination mechanism</td>
<td>Clearance strategy/plan</td>
<td>Risk education coordination</td>
<td>Risk education strategy</td>
<td>Victim assistance coordination</td>
<td>Victim assistance strategy/plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Clearance workplan included within its 2019 Article 4 extension request (updated annually)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>National Mine Action Coordination Centre (CAAMI)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CAAMI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>CAAMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Five-year National Strategy for the Inclusion of People with Disabilities (adopted in 2021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD)</td>
<td>National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2021–2027</td>
<td>PNDHD</td>
<td>Included in mine action strategy</td>
<td>PNDHD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Standards

### Survey and Clearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine action coordination mechanism</th>
<th>Clearance strategy/plan</th>
<th>Risk education coordination</th>
<th>Risk education strategy</th>
<th>Victim assistance coordination</th>
<th>Victim assistance strategy/plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA)</td>
<td>National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 (expired)</td>
<td>SEMA</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>SEMA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported; RE-TWG=Risk Education Technical Working Group.

States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia all had national standards in place consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). However, the standards in place in Chad and Somalia do not cover cluster munition remnants clearance and survey. Chile uses IMAS along with a Joint Demining Manual for its armed forces, while clearance and survey in Germany are conducted according to federal legislation.

In Lao PDR, there are separate standards for UXO clearance and mine clearance operations.\(^{108}\)

In 2020–2021, national mine action standards in Iraq were reviewed and updated with support from UNMAS.\(^{109}\) Lebanon conducted a full review of its standards during 2020.\(^{110}\) Mauritania planned to conduct a review of its standards during its Article 4 extension period from 2022–2024. In 2022, it reported that its standards were being revised.\(^{111}\)

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\(^{110}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2021.

Some States Parties, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, developed specific COVID-19 prevention and control guidelines for mine action operations in 2020.112 Iraq approved and circulated the guidelines to relevant stakeholders in 2021.113

RISK EDUCATION

Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania all have national standards in place for risk education. BiH also has an accreditation guide for risk education operators.114

In 2022, Iraq reported that its risk education standard had been updated in line with the revised IMAS 12.10 on Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE). The Arabic version of Iraq’s risk education standard was being translated into English by international operators.115

In 2021–2022, Lebanon and Mauritania were in the process of updating their national standards on risk education in line with the revised IMAS 12.10.116

Lao PDR planned to update its national risk education standard, which was last revised in 2012; though this was not completed in 2021.117 In Chad, progress on updating its national standard on risk education was also delayed, reportedly due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.118

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Under Action 32 of the Lausanne Action Plan, States Parties have committed to consider IMAS when integrating victim assistance into broader mechanisms, strategies, and plans.

IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance was fully adopted in October 2021.119 According to this new standard, national mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating multisector efforts to address survivors’ needs. National authorities should also assist with including survivors and indirect victims of cluster munitions, and their views, in the development of relevant national legislation and policies. The standard notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.

In 2021, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) worked with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) to promote best practices in victim assistance in ASEAN countries. This support from HI focuses on updating national victim

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112 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form A, p. 10; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 5 March 2021; and by Mohammed Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.
115 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mudhafar Aziz Hamad, Director of Risk Education and Victim Assistance, IKMAA, 1 April 2022; by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information, DMA, 10 March 2022; by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, 8 April 2022; by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager and Team Leader, MAG, 6 April 2022; and by Sofia Cogollos, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 8 April 2022.
116 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, Risk Education Section Head, LMAC, 21 February 2022; and by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEC, 21 March 2022.
117 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Jonty Taylor, Operations Officer, HALO Trust, 9 March 2021; and by Julien Kempeneers, Regional Armed Violence Reduction and Mine Action Specialist, HI, 6 April 2022.
119 The February 2020 edition of IMAS 13.10, as reported on in Landmine Monitor 2021, was taken offline in a review process to address concerns raised by international stakeholders.
assistance standards and contributing to international and national policy campaigns, as well as support for livelihood activities.\textsuperscript{120}

Lao PDR and Lebanon were both working to update their respective national victim assistance standards in 2021, to bring them in line with IMAS 13.10.\textsuperscript{121}

In 2021, government agencies that provide victim assistance services in Iraq, alongside HI and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), held a workshop to form draft national standards on victim assistance in line with IMAS 13.10, with completion targeted for 2022.\textsuperscript{122}

**REPORTING**

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties with cluster munition contamination must report annually on the size and location of all cluster munition contaminated areas under their jurisdiction and control, and on the status and progress of clearance and the destruction of cluster munition remnants. States Parties must submit annual transparency reports by 30 April each year.

As of 1 August 2022, only seven out of 10 States Parties with clearance obligations had submitted updated reports for calendar year 2021: BiH, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania.

States Parties also have an obligation to report on risk education.\textsuperscript{123} Action 29 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits states to provide data on beneficiaries disaggregated by gender, age, and disability in their transparency reports. Only Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon provided adequate reporting on risk education in their reports for 2021. BiH and Mauritania did not detail activities, or provide disaggregated beneficiary data. Chile and Germany stated that risk education was not needed, as their cluster munition remnants contamination was confined to military training areas.

States Parties must report progress on victim assistance under Article 5. Albania, BiH, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Montenegro included information on victim assistance in their reports for 2021.

As of 1 August 2022, five States Parties with clearance obligations and/or a responsibility for cluster munition victims had not submitted their updated annual reports covering activities in 2021. Afghanistan, Chad, and Guinea-Bissau last submitted a transparency report in 2021, for activities in 2020. Somalia failed to submit an annual report in both 2020 and 2021 and Sierra Leone has not provided one since 2011.

**ADDRESSING THE IMPACT**

**CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CLEARANCE**

**OBLIGATIONS REGARDING CLEARANCE**

Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible,
but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention. If unable to complete clearance on time, the State Party may request deadline extensions for periods of up to five years.

**CLEARANCE IN 2021**

In 2021, States Parties reported clearing some 61 km² of cluster munition contaminated land, destroying more than 81,000 cluster munition remnants. The clearance figure is slightly lower than the 63 km² cleared in 2020. Yet two States Parties, Croatia and Montenegro, finished clearance in 2020, contributing to the higher total.

Monitor data on cluster munition clearance in States Parties is based on information from a range of sources including reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 transparency reports, and Article 4 extension requests. In cases where varying annual figures are reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes, and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website.

Afghanistan reported that 0.42 km² of cluster munition contaminated land was cleared in 2021, resulting in the destruction of 32 submunitions. Clearance was reported to have taken place “in April 2022,” but may have taken place in 2021 through to late March 2022, during the reporting period of Afghan calendar year 1401. No reduction via technical survey was carried out during land release and all sub-surface explosive items were addressed in the hazardous areas.124

BiH reported land release of 0.62 km² and the destruction of 2,995 cluster munition remnants during 2021.125 Since 2017, a total of 2.22 km² has been reported as cleared in BiH.126

Chad reported releasing 0.74 km² of cluster munition contaminated land in the Delbo area of West Ennedi province between September 2020 and April 2021 (0.41 km² cleared and 0.33 km² reduced), with a total of 11 submunitions cleared and destroyed. It was not reported how much of this clearance took place in 2021.127 In June 2021, HCND reported that the area was awaiting quality assurance to complete the land release process; this was completed in October 2021.128

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125 BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F; and BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, May 2022, p. 6, bit.ly/BihArt4ExtRequestMay2022. BHMAC reported different figures to the Monitor with a total of 0.98 km² of cluster munition contaminated land released and 1,261 cluster munition remnants destroyed in 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miodrag Gajic, Analysis and Reporting Officer, BHMAC, 19 April 2022. In its annual progress report, BHMAC also reported a total of 0.98 km² released through clearance and technical survey in 2021, but with 3,178 submunitions cleared. BHMAC, “Report on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2021,” (draft), undated, p. 11.

126 In 2019, BiH reported that 3.6 km² was “separated” from the total cluster munition remnants contaminated area during non-technical survey as it was considered “non-conventionally contaminated.” It was not reported to what extent previous clearance occurred in these areas. Statement of BiH, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2–4 September 2019.


