



# CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2023

**Embargoed until 9:30am CEST,  
5 September 2023**



**Cluster  
Munition  
Coalition**

# CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2023

14<sup>th</sup> ANNUAL EDITION

*Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board*  
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines • DanChurchAid • Danish Refugee Council  
Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada  
Research team leaders • ICBL-CMC experts

**Please cite this report as:**

© Cluster Munition Coalition, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023* (ICBL-CMC: August 2023), [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org) (accessed Date Month Year).

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-2-8399-4003-0

Front cover photograph © Evgeniy Maloletka/AP, December 2022

Back cover photographs © Sabrina Montanvert/HI, October 2022 and © Syria Civil Defense, November 2022

Cover, text design, and layout by Michael Sherwin.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and is a formal program of the ICBL-CMC.

For more information visit [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org) or email [monitor2@icblcmc.org](mailto:monitor2@icblcmc.org).

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor aims to limit the environmental footprint of its reporting by publishing all of our research products online. This report and detailed country profiles are available online at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

## CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions and prevent further harm from these weapons. The CMC works through its members to change the policy and practice of governments and organizations and to raise awareness of the devastation that cluster munitions cause.

The CMC is committed to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions and for destroying stockpiles, clearing contaminated areas, and assisting affected communities.

**The CMC calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its full implementation by all, including:**

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of cluster munitions;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants in cluster munition-contaminated areas; and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all cluster munition and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims.

# PREFACE

## CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions pose significant dangers to civilians for two principal reasons: their impact at the time of use and their deadly legacy. Launched from the ground or dropped from the air, cluster munitions consist of containers that open and disperse submunitions indiscriminately over a wide area, claiming both civilian and military victims. Many explosive submunitions, also known as bomblets, fail to detonate as designed when they are dispersed, becoming de facto landmines that kill and maim indiscriminately long after the conflict has ended and create barriers to socio-economic development.

To protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions, Norway and a number of like-minded countries initiated a fast-track diplomatic process in late 2006 aimed at creating a new international treaty. Working in partnership with United Nations (UN) agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and civil society organizations grouped under the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), the fast-track Oslo Process resulted in the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010. It comprehensively prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. It also requires destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years, clearance of cluster munition remnants within 10 years, and assistance to victims, including those injured by submunitions as well as the families of those injured or killed, and affected communities.

The convention's First Meeting of States Parties was held in November 2010 in the Lao People's Democratic Republic—the country with the highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions. States Parties adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, a 66-point action plan to guide their work until the convention's First Review Conference. The 2015 Dubrovnik Action Plan and the 2021 Lausanne Action Plan were respectively adopted at the first and second review conferences, listing concrete steps to further implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions in the periods from 2015 to 2020 and from 2021 to 2026.

## CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

Launched by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in November 2003, the CMC plays a crucial facilitating role in leading global civil society action in favor of the ban on cluster munitions. With campaign contacts in more than 100 countries, the CMC works for the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In January 2011, the CMC merged with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and ICBL remain two distinct campaigns.

## LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for both the CMC and the ICBL, on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty respectively. Created by the ICBL as Landmine Monitor in June 1998, the initiative became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC in 2008 and changed its name in 2010 to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, known simply as “the Monitor.”

The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems. Established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation, the Monitor has put into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts. It has become the de facto monitoring regime for both treaties, monitoring and reporting on States Parties’ implementation and compliance, and more generally, assessing the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor’s reporting complements transparency reporting by states required under the treaties, and reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable for the legal obligations that they have accepted with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive data collection and analysis of publicly available information, including via field missions in some instances. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring in order to benefit the international community as a whole. It aims to promote and advance discussion in support of the goal of a world free of landmines and cluster munitions.

A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of all the ICBL-CMC’s research and monitoring, including the Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Editorial Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all the Monitor research products. To prepare this report, an Editorial Team gathered information with the aid of a global reporting network comprised of more than a dozen researchers with the assistance of CMC campaigners.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved, and as was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought in the spirit of dialogue and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on this important subject.

## ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 14<sup>th</sup> annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the *Landmine Monitor* report, which has been issued annually since 1999.

*Cluster Munition Monitor 2023* covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally; and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. While its principal frame of reference is the Convention on Cluster Munitions, other relevant international law is reviewed, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The report focuses on the calendar year 2022, with information included up to August 2023 where possible.

As this report was being finalized, South Sudan acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which will enter into force for the country on 1 February 2024. Data provided in the impact review reflects how South Sudan was a non-signatory in 2022. Its status as a State Party will be fully reflected in the *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* report.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors with the support of a significant number of donors. Country-specific contributions were received from a network of at least 20 Monitor researchers covering more than 30 countries. The researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their review of the content of this report and their assistance in the release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of six NGOs, as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Danish Refugee Council (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan), Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt), Monitor research team leaders (Ban Policy: Mary Wareham; and Impact: Loren Persi Vicentic), and relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer and Tamar Gabelnick).

During 2022 and the first half of 2023, the Monitoring and Research Committee benefitted from the participation of Paul Hannon, Marion Loddo, and Hector Guerra.

From January to August 2023, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023*. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban Policy:** Mary Wareham, Susan Aboeid, Mark Hiznay, and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan; and
- **Impact:** Loren Persi Vicentic, Katrin Atkins, Matthew Armstrong, and Audrey Torrecilla.

This edition also comprises and builds on earlier contributions from Ruth Bottomley and Marion Loddo through June 2023.

Mary Wareham (Human Rights Watch) provided final editing in July and August 2023 with assistance from Susan Aboeid (Human Rights Watch) and Michael Hart (Publications Consultant).

The Monitor is particularly grateful for the support of Tamar Gabelnick and Susan Aboeid for their essential contributions and for ensuring the final production of all elements of this report.

Michael Sherwin provided design for the report and its cover design. Maps were created by Maria Angela. Heliographie Girard printed the report in Switzerland. The front cover photograph was provided by Evgeniy Maloletka/AP and back cover photographs provided by Sabrina Montanvert/HI and Syria Civil Defence. Additional photographs found within *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023* were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

We extend our gratitude to Monitor financial contributors. In 2023, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 15 August 2023):

- Government of Australia
- Government of Austria
- Government of Canada
- Government of Germany
- Government of New Zealand
- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Holy See

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor's supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BAC	battle area clearance
CBU	cluster bomb unit
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
CMR	cluster munition remnants
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DCA	DanChurchAid
DPICM	dual-purpose improved conventional munition
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	explosive remnants of war
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IED	improvised explosive device
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IDP	internally displaced person
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSAG	non-state armed group
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UXO	unexploded ordnance



## GLOSSARY

**Battle area clearance (BAC)** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cluster bomb** – Air-dropped cluster munition.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

**Confirmed hazardous area (CHA)** – An area where the presence of landmines, mine, unexploded submunition or bomblet, and other ERW (mines/ERW) contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Convention on Cluster Munitions** – An international convention adopted in May 2008 and opened for signature in December 2008, which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The United Nations Secretary-General is the depository. The convention prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. It also requires stockpile destruction, clearance, and victim assistance.

**Diversity** – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person’s social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

**Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM)** – A type of cluster munition that can be used against both personnel and material targets, including armor.

**Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising the awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

**Explosive remnants of war (ERW)** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Gender** – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

**Humanitarian mine action (HMA)** – All activities aiming at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes: survey and assessment, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

**Interoperability** – In relation to Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, interoperability refers to joint military operations with states not party to the convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.

**Intersectionality** – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to create layers of inequality.

**Non-state armed groups (NSAGs)** – For the Monitor’s purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Non-technical survey (NTS)** – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

**Oslo Process** – The diplomatic process undertaken from 2006–2008 that led to the negotiation, adoption, and signing of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Persons with disabilities** – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

**Self-destruct mechanism** – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an “incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated.”

**Self-deactivating** – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, automatically rendering a munition inoperable by making an essential component (e.g. a battery) non-functional.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

**Survivors** – People who have been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

**Suspected hazardous area (SHA)** – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Technical survey (TS)** – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

**Unexploded submunitions or unexploded bomblets** – Submunitions or bomblets that have failed to explode as intended at the time of use, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance (UXO)** – Munitions that were prepared to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

**Victim** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalization or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities.”

## 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

### Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 3 August 2023

Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 3 August 2023

Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 3 August 2023

### The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Belize	Honduras
Bolivia	Mexico
Canada	Nicaragua
Chile	Panama
Colombia	Paraguay
Costa Rica	Peru
Cuba	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Dominican Rep.	Saint Lucia
Ecuador	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
El Salvador	Trinidad and Tobago
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	
Jamaica	Haiti
Argentina	Suriname
Bahamas	United States
Barbados	Venezuela
Brazil	
Dominica	

### East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Cook Islands	Niue
Fiji	Palau
Japan	Philippines
Lao PDR	Samoa
Maldives	Sri Lanka
Indonesia	
Bangladesh	Mongolia
Bhutan	Myanmar
Brunei Darussalam	Nepal
Cambodia	Pakistan
China	Papua New Guinea
India	Singapore
Kiribati	Solomon Islands
Korea, North	Thailand
Korea, South	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Tonga
Marshall Islands	Tuvalu
Micronesia, Fed. States of	Vanuatu
	Vietnam

### Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Holy See	Netherlands
Andorra	Hungary	North Macedonia
Austria	Iceland	Norway
Belgium	Ireland	Portugal
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Italy	San Marino
Bulgaria	Liechtenstein	Slovakia
Croatia	Lithuania	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Spain
Denmark	Malta	Sweden
France	Moldova	Switzerland
Germany	Monaco	United Kingdom
Cyprus	Montenegro	
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Türkiye
Belarus	Latvia	Turkmenistan
Estonia	Poland	Ukraine
Finland	Romania	Uzbekistan
Georgia	Russia	
Greece	Serbia	

### Middle East & North Africa

Iraq	Palestine	Tunisia
Lebanon		
Algeria	Kuwait	Syria
Bahrain	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Morocco	Yemen
Iran	Oman	
Israel	Qatar	
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	

### Sub-Saharan Africa

Benin	Ghana	Nigeria
Botswana	Guinea	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	São Tomé & Príncipe
Burundi	Lesotho	Senegal
Cameroon	Madagascar	Seychelles
Cabo Verde	Malawi	Sierra Leone
Chad	Mali	Somalia
Congo, Rep.	Mauritania	South Africa
Comoros	Mauritius	South Sudan
Côte d'Ivoire	Mozambique	Togo
Eswatini	Namibia	Zambia
Gambia	Niger	
Angola	Djibouti	Tanzania
Central African Rep.	Kenya	Uganda
Dem. Rep. Congo	Liberia	
Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia	Sudan
Eritrea	Gabon	Zimbabwe

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>MAJOR FINDINGS</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CLUSTER MUNITION BAN POLICY</b>	<b>7</b>
7 Introduction	
9 Universalization	
9 Accessions	
9 Ratifications	
10 Meetings on cluster munitions	
11 UN General Assembly Resolution 77/79	
12 Use of Cluster Munitions	
12 Global overview	
13 New use	
17 Unilateral restrictions on use	
17 Production of Cluster Munitions	
18 Producers	
20 Former producers	
20 Transfer of Cluster Munitions	
23 Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction	
23 Global stockpiles	
26 Stockpile destruction	
29 Retention	
31 Transparency Reporting	
31 National Implementation Legislation	
33 Interpretive Issues	
33 Interoperability and the prohibition on assistance	
34 Transit and foreign stockpiling	
35 Disinvestment	
<b>THE IMPACT</b>	<b>41</b>
41 Introduction	
44 Assessing the Impact	
44 Cluster munition casualties	
48 Casualties from cluster munition remnants in 2022	
49 Contamination from cluster munition remnants	
57 Addressing the Impact	
57 Cluster munition remnants clearance	
63 Risk education	
67 Victim assistance	
72 Management and Coordination	
72 Coordination, strategies, and planning	
75 Standards	
77 Reporting	
<b>STATUS OF THE CONVENTION</b>	<b>81</b>
81 Convention Status	
84 Convention on Cluster Munitions	



People assess the damage caused by the Syrian-Russian military alliance's cluster munition attack on the Maram camp for displaced people near the village of Kafr Jalis in Idlib governorate, northwestern Syria, on 6 November 2022.

© 2022, Ali Haj Suleiman/Getty Images

# MAJOR FINDINGS

As of 3 August 2023

## STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- The convention is in good standing, with a total of 112 States Parties and 12 signatories. The last country to accede to the convention was South Sudan in August 2023, while Nigeria ratified it in February 2023.
- An annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention was adopted in December 2022 by 144 states, including 36 non-signatories to the convention. Russia was the only country to vote against it.

## USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- There have been no reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in May 2008.
- Cluster munitions were used extensively in Ukraine during the reporting period (from August 2022 to July 2023), while new use was also recorded in Myanmar and Syria.
- Russia has used cluster munitions repeatedly in Ukraine since invading the country on 24 February 2022, while Ukrainian forces have also used them.

## CASUALTIES AND CONTAMINATION

- Globally, there were at least 1,172 new cluster munition casualties across eight countries in 2022. This is the highest annual number of people killed and injured by cluster munitions that the Monitor has recorded since it began reporting in 2010.
- Of the total casualties in 2022, 987 were caused by cluster munition attacks, with the vast majority (890) recorded in Ukraine. Previously, in 2021, no new casualties were recorded from cluster munition attacks worldwide; all were from remnants of cluster munitions.

- There were at least 185 casualties from cluster munition remnants worldwide during 2022, compared to 149 in 2021.
- Through its reporting since 2010, the Monitor has shown how cluster munition remnants, especially submunitions, disproportionately harm civilians, with children particularly at risk of harm.
  - In 2022, civilians represented 95% of all cluster munition casualties.
  - Children accounted for 71% of casualties from cluster munition remnants, where the age group was recorded.
- A total of 29 countries and other areas are contaminated or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, with 11 being States Parties to the convention, including the newest State Party, South Sudan.

## STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND RETENTION

- Since the convention's adoption in 2008, States Parties have collectively destroyed 99% of the cluster munition stocks that they declared, destroying 1.48 million cluster munitions and 178.5 million submunitions.
- Bulgaria destroyed the last of its stockpiled cluster munitions in June 2023. States Parties Bulgaria, Peru, and Slovakia destroyed a total of at least 4,166 stockpiled cluster munitions and 134,598 submunitions during 2022 and the first half of 2023.
- It is unclear if South Africa will meet its 1 November 2023 stockpile destruction deadline.
- Only 11 States Parties are retaining live cluster munitions for permitted research and training purposes, of which Germany has the highest number. Belgium destroyed 95% of its retained cluster munitions during 2022.

## CLEARANCE OF CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

- In 2022, States Parties reported clearance of approximately 93km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land and the destruction of 75,725 cluster munition remnants, primarily unexploded submunitions. This represents an increase on the 61km<sup>2</sup> cleared in 2021 but a slight decrease on the 81,000 submunitions destroyed.
- As of the end of 2022, Somalia was the only State Party left working towards its original clearance deadline of 1 March 2026, but it is not known if it is on target to meet it.
- The other contaminated States Parties have requested extensions to their original clearance deadlines, including Iraq until 2028 and Mauritania until 2026. Both of these extension requests will be considered and decided at the convention's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2023.

## RISK EDUCATION

- In 2022, affected States Parties provided risk education warning of the dangers of cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) that reached men (35.3%), women (13%), boys (30.3%), and girls (21.4%).
- In 2022, men and boys remained the group at highest risk. Specifically targeted at-risk groups included farmers, shepherds and herders, people collecting wood and other resources, nomadic communities, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
- The long-term socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic remained a reason for risk-taking behavior, particularly in Lao PDR and Lebanon, where people were forced to rely on harmful coping mechanisms such as scrap metal collection and entering hazardous areas for precarious employment, or to forage foodstuff to try to supplement diminishing livelihoods.

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

- Efforts to address the needs of cluster munition victims, and ensure the accessibility and sustainability of rehabilitation services, were reported in most States Parties with reported victims. However, the most affected countries continued to depend on dwindling international support for victim assistance.
- Victim assistance services faced challenges in States Parties Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Somalia, where healthcare systems faced shortages due to drastic national economic crises. Ongoing conflict in cluster munition affected countries outside the convention, including Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, also impeded the delivery of vital victim assistance while contributing to the fragility of health systems.
- International organizations and local partners continued to fill major gaps in the availability, accessibility, and sustainability of healthcare and rehabilitation services in many States Parties. The most recent State Party, South Sudan, has reported a dire situation for victim assistance, and international NGOs are responsible for 80% of health service delivery in the country.
- Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon were reported to be updating their respective national victim assistance standards, to bring them in line with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 on Victim Assistance.

## PRODUCTION

- None of the 16 countries that still produce cluster munitions, or reserve the right to do so, are party to the convention.
- Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions in 2022, including at least two newly developed types that its forces have used in Ukraine since early 2022.
- In the United States (US), the last manufacturer of cluster munitions ended its production of the weapon in 2016. Yet the US is developing and producing replacements for cluster munitions that may still fall under the definition of cluster munitions prohibited by the convention.

## TRANSFER

- Ukraine has publicly asked to be supplied with cluster munitions since 2022. In July 2023, the US announced that it would transfer an unspecified quantity of stockpiled cluster munitions to Ukraine. The 155mm artillery-delivered cluster munitions deliver dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions that have a “dud” or unexploded ordnance failure rate of less than 2.35%, but the US did not explain how this figure was reached.
- World leaders and officials from at least 21 countries have expressed concern over cluster munitions after the US decision to transfer them to Ukraine.
- Ukraine may have acquired cluster munitions from other countries in 2022 and/or 2023, but reports of such transfers have been denied by the countries concerned.
- In the past, at least 15 countries have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.

## TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

- A total of 104 States Parties have submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report as required by the convention. Yet seven have not done so, of which Cabo Verde and Comoros are more than a decade late.
- Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been sporadic as more than half of States Parties do not provide updates to their transparency reports annually.



## NATIONAL LEGISLATION

- Niue was the last country to enact specific national legislation to govern its implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2021, making a total of 33 States Parties with specific implementing laws for the convention.
- A total of 22 States Parties are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention, while 43 States Parties regard their existing laws and regulations as sufficient.





Cambodia Mines Advisory Group (MAG) deminers use a large-loop detector to search for metal in the ground, including cluster munition remnants.

©2022, Sean Sutton/MAG

# CLUSTER MUNITION BAN POLICY

## INTRODUCTION

As this report was being finalized, the United States (US) announced that it would transfer a portion of its stockpiled cluster munitions to Ukraine for use in the war with Russia. Since Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Russian forces have used cluster munitions extensively, causing civilian casualties, damaging civilian infrastructure, and contaminating agricultural land. Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions in the conflict, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries.

The unexpected and controversial transfer attracted global media coverage, sparked public outcry, and triggered congressional and parliamentary debates. It has been criticized by world leaders and officials.

This visceral reaction demonstrates how deeply cluster munitions have been stigmatized, especially over the past 15 years since the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted in Dublin, Ireland on 30 May 2008.

The response shows how there is now much greater awareness and understanding of the two-fold dangers posed by cluster munitions. Delivered from aircraft or fired in rockets, missiles, and artillery projectiles, cluster munitions open in the air to disperse multiple submunitions over a wide area and their impact can be devastating when used in civilian areas. Moreover, many submunitions fail to detonate as designed and pose a threat long after conflict ends.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions provides a comprehensive framework for eradicating these weapons. It prohibits any use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions under any circumstances. The convention requires the destruction of cluster munition stocks, clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, and assistance to victims of these weapons.

The convention entered into force on 1 August 2010 and is in good standing, with a total of 112 States Parties and 12 signatories.<sup>1</sup> Nigeria ratified the convention during the reporting period, while South Sudan acceded to it on 3 August 2023.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new use, production, or transfers of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted. Under the convention, a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and more than 179 million submunitions have now been destroyed, representing 99% of the stocks once held by States Parties.

Bulgaria completed the destruction of its stockpile in June 2023, while Peru and Slovakia are making steady progress in their ongoing destruction of cluster munition stocks. These three States Parties collectively destroyed a total of at least 4,166 cluster munitions and 134,598 submunitions during 2022 and the first half of 2023.

The convention is not without implementation challenges. It is unclear if South Africa will meet its 1 November 2023 stockpile destruction deadline as it has not destroyed any cluster munitions in more than a decade. The pace of national implementation legislation has slowed, with no new laws enacted during 2022 or the first half of 2023. Compliance with the convention's annual transparency reporting requirement under Article 7 has been sporadic, while eight States Parties still have not provided their initial reports.

Such challenges show the need for continued effort by and collaboration between the convention's community of States Parties and its Implementation Support Unit (ISU), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The greatest problems facing the international community working to eradicate cluster munitions lie outside the convention, in states that refuse to join it.

During the reporting period (August 2022–July 2023), cluster munitions were used in Ukraine by both Russian and Ukrainian forces, while new use was also recorded in Myanmar and Syria. Russia and the US continue to invest in the development of new cluster munitions, while evidence points to the apparent domestic production of a cluster bomb in Myanmar.

It is clear that the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is needed now, more than ever. Co-founded 20 years ago and launched in The Hague in November 2003 by 85 NGOs from nearly 50 countries, the CMC aims to provide a coordinated global civil society response to the numerous problems created by cluster munitions.

This ban policy overview covers the second half of 2022 and the first half of 2023. The findings are drawn from detailed country profiles, which are available on the Monitor website.<sup>2</sup>



Muowffak Al Khafaji of the Iraqi Alliance of Disability Organizations (IADO), a Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) member, addresses the convention's Tenth Meeting of States Parties on 30 August 2022, at the United Nations in Geneva.

© August 2022, Jared Bloch/ICBL-CMC

1 Only 16 of the 107 governments that participated in the Dublin negotiations and adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 May 2008 have not joined the convention: Argentina, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Estonia, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Serbia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Adoption does not carry any legal obligations.

2 See, Monitor country profiles, [www.the-monitor.org/cp](http://www.the-monitor.org/cp).

## UNIVERSALIZATION

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the convention, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.<sup>3</sup>

## ACCESSIONS

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it, but must join through a one-step process known as accession.<sup>4</sup>

During the reporting period, South Sudan acceded to the convention on 3 August 2023, after the National Assembly approved a proposal to accede on 9 May 2023, which was signed into law by President Salva Kiir Mayardit. Previously, Saint Lucia acceded to the convention in September 2020.

### Convention on Cluster Munitions membership by regional or security body<sup>5</sup>

Regional body	Support (%)	Support (number of member states)	Non-signatories to the convention
African Union (AU)	81%	44 of 54	Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Zimbabwe
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	30%	3 of 10	Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
European Union (EU)	78%	21 of 27	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	77%	24 of 31	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Türkiye, US
Organization of American States (OAS)	77%	27 of 35	Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Dominica, Suriname, US, Venezuela
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	56%	10 of 18	Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

## RATIFICATIONS

During the reporting period, Nigeria ratified the convention on 28 February 2023, becoming the 111<sup>th</sup> State Party. This was the convention's first ratification since São Tomé and Príncipe did so in January 2020.

Of the 12 signatories still to ratify the convention, eight are in Sub-Saharan Africa, two are in the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from Asia.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Accession, ratification, and other methods of joining the convention usually require parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.

<sup>4</sup> Accession is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.

<sup>5</sup> The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is an African Union (AU) member, but Western Sahara's lack of official representation at the UN prevents it from joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Western Sahara: Cluster Muniton Ban Policy," updated 13 September 2021, [bit.ly/MonitorWesternSahara2021](https://bit.ly/MonitorWesternSahara2021).

<sup>6</sup> Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that "would defeat the object and purpose" of any treaty they have signed. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is considered customary international law and binding on all countries.

The vast majority of signatories have ultimately followed through on their pledge to ratify the convention, though it is clear that the pace of ratifications has slowed significantly.<sup>7</sup>

Most of the remaining signatories do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) said in August 2022 that its delay in ratifying the convention was “more a procedural technical matter than one of political will,” and indicated that legislative approval will again be pursued in order to complete the ratification.<sup>8</sup>

## MEETINGS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties took place at the UN in Geneva from 30 August to 2 September 2022, under the presidency of Ambassador Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom (UK) to the Conference on Disarmament. A total of 96 countries attended the meeting—74 States Parties, eight signatories, and 14 non-signatories—in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.<sup>9</sup>

The meeting took stock of the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and progress made since the Second Review Conference held in 2020–2021, which adopted the 50-point Lausanne Action Plan to guide the convention’s work over the period 2021–2026.<sup>10</sup> At the conclusion of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, States Parties adopted a final report condemning the use of cluster munitions as follows:

The Meeting underscored the obligation of States Parties never under any circumstances to use cluster munitions and, in accordance with the object and provisions of the Convention, condemned any use of cluster munitions by any actor. In this connection the Meeting expressed its grave concern at the increase in civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact resulting from the repeated and well-documented use of cluster munitions since the Second Review Conference. This grave concern applies in particular to the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine.<sup>11</sup>

The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument to eliminate these weapons and the unacceptable harm they cause. During the reporting period there were no formal proposals for the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to consider cluster munitions again, after its failure in 2011 to adopt a new protocol that aimed to legitimize them.

Ambassador Abdul-Karim Hashim Mostafa, Permanent Representative of Iraq to the UN in Geneva, has been designated as president of the convention’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, to be held at the UN in Geneva from 11–14 September 2023.

## Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Angola
Central African Republic
Cyprus
DRC
Djibouti
Haiti
Indonesia
Jamaica
Kenya
Liberia
Tanzania
Uganda

7 A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, while 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference held in September 2015. Another 10 states ratified in the five years leading to the Second Review Conference, held in two parts, in November 2020 and September 2021. Since then, only one state has ratified (Nigeria).

8 Statement of the DRC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August 2022, [bit.ly/DRCStatementMSP30Aug2022](https://bit.ly/DRCStatementMSP30Aug2022).

9 Non-signatories Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nepal, Serbia, South Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, and Zimbabwe participated in the meeting as observers.

10 Final Report of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Annex II: Lausanne Action Plan,” CCM/CONF/2021/6, 6 October 2021, [bit.ly/LausanneActionPlanAnnexII](https://bit.ly/LausanneActionPlanAnnexII).

11 Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties,” Geneva, 19 September 2022, [bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport](https://bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport).

## UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 77/79

The annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is useful for gauging interest in and support for the convention, especially in states that have not joined. Since its introduction in 2015, support for the annual UNGA resolution on the convention has grown and remains high.

### UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions<sup>12</sup>

Year	Resolution	In Favor	Against	Abstained
2015	70/54	139	2	39
2016	71/45	141	2	39
2017	72/54	142	2	36
2018	73/54	144	1	38
2019	74/62	144	1	38
2020	75/62	147	0	38
2021	76/47	146	1	37
2022	77/79	144	1	37

On 7 December 2022, a total of 144 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 77/79 on the Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, of which 36 were non-signatories to the convention.<sup>13</sup>

Russia again voted against the resolution, making it the only country to do so in 2022.<sup>14</sup> In contrast, Myanmar voted for the resolution for the first time.

A total of 37 states abstained from voting on the UNGA resolution.<sup>15</sup> No States Parties abstained from voting, but three signatories did so: the Central African Republic, Cyprus, and Uganda.

<sup>12</sup> See, "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 77/79, 7 December 2022, [bit.ly/UNGAResolutionCCMDec2022](https://bit.ly/UNGAResolutionCCMDec2022); "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/47](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/47); "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/62](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/62); "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/62](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/62); "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/54](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/54); "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/72/54](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/72/54); "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/71/45](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/71/45); and "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/54](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/54).

<sup>13</sup> "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 77/79, 7 December 2022, [bit.ly/UNGAResolutionCCMDec2022](https://bit.ly/UNGAResolutionCCMDec2022). The non-signatories that voted in favor were Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen.

<sup>14</sup> Previously, Russia abstained from the vote on the UNGA resolution in 2018 and 2020. Russia voted against in 2015–2017, 2019, and 2021. Zimbabwe voted against in 2015–2018, but has abstained from the vote since 2019.

<sup>15</sup> The 37 states that abstained from the vote are non-signatories Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, UAE, US, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe, plus signatories Central African Republic, Cyprus, and Uganda.



During the debate, several states not party explained their vote on the 2022 UNGA resolution.<sup>16</sup> Russia repeated its argument that cluster munitions are “legitimate weapons” that are “only harmful when misused.” Brazil, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea reiterated their long-held and well-worn objections over certain provisions of the convention as well as how it was negotiated and adopted outside of UN auspices. Signatory Cyprus—the last European Union (EU) member state to have signed but not ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions—repeated that it cannot ratify the convention until it resolves “the special security situation on the island.”<sup>17</sup>

## USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

### GLOBAL OVERVIEW

Since the end of World War II in 1945, at least 23 governments have used cluster munitions in 41 countries and five other areas. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

#### Past use of cluster munitions<sup>18</sup>

User state	Locations used
Armenia	Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>
Colombia	Colombia
Eritrea	Ethiopia
Ethiopia	Eritrea
France	Chad, Iraq, Kuwait
Georgia	Georgia, possibly <i>Abkhazia</i>
Iraq	Iran, Iraq
Israel	Egypt, Lebanon, Syria
Libya	Chad, Libya
Morocco	Mauritania, <i>Western Sahara</i>
Netherlands	Former Yugoslavia ( <i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Nigeria	Sierra Leone
Russia	Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, <i>Chechnya</i>
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia, Yemen
South Africa	Admitted past use, but did not specify where
Sudan	Sudan
Syria	Syria

<sup>16</sup> UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, video record, New York, 1 November 2022, [bit.ly/UNGAVideoRecord1Nov2022](https://bit.ly/UNGAVideoRecord1Nov2022).

<sup>17</sup> Statement of Cyprus, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2022. See, UN, “Approving 21 Drafts, First Committee Asks General Assembly to Halt Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests in Outer Space,” 1 November 2022, [bit.ly/UNGAFirstCommittee1Nov2022](https://bit.ly/UNGAFirstCommittee1Nov2022).

<sup>18</sup> This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete, as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes use in Angola, Armenia, DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia.

User state	Locations used
Thailand	Cambodia
Ukraine	Ukraine
UK	Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia ( <i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia), <i>Falklands/Malvinas</i>
US	Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia ( <i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Yugoslavia (former Socialist Federal Republic of)	Albania, BiH, Croatia, <i>Kosovo</i>

Note: other areas are indicated in *italics*; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention's core obligations designed to eliminate future humanitarian impact, most crucially the absolute ban on use of cluster munitions.

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new cluster munition use by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008.<sup>19</sup> Several past users and producers of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK, are now States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Most states outside the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users *and* producers of cluster munitions.<sup>20</sup>

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, cluster munitions have been used by nine non-signatories: Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020; Libya in 2011, 2015, and 2019; Russia in 2014–2015 and 2022–2023; Saudi Arabia in 2015–2017; Sudan in 2012–2015; Syria in 2012–2023; Thailand in 2011; and Ukraine in 2014–2015 and 2022–2023.

## NEW USE

Cluster munitions were used extensively in Ukraine during the reporting period, while new use was also recorded in Myanmar and Syria. None of these countries have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

## UKRAINE

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions repeatedly in Ukraine since Russia's all-out invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. This use by Russia has caused civilian casualties, damaged civilian infrastructure, and contaminated agricultural land.<sup>21</sup> Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions, causing civilian deaths and injuries.

<sup>19</sup> However, State Party Lebanon reports that it has experienced the use of cluster munitions from the conflict in Syria. According to its clearance deadline extension request, northeast Lebanon became contaminated by cluster munitions used when fighting in Syria spilled over the border into Lebanon in 2014–2017. See, Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, December 2019, [bit.ly/LebanonArt4ExtRequestCCMDec2019](http://bit.ly/LebanonArt4ExtRequestCCMDec2019).

<sup>20</sup> Nine non-signatories that produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Korea, and Türkiye), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producers (India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore). This leaves Israel, Russia, and the US as the only countries to both produce and use cluster munitions.

<sup>21</sup> Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine," 11 May 2022, [bit.ly/HRWUkraine11May2022](http://bit.ly/HRWUkraine11May2022).

At least 10 types of cluster munitions and three types of individual submunitions have been used in Ukraine since 24 February 2022. The types used are all launched from the ground in missiles, rockets, and artillery projectiles, except for the RBK-series cluster bomb, which is delivered by aircraft. With the exception of an Israeli-designed cluster munition mortar projectile, the cluster munitions used in Ukraine were manufactured in the Soviet Union prior to 1991 or in Russia, some as recently as 2021.

## Cluster munitions used in Ukraine in 2022–2023

### Ground-fired rockets and missiles

- The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N210 or 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
- The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 20–70km and delivers 72 9N210 or 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
- The 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 552 3B30 dual-purpose 9M544 submunitions or 72 9M549 antipersonnel submunitions;
- The 9M549 Tornado-S cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 72 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
- The 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, which is equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions; and
- The 9M723K1 Iskander-M ballistic missile, which contains 54 9N730 dual-purpose submunitions.

### Ground-fired artillery and mortar projectiles

- The 3-O-14 203mm artillery projectile, each delivering 24 O-16 fragmentation submunitions;
- The 3-O-13 152mm artillery projectile, each delivering eight O-16 fragmentation submunitions;
- The 3-O-8 240mm mortar projectile, each delivering 14 O-10 fragmentation submunitions; and
- The M971 120mm mortar projectile, each containing 24 M87 dual-purpose submunitions.

### Air-dropped bombs

- The RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bomb, containing 268 PTAB-1M high explosive/antitank submunitions;
- Individual ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions; and
- Individual PTAB-2.5 dual-purpose submunitions (photographed being modified for use in munitions dropped via drones).

Russia has stated that it regards cluster munitions as “a lawful form of munitions” that “are only harmful when misused.”<sup>22</sup> Russia has generally avoided admitting using cluster munitions in Ukraine and has sought to draw attention elsewhere. Following the July 2023 decision by the US to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin told media, “I want to note that in the Russian Federation there is a sufficient stockpile of different kinds of cluster bombs. We have not used them yet. But of course, if they are used against us, we reserve the right to take reciprocal action.”<sup>23</sup>

22 UN press release, “First Committee Approves 8 Drafts, Continuing Action Phase, as Delegates Differ over Definition of Legitimate Arms Control Treaties,” 2 November 2021, [press.un.org/en/2021/gadis3677.doc.htm](https://press.un.org/en/2021/gadis3677.doc.htm).

23 “Putin says Russia will use cluster bombs in Ukraine if it has to,” *Reuters*, 16 July 2023, [bit.ly/Reuters16July2023](https://bit.ly/Reuters16July2023).

*The New York Times* first reported that Ukrainian forces used Uragan cluster munition rockets in an attack on Husarivka village, Kharkiv oblast, on either 6 or 7 March 2022, when the village was under Russian control.<sup>24</sup> Ukraine did not deny this use of cluster munitions, but told *The New York Times* that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law.”

The Armed Forces of Ukraine used cluster munitions in attacks on Izium city, Kharkiv oblast, between March and September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian forces, according to the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.<sup>25</sup> In July 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) also reported on Ukraine’s cluster munition rocket attacks in Izium city and surrounding areas during 2022, when Russian forces had controlled the area.<sup>26</sup> Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence rejected the research findings shared by HRW, responding that “cluster munitions were not used within or around the city of Izium in 2022 when it was under Russian occupation.”<sup>27</sup>

As of 3 August 2023, the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 40 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the UNGA.<sup>28</sup> The cluster munition attacks in Ukraine have also been condemned by the EU, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the CMC.

## MYANMAR

In the past, Myanmar has stated that it has never used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions. However, evidence has emerged that indicates the Myanmar Armed Forces used an apparently domestically-produced cluster bomb in 2022 and the first half of 2023.

The Monitor has reviewed photographs of cluster bomb remnants and other evidence from attacks by the Myanmar Air Force in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, and Shan states over the past 15 months.