Chile conducted no clearance in 2021, but carried out technical survey, leading to the reduction of 33.84km² of SHA and the identification of 30.77km² of remaining CHA, across four areas.129 Chile was planning to undertake clearance of these areas from mid-2023 until June 2026.130

Cluster munition remnants clearance in 2020–2021131

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance (km²)</td>
<td>CMR destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad*</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>6,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>54.32</td>
<td>71,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>2,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro**</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>63.39</td>
<td>80,925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CMR=cluster munition remnants; N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.

*Chad reported 0.41km² cleared for the period September 2020–April 2021, but did not specify how much of this clearance took place in 2021.

**Croatia and Montenegro completed clearance of all cluster munition remnants contaminated areas in 2020.

129 Pampa Chaca Este (17.11km²) in Arica province; Delta (11.32km²) and Barrancas (0.91km²) in Iquique province; and Punta Zenteno (1.43km²) in Punta Arenas province.

130 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, April 2022, p. 5, bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequestApril2022. Chile had planned to undertake technical survey in 2020, but claimed that COVID-19 had delayed implementation.

Germany cleared 0.85km² of contaminated land during 2021, destroying 466 cluster munition remnants. Between 2017 and 2021, a total of 4.38km² has been cleared within areas of suspected cluster munition remnant contamination.\footnote{Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 17. In its Article 7 report, Germany reported clearance of 4.38km² within SHAs and 0.71km² outside of these areas between 2017 and 2021 (a cumulative total of 5.09km²). In the same report, Germany also provided a different total of 5.15km² cleared in 2017–2021.}

Iraq reported clearing 10.16km² of cluster munition contaminated land in 2021. An additional 6.48km² was released via technical and non-technical survey.\footnote{Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 28; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 24 February 2022.} A total of 8,202 submunitions were cleared; 6,906 through battle area clearance and 1,296 through technical survey.\footnote{Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form F, p. 28.} Most clearance took place in the south (9.71km²), though 0.45km² was cleared in the Middle Euphrates region.\footnote{Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 29; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 24 February 2022.}

As in previous years, Lao PDR cleared the most land, 47.84km², in 2021; representing 78% of all reported clearance. This included 45.14km² of agricultural land and 2.7km² of land needed for development.\footnote{NRA, “IMSMA dashboard,” undated, bit.ly/NRADashboardLaoPDR; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 13. In its Article 7 report, Lao PDR reported a total of 45.57km² cleared (43.01km² for agriculture and 2.56km² for development). The IMSMA dashboard is regularly updated and provides the updated total of 47.84km² cleared in 2021 (as accessed in July 2022).} In total, 66,921 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in Lao PDR in 2021; a decrease from the 71,235 destroyed in 2020. More than 98% (47.16km²) of the total clearance for 2021 occurred in the nine most heavily contaminated provinces.\footnote{Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, pp. 9–13; and NRA, “IMSMA dashboard,” undated, bit.ly/NRADashboardLaoPDR. The nine provinces are Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Salavan, Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xieng Khouang.} Commercial operators accounted for less than 3% of the land cleared in Lao PDR, clearing a total of 1.37km² (1.36km² for development and 0.01km² for agriculture) and destroying 540 cluster munition remnants. About one-third of land cleared by commercial operators was contaminated with cluster munitions (0.51km²).\footnote{Monitor analysis of data from NRA, “IMSMA dashboard,” undated, bit.ly/NRADashboardLaoPDR. The nine provinces are Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Salavan, Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xieng Khouang.} The amount of land cleared with no cluster munition remnants found and destroyed represented just under 2% of the total amount of land cleared in Lao PDR in 2021 (0.86km²).

Lebanon reported releasing 1.24km² of cluster munition contaminated land during 2021. Of the total, 1km² was cleared, 0.1km² was cancelled through non-technical survey, and 0.14km² was reduced through technical survey.\footnote{Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 15.} The 1km² cleared was down from 1.28km² cleared during 2020. A total of 2,418 cluster munition remnants were cleared and destroyed in 2021 through surface, sub-surface, and rapid response. From 2017–2021, Lebanon cleared a total of 6.1km² of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Mauritania undertook an initial assessment of contamination in February 2021, and submitted a request in June 2021 to extend its Article 4 clearance deadline by two years, until 1 August 2024.\footnote{Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.} In 2021, Mauritania cleared 0.18km² of contaminated land, destroying seven cluster munition remnants.\footnote{Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEC, 21 March 2022; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 15.}
As in 2020, Somalia provided no information on clearance of contaminated areas in 2021.

**ARTICLE 4 DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS**

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants on its territory within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention for that country, it can request an extension to its clearance deadline under Article 4 for a period of up to five years.

Despite progress in addressing cluster munition contaminated areas, the first clearance deadline extension requests were submitted in 2019 by Germany and Lao PDR, both of which received five-year extensions. More requests have been submitted each year since then.

In 2020–2021, Afghanistan, BiH, Chile, Lebanon, and Mauritania submitted extension requests and were each granted extensions to their clearance deadlines. In 2022, Chile submitted a third extension request based on the completion of technical survey. Requests were also submitted in 2022 by BiH and Chad.

**Status of Article 4 progress to completion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period (no. of request)</th>
<th>Current deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>4 years (1st)</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>18 months (1st)</td>
<td>1 September 2022</td>
<td>Requested 1-year extension until 1 September 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 September 2023</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 September 2023</td>
<td>Requested 13-month extension until 1 October 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 June 2021</td>
<td>1 year (1st) 1 year (2nd)</td>
<td>1 June 2023</td>
<td>Requested 3-year extension until 1 June 2026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1 August 2020</td>
<td>5 years (1st)</td>
<td>1 August 2025</td>
<td>Expects to complete in 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 November 2023</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 November 2023</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>1 August 2020</td>
<td>5 years (1st)</td>
<td>1 August 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1 May 2021</td>
<td>5 years (1st)</td>
<td>1 May 2026</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 August 2022</td>
<td>2 years (1st)</td>
<td>1 August 2024</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable.

The Lausanne Action Plan notes that sustained efforts are required to ensure that States Parties complete their clearance obligations as soon as possible, and within their original Article 4 deadlines. Only Iraq and Somalia remain within their original deadline, and the number of States Parties on track to meet their Article 4 obligations is decreasing.

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Afghanistan had initially reported that it would meet its clearance deadline of 1 March 2022 as there was commitment from UNMAS and the US to support clearance of 10 areas. However, the discovery of additional contamination and a change in donor commitments led Afghanistan to submit a four-year extension request until March 2026. The request was granted in 2021. In May 2022, Afghanistan stated that it “commits itself to fulfilling its obligations in relation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” The Taliban-led government did not specifically state whether the country was on track to meet its Article 4 clearance deadline.

In its 2019 extension request, Germany reported that it should be able to complete clearance of the Wittstock military training area by 2024. Germany has since stated it was confident that the country would be cluster munition free by 2025. In June 2022, Germany reported that 43% (4.73km²) of the 11km² of contaminated land was cleared between 2017 and 25 March 2022, leaving 6.27km² to clear by 1 August 2025. Challenges to the speed of clearance have included high density metal areas, essential fire maintenance work, limited demining personnel, and poor weather conditions.

Iraq reported in February 2022 that it will not meet its clearance deadline of 2023 and plans to submit an extension request. RMAC South reported that challenges to clearance include the fact that national efforts are focused primarily on areas liberated from Islamic State, while new contaminated areas continue to be found through survey, particularly in the south.

Lao PDR indicated that completion of survey would be the priority during its extension period, with an expectation that additional time and international support would be needed. Survey was ongoing in 2021 and will form a basis for long-term planning and clearance prioritization.

In 2021, Lebanon was granted five additional years until 1 May 2026 to complete clearance. LMAC provided a detailed plan based on available assets; and despite the challenge of difficult terrain, believed that it would meet its 2026 deadline. However, Lebanon reported that a decrease in dedicated international funding for cluster munition clearance affected

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144 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.  
151 Iraq states that obtaining accurate information about the strike locations of US forces would help speed up the survey, planning, and clearance process. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 24 February 2022 and 5 March 2021; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form I, p. 47.  
the number of clearance teams. LMAC had also not received any government funding for clearance. LMAC planned to focus on technical survey to speed up task completion, while also restricting destruction of cluster munition remnants to once per week, as opposed to every day, to enable more time for survey and clearance. Operators have said that the 2026 target for completion of clearance is likely to be missed.

In 2021, Mauritania was granted a two-year extension, to 1 August 2024, to complete survey and clearance. During 2022, Mauritania reported that it still needed to confirm the extent of contaminated areas to confirm whether it would be able to meet this deadline.