Most recently, on 6 June 2023, photographs of the aftermath of an airstrike in Kedong village tract in Kawkareik township, Kayin state, showed cluster bomb remnants among the debris at a damaged school.<sup>29</sup>

On 25 April 2023, cluster bomb remnants were found after an attack by the Myanmar Air Force on a hospital—which injured five people, including two doctors—in Saung Pwe village in Pehkon township, Shan state.<sup>30</sup> On the same day, the Myanmar Air Force dropped a cluster bomb near the village of Mae Ka Neh in Myawaddy township, Kayin state, wounding four

24 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and John Ismay, “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions,” *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, [bit.ly/NewYorkTimes18April2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/18/world/europe/ukraine-cluster-munitions.html).

25 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Human Rights Council, 15 March 2023, [bit.ly/HRCUkraine15March2023](https://www.ohchr.org/en/docd/4404JKm).

26 HRW, “Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions,” 6 July 2023, [bit.ly/HRWUkraine6July2023](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/06/ukraine-cluster-munitions).

27 Letter to HRW from the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 22 June 2023, [bit.ly/4404JKm](https://www.hrw.org/4404JKm).

28 Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the UK.

29 Facebook post by the Karen National Union (KNU), 6 June 2023, [bit.ly/KNUFacebookPost6June2023](https://www.facebook.com/knuofficial); and correspondence on Signal with an officer of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), 20 June 2023. The KNLA officer requested anonymity.

30 The casualties could have been caused by other munitions used in the same attack. See, Facebook post by Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), 25 April 2023, [bit.ly/KHRGFacebookPost25April2023](https://www.facebook.com/khrg).

civilians.<sup>31</sup> Another attack that resulted in casualties in April 2023 in Mindat township, Chin state, also involved cluster bomb use.<sup>32</sup>

Between 17 February and 7 March 2023, witnesses to Myanmar Air Force attacks near the villages of Kon Tha, Nam Mae Kon, and Warisuplia, in Demoso township, Kayah state, reported hearing multiple explosions indicating the use of cluster bombs, and later found cluster bomb remnants.

In December 2022, Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) published photographs of remnants from an apparent domestically-produced cluster bomb used in an April 2022 attack in the P'Loo village tract, in Myawaddy township, Kayin state, adjacent to the border with Thailand.<sup>33</sup>

## SYRIA

Syrian government forces used cluster munitions extensively from 2012–2020, before reports of new use dropped off in 2021.<sup>34</sup> Cluster munitions were used again in November 2022, in attacks documented by the UN, HRW, and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).

On 6 November 2022, eight civilians were killed and at least 75 injured when Syrian government forces, with Russian military support, used cluster munitions in attacks on the Maram camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) near Kafr Jalis, and other IDP camps in Idlib governorate.<sup>35</sup> The cluster munitions used were 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan rockets containing 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions. HRW previously reported the Syrian government's use of this type of cluster munition rocket, including in an attack targeting an IDP camp in October 2015.<sup>36</sup>



The remnants of a 9M27K-series cluster munition rocket after an attack that struck Maram camp for IDPs near the village of Kafr Jalis in Idlib governorate, northwestern Syria, on 6 November 2022.

© 2022, Syria Civil Defence

- 
- 31 Photographic evidence provided to the Monitor by an officer of the KNLA via correspondence on Signal, 8–11 May 2023. The KNLA officer requested anonymity.
- 32 Cluster bomb remnants were previously found in the same township after a July 2022 aerial attack that wounded 13 civilians. See, Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Deadly Cargo: Exposing the Supply Chain that Fuels War Crimes in Myanmar,” 3 November 2022, pp. 28–29, [bit.ly/AmnestyMyanmar3Nov2022](https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mya/2022/11/03/). Photographs of an impact ‘splatter’ pattern were identified by the Monitor as typical of a mortar strike. This was attributed to a submunition from an air-dropped cluster bomb in Kayah state in the Amnesty International report.
- 33 KHRG, “Bombs and Bullets Like Rain: Air strikes in the ‘peace town’ and places of refuge in Dooplaya District: December 2021 to May 2022,” 23 December 2022, [bit.ly/KHRG23Dec2022](https://www.khrg.org/en/2022/12/23/bombs-and-bullets-like-rain-air-strikes-in-the-peace-town-and-places-of-refuge-in-dooplaya-district-december-2021-to-may-2022/). See, photographs of cluster bomb tail, nose, and interior framing bent from the impact, p. 10. KHRG had not identified the bomb type.
- 34 Previously, the last evidence of cluster munition use in Syria was by government forces near Aleppo on 14 March 2021, but subsequent attacks could have gone unreported. According to Syria Civil Defence, cluster munitions were used in attacks on Al-Hamran and Tarhin villages, east of Aleppo, on 14 March 2021. See, The White Helmets (SyriaCivilDef), “The regime and Russia’s shelling on Tarhin and Al-Hamran villages east of #Aleppo yesterday has left unexploded cluster bombs that threaten the lives of civilians in the area. The #WhiteHelmets UXO teams scan the area to locate and destroy any unexploded cluster bombs.” 15 March 2021, 16:31 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/3On0qyv](https://twitter.com/WhiteHelmets/status/1362000000000000000).
- 35 HRW, “Syria: Cluster Munitions Used in November 6 Attacks,” 23 November 2022, [bit.ly/HRW23Nov2022](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/23/syria-cluster-munitions-used-in-november-6-attacks); Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 7 February 2023, [bit.ly/HRCsSyria7Feb2023](https://www.ohchr.org/en/docd/59499); and SNHR, “Investigation: The Syrian Regime Used Cluster Munitions to Target a Gathering of IDPs Camps in Northwestern Idlib City,” 21 March 2023, [bit.ly/SNHRIdlib21March2023](https://www.snhr.org.uk/en/2023/03/21/investigation-the-syrian-regime-used-cluster-munitions-to-target-a-gathering-of-idps-camps-in-northwestern-idlib-city/).
- 36 HRW, “Russia/Syria: Extensive Recent Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 December 2015, [bit.ly/HRWRussiaSyria20Dec2015](https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/20/russia-syria-extensive-recent-use-of-cluster-munitions).

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, global public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.<sup>37</sup> Since May 2013, the UNGA has adopted 10 resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.<sup>38</sup> Since 2014, states have also adopted more than 18 Human Rights Council resolutions condemning use of cluster munitions in Syria.<sup>39</sup> The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has issued numerous reports detailing cluster munition attacks by Syrian government forces.<sup>40</sup>

## USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used cluster munitions, due in part to the complexity of these weapons and their delivery systems. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance; in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by Croat and Serb militias; in Croatia by a Serb militia; in Israel by Hezbollah; in Libya by the Libyan National Army (LNA); in Syria by the Islamic State; and in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatists.

## UNILATERAL RESTRICTIONS ON USE

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed certain restrictions on using cluster munitions in the future.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but has not used them since 2003 in Iraq with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a Department of Defense directive that had required the US to no longer use cluster munitions that resulted in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO), due to come into effect in 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside their own territories. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.

## PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Since World War II, at least 34 states have collectively developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. This includes 18 countries that ceased manufacturing these weapons prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>37</sup> More than 145 countries, including 53 non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, have condemned use of cluster munitions in Syria through national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements.

<sup>38</sup> "Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic," UNGA Resolution 77/230, 9 January 2023, [bit.ly/UNGASyria9Jan2023](https://bit.ly/UNGASyria9Jan2023).

<sup>39</sup> See, for example, Human Rights Council, "The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic," A/HRC/52/L.16, 27 March 2023, [bit.ly/HRCSyria27March2023](https://bit.ly/HRCSyria27March2023).

<sup>40</sup> Human Rights Council, "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic," 7 February 2023, [bit.ly/HRCSyria7Feb2023](https://bit.ly/HRCSyria7Feb2023); Human Rights Council, "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic," 21 January 2021, [bit.ly/HRCSyria21Jan2021](https://bit.ly/HRCSyria21Jan2021); Human Rights Council, "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic," 28 January 2020, [bit.ly/HRCSyria28Jan2020](https://bit.ly/HRCSyria28Jan2020); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) press release, "They have erased the dreams of my children": children's rights in the Syrian Arab Republic," 13 January 2020, [bit.ly/OHCHRsyria13Jan2020](https://bit.ly/OHCHRsyria13Jan2020); and Human Rights Council, "The siege and recapture of eastern Ghouta," 20 June 2018, [bit.ly/HRCEasternGhouta20June2018](https://bit.ly/HRCEasternGhouta20June2018).

<sup>41</sup> The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers' delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

## PRODUCERS

There were no changes during the reporting period to the list of 16 countries that produce cluster munitions and have yet to commit to never producing them in the future. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

## NEW DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions in 2022, including two newly developed cluster munitions that its forces have used during the conflict in Ukraine. The Russian Armed Forces have used the 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions. The same company is producing guided 9M54-series cluster munition missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.<sup>42</sup> Russia has also used a cluster munition variant of its new Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile system.

The last US manufacturer of cluster munitions, Textron Systems Corporation, ended its production of the weapon in 2016.<sup>43</sup> However, the US is developing and producing replacements for cluster munitions that may fail to meet the submunition reliability policy of its own Department of Defense, and may still fall under the definition of cluster munitions prohibited under the convention.

The US military is developing several replacements for ground-launched cluster munitions. The US Army has budgeted nearly US\$500 million from 2022–2028 to research and develop replacements for the 155mm artillery projectiles containing older M42/M46 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM). In 2018, two parallel research and development tracks began to develop Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions (C-DAEM) as “policy-compliant munitions” as a replacement.<sup>44</sup>

The intent behind the C-DAEM project is reportedly to attack targets ranging from personnel to soft-skinned vehicles. The US Army has approved acquiring an advanced Israeli-designed M999 antipersonnel munition to fulfil this requirement, and has renamed it the XM1208. Hardware and some components of this projectile are being imported from Israel in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defense.<sup>45</sup> The XM1208 projectile dispenses nine M99 “advanced submunitions.”<sup>46</sup>

Another replacement program is the Alternative Warhead variant for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rocket, which began production in 2015 to replace M26 rockets, which deliver M77 DPICM munitions. This GMLRS Alternative Warhead contains

### Cluster munition producers

Brazil	Israel	Russia
China	Korea, North	Singapore
Egypt	Korea, South	Türkiye
Greece	Pakistan	US
India	Poland	
Iran	Romania	

42 According to Rostec (the parent company of Splav State Research and Production Enterprise), Russian president Vladimir Putin reportedly set an objective in 2016 for the company to use only Russian components in the modernized multi-launch rocket systems. See, Rostec, “The New Rocket System Passes Official Tests,” 25 January 2017, [rostec.ru/en/news/4519813/](http://rostec.ru/en/news/4519813/).

43 Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) of Hopkins, Minnesota, US, manufactured a solid rocket motor for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105 cluster munition, but produced it only for use in that weapon. See, Marjorie Censer, “Textron to discontinue production of sensor-fuzed weapon,” *Inside Defense*, 30 August 2016, [bit.ly/TextronDiscontinue](http://bit.ly/TextronDiscontinue); and “Last US cluster-bomb maker to cease production,” *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, 1 September 2016, [bit.ly/AFPclusterBombs1Sept2016](http://bit.ly/AFPclusterBombs1Sept2016).

44 US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E: Volume II, Budget Activity 5B, “Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions,” March 2023, Volume 3B, pp. 154–163.

45 Ibid. It is unclear if the original Israeli manufacturer is involved in this transfer of technology. Previously, in October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. stated that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” Email to PAX from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer, and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., 14 October 2020.

46 US Department of Defense, Joint Program Executive Office: Armaments and Ammunition, “C-DAEM DPICM Replacement (XM1208),” undated, [bit.ly/USDODC-DAEM](http://bit.ly/USDODC-DAEM).

160,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments, but no explosive submunitions. A longer-term US research project will test a “Sensor Fuzed Weapon” (type not specified) for delivery by the GMLRS rocket by 2030. Efforts under this project will “determine the feasibility and effectiveness of utilizing GMLRS rockets to dispense anti-armor submunitions for engaging medium and heavy armor targets.”<sup>47</sup>

## LIMITED OR NO CURRENT PRODUCTION

Greece, Israel, Poland, Romania, Singapore, and Türkiye have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.<sup>48</sup> States that say their policy is aligned with the convention’s prohibitions should elaborate how specific policies, practices, and doctrines have changed in this regard, and detail any measures put in place to deter and prevent such activities in future.

Since the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, several companies that once manufactured cluster munitions have ceased their production. For example, in July 2023, Romanian company AEROTEH S.A. shared the following statement with the Monitor:

Although Romania is not yet a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, AEROTEH S.A. has decided since 2008 not to be involved in the production of cluster munitions and is firmly committed not to produce any type of components for such ammunition in the future nor to participate in any governmental or industrial cooperation program with other companies for the production or development of cluster munitions.<sup>49</sup>

Previously, in 2015, Singapore’s only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced that it would no longer produce them, stating, “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”<sup>50</sup> Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer, Israel Military Industries (IMI), was acquired in late 2018 by Elbit Systems Ltd., which announced that it would discontinue the production of cluster munitions.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>47</sup> US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E: Volume III, Budget Activity 7, “Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS),” March 2023, Volume 4B, pp. 301–308.

<sup>48</sup> For example, in April and October 2021, Türkiye informed the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that “Turkey has never used, produced, imported or transferred cluster munitions since 2005 and does not intend to do so in the future.” Letter to Amb. Aidan Liddle of the UK, President of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, from Amb. Sadik Arslan, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the UN in Geneva, 5 October 2021.

<sup>49</sup> Email to the Monitor from Dumitru Banut, General Director, AEROTEH S.A., 6 July 2023. A letter attached to the email referred to the company’s “Statement of Principles,” [bit.ly/AEROTEHStatementofPrinciples](https://bit.ly/AEROTEHStatementofPrinciples). The letter also stated that during 2022, a meeting of AEROTEH S.A. shareholders decided “to delete from its object of activity ‘Manufacturing of Armament and Ammunition - CAEN code 2540’...from the industrial activities of our company.” According to the letter, the decision to delete this code “represents also, the commitment of AEROTEH S.A. not to manufacture any type of armaments or ammunition in the future, therefore implicitly no type of components for cluster submunitions.” See, AEROTEH S.A., “Decision of the Extraordinary General Assembly of Shareholders: AEROTEH S.A, No. 1 of 08.11.2022,” 8 November 2022, [bit.ly/AEROTEHMeeting8Nov2022](https://bit.ly/AEROTEHMeeting8Nov2022).

<sup>50</sup> See, Singapore Technologies Engineering website, [www.stengg.com/en](http://www.stengg.com/en); PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015, [bit.ly/StopExplosiveSTE2015](https://bit.ly/StopExplosiveSTE2015); and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015. The president of the company said the decision came about in part because “we often get asked by the investment community [about] our stand on cluster munitions.” Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, 11 November 2015.

<sup>51</sup> According to Elbit Systems Ltd. vice president David Vaknin, “As part of the Elbit Systems organization, IMI Systems will not be continuing its prior activities with respect to cluster munitions. All of Elbit Systems activities relating to munitions, including those activities to be continued by IMI Systems, will be conducted in accordance with applicable international conventions or US law.” See, Tovah Lazaroff, “Elbit rejects HSBC’s BDS disclaimer stating: ‘We don’t produce cluster bombs,’” *The Jerusalem Post*, 3 January 2019, [bit.ly/JerusalemPost3Jan2019](https://bit.ly/JerusalemPost3Jan2019); and PAX, “Elbit Systems confirms cluster munitions exit,” 23 January 2019, [bit.ly/PAXElbitSystems23Jan2019](https://bit.ly/PAXElbitSystems23Jan2019).



## APPARENT PRODUCTION

Myanmar was not known to have produced cluster munitions. Yet evidence emerged in 2023 that indicates it may have manufactured a cluster bomb since 2021, which was used in several attacks. The air-delivered bomb consists of a shell casing that contains twelve 120mm mortar projectiles, attached on an internal frame as submunitions. Each one has a plastic arming vane attached to an impact fuze that detonates on contact. The origin of this rudimentary cluster bomb is unknown, but it appears similar to other products made by the state-owned weapons production facility “KaPaSa,” or Defense Products Industries of Myanmar. Photographic evidence and witness descriptions of this weapon indicate that it appears to meet the definition of a cluster munition under the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which prohibits a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms.”

## FORMER PRODUCERS

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions. Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party.

Eighteen states have ceased production of cluster munitions; all are States Parties to the convention with the exception of Argentina. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period.

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of cluster munition production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including BiH, Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.<sup>52</sup>

### Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina	Italy
Australia	Japan
Belgium	Netherlands
BiH	Slovakia
Chile	South Africa
Croatia	Spain
France	Sweden
Germany	Switzerland
Iraq	UK

## TRANSFER OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Since joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.<sup>53</sup>

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. Few cluster munition transfers have been documented by non-signatories to the convention over the past fifteen years since the convention was adopted.

<sup>52</sup> Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of the former Yugoslavia, has declared that “There are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM](http://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM).