It is unknown whether Somalia will meet its clearance deadline of 1 March 2026, as it does not have an accurate picture of contamination and has no plan in place for clearance.

Three States Parties submitted extension requests during 2022.

Despite expectations that BiH would complete clearance by its deadline of 1 September 2022, it submitted a second extension request in 2022, asking for a further year. According to the extension request, submitted in May 2022, this was to allow for finalization of documentation, and for additional time if any delays occurred.

Chad reported in June 2021 that it was in the process of clearing its last known contaminated area and that clearance would be completed by the end of July 2021, ahead of its September 2023 deadline. Yet Tibesti province, in the north, is suspected to have some cluster munition remnant contamination around former Libyan military bases. No survey has been conducted there due to insecurity and inaccessibility. In 2022, Chad submitted its first extension request, seeking one year to conduct non-technical survey on 19.05km² of land in Tibesti province.

Chile has made no progress on clearance, despite having been a State Party to the convention since December 2010. In January 2020, Chile asked for an extension period of five years until 2026. In June 2020, the request was revised to a one-year interim extension, to enable technical survey before submitting a second extension request with a clearance plan. In June 2021, Chile submitted a second one-year extension request, without survey having taken place, citing a lack of resources and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Technical survey was undertaken later in 2021, before Chile submitted its third extension.
request in April 2022, for a period of three years, to clear 31km² of CHA identified in the survey. Following a preparatory phase, Chile plans to begin clearance operations in 2023 and complete clearance in 2026.166

The Article 4 extension requests from BiH, Chad, and Chile will be considered at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in August–September 2022.

RISK EDUCATION

OBLIGATIONS REGARDING RISK EDUCATION

Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions states that each State Party shall “conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.” Risk education involves interventions aimed at protecting civilian populations and individuals, at the time of cluster munition use, when they fail to function as intended, and when they have been abandoned.

RISK EDUCATION FOR CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION

States Parties BiH, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon all reported conducting risk education in 2021. While Afghanistan did not report on risk education, international operators reported that they conducted risk education activities in Afghanistan in 2021 which included messaging on cluster munition remnants.167 Risk education was also conducted in Chad and Mauritania, although it was not reported whether it specifically targeted the threat of cluster munition remnants.

In Lao PDR, risk education is specifically directed to address the risk behaviors associated with cluster munition remnants.

In other States Parties where cluster munition contamination is mixed with other forms of mine and ERW contamination, which might be more predominant, operators do not conduct specific risk education sessions related to cluster munition remnants.

In Somalia, cluster munition remnants are not included on risk education materials due to there being little evidence of contamination.168

RISK EDUCATION TARGETING

The Lausanne Action Plan directs States Parties to implement context-specific, tailor-made risk education activities and interventions, which prioritize at-risk populations and are sensitive to gender, age, and disability, as well as the diversity of populations in affected communities.

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167 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammed Daud Raufi, Head of the Survey and Information Department, HALO Trust Afghanistan, 7 April 2022; and by Mahboob Rahman, Risk Education Specialist, Danish Refugee Council Afghanistan, 6 April 2022.

168 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sudip Thapa, Operations Officer, UNMAS Somalia, 19 March 2021; by Alice Mougin, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, March 2021; by Robert Iga Afedra, Country Director, NPA Somalia, 5 April 2022; and by Katie Nelson, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Somalia, 27 April 2022.
In the majority of States Parties with cluster munition remnants contamination, the ordinance is found in rural areas and directly impacts people who rely on the land and natural resources for their livelihoods. Men are a particularly high-risk group due to their participation in activities which can take them into contaminated areas, such as cultivation, collection of forest products, and hunting and fishing.

According to risk education beneficiary data provided by States Parties Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia, men formed the largest number of direct beneficiaries of risk education in 2021. At least 472,403 men were reached, representing 54% of all beneficiaries. The largest number of men (409,883) were reached through risk education conducted in Afghanistan.

In BiH, accidents are common in spring and autumn during agricultural work, and when people go to the forest to collect firewood and other raw materials. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC) reported that people often knowingly enter contaminated areas for economic reasons. Target groups for risk education in BiH include farmers, mountaineers, hunters, and people collecting wood and other resources.

In Iraq, since 2020, the DMA has implemented an intensive risk education campaign aimed at Bedouin people in the southern governorate of Al-Muthanna, to address a rise in incidents in spring when Bedouins gather to graze livestock and plant crops. Tourism seasons in Missan and Wassit governorates, and the grazing, transportation, and hunting seasons in Al-Muthanna and Samawah Badia were also a focus of risk education campaigns. This focus

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169 Risk education beneficiary data was collected from States Parties and international operators, and represents six cluster munition contaminated States Parties: Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia. Beneficiary data for BiH and Mauritania was not disaggregated by age and sex, and therefore was not included in these totals. International operators collected data according to the Standard Beneficiary Definition guidelines. See, DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council, FSD, HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA, “Standardising Beneficiary Definitions in Humanitarian Mine Action: Second Edition,” p. 9, October 2020, bit.ly/StandardisingBeneficiaryDef. Direct beneficiaries are defined as those who receive safety messages via interpersonal risk education, mass and digital media, and training of trainers programs. However, beneficiary data for digital media was often not disaggregated and therefore was not included in these totals.


171 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 56; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, Head of Operations, RMAC South, 13 August 2020; and by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021.

172 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 13 April 2021; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form I, p. 39.
continued in 2021, combined with the dissemination of messages via mobile phones and social media.\(^{173}\)

In Afghanistan, communities living in proximity to hazards were targeted: returnees and IDPs, nomads, scrap metal collectors, and travelers.\(^{174}\) In Chad, nomads, animal herders, traditional guides, and trackers remained high-risk groups due to their transit through desert areas which may be contaminated.\(^{175}\) In Mauritania, shepherds, nomads, artisanal miners, and fisherfolk were all considered important groups for risk education.\(^{176}\)

In Lao PDR, agricultural activities and the collection of natural resources were highlighted as high-risk activities in risk education materials. Casualties in Lao PDR in 2021 were most often caused by people digging the land, cutting grass, or making fires for warmth or cooking.\(^{177}\)

In 2021, the longer-term social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic appeared to increase risks, with people forced to rely on harmful coping mechanisms. In both Lao PDR and Lebanon, economic hardship encouraged risk-taking as people tried to supplement diminishing livelihoods.\(^{178}\) The collection of scrap metal and explosives remains a common practice in some areas of Lao PDR. A rise in the price of scrap in 2021 likely led to more people taking up scrap metal collection, putting them at risk from cluster munition remnants and other ERW.\(^{179}\)

In Lebanon, refugees were particularly affected, as the impacts of the pandemic combined with other national crises.\(^{180}\) The approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon are regarded as a priority group for risk education, as several refugee camps and settlements are in close proximity to hazardous areas, while refugees are less familiar with the contamination.\(^{181}\) In 2021, Lebanon provided risk education to Syrian refugees near the northeastern border.\(^{182}\)

Children, particularly boys, remain susceptible to the lure of cluster munition remnants. Living in contaminated areas, they often lack sufficient

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\(^{174}\) Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Hamid Ibrahim, Acting Head of EORE Department, DMAC, 20 February 2021; and by Zareen Khan Mayar, Armed Violence Reduction Technical Advisor, HI, 17 March 2021.

\(^{175}\) Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 8 May 2020; and by Jason Lufuluabo Mudingay, Chief of Operations, HI, 13 March 2021.


\(^{179}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Megan MacMillan, Operations Officer, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.


\(^{182}\) Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form G, p. 22.
knowledge of the risks and are prone to picking up and playing with items. Children remained a key target group for all affected States Parties in 2021; a total of 191,847 boys (22% of beneficiaries), and 122,085 girls (14%), were reached through risk education in Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia.

In Iraq, children often participate in livelihood activities such as shepherding, foraging, or scrap metal collection, placing them at risk. Young adult men are likely to engage in risk-taking behavior and occupations such as scrap metal collection, daily laboring, or agriculture. This group was reported to be the most difficult to reach through risk education sessions, partly due to their lack of interest in participating. Adolescent boys were also cited as a difficult group to reach in Lao PDR.

Risk education reached fewer women and girls in States Parties in 2021. They accounted for a collective 24% of all recorded beneficiaries in Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia. In some contexts, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, this was partly due to difficulty accessing women and girls in rural and conservative areas.

**RISK EDUCATION DELIVERY**

Given the strong links between risk-taking behaviors, livelihoods, and vulnerability, as highlighted by the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is important to integrate risk education efforts within wider mine action, humanitarian, and development initiatives.

Mine action operators in Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania all reported that risk education was integrated with clearance and survey activities in 2021.

BiH reported working with development operators to identify alternative sustainable livelihood activities, which would not expose people to the dangers of cluster munition contamination.

In Chad, a new project began in Lake province in 2021 to provide risk education to community focal points, humanitarian workers, and schoolteachers. Yet risk education was not reported to have been conducted in Tibesti, thought to be the most heavily contaminated province.

Risk education is conducted in schools in Lao PDR and Lebanon. In Lao PDR, risk education is integrated into the primary school curriculum for grades 1 to 5, across 10 of its 18 provinces, and was in the process of being integrated into the secondary school curriculum. Lebanon implemented risk education in educational institutions under the school health curriculum.

Risk education was conducted in schools in Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, and Somalia in 2021, but not as part of the formal curriculum. In Iraq, the DMA was working with the Ministry...
of Education to integrate risk education into the curriculum for grades 5 and 6, and was developing plans to train groups of teachers in risk education delivery in all governorates.\textsuperscript{191}

Teenagers, particularly adolescent boys, were seen as a particularly challenging group to reach effectively through traditional risk education methodology. In Lao PDR, HI launched a pilot project to better target youths, through improved materials and outreach. This project included the participation of survivors.\textsuperscript{192}

World Education Laos began implementation of a three-year risk education project in 2021. It targets out-of-school children, youths, agricultural workers, and speakers of ethnic minority languages via non-formal education centers, media platforms, and using youth volunteers.\textsuperscript{193}

Training local committees, or community focal points, has been particularly beneficial in States Parties where affected communities are remote, with varied languages; and where local people may distrust outsiders. This also builds a local capacity to support risk education and reporting.

In Chad, local committees were established to provide risk education orally in local languages, and via the distribution of leaflets during risk education sessions.\textsuperscript{194}

In Lao PDR, a network of community volunteers supported by UXO Lao, the national operator, provided risk education in ethnic minority languages and reported evidence of cluster munition and ERW contamination.\textsuperscript{195}

The use of digital media for risk education continued to expand in 2021. In Lebanon, LMAC and its implementing partners produced a risk education virtual reality video, delivered a risk education Facebook campaign, and began production of an interactive digital app.\textsuperscript{196}

In Iraq, IKMAA and DMA participated in digital risk education workshops organized by MAG, which aimed to promote digital methods and boost the capacity of staff to produce materials.\textsuperscript{197}

Mauritania supplemented its risk education radio campaign with online audiovisual content.\textsuperscript{198}

In 2020 and 2021, HI used a risk education video with messages in sign language and subtitles in Iraq. HI also provided inclusion awareness training and positive disability inclusion messages for all risk education agents and community focal points across their programs.\textsuperscript{199}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{191} Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 51; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMBC, DMA, 10 March 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{192} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Julien Kempeneers, Regional Armed Violence Reduction and Mine Action Specialist, HI, 6 April 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{193} Email from Sarah Bruinooge, Country Director, World Education Laos, 4 March 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{194} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021 and 10 May 2022; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form G, p. 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{197} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager and Team Leader, MAG, 6 April 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{198} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEC, 21 March 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{199} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sofia Cogollos, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 8 April 2022.
\end{itemize}
IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

COVID-19 restrictions continued to create challenges for risk education delivery during 2021. In Iraq, operators were able to resume community sessions but with restricted numbers. Schools also remained closed for the first 10 months of the year.\textsuperscript{200}

In Lebanon, new standard operating procedures, developed to facilitate the safe delivery of risk education during the COVID-19 pandemic, continued to be implemented in 2021.\textsuperscript{201}

Some States Parties combined COVID-19 safety messages with risk education. In Afghanistan, UNMAS and the HALO Trust integrated such messages into their sessions.\textsuperscript{202}

States Parties and operators used social media and other digital means to reach as many people as possible with risk education messages whilst social distancing measures were in place.

MONITORING AND EVALUATING RISK EDUCATION

In Iraq, the Danish Refugee Council conducted a Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) survey in 2021 in Basra and Ninevah governorates. It confirmed that while at-risk people had an acceptable level of knowledge about explosive ordnance, risk-taking was underpinned by socio-economic factors. Men, teenage boys, and children were the most at-risk groups, and were the most prone to engaging in unsafe risk-taking behaviors such as scrap metal collection, daily laboring, or agricultural work.\textsuperscript{203}

In Lao PDR, the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) began a study to identify improvements and best practices for risk education implementing partners in 2021.\textsuperscript{204}

RISK EDUCATION IN NON-SIGNATORY STATES

In non-signatories Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, as well as in Nagorno-Karabakh, risk education was carried out in 2021 to alert communities to the risk of contamination from recent or ongoing conflict. Risk education specifically addressed the threat posed by cluster munition remnants.

In Libya, risk education was conducted alongside clearance and survey operations. The HALO Trust provided risk education combined with mechanical clearance, to inform communities of the danger of clearance operations and raise awareness of the prevalence of ERW in rubble and damaged buildings.\textsuperscript{205} Migrants and refugees in Libya were found to have lower awareness of contamination than Libyans.\textsuperscript{206} Risk education materials were developed in multiple languages to ensure that migrants and refugees were reached.\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{200} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, 8 April 2022; and by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust, 7 April 2022.

\textsuperscript{201} Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form G, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{202} UNMAS, “Factsheet: Afghanistan,” February 2022, bit.ly/UNMASAfghanistanFeb2022; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammed Dud Raufi, Head of Survey and Information Department, HALO Trust Afghanistan, 7 April 2022.

\textsuperscript{203} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, 8 April 2022.


\textsuperscript{205} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zita Andrassy, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 6 April 2022.


The HALO Trust provided risk education in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2021. Messaging on cluster munition remnants was a key part of its messaging for children. It also trained risk education trainers in five provinces of Armenia as part of an Action Against Hunger project.208

In Syria and Yemen, risk education continued amid ongoing conflict in 2021, although delivery was limited in both countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic.209

In Syria, in-person sessions were held with smaller groups of participants, and sessions held in IDP camps were sometimes cancelled. The security of risk education and community liaison teams was a major concern for operators amid continued conflict.210 Both the HALO Trust and HI trained community volunteers in risk education delivery, to enable them to pass on messages within their communities when risk education teams were unable to visit.

In Yemen, migrants travelling to Aden were a high-risk group, and challenging to reach. The Danish Refugee Council provided risk education to migrants through a mobile caravan.211 UNDP implemented a risk education project from November 2021 to January 2022, to reach newly displaced people from Marib, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).212

In Ukraine, risk education increased from February 2022 in response to hostilities and the mass movement of people fleeing the conflict. In the initial weeks after Russia’s invasion, risk education stakeholders used digital approaches to reach as many people as possible. Metro and train stations were targeted with videos and printed materials, and interpersonal risk education was provided in shelters.213

Risk education activities in Ukraine were conducted by 10 organizations. Digital messaging reached some three million people, while 30,000 people had received in-person risk education by the end of June 2022.214 Digital methods were the most prevalent means of reaching beneficiaries in Ukraine after the conflict began in early 2022.215 For example, the BezMin (Without Mines) Facebook page, which was initially designed for conflict-affected areas in eastern Ukraine, was adapted to target at-risk audiences nationwide, in both the Russian and Ukrainian languages.216

The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) developed an app to report ordnance, whilst hotlines were disseminated for the reporting of objects including unexploded submunitions.217

In 2022, the EORE Advisory Group produced a detailed guidance note, which included safety messages on cluster munitions, to support authorities and humanitarian workers.