<sup>53</sup> States Parties Chile, France, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purposes of destruction: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

## TRANSFERS TO UKRAINE

Ukraine has publicly asked to be supplied with cluster munitions for use in the ongoing war with Russia.<sup>54</sup> On 7 July 2023, the administration of President Joe Biden announced that an unspecified quantity of US cluster munitions, with a failure rate exceeding 1%, would be transferred to Ukraine.<sup>55</sup> According to the US Department of Defense, “155mm artillery rounds” will be transferred, including ones that deliver, what it and the Department of State describe as, “highly effective and reliable” DPICM submunitions.<sup>56</sup> Department of Defense officials claim the DPICM submunitions “have a dud rate less than 2.35 percent” but say that the testing data behind this figure is “classified.”<sup>57</sup>

It appears that the US will transfer 155mm M864 cluster munition artillery projectiles that each contain 72 DPICM submunitions, as well as 155mm M483A1 artillery projectiles that each contain 88 DPICM submunitions. The projectiles deliver M42 and M46 DPICM submunitions, and historic data for these DPICM submunitions shows a failure rate of 6% to 14%, often higher in operations due to wind, soft soil, dense vegetation, and other factors.<sup>58</sup>

Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Oleksii Reznikov, welcomed the US decision to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions, which he said “will significantly help us to de-occupy our territories while saving the lives of the Ukrainian soldiers.”<sup>59</sup> He outlined five “key principles” guiding Ukraine’s use of the cluster munitions which he said “we will abide by and which we have clearly communicated to all our partners, including the US.”<sup>60</sup>

As of 3 August 2023, world leaders and officials from 21 countries have expressed concern over cluster munitions after the US decision to transfer them to Ukraine.<sup>61</sup> The US decision has led media coverage worldwide and has been criticized by UN officials and civil society organizations, including the CMC. On 13 July 2023, 147 US congressional representatives (98 Republicans and 49 Democrats) voted to prohibit the sale and transfer of cluster munitions

54 For example, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2023, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, Olexander Kubrakov, and foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, appealed for Ukraine to be supplied with cluster munitions. Kubrakov said, “Russia is using cluster munitions every day. Our people are dying. Why can’t we receive and use such weapons? The US has millions of rounds, which we want. It’s complicated with conventions, but we can use such weapons.” See, Munich Security Conference, “Spotlight: Ukraine,” undated, [bit.ly/MSCUkraine2023](https://bit.ly/MSCUkraine2023); and “NATO Secretary General rejects Ukraine’s demand for cluster munitions,” *Ukrainska Pravda*, 18 February 2023, [bit.ly/UkrainskaPravda18Feb2023](https://bit.ly/UkrainskaPravda18Feb2023).

55 The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/WhiteHousePressBriefing7July2023](https://bit.ly/WhiteHousePressBriefing7July2023); and US Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds Press Briefing,” 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/DoDPresBriefing7July2023](https://bit.ly/DoDPresBriefing7July2023).

56 US Department of Defense press release, “Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/DoDPresRelease7July2023](https://bit.ly/DoDPresRelease7July2023).

57 US Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds Press Briefing,” 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/DoDPresBriefing7July2023](https://bit.ly/DoDPresBriefing7July2023).

58 John Ismay, “Cluster Weapons U.S. Is Sending Ukraine Often Fail to Detonate,” *The New York Times*, 8 July 2023, [bit.ly/NewYorkTimes8July2023](https://bit.ly/NewYorkTimes8July2023); and Karen DeYoung, Alex Horton, and Missy Ryan, “Biden approves cluster munition supply to Ukraine,” *The Washington Post*, 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/WashingtonPost7July2023](https://bit.ly/WashingtonPost7July2023).

59 Oleksii Reznikov (oleksiireznikov), “We welcome the decision of the US to provide Ukraine with the new liberation weapons that will significantly help us to de-occupy our territories while saving the lives of the Ukrainian soldiers.” 7 July 2023, 21:13 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/OleksiiReznikovTweet7July2023](https://bit.ly/OleksiiReznikovTweet7July2023).

60 Ibid. The five “key principles” are summarized by the Monitor as: Ukraine will use cluster munitions on its own territory and not in Russia; Ukraine will not use cluster munitions “in urban areas (cities)” and “only in the fields where there is a concentration of Russian military;” Ukraine will keep a strict record of its use of cluster munitions and “the local zones where they will be used;” areas where cluster munitions are used by Ukraine will be prioritized for post-conflict clearance; and Ukraine will “report to our partners about the use of these munitions, and about their efficiency to ensure the appropriate standard of transparent reporting and control.”

61 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lao PDR, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, and UK.

to Ukraine, but the measure did not pass as 276 representatives voted against it.<sup>62</sup> The original amendment sought to prohibit cluster munition transfers to any country and was accompanied by a letter from Sara Jacobs, Ilhan Omar, and 17 other House Democrats renouncing the US transfer of cluster munitions.<sup>63</sup>

Ukraine may have acquired cluster munitions from other countries during 2022–2023. US defense officials alleged in June and July 2023 that certain unnamed countries have supplied cluster munitions to Ukraine.<sup>64</sup>

Senior government officials from Türkiye and Ukraine denied a January 2023 media report that claimed Türkiye had transferred cluster munitions to Ukraine in November 2022.<sup>65</sup> In 2021 and 2022, Türkiye informed the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that “Turkey has never used, produced, imported or transferred cluster munitions since 2005, nor does it intend to do so in the future.”<sup>66</sup>

Also in January 2023, Estonian state media reported that Estonia was considering providing Ukraine with German-made DM632 155mm cluster munition projectiles.<sup>67</sup> Such a transfer would require approval from the German government and, in February 2023, Germany’s defense minister Boris Pistorius said that “Germany won’t authorize the transfer of cluster bombs to Ukraine.”<sup>68</sup>

Israeli-made or copied M971 120mm cluster munition mortar projectiles were photographed in possession of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in December 2022.<sup>69</sup> Israel originally produced this type of cluster munition, but it is not known how or from whom Ukraine acquired it.

62 Clerk of the US House of Representatives, “Final vote results for roll call 317 on HR2670, recorded vote, Green of Georgia Amendment No. 48,” 13 July 2023, [bit.ly/USHouseVote13July2023](https://bit.ly/USHouseVote13July2023).

63 Branko Marcetic, “As Cluster Bombs Head to Ukraine, Progressive Dissent on the War Is Suddenly Allowed Again,” *Jacobian*, 14 July 2023, [bit.ly/Jacobian14July2023](https://bit.ly/Jacobian14July2023).

64 In June 2023, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, Gen. Mark Milley, told media that “other European countries have provided some” cluster munitions to Ukraine in recent months. See, Ashley Roque, “White House weighing controversial cluster munitions deliveries to Ukraine,” *Breaking Defense*, 30 June 2023, [bit.ly/BreakingDefense30June2023](https://bit.ly/BreakingDefense30June2023); Sabrina Singh, Deputy Press Secretary, US Department of Defense, on “Meet The Press NOW – July 13,” *NBC News*, YouTube.com, 13 July 2023, [bit.ly/NBCNewsYouTube13July2023](https://bit.ly/NBCNewsYouTube13July2023); and US Department of Defense, “Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Sims II (USA), Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff; Brigadier General Pat Ryder, Pentagon Press Secretary, Hold a Press Briefing,” 13 July 2023, [bit.ly/USDoDBriefing13July2023](https://bit.ly/USDoDBriefing13July2023).

65 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” *Foreign Policy*, 10 January 2023, [bit.ly/ForeignPolicy10Jan2023](https://bit.ly/ForeignPolicy10Jan2023). The Turkish president’s spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, denied the report and reportedly stated, “We don’t have cluster munitions and we haven’t provided them to Ukraine.” Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” *Middle East Eye*, 14 January 2023, [bit.ly/MiddleEastEye14Jan2023](https://bit.ly/MiddleEastEye14Jan2023). Ukraine’s ambassador to Türkiye, Vasyl Bodnar, denied the alleged transfer as “Russian propaganda.” See, Mustafa Devici, “Ukrainian envoy in Türkiye denies claims Ankara sending cluster bombs to Ukraine,” *Anadolu Agency*, 11 January 2023, [bit.ly/AnadoluAgency11Jan2023](https://bit.ly/AnadoluAgency11Jan2023).

66 Letter to Amb. Aidan Liddle of the UK, President of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, from Amb. Sadik Arslan, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the UN in Geneva, 5 October 2021; and statement of Türkiye, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August 2022, [bit.ly/TurkiyeStatement30Aug2022](https://bit.ly/TurkiyeStatement30Aug2022).

67 Madis Hindre, “Estonia weighing giving Ukraine cluster munitions,” *ERR News*, 26 January 2023, [bit.ly/ERRNews26Jan2023](https://bit.ly/ERRNews26Jan2023).

68 Antonia Faltermaier, “Cluster bombs for Ukraine? Pistorius makes a clear statement,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, 23 February 2023, [bit.ly/BerlinerMorgenpost23Feb2023](https://bit.ly/BerlinerMorgenpost23Feb2023).

69 Each M971 120mm mortar projectile delivers 24 M87 DPICM submunitions. See, War in Ukraine (Rinegati), “In Ukraine, something very similar to Israeli M971 mortar cluster munitions has been spotted. Unlike standard cluster munitions, the M971 has a built-in self-destruct mechanism for unexploded submunitions, making them much safer for civilians.” 12:50 UTC, 18 December 2022. Tweet, [bit.ly/UkraineWarTweet18Dec2022](https://bit.ly/UkraineWarTweet18Dec2022); Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “Who supplied them to Ukraine? That’s not clear. A very limited number of countries reported possession of such mortar bombs and we tend to believe what we see was exported from a country which previously purchased these bombs from Israel.” 20:18 UTC, 17 December 2022. Tweet, [bit.ly/UkraineWeaponsTrackerTweet17Dec2022](https://bit.ly/UkraineWeaponsTrackerTweet17Dec2022); and “Ukraine received M971 cluster bombs (VIDEO),” *UA.TV*, 18 December 2022, [bit.ly/UATV18Dec2022](https://bit.ly/UATV18Dec2022).

## PREVIOUS TRANSFERS

The Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.<sup>70</sup> While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was most likely the world's leading exporter as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries and other areas.<sup>71</sup>

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.<sup>72</sup> The full extent of China's exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

# STOCKPILES OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION

## GLOBAL STOCKPILES

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 95 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions, containing more than one billion submunitions.<sup>73</sup>

## STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY STATES PARTIES

In the past, the convention's States Parties stockpiled a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions, containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 41 countries—38 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munition stocks have now destroyed them.

At least three States Parties have cluster munition stocks still to destroy. Questions remain over whether Guinea knowingly possesses cluster munitions, as it apparently imported them in the past. Guinea must report any stocks in its initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was due in April 2015 but still has not been submitted.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup> There is no comprehensive accounting of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK) in addition to exports by non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, US, and the former Yugoslavia.

<sup>71</sup> Recipients of US exports include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, the UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

<sup>72</sup> Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, cluster munition remnants of Soviet origin have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

<sup>73</sup> The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW provided the first list identifying 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, "Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions," 20 May 2002.

<sup>74</sup> The Republic of Moldova has reported that it transferred 860 9M27K-series cluster munition rockets, each containing 30 fragmentation submunitions, to Guinea in 2000, for use in its 220mm Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers. Republic of Moldova, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Submission for Calendar Year 2000, 30 May 2001.

Countries that stockpiled cluster munitions<sup>75</sup>

States Parties	Signatories	Non-signatories	
Afghanistan	Angola	<b>Algeria</b>	<b>UAE</b>
Austria	Cent. African Rep.	Argentina	<b>US</b>
Belgium	<b>Cyprus</b>	<b>Armenia</b>	<b>Uzbekistan</b>
BiH	<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<b>Venezuela</b>
Botswana		<b>Bahrain</b>	<b>Yemen</b>
Bulgaria		<b>Belarus</b>	<b>Zimbabwe</b>
Cameroon		<b>Brazil</b>	
Canada		<b>Cambodia</b>	
Chile		<b>China</b>	
Colombia		<b>Egypt</b>	
Congo, Rep. of		<b>Eritrea</b>	
Côte d'Ivoire		<b>Estonia</b>	
Croatia		<b>Ethiopia</b>	
Cuba		<b>Finland</b>	
Czech Republic		<b>Georgia</b>	
Denmark		<b>Greece</b>	
Ecuador		<b>India</b>	
France		<b>Iran</b>	
Germany		<b>Israel</b>	
Guinea		<b>Jordan</b>	
Guinea-Bissau		<b>Kazakhstan</b>	
Honduras		<b>Korea, North</b>	
Hungary		<b>Korea, South</b>	
Iraq		<b>Kuwait</b>	
Italy		<b>Libya</b>	
Japan		<b>Mongolia</b>	
Moldova		<b>Morocco</b>	
Montenegro		<b>Oman</b>	
Mozambique		<b>Pakistan</b>	
Netherlands		<b>Poland</b>	
Nigeria		<b>Qatar</b>	
North Macedonia		<b>Romania</b>	
Norway		<b>Russia</b>	
<b>Peru</b>		<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	
Philippines		<b>Serbia</b>	
Portugal		<b>Singapore</b>	
<b>Slovakia</b>		<b>Sudan</b>	
Slovenia		<b>Syria</b>	
<b>South Africa</b>		<b>Thailand</b>	
Spain		<b>Türkiye</b>	
Sweden		<b>Turkmenistan</b>	
Switzerland		<b>Ukraine</b>	
UK			
<b>43 (3 current)</b>	<b>4 (2 current)</b>	<b>48 (47 current)</b>	

Note: countries in **bold** still possess stockpiles.

<sup>75</sup> This information is drawn from Monitor Cluster Munition Ban Policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as statements and other sources. Armenia has been added to the list of stockpilers following evidence of its use of cluster munitions in 2020.

## Cluster munitions held by States Parties still to complete stockpile destruction<sup>76</sup>

State Party	Cluster munitions	Submunitions	Deadline
Peru	2,012	162,417	1 April 2024
Slovakia	1,235	299,187	1 January 2024
South Africa	1,485	99,465	1 November 2023
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,732</b>	<b>561,069</b>	

## STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY SIGNATORIES

At least two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

- Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles, containing a total of 2,559 M20G submunitions, to Bulgaria in 2014. By August 2019, they had been destroyed by private company EXPAL Bulgaria.<sup>77</sup> Cyprus has never made a public statement or provided a voluntary transparency report to confirm if it has now destroyed all its stockpiled cluster munitions.
- Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions, but has not shared information on its plan to destroy them under the convention. In June 2022, an Indonesian official told the Monitor that the stockpile consists of approximately 150 “very old” cluster bombs.<sup>78</sup>

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

- Angola stated in 2017 that all of its stockpiled cluster munitions were destroyed in or by 2012.<sup>79</sup>
- The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.<sup>80</sup>

After ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions in February 2023, Nigeria provided an Article 7 transparency report in April 2023, which stated that it has not produced cluster munitions and has no stockpiled cluster munitions, including for research and training purposes.<sup>81</sup>

## STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY NON-SIGNATORIES

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

<sup>76</sup> This table lists the total number of cluster munitions declared by these States Parties, and does not reflect the cluster munitions destroyed to date.

<sup>77</sup> Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 June 2017; Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2019; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2020. The Greek-made GRM-20 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar system uses these projectiles, each of which contain 20 submunitions.

<sup>78</sup> CMC meeting with Risha Jilian Chaniago, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 24 June 2022.

<sup>79</sup> Statement of Angola, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, [bit.ly/CCMStatementAngola4Sep2017](https://bit.ly/CCMStatementAngola4Sep2017).

<sup>80</sup> Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, [bit.ly/StatementCAR14Sep2011](https://bit.ly/StatementCAR14Sep2011).

<sup>81</sup> Nigeria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 30 March 2023.

The US reported in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than six million cluster munitions.”<sup>82</sup> Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs, containing 320,375 submunitions, in 2004.<sup>83</sup> Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.<sup>84</sup>

## STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force of the convention for that State Party.

## STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE COMPLETED STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

Of the 43 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions, at least 39 have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 178.5 million submunitions. This represents 99% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have reported stockpiling.

Bulgaria was the last State Party to complete stockpile destruction under the convention, in June 2023.

Five States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the overview table, due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

- Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions found in abandoned arms caches.
- The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but it must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, [bit.ly/CCWUSStatement14Nov2011](http://bit.ly/CCWUSStatement14Nov2011). The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in 2004.

<sup>83</sup> “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated. This document was provided by the press office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

<sup>84</sup> “The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs,” *InfoDefensa*, 26 August 2011, [bit.ly/InfoDefensa26Aug2011](http://bit.ly/InfoDefensa26Aug2011).

<sup>85</sup> In September 2011, the Republic of the Congo stated that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory. In May 2013, it reported that it had destroyed its remaining 372 antipersonnel landmines that were held for training and research purposes, following the massive explosions at a weapons depot in Brazzaville in March 2012. It reported that it was now a country free of landmines and cluster munitions. Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, [bit.ly/StatementRepCongo15Sep2011](http://bit.ly/StatementRepCongo15Sep2011); statement by Col. Nkoua, National Focal Point of the Struggle Against Mines, seminar to mark the 20th Anniversary of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) hosted by the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs (CCBL), Kinshasa, 19 December 2012; and statement of the Republic of the Congo, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction<sup>86</sup>

State Party (year of completion)	Cluster munitions	Submunitions
Austria (2010)	12,672	798,336
Belgium (2010)	115,210	10,138,480
BiH (2011)	445	148,059
Botswana (2018)	510	14,400
Bulgaria (2023)	6,905	190,919
Cameroon (2017)*	6	906
Canada (2014)	13,623	1,361,958
Chile (2013)	249	25,896
Colombia (2009)	72	10,832
Côte d'Ivoire (2013)	68	10,200
Croatia (2018)	7,235	178,318
Cuba (2017)**	1,856	N/R
Czech Republic (2010)	480	16,400
Denmark (2014)	42,176	2,440,940
Ecuador (2004)	117	17,199
France (2016)	34,876	14,916,881
Germany (2015)	573,700	62,923,935
Hungary (2011)	287	3,954
Italy (2015)	4,963	2,849,979
Japan (2015)	14,011	2,027,907
Moldova (2010)	1,385	27,050
Montenegro (2010)	353	51,891
Mozambique (2015)	293	12,804
Netherlands (2012)	193,643	25,867,510
North Macedonia (2013)	2,426	39,980
Norway (2010)	52,190	3,087,910
Philippines (2011)	114	0
Portugal (2011)	11	1,617
Slovenia (2017)	1,080	52,920
Spain (2018)	6,837	293,652
Sweden (2015)	370	20,595
Switzerland (2019)	206,061	12,211,950
UK (2013)	190,832	38,759,034
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,485,056</b>	<b>178,502,412</b>

Note: N/R=not reported.

\*Cameroon did not destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but instead retained them all for research and training.

\*\*Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

<sup>86</sup> See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, [www.the-monitor.org/cp](http://www.the-monitor.org/cp). Some quantities of cluster munitions and/or submunitions have changed since previous reports due to adjusted information provided in Article 7 reports. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a collective total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions.