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208 Email from HALO Trust Nagorno-Karabakh, 6 April 2022.
210 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sultan Alshoubaki, Risk Education Specialist, and Najwa Al Janda, Atif Iqbal, and Nermin Lieli, Risk Education Project Managers, HI, 5 April 2022; by Damien O’Brien, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 6 March 2022; and by Leila Susic, Community Liaison Manager and Team Leader, MAG, 21 March 2022.
211 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mario Quiñones, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Manager, Danish Refugee Council, 4 April 2022.
216 See, BezMin (Without Mines) Facebook page, bit.ly/BezMinFacebook.
responding to the crisis in Ukraine and to inform the provision of emergency risk education.\textsuperscript{218} GICHD published a guide to explosive ordnance in Ukraine for operators conducting mine action activities that “aims to help those in the field manage the risks they face.”\textsuperscript{219}

\section*{VICTIM ASSISTANCE}

\subsection*{OBLIGATIONS REGARDING VICTIM ASSISTANCE}

As stated in the preamble to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are determined “to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition victims and recognising their inherent dignity.” The convention requires that States Parties assist all cluster munition victims in areas under their jurisdiction, and report on progress.

Specific activities to ensure adequate assistance is provided under Article 5 include:\textsuperscript{220}

\begin{itemize}
\item Collecting data and assessing the needs of cluster munition victims;
\item Coordinating victim assistance programs and developing a national plan;
\item Actively involving cluster munition victims in all processes that affect them;
\item Providing adequate and accessible assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support, and socio-economic inclusion;
\item Providing assistance that is gender- and age-sensitive, and non-discriminatory.\textsuperscript{221}
\end{itemize}

Thirteen States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have reported having responsibility for cluster munition victims.

The Lausanne Action Plan’s commitments on victim assistance largely reflect the obligations enshrined in the convention.

Action 34 commits States Parties to provide first-aid and long-term medical care to cluster munition victims. It also requires them to ensure access to adequate rehabilitation, psychological, and psychosocial support services as part of a broader public health approach. Ideally, States Parties should have a national referral mechanism and a directory of services. Victim assistance should be provided in a non-discriminatory manner, and be sensitive to gender, age, and disability.

Action 35 requires States Parties to facilitate the social, educational, and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such measures may take the form of employment referrals, access to micro-finance institutions, livelihood support, and rural development and social protection programs.

Action 37 commits States Parties to endeavor to support the training, development, and official recognition of multidisciplinary, skilled, and qualified rehabilitation professionals.


\textsuperscript{220} These activities are to be implemented in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.

\textsuperscript{221} Increasingly this obligation is understood to include measures that address disability sensitivity, diversity, and intersectionality.
MEDICAL CARE

Medical responses for victims include first-aid, field trauma response, emergency evacuation, transport, and immediate medical care, as well as addressing longer-term healthcare needs.

In Afghanistan, people living in remote areas lacked access to healthcare, due to a lack of health facilities and hazardous road conditions. War trauma and physical injuries left needs far beyond the capacity and resources of Afghanistan’s health system. Overall, healthcare in the country was supported by donors via the Sehatmandi Project. From August 2021, a pause in funding to the project left 90% of supported health facilities at risk of closure.

In response to the failing health system, ICRC launched a six-month project to support hospitals in coordination with local authorities. ICRC reported that its long-standing dialogue with the Taliban had enabled it to carry out activities after the political transition. A non-governmental organization (NGO) working in Afghanistan, EMERGENCY, also maintained a network of first-aid posts and primary health centers, with an ambulance service for isolated areas. In Afghanistan, access to healthcare services was inadequate, especially for women. Women in Afghanistan are often not allowed to travel alone, and there is a shortage of trained female healthcare personnel.

In Lao PDR, the Ministry of Health, with support from partners World Education Laos and the Quality of Life Association, provided medical treatment to survivors of cluster munitions in 2021. World Education Laos partnered with the NRA to administer the War Victims Medical Fund, which provided emergency assistance to survivors and their families, including medical expenses, transportation, and funeral expenses.

In Houaphan and Xieng Khouang provinces, which have recorded among the highest numbers of cluster munition remnants incidents, HI supported healthcare operators to provide services free of charge or to provide financial support for urgent healthcare issues. Community focal points in Houaphan received first-aid training. In heavily affected Luang Prabang province, HI also provided technical support to increase access to health services for persons with disabilities.

Hospitals in Lebanon were forced to restrict essential health services, and limit the distribution of medicine, as the healthcare system deteriorated due to the economic crisis. In 2021, ICRC trauma care training for LMAC personnel and first responders in cluster munition contaminated areas was not carried out, due to administrative constraints.

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223 Ibid.

224 The Sehatmandi Project was supported by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), managed by the World Bank (on behalf of 34 donors), and the International Development Association (IDA), supported by the Global Financing Facility. See, World Bank, "Ensuring Accessible Health Care for Rural Afghans;" 9 April 2020, bit.ly/WorldBankRuralAfghansApril2020.


228 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form H.

229 Email from Sarah Bruinooge, Country Director, World Education Laos, 4 March 2022.


Syrian refugees requiring reconstructive surgery and post-operative rehabilitation in Lebanon were treated at the Weapon Traumatology Training Centre, in the city of Tripoli, which ICRC had established in September 2014. However, the center closed in March 2021, in part due to financial constraints.\textsuperscript{234}

Iraq reported that no emergency medical services are available in remote areas, meaning that injured survivors are evacuated by companions or receive first-aid from organizations working nearby.\textsuperscript{235} ICRC provided medicines, supplies, and training for emergency and surgical care at an additional hospital in Anbar governorate in 2021 to build capacity to treat injuries.\textsuperscript{236}

Timely referrals to medical care are important, especially if the available services are adequate when a patient arrives. Training healthcare workers on rehabilitation and disabilities, as carried out by HI in Chad, can improve identification and referral to rehabilitation centers.\textsuperscript{237} In Chad, survivors requiring additional surgery following an amputation were referred to a hospital in N’Djamena.\textsuperscript{238}

Mauritania reported that the government covers the costs of medical care for survivors.\textsuperscript{239}

Access to healthcare in Sierra Leone is constrained by distances, costs, a lack of skilled medical staff, and poor service quality. Resources are unevenly distributed, with the vast majority of referral hospitals concentrated in the urban area of the capital, Freetown.\textsuperscript{240}

**PHYSICAL REHABILITATION**

Rehabilitation, which includes physiotherapy and the provision of assistive devices such as prosthetics, orthotics, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, aims to help cluster munition victims regain or improve mobility, and to engage in everyday activities. Comprehensive rehabilitation requires a multidisciplinary approach involving doctors, physiotherapists, prosthetists, social workers, and other specialists.

The Rehabilitation 2030 initiative, launched in 2017, focuses on coordinated global action to improve rehabilitation through strengthening health systems and integrating rehabilitation into all levels of healthcare. The World Health Organization (WHO) has designed the Systematic Assessment of Rehabilitation Situation (STARS) tool to facilitate effective prioritization and strategic planning for rehabilitation in countries. This was complimented by the launch, in May 2022, of the Global Report on Assistive Technology, by the WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The report contains a wide-ranging dataset and analysis of current assistive technology access, and is the first of several planned reports on actions taken to improve access to assistive technology.

Integrating rehabilitation into national health systems, including by developing universal health coverage, is considered key to the sustainability of rehabilitation services, and is recommended by the WHO. Yet, to date, rehabilitation has not been a priority in many affected States Parties.

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., p. 465.
\textsuperscript{235} Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 67; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 12 April 2021.
\textsuperscript{237} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Marie-Cécile Tournier, Country Director, HI Chad, 11 June 2021; and by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.
\textsuperscript{238} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jean-Michel Mathiam, North Area Coordinator, HI, 22 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{239} Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019).
Healthcare systems in many States Parties with responsibility for cluster munition victims are under-funded and lack the necessary infrastructure and expertise. In some States Parties, such as Afghanistan and Lebanon, the quality of healthcare systems has severely deteriorated due to broader national economic and political conditions. Therefore, significant challenges remained to providing adequate, accessible, and affordable rehabilitation.

In Afghanistan, ICRC supported rehabilitation centers in seven provinces and provided materials, training, and technical assistance to six orthopedic workshops. HI resumed its activities in four provinces after only a few days of service interruption amid the Taliban takeover in August 2021, and continued to operate its rehabilitation center in Kandahar. The number of beneficiaries increased as the end of fighting and lifting of roadblocks allowed more people to access the center. HI has been supporting the Ministry of Public Health to improve the skills of physiotherapists and prosthetics technicians through enhanced training. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) continued to provide rehabilitation services, and commenced a new rehabilitation program in Bamyian province in June 2022.

Albania needs to follow-up to address needs identified during a survivor assessment survey in 2016, and to maintain healthcare and rehabilitation services for amputees in remote areas. The Prosthetics Department at Kukes Regional Hospital, which is in the cluster munition impacted area, suffers from a lack of funding. Its work has also been hampered by inconsistent supplies for three years, with no materials available locally. Training for staff was also needed to build capacity. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is required to supply prosthetic materials to Kukes Regional Hospital and the National Ortho-Prosthetic Center in Tirana, but the level of support is unknown. Albania reported that prosthetics services at Kukes Regional Hospital were under strain due to the poor functioning of the national prosthetics center in Tirana.

Chad needs more investment in physical rehabilitation. HI increased support for physical rehabilitation through PRODECO, a European Union (EU)-funded development project, running from 2017 through 2021.

In Croatia, where substantial rehabilitation services are available, the Ombudsman for Persons with Disabilities noted the complexity and length of the procedure to obtain orthopedic aids.

In Guinea-Bissau, the only physical rehabilitation center was supported by ICRC, which also covered treatment costs for some patients. However, ICRC

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245 HI, "Chad 4-year economic development project nears end," undated, bit.ly/ChadHIProject2021.


Iraq needs to improve coordination among its 23 rehabilitation centers. There was no national referral mechanism due to financial constraints and security issues. Community rehabilitation units require financial support for logistics, vehicles, and specialist personnel. Gender-sensitive services were available, as women staff were employed in rehabilitation and medical centers.

There was no progress during 2021 on increasing access to services in rural areas of Iraq, and no extension of rehabilitation to all governorates, due to the lack of funding.\footnote{Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information Department, DMA, 10 March 2022; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 45.} ICRC opened a physical rehabilitation center in Erbil in March 2022. It is the largest such facility in Iraq, and will also address the needs of people from nearby governorates, as well as displaced persons and refugees, particularly those from Syria.\footnote{ICRC press release, “Erbil: A new glimpse of hope, ICRC opens the largest Physical Rehabilitation Centre in Iraq,” 15 March 2022, bit.ly/ICRCErbil15March2022.} ICRC outreach activities enabled persons with disabilities in remote areas to obtain assistive devices and referrals for rehabilitation.\footnote{ICRC, “Annual Report 2021,” 27 July 2022, p. 465, www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2021.}

Lao PDR needs to improve access to rehabilitation services, including to survivors from remote and rural areas.\footnote{COPE, “Community Outreach,” undated, bit.ly/COPELaosCommunityOutreach.} In 2021, HI supported the Ministry of Health to integrate rehabilitation, while supporting the monitoring of outcomes of the National Rehabilitation Action Plan.\footnote{HI, “Country Card: Lao PDR,” updated September 2021, p. 7, bit.ly/HILaosCountryCard2021.}

In 2021, the Center for Medical Rehabilitation, operated jointly by the Ministry of Health and COPE, provided physical rehabilitation to 43 survivors in Lao PDR. This marked a significant increase from 2020, when six survivors were assisted.\footnote{Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J, p. 45.} In May 2022, NRA and COPE signed an agreement to implement a project for mobile rehabilitation services in Houaphan and Xieng Khouang provinces.\footnote{NRA, “On May 26, 2022, the signing ceremony between the office of the National Management Committee to solve the problem of unexploded ordnance remaining in the Lao PDR and the cooperation project on artificial intelligence and rescue equipment,” 26 May 2022, bit.ly/NRALaos26May2022.}


In Mauritania, the government provided a grant for victim assistance to both the PNDHD and the National Orthopedic and Functional Rehabilitation Center (Centre National d’Orthopédie et de Réhabilitation Fonctionnelle, CNORF), where survivors also receive psychological support services.\footnote{Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 10–11.} Mauritania reported on few specific activities or services in 2021.
In Sierra Leone, responsibility for rehabilitation services has been gradually handed over from international NGOs, including HI and the Prosthetics Outreach Foundation, to the government. Progress was hampered by an absence of funding, a lack of prioritization for rehabilitation, and limited coordination between providers. Subsidized services and greater outreach are needed to expand access.\footnote{Victoria Jerwanska, Ismaila Kebbie, and Lina Magnusson, "Coordination of health and rehabilitation services for person with disabilities in Sierra Leone – a stakeholders’ perspective," \textit{Disability and Rehabilitation}, 22 May 2022, bit.ly/SierraLeone22May2022; and Archie P. T. Allen, William S. Bolton, Mohamed B. Jalloh, Stephen J. Halpin, David G. Jayne, and Julian D. A. Scott, "Barriers to accessing and providing rehabilitation after a lower limb amputation in Sierra Leone – a multidisciplinary patient and service provider perspective," \textit{Disability and Rehabilitation}, Vol. 44, Issue 11, 1 December 2020, bit.ly/SierraLeoneRehab2020.} The Ministry of Health and Sanitation adopted the Assistive Technology Policy and Strategic Plan 2021–2025, which includes an objective to increase national capacity for rehabilitation, covering physiotherapy and prosthetics.\footnote{Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation, "Assistive Technology (AT): Policy and Strategic Plan 2021–2025," 23 November 2021, bit.ly/SierraLeonePlan2021-2025.}


Training of rehabilitation professionals was ongoing in several states in 2021–2022. ICRC organized training for physiotherapists and physiotherapy students in Lebanon for the rehabilitation of amputees.\footnote{ICRC, "Annual Report 2021," 27 July 2021, p. 465, www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2021.} In May 2022, the Okard project, under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and set to run for five years from 2017 to 2022, opened a development training facility for health professionals in Lao PDR. It is designed to improve the capacity of 150 doctors, nurses, and physiotherapists at the Center for Medical Rehabilitation.\footnote{World Education Laos, "Strengthening Rehabilitation Services in Laos," 5 May 2022, bit.ly/LaosRehabilitation5May2022.}

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

Psychological and psychosocial support includes counselling, individual peer-to-peer support, community-based support groups, and survivor networks. Peer-to-peer support was among the least supported victim assistance activities during 2021, despite being inclusive, targeted, cost-effective, and sustainable. Psychological and psychosocial support remained in need of further resources. Despite an overall lack of progress, some services of this nature were reported.

Afghanistan faced a severe lack of funding for all victim assistance activities, including survivor peer-to-peer support required to address their needs and those of conflict-affected communities.

BiH reported that psychological and psychosocial support were available, with Red Cross and Red Crescent social workers and volunteers trained to support persons with disabilities, including survivors.\footnote{Committee on Victim Assistance, "Preliminary Mid-Term Assessment: Bosnia and Herzegovina Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022, bit.ly/MBTObservationsVABiHJun2022.}

World Education Laos provided psychosocial support to 43 survivors in Lao PDR in 2021. Yet psychological support remained limited, with only three psychologists active in the country. HI assisted persons with the greatest need to gain priority access to psychological support.\footnote{Response to Monitor questionnaire by Reinier Carabain, Operations Manager, HI Lao PDR, 14 June 2021.}
In Lebanon, ICRC provided mental health support in 2021. It also provided training in psychological counselling and psychosocial support.268

In Iraq, HI provided mental health and psychosocial support services.

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND EDUCATION**

Economic inclusion via vocational training, micro-credit, income-generation projects, and employment programs continues to be an area of great need for cluster munition victims. Access to inclusive education, and social inclusion through sport, leisure, and cultural activities are also ongoing needs.

In 2021, survivors in Afghanistan, BiH, Lao PDR, and Lebanon received vocational training and economic support through local organizations, with international assistance.

According to Lao PDR’s National Protection Strategy, adopted in September 2020, services and benefits should be provided to persons with disabilities, “including UXO survivors with a disability,” who are not able to work or are from low-income families.269

In Chad, survivors benefited from income-generation activities supported by HI. This included a social fund which provided grants to start businesses to more than 1,000 beneficiaries, and training for teachers to improve the provision of inclusive education and psychosocial support.270

In Guinea-Bissau, ICRC promoted the social inclusion of persons with disabilities, by referring them for livelihood support and organizing public awareness-raising events.271

In Lao PDR, 14 survivors received vocational training and economic support in 2021 from the Quality of Life Association and from Terra Renaissance, a Japanese NGO. Lao PDR reported that, in 2019, 95% of registered ERW survivors of working age were unable to earn sufficient income (similar to the 96% in 2015).272

The Disability Empowerment Movement, formed by a landmine survivor, worked to improve access to assistance for persons with disabilities in Sierra Leone in 2021.273 HI adapted schools in the country to make them accessible for persons with disabilities, including survivors.274

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270 Elizabeth Johnson Sellers, “Chad: ‘I had never been to school’,” HI, 8 June 2022, bit.ly/HIChad8June2022; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Marie-Cécile Tournier, Country Director, HI, 11 June 2021; and by Brahim Djibrin Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.


CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION

MAP KEY
- Massive contamination (more than 1,000km²)
- Large contamination (100–1,000km²)
- Medium contamination (10–99km²)
- Small contamination (less than 10km²)
- Extent of contamination unknown/Residual contamination
- Clearance reported complete

Note: States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are bold, signatories are underlined, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are italics.

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
MAP KEY
- Cluster munition casualties recorded prior to 2021
- Casualties recorded from cluster munition remnants in 2021
- No recorded cluster munition casualties

Note: States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are bold, signatories are underlined, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are italic.

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
An orthopedic technician works on a new prothesis in the Physical Rehabilitation Center in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
© Till Mayer/HI, March 2022
STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 15, the convention was open for signature from 3 December 2008 until its entry into force, which was 1 August 2010. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the convention has entered into force, states may no longer sign—rather they may become bound through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16(2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a).

As of 1 August 2022 there were 110 States Parties and 13 signatories.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 3 Dec 08; 8 Sep 11
Albania 3 Dec 08; 16 Jun 09
Andorra 9 Apr 13 (a)
Antigua and Barbuda 16 Jul 10; 23 Aug 10
Australia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 12
Austria 3 Dec 08; 2 Apr 09
Belgium 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09
Belize 2 Sep 14 (a)
Benin 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 17
Bolivia 3 Dec 08; 30 Apr 13
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 08; 7 Sep 10
Botswana 3 Dec 08; 27 Jun 11
Bulgaria 3 Dec 08; 6 Apr 11
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10
Burundi 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
Cameroon 15 Dec 09; 12 Jul 12
Canada 3 Dec 08; 16 Mar 15
Cabo Verde 3 Dec 08; 19 Oct 10
Chad 3 Dec 08; 26 Mar 13
Chile 3 Dec 08; 16 Dec 10
Colombia 3 Dec 08; 10 Sep 15
Comoros 3 Dec 08; 28 Jul 10
Congo, Rep. 3 Dec 08; 2 Sep 14
Cook Islands 3 Dec 08; 23 Aug 11
Costa Rica 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 11
Côte d’Ivoire 4 Dec 08; 12 Mar 12
Croatia 3 Dec 08; 17 Aug 09
Cuba 6 Apr 16 (a)
Czech Republic 3 Dec 08; 22 Sep 11
Denmark 3 Dec 08; 12 Feb 10
Dominican Republic 10 Nov 09; 20 Dec 11
Ecuador 3 Dec 08; 11 May 10
El Salvador 3 Dec 08; 10 Jan 11
Eswatini 13 Sep 11 (a)
Fiji 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
France 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
Gambia 3 Dec 08; 11 Dec 11
Germany 3 Dec 08; 8 Jul 09
Ghana 3 Dec 08; 3 Feb 11
Grenada 29 Jun 11 (a)
Guatemala 3 Dec 08; 3 Nov 10
Guinea 3 Dec 08; 21 Oct 14
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
Guyana 31 Oct 14 (a)
Holy See 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
Honduras 3 Dec 08; 21 Mar 12
Hungary 3 Dec 08; 3 Jul 12
Iceland 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 15
Iraq 12 Nov 09; 14 May 13
Ireland 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
Italy 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 11
Japan 3 Dec 08; 14 Jul 09
Lao PDR 3 Dec 08; 18 Mar 09
Lebanon 3 Dec 08; 5 Nov 10
Lesotho 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 08; 4 Mar 13
Lithuania 3 Dec 08; 24 Mar 11
Luxembourg 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
Madagascar 3 Dec 08; 20 May 17
Malawi 3 Dec 08; 7 Oct 09
Maldives 27 Sep 19 (a)
Mali 3 Dec 08; 30 Jun 10
Malta 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
Mauritania 19 Apr 10; 1 Feb 12
Mauritius 1 Oct 15 (a)
Mexico 3 Dec 08; 6 May 09
Moldova 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10
Monaco 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 10
Montenegro 3 Dec 08; 25 Jan 10
Mozambique 3 Dec 08; 14 Mar 11
Namibia 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 18
Nauru 3 Dec 08; 4 Feb 13
Netherlands 3 Dec 08; 23 Feb 11
New Zealand 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09
Nicaragua 3 Dec 08; 2 Nov 09
Niger 3 Dec 08; 2 Jun 09
Niue 6 Aug 20 (a)
North Macedonia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 09
Norway 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
Palau 3 Dec 08; 19 Apr 16
Palestine 2 Jan 15 (a)
Panama 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
Paraguay 3 Dec 08; 12 Mar 15
Peru 3 Dec 08; 26 Sep 12
Philippines 3 Dec 08; 3 Jan 19
Portugal 3 Dec 08; 9 Mar 11
Rwanda 3 Dec 08; 25 Aug 15
Saint Kitts and Nevis 13 Sep 13 (a)
Saint Lucia 15 Sep 20 (a)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
23 Sep 09; 29 Oct 10
Samoa 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 10
San Marino 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
São Tomé & Príncipe 3 Dec 08; 27 Jan 20
Senegal 3 Dec 08; 3 Aug 11
Seychelles 13 Apr 10; 20 May 10
Sierra Leone 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
Slovak Republic 24 Jul 15 (a)
Slovenia 3 Dec 08; 19 Aug 09
Somalia 3 Dec 08; 30 Sep 15
South Africa 3 Dec 08; 28 May 15
Spain 3 Dec 08; 17 Jun 09
Sri Lanka 1 Mar 2018 (a)
Sweden 3 Dec 08; 23 Apr 12
Switzerland 3 Dec 08; 17 Jul 12
Togo 3 Dec 08; 22 Jun 12
Trinidad and Tobago 21 Sep 11 (a)
Tunisia 12 Jan 09; 28 Sep 10
United Kingdom 3 Dec 08; 4 May 10
Uruguay 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
Zambia 3 Dec 08; 12 Aug 09

SIGNATORIES
Angola 3 Dec 08
Central African Republic 3 Dec 08
Congo, Dem. Rep. 18 Mar 09
Cyprus 23 Sep 09
Status of the Convention

**Djibouti** 30 Jul 10
**Haiti** 28 Oct 09
**Indonesia** 3 Dec 08
**Jamaica** 12 Jun 09
**Kenya** 3 Dec 08

**Liberia** 3 Dec 08
**Nigeria** 12 Jun 09
**Tanzania** 3 Dec 08
**Uganda** 3 Dec 08

**NON-SIGNATORIES**

Algeria
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Bhutan
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
China
Dominica
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
Gabon
Georgia
Greece
India
Iran
Israel
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kiribati
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Libya
Malaysia
Marshall Islands

Micronesia, Federated States of
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar/Burma
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Poland
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Sudan
Sudan
Suriname
Syria
Tajikistan
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Türkiye
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zimbabwe
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DUBLIN 19-30 MAY 2008

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict,

Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned,

Concerned that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss of livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use,

Deeply concerned also at the dangers presented by the large national stockpiles of cluster munitions retained for operational use and determined to ensure their rapid destruction,

Believing it necessary to contribute effectively in an efficient, coordinated manner to resolving the challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located throughout the world, and to ensure their destruction,

Determined also to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition victims and recognising their inherent dignity,

Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance to cluster munition victims, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as providing for their social and economic inclusion,

Recognising the need to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to cluster munition victims and to address the special needs of vulnerable groups,

Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, inter alia, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability,

Mindful of the need to coordinate adequately efforts undertaken in various fora to address the rights and needs of victims of various types of weapons, and resolved to avoid discrimination among victims of various types of weapons,

Reaffirming that in cases not covered by this Convention or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law, derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,

Resolved also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party to this Convention,

Welcoming the very broad international support for the international norm prohibiting anti-personnel mines, enshrined in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,
Welcoming also the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its entry into force on 12 November 2006, and wishing to enhance the protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition remnants in post-conflict environments,


Welcoming further the steps taken nationally, regionally and globally in recent years aimed at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the global call for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster munitions and recognising the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world,

Reaffirming the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by which, inter alia, States recognised the grave consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions and committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and would establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education and destruction of stockpiles,

Emphasising the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalisation and its full implementation,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and the rules that the parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations against military objectives only, that in the conduct of military operations constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects and that the civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1
General obligations and scope of application

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
   a. Use cluster munitions;
   b. Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;
   c. Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, mutatis mutandis, to explosive bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to aircraft.