- Guinea-Bissau initially reported possessing cluster munitions in 2011, but did not provide information on the types or quantities.<sup>87</sup> It subsequently clarified in May 2022 and reported in July 2022 that it does not possess any stocks.<sup>88</sup>
- Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017, but did not declare any cluster munitions as it had destroyed its stockpile long before the convention's entry into force.<sup>89</sup>

## DESTRUCTION UNDERWAY

In 2022 and the first half of 2023, three States Parties—Bulgaria, Peru, and Slovakia—destroyed a total of at least 4,166 cluster munitions and 134,598 submunitions from their stocks.

Previously, in 2021 and the first half of 2022, the three States Parties destroyed a total of 1,658 cluster munitions and 46,733 submunitions.

### Cluster munitions destroyed by States Parties in 2022 and the first half of 2023

State Party	Cluster munitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed
Bulgaria	3,588	98,814
Peru	542	34,834
Slovakia	36	950
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,166</b>	<b>134,598</b>

According to Bulgaria's Ministry of Defence, the last of Bulgaria's stockpiled cluster munitions were destroyed at the end of June 2023, six months in advance of the 31 December 2023 deadline.<sup>90</sup> By the end of 2022, all remaining cluster munition stocks once held by the Bulgarian Armed Forces had been transferred to Italy for destruction by a private company, Esploidenti Sabino Srl.<sup>91</sup> The destruction of Bulgaria's stocks resumed in Italy in February 2022 and scaled up rapidly, with 1,303 cluster munitions and 51,285 submunitions destroyed as of the end of 2022. During the first half of 2023, Bulgaria destroyed 2,285 cluster munitions

87 Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 January 2020; and statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 3 September 2014, [bit.ly/StatementGuinea-BissauSep2014](https://bit.ly/StatementGuinea-BissauSep2014). Guinea-Bissau told States Parties that it had asked for help to destroy its stockpile in 2013 from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which had conducted a technical assessment in 2011 that found the cluster munition stocks were held by the armed forces "in very bad conditions." See, statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, [bit.ly/StatementGuinea-Bissau11Sep2013](https://bit.ly/StatementGuinea-Bissau11Sep2013). A 2011 inventory review by the National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI) found that an air force base in Bissau City held stocks of cluster munitions. Interview with César Luis Gomes Lopes de Carvalho, General Director, CAAMI, in Geneva, 27 June 2011. RBK-series air-dropped bombs and PTAB-2.5 submunitions were among munitions ejected by an explosion at an ammunition storage facility on the outskirts of Bissau City in 2000. See, Cleared Ground Demining, "Guinea Bissau," undated, [bit.ly/ClearedGroundGuinea-Bissau](https://bit.ly/ClearedGroundGuinea-Bissau).

88 Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2022, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauStatement19May2022](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauStatement19May2022); and Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 6 July 2022.

89 According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munition were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007, and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

90 Email to Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, Arms Division, HRW, from Stoyan N. Karastoyanov, Chief Expert, EU and International Organizations Department, Defence Policy and Planning Directorate, Bulgaria Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2023.

91 Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2023.

and 47,529 submunitions.<sup>92</sup> Bulgaria is expected to formally announce the completion of its stockpile destruction at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2023.

Peru told the convention's Tenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2022 that it is striving to complete destruction of its stockpile by the end of 2023, in advance of its 1 April 2024 deadline.<sup>93</sup> At the same meeting, Slovakia reiterated its commitment to destroy its stockpile "on time and in line with our stipulated destruction deadline." Slovakia's deadline is 1 January 2024.<sup>94</sup>

South Africa told the Tenth Meeting of States Parties that it "remains fully committed to concluding this destruction process under Article 3 within the specified time frame."<sup>95</sup> It is unclear if South Africa will meet its stockpile destruction deadline of 1 November 2023 as it has not destroyed any cluster munitions since 2012. According to South Africa's Article 7 transparency report submitted in June 2023, the stockpile destruction "will take place strictly based on priorities." The report also stated that destruction of stocks planned for 2020–2021 "was curbed by COVID-19 restrictions."<sup>96</sup>

## RETENTION

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

A total of 11 States Parties are retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes. Germany retains the highest number of cluster munitions of any State Party. It reported consuming 22 cluster munitions during 2022.<sup>97</sup> Switzerland retains the second-highest number of cluster munitions, after consuming one-third of its retained cluster munitions in 2022.<sup>98</sup> BiH, Spain, and Sweden also consumed cluster munitions or submunitions in 2022.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>92</sup> During the first half of 2023, Bulgaria destroyed: 46 RBK 250-275 AO-1 SCh bombs and 6,900 submunitions; 120 RBK 500 AO-2.5 RT bombs and 7,200 submunitions; 15 RBK 500 SHOAB-O.5M bombs and 8,190 submunitions; 672 BKF AO-2.5 RT bombs and 8,064 submunitions; 1,431 BKF AO-2.5 RTM bombs and 17,172 submunitions; and one RBS 100 AO-25-33 bomb and three submunitions. Email to Mary Wareham, HRW, from Stoyan N. Karastoyanov, Chief Expert, EU and International Organizations Department, Defence Policy and Planning Directorate, Bulgaria Ministry of Defence, 10 July 2023.

<sup>93</sup> Statement of Peru, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 31 August 2022, [bit.ly/PeruStatement31Aug2022](https://bit.ly/PeruStatement31Aug2022).

<sup>94</sup> Statement of Slovakia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 31 August 2022, [bit.ly/SlovakiaStatement31Aug2022](https://bit.ly/SlovakiaStatement31Aug2022).

<sup>95</sup> Statement of South Africa, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 31 August 2022, [bit.ly/SouthAfricaStatement31Aug2022](https://bit.ly/SouthAfricaStatement31Aug2022). South Africa has regularly expressed its intent to meet the stockpile destruction deadline. See, statement of South Africa, Convention on Cluster Munitions Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 September 2019, [bit.ly/SouthAfricaStatement2Sept2019](https://bit.ly/SouthAfricaStatement2Sept2019); and statement of South Africa, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018, [bit.ly/SouthAfricaStatement3Sept2018](https://bit.ly/SouthAfricaStatement3Sept2018).

<sup>96</sup> South Africa Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 23 June 2023.

<sup>97</sup> Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 31 March 2023.

<sup>98</sup> Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2023.

<sup>99</sup> Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 22 May 2023; and BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form D, 19 May 2023.

## Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 31 December 2022)<sup>100</sup>

State Party	Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)			Year first reported
	Currently retained	Consumed in 2022	Initially retained	
Germany	129 (11,102)	22 (2,485)	685 (62,580)	2011
Switzerland	28 (1,299)	14 (798)	138 (7,346)	2013
Belgium	9 (792)	166 (15,576)	276 (24,288)	2011
Cameroon	6 (906)	0 (0)	6 (906)	2014
Bulgaria	6 (300)	0 (0)	8 (400)	2017
France	3 (189)	0 (0)	55 (10,284)	2011
Spain	2 (275)	5 (247)	711 (16,652)	2011
Denmark	0 (2,816)	N/R	170 (0)	2011
Netherlands	0 (1,854)	0 (0)	272 (23,545)	2011
Sweden	0 (100)	0 (13)	0 (125)	2013
BiH	0 (23)	0 (7)	0 (30)	2013

Note: N/R=not reported.

Belgium no longer retains the highest number of cluster munitions among States Parties, having destroyed 95% of its retained cluster munitions in 2022.<sup>101</sup> According to Belgium's transparency report, it intends to destroy its remaining cluster munitions retained for training in 2023.

Bulgaria, Cameroon, France, and the Netherlands did not consume any retained cluster munitions during 2022. It is unclear if Denmark consumed any retained cluster munitions in 2022 as it has not submitted its annual updated transparency report, as of 3 August 2023. Cameroon provided a transparency report in June 2023, which reported no change in the status of its retained cluster munitions since its previous report was submitted in 2017.<sup>102</sup>

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have reduced their stocks significantly since making their first declarations, indicating that the initial amounts retained were not the "minimum number absolutely necessary" for the permitted purposes under the convention.

Some States Parties such as Chile, Croatia, Moldova, and the Netherlands have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which are no longer considered to be cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

The majority of States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for training purposes, including 28 States Parties that once possessed stocks.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>100</sup> For more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained by each country, see Monitor country profiles, [www.the-monitor.org/cp](http://www.the-monitor.org/cp); and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM](http://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM).

<sup>101</sup> Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2023.

<sup>102</sup> Cameroon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 27 June 2023.

<sup>103</sup> Afghanistan, Austria, BiH, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Slovenia, and UK.

## TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.<sup>104</sup>

### States Parties with initial Article 7 deadlines

State Party	Date due
Cabo Verde	28 September 2011
Comoros	30 June 2011
Congo, Rep. of	28 August 2015
Guinea	19 April 2015
Madagascar	30 April 2018
Rwanda	31 July 2016
Togo	29 May 2013

As of 3 August 2023, 104 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report, including Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe in the reporting period.<sup>105</sup> South Sudan provided four voluntary transparency reports prior to acceding to the convention. Of the seven States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 reports, Cabo Verde and Comoros are more than a decade overdue.

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year. Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been poor and sporadic, as more than half of States Parties do not provide Article 7 reports annually. Twelve States Parties have not provided an annual update since submitting their initial Article 7 report.<sup>106</sup>

In 2022, signatory the DRC submitted its fourth voluntary Article 7 transparency report since 2011. Prior to acceding to the convention in August 2023, South Sudan had provided four voluntary reports as a non-signatory since 2020. Canada and Palau provided voluntary reports prior to ratifying the convention.

The CMC continues to encourage States Parties to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.<sup>107</sup>

## NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

<sup>104</sup> The transparency report should be emailed to the UN Secretary-General via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs at [ccm@un.org](mailto:ccm@un.org). For more information, see: [www.clusterconvention.org/reporting-forms](http://www.clusterconvention.org/reporting-forms).

<sup>105</sup> Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM](http://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM).

<sup>106</sup> Benin, Burundi, Fiji, Iceland, Lesotho, Mali, Nauru, Niue, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka.

<sup>107</sup> Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable.” States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J.

A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention's entry into force in August 2010, a total of 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 22 states have done so since.

Niue was the last country to enact national implementation legislation for the convention, in 2021. The Monitor is not aware of any State Party enacting implementing legislation for the convention during 2022 or the first half of 2023. Nigeria reported in April 2023 that it "needs to enact specific legislation to enforce provisions of the Convention."<sup>108</sup>

A total of 22 States Parties have indicated that they are either planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.<sup>109</sup>

A total of 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.<sup>110</sup>

Other States Parties are still considering whether specific implementing legislation for the convention is needed.

Several guides are available to encourage the preparation of robust legislation. The CMC prepared model legislation in 2020.<sup>111</sup> HRW and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation.<sup>112</sup> The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states.<sup>113</sup> New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.<sup>114</sup>

## National implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party (year enacted)	
Afghanistan (2018)	Italy (2011)
Australia (2012)	Japan (2009)
Austria (2008)	Liechtenstein (2013)
Belgium (2006)	Luxembourg (2009)
Bulgaria (2015)	Mauritius (2016)
Cameroon (2016)	Namibia (2019)
Canada (2014)	New Zealand (2009)
Colombia (2012)	Niue (2021)
Cook Islands (2011)	Norway (2008)
Czech Republic (2011)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (2014)
Ecuador (2010)	Samoa (2012)
France (2010)	Spain (2015)
Germany (2009)	Sweden (2012)
Guatemala (2012)	Switzerland (2012)
Hungary (2012)	Togo (2015)
Iceland (2015)	UK (2010)
Ireland (2008)	

<sup>108</sup> Nigeria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 March 2023.

<sup>109</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Somalia, and Zambia.

<sup>110</sup> Albania, Andorra, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

<sup>111</sup> CMC, "2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions: Model Legislation. Act to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 2020, [bit.ly/CMCModelLegislation2020](https://bit.ly/CMCModelLegislation2020).

<sup>112</sup> HRW and IHRC, "Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation," September 2014, [bit.ly/StayingStrong2014](https://bit.ly/StayingStrong2014).

<sup>113</sup> ICRC, "Model Law: Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions," March 2013, [bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationICRC](https://bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationICRC).

<sup>114</sup> New Zealand, "Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act," 7 September 2011, [bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationNZ2011](https://bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationNZ2011).

## INTERPRETIVE ISSUES

During the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the final negotiations in Dublin where the convention was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states' interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions ("interoperability");
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and
3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties have not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.<sup>115</sup> Please refer to previous *Cluster Munition Monitor* reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks, and foreign stockpiling.<sup>116</sup>

## INTEROPERABILITY AND THE PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties "never under any circumstances to...assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention." Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these "interoperability" concerns, Article 21 on "Relations with States not Party to this Convention" was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties "may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party." It does not, however, negate States Parties' obligation under Article 1 to "never under any circumstances" assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by states not party, and to encourage them to join the convention.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as

<sup>115</sup> The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritania, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

<sup>116</sup> As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions, that originated from 100 locations between 2003 and 2010.

qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

Therefore, States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party. Forms of prohibited assistance include, but are not limited to:

- Securing, storing, or transporting cluster munitions that belong to a state not party;
- Agreeing to rules of engagement that allow cluster munition use by a state not party;
- Accepting orders from a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Requesting a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Participating in planning for use of cluster munitions by a state not party; and
- Training others to use cluster munitions.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention's Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.<sup>117</sup>

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention's Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties and Lithuania used Article 21 as a justification to argue forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations, but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

## TRANSIT AND FOREIGN STOCKPILING

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 35 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.<sup>118</sup>

117 Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2012* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2012), pp. 34–35, [bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2012](http://bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2012); CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27, [bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2011](http://bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2011); ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, [bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2010](http://bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2010); HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, [bit.ly/HRWLandmineAction2009](http://bit.ly/HRWLandmineAction2009); and HRW and IHRC, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” 3 September 2014, pp. 19–23, [bit.ly/StayingStrong2014](http://bit.ly/StayingStrong2014).

118 Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29, [bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2011](http://bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2011); ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, [bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2010](http://bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2010); and HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, [bit.ly/HRWLandmineAction2009](http://bit.ly/HRWLandmineAction2009).

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view, that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

## US STOCKPILING AND TRANSIT

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010.

US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.

## DISINVESTMENT

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention's Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Lausanne Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention's Second Review Conference in September 2021, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investment in producers of cluster munitions.<sup>119</sup>

Since 2007, a total of 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.<sup>120</sup>

A few States Parties to the convention have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

Several private companies in non-signatory states have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments for prohibited weapons. These companies include Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.

### Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party	Year enacted
Belgium	2007
Ireland	2008
Italy	2021
Liechtenstein	2013
Luxembourg	2009
Netherlands	2013
New Zealand	2009
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2014
Samoa	2012
Spain	2015
Switzerland	2013


<sup>119</sup> See Action 47 in "Annex II: Lausanne Action Plan," Final Report of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/CONF/2021/6, 6 October 2021, [bit.ly/LausanneActionPlanAnnexII](https://bit.ly/LausanneActionPlanAnnexII).

<sup>120</sup> Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, and Zambia.





# PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS



## MAP KEY


- Current producer
- Past producer

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, signatories are underlined, non-signatories are plain text.

## DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

# CLUSTER MUNITION STOCKPILES AND DESTRUCTION







A clearance operator from DanChurchAid (DCA) clears an area suspected to be contaminated by explosive remnants of war in Pajok, South Sudan in February 2023.

© 2023, Rasmus Emil Gravesen/DCA

# THE IMPACT

## INTRODUCTION

This overview details the negative impact caused by use of cluster munitions, and charts the efforts and challenges facing States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have a responsibility for clearing cluster munition remnants and assisting victims of these weapons.<sup>1</sup> It assesses progress on the strategic commitments made by States Parties under the five-year Lausanne Action Plan, adopted at the convention's Second Review Conference in September 2021.<sup>2</sup> It also considers States Parties' overarching commitment "to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions" as stated in the convention's preamble.

## A RISE IN ANNUAL CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

The Monitor recorded a total of 1,172 new cluster munition casualties across eight countries in 2022.<sup>3</sup> This is the highest annual number of people killed and injured by cluster munitions that the *Cluster Munition Monitor* has recorded since it first began reporting in 2010. The alarming finding is primarily due to the casualties caused by Russia's repeated use of cluster munitions across Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions causing civilian deaths and injuries. Both states have launched cluster munition attacks that have affected protected civilian objects including schools and hospitals, and caused casualties among children. The rise is also due to cluster munition attacks in Syria during 2022, and a substantial increase in the number of casualties from cluster munition remnants in Yemen.

- 
- 1 Cluster munition remnants include abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions, and unexploded bomblets, as well as failed cluster munitions. Unexploded submunitions are "explosive submunitions" that have been dispersed or released from a cluster munition but failed to explode as intended. Unexploded bomblets are similar to unexploded submunitions, but refer to "explosive bomblets," which have been dispersed or released from an affixed aircraft dispenser and failed to explode as intended. Abandoned cluster munitions are unused explosive submunitions or cluster munitions that have been left behind or dumped, and are no longer under the control of the party that abandoned them. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 2 (5), (6), (7), and (15).
  - 2 Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Lausanne Action Plan," September 2021, [bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan](https://bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan).
  - 3 The eight countries with cluster munition casualties in 2022 were Azerbaijan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

In 2022, 95% of cluster munition casualties recorded by the Monitor were civilians. This shows how these weapons disproportionately cause civilian harm and suffering. The devastating humanitarian impact of cluster munitions is due to their inherently indiscriminate nature. It was grave concern over civilian harm from use of cluster munitions that drove the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008.

Of all casualties recorded in 2022, a total of 987 were caused by cluster munition attacks while 185 resulted from cluster munition remnants. Casualties directly from cluster munition attacks were recorded in three countries during 2022: Myanmar (for the first time), Syria, and Ukraine. Previously, 2021 had been the first year since 2012 in which no casualties from cluster munition attacks were recorded. The annual casualty total for cluster munition remnants in 2022 marks a significant increase from the 149 casualties recorded in 2021.

Of the 916 cluster munition casualties recorded in Ukraine during 2022, 890 were due to cluster munition attacks, though many casualties from other attacks could have gone unrecorded.<sup>4</sup> The remaining 26 casualties were from cluster munition remnants. Ukraine has now overtaken Syria in terms of annual casualties from cluster munitions. Previously, Syria repeatedly experienced the highest annual casualty total of any country, each year from 2012 to 2021.

Children remain most susceptible to the threat of cluster munition remnants. They accounted for 71% of all cluster munition casualties in 2022, where the age was recorded. Men and boys made up 73% of cluster munition remnants casualties, where the sex was recorded.

## PROGRESS IN CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

In 2022 and in the first half of 2023, there were some positive developments as many countries picked up the pace of clearance efforts. Clearance of cluster munition remnants returned to the pre-COVID-19 rate after slowing amid the pandemic, yet challenges remain. The longer-term socio-economic impacts of the pandemic have affected state budgets and, in some cases, changed funding priorities. Global insecurity and ongoing hostilities hampered progress toward a cluster munition free world, especially in Ukraine.

During 2022, no States Parties completed clearance of cluster munition remnants, as required by Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. As of the end of 2022, ten States Parties are still contaminated by cluster munition remnants; while two signatories, 14 non-signatories, and three other areas have, or are believed to have, areas containing cluster munition remnants.

States Parties reported that 108.92km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land was released via clearance, technical survey, and non-technical survey during 2022, with at least 75,725 cluster munition remnants destroyed. These were primarily unexploded submunitions, also known as bomblets. Of the total land released, 93.28km<sup>2</sup> was cleared, marking a significant increase from the 61km<sup>2</sup> cleared in 2021. Somalia did not report cluster munition clearance figures for 2022. No clearance took place in Chad or Chile in 2022. Chile conducted technical survey of its contaminated areas during 2021 and planned to begin clearance in 2023.<sup>5</sup> Chad planned to survey its remaining contamination between 2022 and 2024.<sup>6</sup>

4 At least 51 cluster munition attacks in Ukraine were reported in 2022 where the number of casualties was not recorded. This information is based on data and incident notes documented within the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) compilation of conflict incidents in Ukraine during 2022. See, [acleddata.com](https://acleddata.com).

5 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, 30 April 2023. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM](https://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM); and Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, pp. 3 and 5, [bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2021).

6 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, 8 June 2023, pp. 13–14.

Requests by States Parties to extend Article 4 clearance deadlines have been made every year since the first extension requests were submitted in 2019. In September 2022, States Parties granted Article 4 deadline extensions to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, and Chile.<sup>7</sup> In the first half of 2023, Iraq submitted a request to extend its deadline by five years to November 2028, while Mauritania requested a two-year extension to August 2026.<sup>8</sup> Both requests will be considered at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2023.

Only one State Party, Somalia, is still working towards its original ten-year clearance deadline under Article 4. However, unfortunately, Somalia does not appear to be on target to meet it.

## RISK EDUCATION TO RESPOND TO INCREASED RISK TAKING-BEHAVIOR

In 2022, the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic remained a trigger for risk-taking behavior—especially from men and boys—in contaminated areas, as people were forced to rely on harmful coping mechanisms such as scrap metal collection and entering hazardous areas for precarious employment or to forage foodstuff to try to supplement diminishing livelihoods.

This was particularly apparent in Lao PDR and Lebanon.<sup>9</sup>

All affected States Parties have a risk education mechanism in place, with the exception of Germany, where the cluster munition contaminated area is on military land that is inaccessible to the public.<sup>10</sup> Of the contaminated States Parties, Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia reported implementing risk education activities during 2022, and where funding was available, restored field activities after forced interruption due to the pandemic.

## CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS

Victim assistance is a core legal obligation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, yet States Parties with survivors face an array of challenges in meeting it.

Under Article 5, the convention codifies an international understanding of victim assistance and its components that extends on the scope and understanding of the victim assistance norm developed under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>11</sup> That standard was again adapted, although in a less comprehensive form, in the text of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>12</sup> Most recently, in November 2022, 83 countries meeting in Dublin adopted the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from

7 Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties,” 19 September 2022, p. 4, [bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport](https://bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport).

8 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 11 April 2023, [bit.ly/IraqCCMArt4ExtRequest2023R](https://bit.ly/IraqCCMArt4ExtRequest2023R); and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023).

9 National Regulatory Authority for the UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA), “IMSMA Dashboard,” undated, [bit.ly/NRADashboardLaoPDR](https://bit.ly/NRADashboardLaoPDR); email from Sarah Bruinooge, Country Director, World Education Laos (WEL), 4 March 2022; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, Risk Education Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), 8 May 2023; and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Increasing Humanitarian Needs in Lebanon,” 14 April 2022, p. 7, [bit.ly/UNOCHALebanon14April2022](https://bit.ly/UNOCHALebanon14April2022).

10 Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 28 December 2018, p. 71, [bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2018](https://bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2018).

11 Mine Ban Treaty (1997), Article 6.3.

12 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017), Article 6.1.



the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.<sup>13</sup>

Aspects of the 2022 political declaration on explosive weapons overlap with, and may bolster implementation of, the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions related to victim assistance. The declaration refers to “blast and fragmentation effects” that “cause deaths and injuries, including lifelong disabilities,” and includes the specific commitment to “provide, facilitate, or support assistance to victims.”<sup>14</sup> The declaration’s signatories have agreed to collect and publicly share disaggregated data on the effects of use of explosive weapons in populated areas; facilitate humanitarian access to those in need; adopt a gender-sensitive and non-discriminatory approach to providing assistance; take into account the rights of persons with disabilities; and facilitate the work of organizations protecting and assisting impacted civilian populations.

Victim assistance efforts under the Convention on Cluster Munitions face numerous challenges. In 2022, many States Parties continued to depend on dwindling international support for victim assistance. Afghanistan and Lebanon faced drastic economic crises that have impaired the functioning of their healthcare systems. In States Parties such as BiH, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Somalia, and the most recent state to join the convention, South Sudan, local and international partners continue their work to fill major gaps in the availability, accessibility, and sustainability of healthcare and rehabilitation services. There was limited progress in 2022 in access to socio-economic inclusion programs and in the provision of financial assistance to victims. There were new psychological support initiatives, yet peer-to-peer support remained lacking despite the recognized need for workable local services.

## ASSESSING THE IMPACT

### CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

#### GLOBAL CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

As of the end of 2022, the total number of cluster munition casualties recorded by the Monitor globally for all time reached 24,274. This total includes casualties resulting both directly from cluster munition attacks (5,662) and from unexploded cluster munition remnants (18,611).<sup>15</sup> Monitor casualty data starts in the mid-1960s, when the United States (US) used cluster bombs extensively in Southeast Asia.

As many casualties go unrecorded, global cluster munition casualties may be as high as 56,600; a figure calculated from a review of multiple datasets and individual country estimates.<sup>16</sup>

13 Republic of Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs press release, “Conference adopts Declaration on protecting civilians from Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” 18 November 2022, [bit.ly/IrelandDFA18Nov2022](https://bit.ly/IrelandDFA18Nov2022); and International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), “Dublin Conference to Adopt the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons,” 19 November 2022, [bit.ly/INEW19Nov2022](https://bit.ly/INEW19Nov2022).

14 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (4.5), 17 June 2022, [bit.ly/PoliticalDeclarationEW2022](https://bit.ly/PoliticalDeclarationEW2022); and Republic of Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs, “Protecting Civilians in Urban Warfare: A Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” 18 November 2022, [bit.ly/PoliticalDeclarationDublinNov2022](https://bit.ly/PoliticalDeclarationDublinNov2022).

15 For one casualty reporting did not specify an attack or cluster munition remnant as the cause.

16 Other global estimates have put the total number of cluster munition casualties for all time at 86,600 to 100,000. Yet these are based on extrapolations from limited data samples, which may not be representative of national averages or the actual number of casualties calculated by the Monitor based on known data and various country estimates recorded in Humanity & Inclusion (HI) data. See HI, *Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities* (Brussels: HI, May 2007), [bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007](https://bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007).

Before the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008, a total of 13,306 cluster munition casualties had been identified globally.<sup>17</sup> Since then, the total number of recorded casualties has increased as new surveys have identified more pre-convention casualties and new casualties from historical cluster munition remnants, as well as due to new cluster munition attacks and further casualties from the remnants they left behind.

As of the end of 2022, cluster munition casualties have been recorded in 15 States Parties to the convention, four signatory states, 18 non-signatories, and three other areas. The first confirmed cluster munition casualties in non-signatory Myanmar were recorded in 2022.

The states with the highest number of casualties, for all time, in the Monitor dataset are: Lao PDR (7,802), Syria (4,408), Iraq (3,175), Vietnam (2,135), and Ukraine (1,016). Before 2022, Ukraine had less than 100 recorded cluster munition casualties, from previous use of the weapons in 2014–2015 and the resulting contamination.

### States and other areas with cluster munition casualties (as of 31 December 2022)<sup>18</sup>

More than 1,000 casualties	100–1,000 casualties	10–99 casualties	Less than 10 casualties/unknown
<b>Iraq</b> <b>Lao PDR</b> Syria Ukraine Vietnam	<b>Afghanistan</b> <u>Angola</u> Azerbaijan <b>BiH</b> Cambodia <b>Croatia</b> <u>DRC</u> Eritrea Ethiopia <i>Kosovo</i> Kuwait <b>Lebanon</b> Russia Serbia South Sudan <i>Western Sahara</i> Yemen	<b>Albania</b> <b>Colombia</b> Georgia Israel Myanmar <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> <b>Sierra Leone</b> Sudan Tajikistan <u>Uganda</u>	<b>Chad</b> <b>Guinea-Bissau</b> <u>Liberia</u> Libya <b>Mauritania</b> <b>Montenegro</b> <b>Mozambique</b> <b>Somalia</b>

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.

Among the 15 States Parties with recorded cluster munition casualties, 13 have a recognized responsibility for victims under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

<sup>17</sup> Global cluster munition casualty data used by the Monitor includes global casualty data collected by HI in 2006 and 2007. See HI, *Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities* (Brussels: HI, May 2007), [bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007](http://bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007).

<sup>18</sup> No precise or estimated casualty total is known for Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, or Mozambique. No cluster munition victims have been reported by Chile, yet media reporting in 2021 on two survivors of a military explosive remnants of war (ERW) incident in 1995 described the item as a cluster munition remnant. These would be the first recorded cluster munition casualties in Chile. It is possible that cluster munition casualties have occurred but gone unrecorded in other states where cluster munitions were used, abandoned, or stored in the past, such as State Party Zambia and non-signatories Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. Better identification and disaggregation of cluster munition casualties is needed in most cluster munition affected states and areas.

Colombia and Mozambique have had cluster munition casualties reported, but have not recognized having any victims and therefore a responsibility to assist victims under the convention.<sup>19</sup>

In its Article 7 transparency reports for the convention, Colombia noted no reports or records on victims of cluster munitions. However, in November 2017, the Supreme Court of Colombia upheld a decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in the case “Santo Domingo Massacre vs. the Republic of Colombia” regarding redress for victims of a cluster munition attack in Santo Domingo, Colombia in 1998. As identified in the case, 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured.<sup>20</sup>

There were reported to have been casualties from cluster munition remnants in Mozambique, though these were not distinguished from explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the data.<sup>21</sup> Mozambique also reported that there might be military cluster munition victims assisted by the Ministry of Defence, but that information was protected by state secrecy protocols. After previously reiterating that “additional surveys are needed to identify victims of cluster munitions,” Mozambique reported in 2019 that “at the moment there is no evidence of victims of cluster munitions.”<sup>22</sup>

The majority of recorded cluster munition casualties for all time (54%, or 13,146) occurred in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

A total of 604 casualties have been recorded in signatories Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Uganda.

In non-signatory states, a total of 10,107 cluster munition casualties were recorded for all time up to the end of 2022. Since the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, casualties from cluster munition attacks have only occurred in non-signatory states, namely Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

In other areas where cluster munition casualties have occurred—Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara—a total of 417 casualties were recorded for all time.

## CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2022

The Monitor recorded a total of 1,172 cluster munition casualties during 2022 across eight countries, including three States Parties and five non-signatories.<sup>23</sup> This is the highest number of annual casualties recorded since 2010 when the convention entered into force.<sup>24</sup>

Cluster munition attacks accounted for 987 casualties in Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine in 2022, of which the vast majority (890) were in Ukraine. This contributed significantly to the

<sup>19</sup> Colombia and Mozambique are both party to the Mine Ban Treaty and have recognized their responsibility to assist landmine survivors.

<sup>20</sup> Since *Cluster Munition Monitor 2019*, Liberia has been added as a state with cluster munition casualties due to a newly-identified casualty reported from cluster munition attacks in the 1990s. No unexploded submunition casualties have been reported in Liberia. See, Supreme Court of Colombia, “César Romero Pradilla vs. Johan Jiménez Valencia,” 23 November 2017, [bit.ly/CorteSupremaColombia2017](http://bit.ly/CorteSupremaColombia2017); and IACHR, “Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia: Judgement of November 30, 2012,” 30 November 2012, [bit.ly/IACHRColombia30Nov2012](http://bit.ly/IACHRColombia30Nov2012).

<sup>21</sup> Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2012), Form H; statement of Mozambique, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 16 September 2011; and interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, and Mila Massango, Head of International Affairs, National Institute of Demining (IND), in Geneva, 22 June 2010.


<sup>22</sup> Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form H; and Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H.

<sup>23</sup> The Monitor systematically collects data from a wide array of sources including national reports, mine action centers, clearance operators, victim assistance providers, and national and international media organizations.

<sup>24</sup> The calendar year 2022 had more casualties than any year since 2010, including when compared to annual totals that were revised retrospectively with new data sources and upwardly adjusted to include those casualties.

increase in casualties from 2021, which was the first year in a decade that no new casualties from cluster munition attacks were recorded.

### Cluster munition casualties in Syria, Ukraine, and all other states and areas 2011–2022<sup>25</sup>



Cluster munition remnants pose an ongoing threat and disproportionately harm civilians, with children particularly at risk from unexploded submunitions. In 2022, a total of 185 casualties were recorded from cluster munition remnants globally, with 50 people killed and 134 injured. For one casualty their survival was not reported. This represents an increase from 149 casualties caused by cluster munition remnants in 2021. However, the total for 2022 is likely far higher, as there was a notable absence of data collection and sharing on casualties from cluster munition remnants in Syria and Ukraine during 2022.

Limited access to conflict-affected areas, a lack of available data due to insufficient resources, and inconsistency in reporting mean that comparisons between recorded annual casualty totals do not necessarily represent definitive trends. Casualty data is adjusted by the Monitor over time when new information becomes available.

### Cluster munition casualties in 2022

Country	Casualties
<b>Cluster munition attacks</b>	
Ukraine	890
Syria	84
Myanmar	13
<b>Cluster munition remnants</b>	
Yemen	95
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>41</b>
Ukraine	26
<b>Lao PDR</b>	<b>9</b>
Syria	6
<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>5</b>
Azerbaijan	3

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**.

<sup>25</sup> This data includes all cluster munition casualties, both those directly from cluster munition attacks and due to cluster munition remnants.

## CASUALTIES FROM CLUSTER MUNITION ATTACKS IN 2022

In Myanmar, cluster bomb remnants were found after an aerial attack by Myanmar government forces that wounded 13 civilians in Mindat township, Chin state in July 2022.<sup>26</sup>

In Syria, cluster munition rockets fired by Syrian government forces, with Russian support, struck refugee camps west of Idlib city on 6 November 2022.<sup>27</sup> Nine civilians were killed, including a pregnant woman who died of her injuries along with her unborn child a week after the attack. Children killed in the attacks included a 14-year-old girl, two girls under six years old, and a four-month-old boy. At least 75 other people were injured.<sup>28</sup>

In Ukraine, the Monitor recorded at least 916 casualties from cluster munition attacks since the Russian invasion began on 24 February 2022. Access to disaggregated data on casualties has proven challenging as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) records casualties of “explosive weapons with wide area effects” without separately identifying casualties from cluster munitions. Data compiled by the Monitor indicates that at least 890 casualties (294 killed and 596 injured) were reported during cluster munition attacks in Ukraine. While this data does not yet represent a full or precise account, it clearly indicates the massive human impact of cluster munition use in Ukraine. The casualties recorded by the Monitor in 2022 as occurring during cluster munition attacks could be differentiated by date or timeframe, the location, and other identifying details.<sup>29</sup>

## CASUALTIES FROM CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS IN 2022

In 2022, the number of annual casualties caused by cluster munition remnants increased in Iraq, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Yemen recorded a steep increase to 95 casualties in 2022. This is up from 29 in 2021 and 11 in 2020. In 2022, it was reported that overall casualties due to conflict in Yemen had reduced sharply since a truce began in October 2021, but that “the number of people injured or killed by landmines and unexploded ordnance remained the same or higher, highlighting the dangers of these remnants of war even in peace time.”<sup>30</sup>

Iraq reported 41 cluster munition remnants casualties in 2022, up from 33 in 2021 and 31 in 2020. This marked the highest annual total recorded in Iraq since 2010.

26 Amnesty International, “Deadly cargo: The supply chain that fuels war crimes in Myanmar,” 3 November 2022, [bit.ly/AmnestyMyanmar3Nov2022](https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mya/2022/11/03/).

27 The cluster munitions hit Maram Refugee Camp, refugee hosting areas in Kafr Jalis, Watan refugee camp, Wadi Haj Khaled refugee camp, Kafruhin refugee camp, Murin refugee camp, and Ba'ayba refugee camp.

28 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Syria: Cluster Munitions Used in November 6 Attacks,” 23 November 2022, [bit.ly/HRWSyria23Nov2022](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/23/syria-cluster-munitions).