3. This Convention does not apply to mines.

ARTICLE 2
Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. “Cluster munition victims” means all persons who have been killed or suffered physical
or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities;

2. **Cluster munition** means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:
   a. A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
   b. A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects;
   c. A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
      i. Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
      ii. Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
      iii. Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object;
      iv. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism;
      v. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature.

3. **Explosive submunition** means a conventional munition that in order to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;

4. **Failed cluster munition** means a cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so;

5. **Unexploded submunition** means an explosive submunition that has been dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and has failed to explode as intended;

6. **Abandoned cluster munitions** means cluster munitions or explosive submunitions that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. They may or may not have been prepared for use;

7. **Cluster munition remnants** means failed cluster munitions, abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets;

8. **Transfer** involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing cluster munition remnants;

9. **Self-destruction mechanism** means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated;

10. **Self-deactivating** means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition;

11. **Cluster munition contaminated area** means an area known or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants;

12. **Mine** means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle;

13. **Explosive bomblet** means a conventional munition, weighing less than 20 kilograms, which is not self-propelled and which, in order to perform its task, is dispersed or released by a dispenser, and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;

14. **Dispenser** means a container that is designed to disperse or release explosive bomblets and which is affixed to an aircraft at the time of dispersal or release;

15. **Unexploded bomblet** means an explosive bomblet that has been dispersed, released or otherwise separated from a dispenser and has failed to explode as intended.
ARTICLE 3
Storage and stockpile destruction

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to four years. A State Party may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. Each request for an extension shall set out:
   a. The duration of the proposed extension;
   b. A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional circumstances justifying it;
   c. A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed;
   d. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions held at the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional cluster munitions or explosive submunitions discovered after such entry into force;
   e. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed during the period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; and
   f. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions remaining to be destroyed during the proposed extension and the annual destruction rate expected to be achieved.

5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate. A request for an extension shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which it is to be considered.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the retention or acquisition of a limited number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for the development of and training in cluster munition and explosive submunition detection, clearance or destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster munition counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions retained or acquired shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer of cluster munitions to another State Party for the purpose of destruction, as well as for the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is permitted.

8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for the purposes described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and actual use of these cluster munitions and explosive submunitions and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions or explosive submunitions are transferred to another State Party for these purposes, the report shall include reference to the receiving party. Such a report shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party retained, acquired or transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 30 April of the following year.
ARTICLE 4
Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education

1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows:
   a. Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date;
   b. Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
   c. Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and assistance:
   a. Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
   b. Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and methodologies;
   c. Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking readily recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe;
   d. Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and
   e. Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.

3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, each State Party shall take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster munition remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
   a. In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, inter alia, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants.
b. Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.

5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. The requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.

6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is to be considered. Each request shall set out:
   a. The duration of the proposed extension;
   b. A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to and required by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants during the proposed extension;
   c. The preparation of future work and the status of work already conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and any subsequent extensions;
   d. The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force;
   e. The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry into force of this Convention;
   f. The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension;
   g. The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability during the proposed extension;
   h. The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the proposed extension; and
   i. Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, inter alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants reported, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate.

Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon the submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken during the previous extension granted pursuant to this Article.

ARTICLE 5
Victim assistance

1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall:
   a. Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;
   b. Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and policies;
   c. Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out these activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing national disability, development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and contribution of relevant actors;
   d. Take steps to mobilise national and international resources;
   e. Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between cluster munition victims and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes; differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic needs;
   f. Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organisations;
   g. Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and
   h. Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including in the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as social and economic inclusion.

ARTICLE 6
International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance.

2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.

3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision and receipt of clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 4 of this Convention, each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and information concerning various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and related activities.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and shall also provide assistance to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of marking, risk reduction education, protection of civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4 of this Convention.

6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, each State Party in a position to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected State Party.

7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on a bilateral basis.
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to contribute to the economic and social recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in affected States Parties.

9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds in order to facilitate the provision of assistance under this Article.

10. Each State Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all appropriate measures in order to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of this Convention, including facilitation of the entry and exit of personnel, materiel and equipment, in a manner consistent with national laws and regulations, taking into consideration international best practices.

11. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national action plan, request the United Nations system, regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions to assist its authorities to determine, inter alia:
   a. The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
   b. The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the plan;
   c. The time estimated as necessary to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
   d. Risk reduction education programmes and awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster munition remnants;
   e. Assistance to cluster munition victims; and
   f. The coordination relationship between the government of the State Party concerned and the relevant governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the plan.

12. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.

**ARTICLE 7**

**Transparency measures**

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, on:
   a. The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this Convention;
   b. The total of all cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Convention, to include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type;
   c. The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition produced by that State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by it, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information that may facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants;
   d. The status and progress of programmes for the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions;
   e. The status and progress of programmes for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, with details of the methods that will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   f. The types and quantities of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, including details of the methods of destruction used, the location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards observed;
g. Stockpiles of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, discovered after reported completion of the programme referred to in sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, and plans for their destruction in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention;

h. To the extent possible, the size and location of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant in each such area and when they were used;

i. The status and progress of programmes for the clearance and destruction of all types and quantities of cluster munition remnants cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 of this Convention, to include the size and location of the cluster munition contaminated area cleared and a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant cleared and destroyed;

j. The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;

k. The status and progress of implementation of its obligations under Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims and to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims;

l. The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide information and to carry out the measures described in this paragraph;

m. The amount of national resources, including financial, material or in kind, allocated to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Convention; and

n. The amounts, types and destinations of international cooperation and assistance provided under Article 6 of this Convention.

2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the previous calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to a matter of compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information that would assist in clarifying the matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requesting State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties shall first determine whether to consider that matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. If it does so determine, the Meeting of States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means further to clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6 of this Convention.

6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties may decide to adopt such other general procedures or specific mechanisms for clarification of compliance, including facts, and resolution of instances of non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems appropriate.

ARTICLE 9
National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10
Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the States Parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of States Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.

2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

ARTICLE 11
Meetings of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a. The operation and status of this Convention;
   b. Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c. International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention;
   d. The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants;
   e. Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and
   f. Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.

2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent...
Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a. To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b. To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this Convention; and
   c. To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.

3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 13
Amendments

1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to all States.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for States Parties that have accepted the amendment on the date of deposit of acceptances by a majority of the States which were Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
ARTICLE 14
Costs and administrative tasks
1. The costs of the Meetings of States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The performance by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of administrative tasks assigned to him or her under this Convention is subject to an appropriate United Nations mandate.

ARTICLE 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Dublin on 30 May 2008, shall be open for signature at Oslo by all States on 3 December 2008 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may, at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force for that State.
ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

ARTICLE 21
Relations with States not Party to this Convention
1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party:
   a. To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions;
   b. To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions;
   c. To itself use cluster munitions; or
   d. To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control.

ARTICLE 22
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 23
Authentic texts
The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention shall be equally authentic.
Cluster Munition Monitor 2022 examines how states are working to implement and join the ban on cluster munitions, ensure clearance of cluster munition remnants, provide risk education, and assist victims of these indiscriminate weapons. Using the Convention on Cluster Munitions as its principal frame of reference, the report focuses on calendar year 2021 with information included up to August 2022 where possible. It covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally, and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Profiles published online provide additional country-specific findings on these topics.

This report was prepared by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC).

Front Cover: The cargo section of a cluster munition in a field near Kharkiv, Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, considered Europe’s breadbasket, has disrupted global agricultural markets and put food supplies under strain. © Sergey Bobok/AFP, May 2022

Top left: A 300mm 9M55K rocket, likely to have carried submunitions, encountered in Aleppo governorate, Syria, in February 2021.

Top middle: A clearance operator from Syria Civil Defence (also known as the White Helmets) disposing of explosive ordnance in Aleppo governorate, in March 2022.

Top right: An AO-2.5RT submunition disposed of by a clearance team in Idlib governorate, Syria, in March 2022.

Back cover photographs: © Syria Civil Defence, February 2021 and March 2022
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Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor

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