29 Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 December 2022; HRW, “Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine,” 11 May 2022, [bit.ly/UkraineHRW11May2022](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/11/ukraine-cluster-munitions); HRW, “Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Repeatedly Used on Mykolaiv,” 17 March 2022, [bit.ly/UkraineHRW17March2022](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/17/ukraine-cluster-munitions); HRW, “Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Launched Into Kharkiv Neighborhoods,” 4 March 2022, [bit.ly/UkraineHRW4March2022](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/04/ukraine-cluster-munitions); HRW, “Cluster Munition Use in Russia-Ukraine War,” 29 May 2023, [bit.ly/UkraineHRW29May2023](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/29/ukraine-cluster-munitions); HRW, “Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions,” 6 July 2023, [bit.ly/UkraineHRW6July2023](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/06/ukraine-civilian-deaths); Amnesty International, “‘Anyone can die at any time’: Indiscriminate attacks by Russian forces in Kharkiv, Ukraine,” 13 June 2022, [bit.ly/UkraineAmnesty13June2022](https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur/2022/06/13/); and Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2022. See, Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, Issue 5, September 2010, pp. 651–660, [bit.ly/IntroducingACLEDSept2010](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02916510903291651).

30 Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), “Yemen: Civilian casualties halved since the start of the truce,” 11 May 2022, [bit.ly/YemenNRC11May2022](https://www.nrc.no/en/news/2022/05/11/yemen-civilian-casualties-halved); and statement by Barbara Woodward in United Nations (UN) press release, “Extending Yemen’s Truce Has Resulted in Improved Humanitarian Conditions, Reduced Civilian Casualties, Special Envoy Tells Security Council,” 14 June 2022, [bit.ly/YemenUN14June2022](https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/20220614.yemen.htm).

In Ukraine, 26 cluster munition remnants casualties were recorded, including 23 civilians and three clearance personnel. No cluster munition remnants casualties had been recorded in 2021.

Other countries saw the number of new annual casualties from cluster munition remnants fall. In Syria, six casualties were recorded, down from 37 in 2021. Lao PDR recorded nine casualties in 2022, a significant fall from 30 in 2021. In Lebanon, five casualties were recorded in 2022, down from eight in 2021. Four of the casualties in Lebanon in 2022 were Syrians.

In Azerbaijan, three casualties from unexploded submunitions were recorded in 2022, up from one in 2021.

## CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS

Civilians accounted for 94.5% (1,109) of all casualties recorded during 2022, where the status was recorded.<sup>31</sup> At least 60 casualties were military personnel. Three casualties were deminers. The high ratio of civilian casualties from cluster munitions in 2022 corresponds with findings based on analysis of historical data. This consistent and foreseeable disproportionate impact on civilians is due to the indiscriminate nature of these weapons. Fewer details on demographics were reported for casualties that occurred during cluster munition attacks than for those caused by cluster munition remnants.

In 2022, the proportion of child casualties from cluster munition remnants continued to rise, accounting for 71% where the age was known.<sup>32</sup> Children had accounted for two-thirds (66%) of cluster munition remnants casualties in 2021 and 44% in 2020. In 2022, children accounted for the majority of casualties from cluster munition remnants in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. All five casualties from remnants in Lebanon during 2022 were boys.

Of all child casualties of cluster munition remnants in 2022, where the sex was known, 61% were boys and 39% were girls.<sup>33</sup>

Where the sex was known, 31% of cluster munition remnants casualties in 2022 were recorded as female. Of these, 81% were girls and 19% were women. Among the remaining 69% of casualties recorded as male, 57% were boys and 43% were men.

In 2022, survival outcomes differed depending on the sex of casualties: 41% of female cluster munition remnants casualties were killed compared to 32% of male casualties. Previously, in 2021, the reverse was observed, with 47% of male casualties killed compared to 26% of female casualties. This had also represented a reversal of the overall situation reported in 2020, when half of female casualties were killed.

## CONTAMINATION FROM CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

### GLOBAL CONTAMINATION

A total of 26 states and three other areas are known or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants as of 1 August 2023. As of the end of 2022, ten are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with clearance obligations, while two were signatories. Fourteen non-signatories and three other areas are also affected by cluster munitions. The number of states and areas listed by the Monitor as contaminated or affected by cluster munition remnants remained unchanged from 2021.

<sup>31</sup> For one casualty in 2022 the civilian/military status of the victim was not reported.

<sup>32</sup> "Child" means persons under 18 years-of-age or casualties that were listed as "child" in existing data or reporting. The 71% figure represents 71 children among 100 casualties where the age group was known. The age of 84 cluster munition remnants casualties in 2022 was not reported.

<sup>33</sup> The sex of 78 casualties in 2022 was not recorded.

## Estimated cluster munition remnants contamination (as of 31 December 2022)<sup>34</sup>

Massive (more than 1,000km <sup>2</sup> )	Large (100– 1,000km <sup>2</sup> )	Medium (10–99km <sup>2</sup> )	Small (less than 10km <sup>2</sup> )	Unknown
<b>Lao PDR</b> Vietnam	Cambodia <b>Iraq</b>	Azerbaijan <b>Chad</b> <b>Chile</b> <b>Mauritania</b> <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> Syria Ukraine Yemen	<b>Afghanistan</b> <b>BiH</b> <u>DRC</u> Georgia <b>Germany</b> Iran <i>Kosovo</i> <b>Lebanon</b> Libya Serbia South Sudan Sudan Tajikistan <i>Western Sahara</i>	<u>Angola</u> Armenia <b>Somalia</b>

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.

## CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

### States Parties that have completed clearance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention.

No States Parties reported completion of clearance of cluster munition remnants during 2022. The last States Parties to complete clearance were Croatia and Montenegro, in 2020.

In all, a total of 10 States Parties have reported completing clearance of cluster munition remnants as required by the convention.<sup>35</sup>

### Extent of contamination in States Parties

The Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as Action 18 of the Lausanne Action Plan, requires States Parties to identify the precise location, scope, and extent of cluster munition remnants

### States Parties that have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants

State Party	Year of completion
Albania	2009
Croatia	2020
Grenada	2012
Guinea-Bissau	2008
Montenegro	2020
Mozambique	2016
Norway	2013
Palau	2010
Republic of the Congo	2012
Zambia	2010

<sup>34</sup> The extent of contamination is unknown but assumed to be small for Angola, Armenia, and Somalia. In Nagorno-Karabakh, a survey by the HALO Trust estimated that more than 16km<sup>2</sup> of land was contaminated. Some clearance in these areas was undertaken in 2020–2021. After the ceasefire in November 2020, more than 20% of land in Stepanakert, the capital of Armenian-controlled areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, was initially contaminated with unexploded items. By May 2022, the HALO Trust had completed clearance of all known contamination in the city. The extent of remaining cluster munition contamination is believed to be medium.

<sup>35</sup> Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Country profiles,” undated, [www.clusterconvention.org/country-profiles](http://www.clusterconvention.org/country-profiles).

contamination in areas under their jurisdiction or control. The Lausanne Action Plan also requires contaminated States Parties to establish accurate, evidence-based contamination baselines, to the fullest extent possible, no later than the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2022, or within two years after entry into force of the convention for new States Parties.

As of the end of 2022, five States Parties—BiH, Chile, Germany, Iraq, and Lebanon—had a clear understanding of their contamination having conducted evidence-based surveys, while survey was ongoing in Lao PDR.<sup>36</sup>

In **BiH**, cluster munition remnants contamination is primarily a result of the 1992–1995 conflict in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>37</sup> In May 2023, BiH reported that 0.35km<sup>2</sup> of land was still contaminated by cluster munition remnants.<sup>38</sup>

In **Chile**, contamination from cluster munition remnants is limited to land that was used for military training, on an army base and three ranges belonging to the Chilean Air Force.<sup>39</sup> Cluster munition remnants contamination across the four sites totals 30.77km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>40</sup> In 2022, Chile did not release any cluster munition contaminated land. Chile has been granted a deadline extension under Article 4 to clear its remaining contamination from 2023–2026.<sup>41</sup>

In **Germany**, cluster munition remnants still contaminate a former military training site in Wittstock, located 80km northwest of Berlin.<sup>42</sup> In March 2023, Germany reported that 5.72km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land has been cleared since 2017, leaving 5.28km<sup>2</sup> still to be cleared.<sup>43</sup>

In **Iraq**, the Regional Mine Action Center for the south of the country (RMAC South) reported that as of February 2023, cluster munition remnants affected a total area of

174.13km<sup>2</sup> across the four southern governates of Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. The highest level of contamination is in Muthanna (81.78km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>44</sup> The RMAC in the Middle Euphrates region reported 4.48km<sup>2</sup> of contamination, while RMAC North reported 10.99km<sup>2</sup>. Nationally, Iraq's cluster munition remnants contamination therefore totals 189.6km<sup>2</sup>. This represents an increase of 11.46km<sup>2</sup> on the 2021 total, due to newly discovered and surveyed contaminated areas.<sup>45</sup> No suspected hazardous areas (SHA) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) have been reported in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which covers the governorates of Duhok, Erbil, Halabja, and Sulaymaniyah.<sup>46</sup>



Clearance operators from DanChurchAid (DCA) clear land contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance in Mount Lebanon.

© November 2022, Mikkel Rytter Poulsen/DCA

In **Lebanon**, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) reported that as of the end of 2022, cluster

- 
- 36 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 14.
- 37 BiH Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form A. See, CCW Protocol V Database, [bit.ly/Article10DatabaseCCWPV](https://bit.ly/Article10DatabaseCCWPV).
- 38 BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (For calendar year 2022), Form F.
- 39 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 4.
- 40 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, April 2022, pp. 8 and 11–15, [bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequestApril2022](https://bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequestApril2022).
- 41 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, pp. 8 and 9, [bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2021).
- 42 Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, pp. 15–18.
- 43 Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, 31 March 2023, pp. 18–19.
- 44 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 26.
- 45 Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 24 February 2022.
- 46 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 26.



munition remnants contamination totaled 5.23km<sup>2</sup> of CHA in Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and southern Lebanon. Despite 0.44km<sup>2</sup> of newly identified contamination, the 2022 total reported by LMAC marks a decrease of 1.04km<sup>2</sup> since 2021, due to land release activities.<sup>47</sup>

**Lao PDR** is the State Party most heavily contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Of the country's 18 provinces, 15 are contaminated, nine heavily.<sup>48</sup> As of the end of 2022, the extent of CHA in surveyed areas of Lao PDR totaled 1,745.37km<sup>2</sup> across 11 provinces.<sup>49</sup> Clearance operators report that at least 186 types of munitions including different types of cluster munitions have been found in Lao PDR.<sup>50</sup>

**Afghanistan** reported in April 2023 that it had a total of 9.9km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants, covering 16 areas across the provinces of Faryab, Nangarhar, Paktya, and Samangan.<sup>51</sup> Eleven of these areas were identified by survey in 2021, and a nationwide survey to establish the full extent of contamination has been proposed. This is now possible after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, because areas of the country previously difficult to reach due to security concerns have become accessible.<sup>52</sup>

**Chad** reported in June 2021 that the last area known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants had been cleared.<sup>53</sup> However, Tibesti province, in the northwest of Chad, which is suspected to contain cluster munition contamination around former Libyan military bases, had not yet been surveyed.<sup>54</sup> In 2022, Chad submitted an Article 4 deadline extension request, to conduct non-technical survey of 19.05km<sup>2</sup> in Tibesti until 2024. Chad plans to submit a second extension request with a workplan for clearance based on the results of non-technical survey.<sup>55</sup> As of June 2023, Chad had not reported any survey progress through the end of 2022.<sup>56</sup>

**Mauritania** conducted an initial assessment in 2021 that found 14.01km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated with cluster munition remnants in the region of Tiris Zemmour in the north,

- 
- 47 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2022 and 8 May 2023; Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 15; and Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 16.
- 48 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, detailed narrative, 26 February 2019, p. 1, [bit.ly/LaosCCMArt4ExtRequest2019](https://bit.ly/LaosCCMArt4ExtRequest2019).
- 49 Survey is complete in Attapeu, Champasak, Salavan, Savannakhet, and Sekong provinces. In Xieng Khouang, survey is still ongoing. In Bolikhamxai, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, and Vientiane, survey is being undertaken although not systematically. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 14.
- 50 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, detailed narrative, 26 February 2019, p. 1, [bit.ly/LaosCCMArt4ExtRequest2019](https://bit.ly/LaosCCMArt4ExtRequest2019).
- 51 Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) presentation at "Celebration of International Day of Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action," held virtually, 4 April 2023. In its Article 7 report for 2022, Afghanistan noted plans to clear 1.912km<sup>2</sup> through 2024. Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F. It was also reported that 9.11km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land remained as of 31 December 2022. Response to Monitor questionnaire by United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Afghanistan, 3 April 2023.
- 52 Afghanistan reported that due to "the change of government and takeover of new regime, all the area is fortunately secure now and ready for conducting survey and clearance operations." Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022, [bit.ly/AfghanistanStatement16May2022](https://bit.ly/AfghanistanStatement16May2022).
- 53 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), 18 June 2021; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form F, p. 5.
- 54 Emails from Romain Coupez, Regional Security Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 10 May 2017 and 31 May 2018; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Romain Coupez, Regional Security Manager, MAG, 3 May 2017.
- 55 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2022, pp. 6–7, [bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequestMay2022](https://bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequestMay2022); and presentation of Chad, Convention of Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August 2022, p. 6, [bit.ly/ChadPresentation2022](https://bit.ly/ChadPresentation2022).
- 56 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, pp. 14–16.



Humanity & Inclusion (HI) clearance operators cover cluster munitions with sandbags before they are destroyed in Houaphanh province, Lao PDR.

© September 2022, Gary Toombs/HI

bordering Western Sahara.<sup>57</sup> In April 2022, Mauritania reported that the contamination is across 10 areas totaling 14.01km<sup>2</sup>, and consists of BLU-63 and Mk-118 submunitions.<sup>58</sup> Mauritania has reported that further survey is required to determine the full extent of the contamination. In early 2023, it requested a two-year extension to its Article 4 clearance deadline, to 1 August 2026.<sup>59</sup>

In **Somalia**, the extent of contamination is unknown, but believed to be limited. It may include areas contaminated with PTAB-2.5M and AO-1-SCh submunitions in Jubaland state, on the border with Kenya and Ethiopia. BL755 submunitions have also been found in the Middle Juba and Gedo regions in Jubaland state, as well as in Puntland on the border with Ethiopia.<sup>60</sup> There may be contamination in the Bakool and Bay regions of South West state.<sup>61</sup> The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported in 2021 that cluster munition remnants may also have been collected and used as components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs).<sup>62</sup> Somalia reports that no survey of contaminated areas has been possible, due to a lack of funding and inaccessibility amid armed conflict.<sup>63</sup> As of 1 August 2023, Somalia had not provided any updates on contamination.

### Possible contamination in States Parties

**Colombia** may have a small amount of residual contamination, though it states that no evidence has been found.<sup>64</sup> In 2022, Colombia did not report any contamination on its territory.<sup>65</sup> When the convention entered into force for Colombia in 2016 it reported that it was in the process of establishing the location and extent of any cluster munition contamination.<sup>66</sup> In 2017, Colombia stated that it had no cluster munition remnants contamination, yet no survey was undertaken to confirm this.<sup>67</sup> In 2021, a study reported that contamination was a possibility, as in the 1990s the Colombian Air Force had acquired two types of cluster bombs: the CB-250K from Chile and the ARC-32 from Israel. Yet no sufficient information on their use

57 Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021).

58 Presentation by Col. Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), Mine Action Support Group meeting, 27 April 2022.

59 Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021); and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 3, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023).

60 Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, pp. 4–6.

61 Ibid.

62 Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, p. 8; and responses to Monitor questionnaire and follow-up questions by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 27 August and 21 September 2021.

63 Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 6; and responses to Monitor questionnaire and follow-up questions by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 27 August and 21 September 2021.

64 Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

65 Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, pp. 13–15.

66 Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, August 2016 (initial report), Form F; and Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

67 Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F; and email from Camilo Serna, Sub-Director, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL), 30 July 2020.

was available prior to ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and subsequent stockpile destruction.<sup>68</sup>

In the **United Kingdom** (UK), it is estimated that more than 2,000 crates of AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 “cluster adapter” type bombs and some 800 fused cluster bombs are believed to remain in UK waters.<sup>69</sup> These are located at Sheerness off the east coast of England, in the cargo of a sunken World War II ship.<sup>70</sup> The wreck is in a no-entry exclusion zone and under constant radar surveillance. The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency undertakes regular surveys and has reported that the wreck is showing evidence of gradual deterioration but is considered to be in a stable condition.<sup>71</sup>

## CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CONTAMINATION IN SIGNATORIES

Two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—Angola and the DRC—may be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Signatory Uganda completed clearance of its contaminated areas in 2008.<sup>72</sup>

**Angola** has not reported any areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, but there may remain abandoned cluster munitions or cluster munition contamination. In past years, cluster munition remnants have been found and destroyed through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs. In May 2023, Angola reported that 9,515 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were cleared and destroyed in 2022, but did not specify if any were cluster munition remnants.<sup>73</sup>

The **DRC** has reported a total of 0.16km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants. The contamination is primarily from MK7-118 and PM1 submunitions, and is located in the provinces of Equateur, Ituri, Maniema, South-Kivu, Tanganyika, and Tshopo. Contaminated areas are reportedly marked, but difficult to access. Further survey is viewed as necessary to clarify the exact extent of contamination, especially in Maniema and Tshopo provinces.<sup>74</sup>

68 Carlos Andrés Soler Palomino, “Technical Study of the cluster munitions used by the Colombian Air Force: strategic guidelines for the compliance with Article 4 of the Oslo Convention,” Postgraduate School of the Colombian Air Force, 2021.

69 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “Report on the Wreck of the SS Richard Montgomery,” May 1999, [bit.ly/SSMontgomeryReport1999](http://bit.ly/SSMontgomeryReport1999).

70 The SS Richard Montgomery, carrying a cargo of munitions, was shipwrecked off the Thames Estuary, near Sheerness, in August 1944 and remains submerged there. The former UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency has listed best estimates of the munitions which remain aboard the ship, including 2,297 cases of fragmentation cluster bombs with AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 “cluster adapter” submunitions. Surveys from November 2017 and April 2018 indicated that the wreck is generally stable but is showing accelerated levels of deterioration. See, “Masts to be cut from Thames Estuary wreck packed with explosives,” *BBC News*, 4 June 2020, [bit.ly/BBCNews4June2020](http://bit.ly/BBCNews4June2020); Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “Report On The Wreck Of The SS Richard Montgomery,” November 2000, p. 20; and Jamie Doward and Chris Bradford, “Fears grow that WW2 wreck could explode on Kent coast,” *The Guardian*, 17 August 2019, [bit.ly/TheGuardian17Aug2019](http://bit.ly/TheGuardian17Aug2019).

71 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “SS Richard Montgomery: background information,” updated 18 July 2023, [bit.ly/SSMontgomeryMCA2023](http://bit.ly/SSMontgomeryMCA2023).

72 Email from Vincent Woboya, Director, Uganda Mine Action Center (UMAC), 8 April 2010.

73 Email from Robert Iga Afedra, Capacity Development Advisor, National Intersectoral Demining and Humanitarian Assistance Commission (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), 12 August 2020; and Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), pp. 8–11.

74 DRC Convention on Cluster Munitions Voluntary Article 7 Report (for 1 January 2013–31 December 2021), Form F, pp. 14–16; statement of DRC, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August 2022, [bit.ly/DRCStatement30Aug2022](http://bit.ly/DRCStatement30Aug2022); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 18 August 2020.

## CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CONTAMINATION IN NON-SIGNATORIES AND OTHER AREAS

As of the end of 2022, fourteen non-signatories and three other areas are, or are believed to be, contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

**Vietnam** is massively contaminated by cluster munition remnants, but there is no accurate estimate of the extent of contamination. In 2023, the Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC) reported that more than 5.6 million hectares (56,000km<sup>2</sup>) is contaminated by ERW, including cluster munition remnants. This represents some 17% of Vietnam's total land area. The contamination is mostly found in the central provinces of Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Quang Ngai.<sup>75</sup>

**Cambodia** has raised its overall estimate of cluster munition contamination after conducting surveys. The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) reported in May 2023 that a total of 741.07km<sup>2</sup> is contaminated by cluster munition remnants.<sup>76</sup> This is an increase from the previous reported contamination of 698.69km<sup>2</sup> at the end of 2021.<sup>77</sup> Most of the contaminated areas are in the northeast, along the borders with Lao PDR and Vietnam.<sup>78</sup>

In **Armenia**, as of October 2022, land contaminated by ERW was estimated to total 39.24km<sup>2</sup>, of which less than 5% is believed to be due to cluster munition remnants.<sup>79</sup>

**Azerbaijan's** extent of cluster munition contamination, in areas under its jurisdiction, was not known, due to ERW contamination in areas regained during the conflict in 2020 with Armenia that are yet to be surveyed. Casualties from cluster munition remnants continued to be reported in Azerbaijan into 2022.<sup>80</sup>

In **Syria**, cluster munitions were used extensively between 2012 and 2020, across 13 of its 14 governorates, before use appeared to drop off in 2021. However, new cluster munition use was reported in November 2022 on camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northwest Idlib governate.<sup>81</sup> From 2018 to 2020, the HALO Trust conducted an initial assessment of ERW contamination in northwest Syria and reported that cluster munitions were the most frequently found type of ordnance, also accounting for the highest number of incidents.<sup>82</sup> In 2022, with limited capacity, the HALO Trust conducted further survey in the northwest but identified mine contaminated areas only.<sup>83</sup> Cluster munition contamination in Syria is believed to be significant but its exact extent remains undetermined.<sup>84</sup>

75 VNMAC, "Pilot Project on Long-Term Risk Management," presentation at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) Southeast Asia Regional Workshop on Risk Management and Liability in Land Release and the Management of Residual Contamination, 22–26 May 2023, p. 3.

76 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ros Sophal, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 25 May 2023.

77 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, 18 April 2022.

78 Southeast Asia Air Sortie Database, cited in Dave McCracken, "National Explosive Remnants of War Response Study, Cambodia," Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in collaboration with the CMAA, March 2006, p. 15, [bit.ly/ERWStudyCambodia2006](http://bit.ly/ERWStudyCambodia2006); and HI, *Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions* (Brussels: HI, November 2006), p. 11, [bit.ly/HIFatalFootprintNov2006](http://bit.ly/HIFatalFootprintNov2006).

79 Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), "Humanitarian Demining and Expert Center summarizes the work done in 2022," 30 December 2022, [bit.ly/ArmeniaCHDE2022](http://bit.ly/ArmeniaCHDE2022).

80 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ramil Azizov, Head of International Relations, Risk Education and Media Department, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 17 May 2023.

81 HRW, "Syria: Cluster Munitions Used in November 6 Attacks," 23 November 2022, [bit.ly/HRWSyria23Nov2022](http://bit.ly/HRWSyria23Nov2022).

82 HALO Trust, "A Hidden Emergency: Why Explosive Ordnance Contamination must be addressed now in Northwest Syria," December 2020, pp. 7 and 9, [bit.ly/SyriaHALOTrustDec2020](http://bit.ly/SyriaHALOTrustDec2020).

83 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Cassiopee Bruschini-Chaumet, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 25 April 2023.

84 Information Management and Mine Action Program (iMMAP), "Northeast Syria: Humanitarian Mine Action Response: Bi-annual Update (October 2022–March 2023)," 20 June 2023, [bit.ly/iMMAPSyriaJune2023](http://bit.ly/iMMAPSyriaJune2023); and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Cassiopee Bruschini-Chaumet, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 25 April 2023; and by Francesca Chiaudani, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 8 May 2023.

In **Ukraine**, extensive cluster munition attacks were reported in 2022 and the first half of 2023 after the Russian invasion, resulting in widespread contamination. Cluster munitions continue to be used by both parties to the conflict. The extent of contamination has not been documented but is increasing due to the ongoing use.

**Yemen** identified approximately 18km<sup>2</sup> of suspected cluster munition contaminated areas in 2014, before a Saudi Arabia-led coalition used cluster munitions in Yemen in 2015–2017. This reportedly increased cluster munition contamination in northwestern and central areas.<sup>85</sup> The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported in 2021 that cluster munition and ERW contamination is widespread in the north.<sup>86</sup> In southern Yemen, a few areas are contaminated by cluster munition remnants.<sup>87</sup> The Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) did not report any cluster munition contamination in 2022.<sup>88</sup>

In **Kosovo**, the Kosovo Mine Action Center (KMAC) reported 9.82km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition remnants contamination as of the end of 2022, including 0.42km<sup>2</sup> of newly discovered CHA.<sup>89</sup>

Non-signatories Georgia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and the area of Western Sahara are known or believed to each have less than 10km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition remnants contamination.

**Georgia** is thought to be free of contamination, though South Ossetia—a disputed territory not controlled by the government of Georgia—is a possible exception.

**Iran's** extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants is not known. Some contamination is believed to date from the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, when cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in Kermanshah.<sup>90</sup>

**Libya's** contamination from cluster munition remnants is primarily the result of armed conflict in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014, particularly in urban areas. In 2019, there were several instances or allegations of cluster munition use by forces affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA).<sup>91</sup> The exact extent of contamination in Libya has not yet been determined.

**Serbia** is contaminated by cluster munition remnants in three municipalities: Bujanovac, Tutin, and Užice. Serbia reported 0.74km<sup>2</sup> of CHA as of the end of 2022.<sup>92</sup>

**South Sudan** reported a total of 5.28km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition remnants contamination in April 2023, with 4.58km<sup>2</sup> classified as CHA and 0.7km<sup>2</sup> as SHA.<sup>93</sup>

**Sudan** reported 142,402m<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition remnants contamination as of the end of 2021, with 5,820m<sup>2</sup> classified as CHA and 136,582m<sup>2</sup> as SHA.<sup>94</sup> Since conflict erupted in April 2023, Sudan has not been able to provide updated information on the extent of contamination.

**Tajikistan** has reported cluster munition remnants contamination totaling 2.07km<sup>2</sup> CHA.<sup>95</sup>

85 UNDP, "Grant Progress Report for 1 October–31 December 2015," 25 January 2016; and UNDP, "Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Report 2021," February 2022, p. 7.

86 UNDP, "Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Report 2020," February 2021, p. 8.

87 Email from Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Mine Action Advisor, UNDP, 11 August 2020.

88 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameen Saleh Alaqli, Director, YEMAC, 22 May 2023.

89 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmet Sallova, Director, KMAC, 24 April 2023.

90 Interview with Ali Alizadeh, Iranian Air Force Colonel (ret.), Tehran, 8 February 2014.

91 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011)," S/2019/914, Annex 17, 9 December 2019, [bit.ly/UNSCLibya9Dec2019](https://bit.ly/UNSCLibya9Dec2019); HRW, "Libya: Banned Cluster Munitions Used in Tripoli," 20 February 2020, [bit.ly/HRWLibya13Feb2020](https://bit.ly/HRWLibya13Feb2020); and Sami Zaptia, "Tripoli forces claim successes and accuse Hafter of using cluster bombs and internationally banned phosphorus bombs," *Libya Herald*, 20 June 2019, [bit.ly/LibyaHerald20June2019](https://bit.ly/LibyaHerald20June2019).

92 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, Serbian Mine Action Center (SMAC), 9 May 2023.

93 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 17 April 2023.

94 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majid, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (SNMAC), 20 April 2022.

95 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibromhizoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 20 April 2022.

**Western Sahara** was reported to have 2.09km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition remnants contamination as of the end of 2021.<sup>96</sup> No clearance activities took place in Western Sahara during 2022.

In **Nagorno-Karabakh**, a survey by the HALO Trust found that 68% of inhabited settlements had experienced cluster munition use and contamination. The current extent of contamination is not known, but is believed to total less than 16km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>97</sup>

## ADDRESSING THE IMPACT

### CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS CLEARANCE

#### OBLIGATIONS REGARDING CLEARANCE

Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention.

#### CLEARANCE IN STATES PARTIES IN 2022

Monitor data on cluster munition remnants clearance in States Parties is based on information from sources including reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 transparency reports, and Article 4 extension requests.<sup>98</sup>

In 2022, seven States Parties reported having released a combined total of 108.92km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land, of which 93.28km<sup>2</sup> was cleared. A total of 75,725 cluster munition remnants—mostly unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets—were destroyed.

The clearance total for 2022 represents a significant increase on the 61.07km<sup>2</sup> reported cleared in 2021. Afghanistan, BiH, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania all reported clearing more land in 2022 than in 2021. Iraq and Lao PDR accounted for more than 94% (some 30km<sup>2</sup>) of the total annual increase in the area cleared. Both Afghanistan and Iraq significantly increased their clearance rate compared to 2021.

Of the cluster munition contaminated land released by States Parties in 2022, 86% was cleared, 2% was reduced through technical survey, and 12% was cancelled via non-technical survey.

Only BiH, Iraq, and Lebanon reported on land release methodologies other than clearance, with Iraq accounting for 82% of the total land released through technical survey and 96% of the land released through non-technical survey.

**Afghanistan** reported that during 2022, 1.37km<sup>2</sup> of land with mixed contamination (including cluster munition remnants) and 0.22km<sup>2</sup> contaminated only by cluster munition remnants was cleared, resulting in the destruction of 1,197 submunitions.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Acting Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 12 April 2022.

<sup>97</sup> Liz Cookman, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Land still laced with mines, year after war," *Al Jazeera*, 9 November 2021, [bit.ly/AUzazeera9Nov2021](https://bit.ly/AUzazeera9Nov2021); HALO Trust, "Making Stepanakert Safe: HALO has cleared all known explosive hazards in Stepanakert," 18 May 2022, [bit.ly/HALOTrustNK18May2022](https://bit.ly/HALOTrustNK18May2022); and "The HALO Trust clears Stepanakert of unexploded hazards left by 2020 war," *Armenian Weekly*, 19 May 2022, [bit.ly/ArmenianWeekly19May2022](https://bit.ly/ArmenianWeekly19May2022).

<sup>98</sup> When varying annual figures are reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes, and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website.

<sup>99</sup> Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F. The clearance total differed from Afghanistan's article 7 reporting. It was also reported that 2,719 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in 2022. Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS Afghanistan, 3 April 2023.

## Cluster munition remnants clearance in 2021–2022<sup>100</sup>


State Party	2021		2022	
	Clearance (km <sup>2</sup> )	CMR destroyed	Clearance (km <sup>2</sup> )	CMR destroyed
Afghanistan	0.42	32	1.59	1,197
BiH	0.62	2,995	0.64	1,599
Chad*	0	2	0	0
Chile	0	0	0	0
Germany	0.85	466	1.34	1,187
Iraq	10.16	8,202	33.62	4,670
Lao PDR	47.84	66,921	54.37	64,516
Lebanon	1.00	2,418	1.15	2,556
Mauritania**	0.18	7	0.57	N/R
Somalia	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>61.07</b>	<b>81,043</b>	<b>93.28</b>	<b>75,725</b>

Note: CMR=cluster munition remnants; N/R=not reported.

\*Chad reported 0.41km<sup>2</sup> cleared for the period September 2020–April 2021, but did not specify how much of this clearance took place in 2021.

\*\*Mauritania reported 0.57km<sup>2</sup> cleared for the last article 4 extension period but did not specify whether all of this clearance took place in 2022.

## Cluster munition remnants land release in 2022



<sup>100</sup> Afghanistan data: response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS Afghanistan, 3 April 2023; BiH data: BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; and Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMIC), “Report on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2022,” undated, p. 15; Chad data: Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; Chile data: Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; Germany data: Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; Iraq data: Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; Lao PDR data: Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; NRA, “NRA Dashboard,” undated, [bit.ly/NRALaoPDRDashboard](https://bit.ly/NRALaoPDRDashboard); Lebanon data: Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; Mauritania data: Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline extension request, 3 March 2023, p. 3, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023).

**BiH** reported that 1.32km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land was released in 2022, while 1,599 cluster munition remnants were destroyed. Of the land released, 0.64km<sup>2</sup> was cleared.<sup>101</sup>

**Chad** did not report any survey or clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in 2022.<sup>102</sup>

**Chile** did not conduct any clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2022.<sup>103</sup> It plans to start clearance operations in 2023.<sup>104</sup>

**Germany** cleared 1.34km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land during 2022, destroying 1,187 cluster munition remnants. Between 2017 and 2022, it cleared a total of 5.72km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>105</sup>

**Iraq** reported clearing 33.62km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land in 2022, while another 14.64km<sup>2</sup> was released through survey. A total of 4,670 submunitions were destroyed in 2022, a significant decrease from 8,202 in 2021.<sup>106</sup> In the south of Iraq, 16.28km<sup>2</sup> of land was cleared, while 17.34km<sup>2</sup> was cleared in the Middle Euphrates region.<sup>107</sup>

As in previous years, **Lao PDR** cleared the most land of any affected country, accounting for 58% of all reported clearance. Lao PDR cleared 49.84km<sup>2</sup> of agricultural land and 4.53km<sup>2</sup> of land needed for development.<sup>108</sup> In total, 64,516 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in Lao PDR during 2022, compared to 66,921 in 2021.<sup>109</sup> More than 98% (53.57km<sup>2</sup>) of the total land cleared in 2022 occurred in the nine most heavily contaminated provinces.<sup>110</sup>

**Lebanon** reported releasing 1.47km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land during 2022, of which 1.15km<sup>2</sup> was cleared, 0.21km<sup>2</sup> was cancelled through non-technical survey, and 0.11km<sup>2</sup> was reduced through technical survey.<sup>111</sup> The 1.15km<sup>2</sup> cleared represents a slight increase from the 1km<sup>2</sup> cleared in 2020. A total of 2,556 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in 2022. From 2017–2022, Lebanon cleared a total of 7.25km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

<sup>101</sup> BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F. BHMIC provided different figures to the Monitor for 2021, reporting 0.98km<sup>2</sup> of cluster munition contaminated land released and 1,261 cluster munition remnants destroyed. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miodrag Gajic, Analysis and Reporting Officer, BHMIC, 19 April 2022. In its annual progress report, BHMIC also reported a total of 0.98km<sup>2</sup> released through clearance and technical survey in 2021, but with 3,178 submunitions destroyed. BHMIC, “Report on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2021,” draft, undated, p. 11.

<sup>102</sup> Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, pp. 13–14.

<sup>103</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F.

<sup>104</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, pp. 3 and 5, [bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2021).

<sup>105</sup> Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 18. In its Article 7 report, Germany reported clearance of 5.72km<sup>2</sup> of SHA and 0.92km<sup>2</sup> outside of these areas between 2017 and 2021 (totaling 6.64km<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>106</sup> Of the 2022 total, 4,134 unexploded submunitions were destroyed through battle area clearance (BAC) and another 536 through technical survey. Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, pp. 29–30; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 5 May 2023.

<sup>107</sup> Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 29; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 24 February 2022.

<sup>108</sup> Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 12.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 7.

<sup>110</sup> The nine provinces are Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Salavan, Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xieng Khouang. Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 12.

<sup>111</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023.



**Mauritania** reported 0.57km<sup>2</sup> cleared for the last article 4 extension period but did not specify whether all of this clearance took place in 2022.<sup>112</sup>

**Somalia** did not provide any information on its clearance of contaminated areas in 2022, and did not report any progress for 2020–2021. Survey was planned for 2023, although no further information was available as of 1 August 2023.<sup>113</sup>

## ARTICLE 4 CLEARANCE DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants on its territory within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention for that country, it can request an extension to its clearance deadline under Article 4 for a period of up to five years.

Despite progress in surveying and clearing areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, the first clearance deadline extension requests were submitted by Germany and Lao PDR in 2019. Both states received five-year extensions. More requests have been submitted by other States Parties every year since 2019.

In 2020–2021, requests to extend Article 4 clearance deadlines were granted to Afghanistan, BiH, Chile, Lebanon, and Mauritania. In 2022, Chile submitted a third extension request based on the completion of technical survey. Requests were also submitted in 2022 by BiH and Chad. In 2023, Iraq submitted its first extension request, and Mauritania submitted its second.

The Lausanne Action Plan notes that sustained efforts are required to ensure that States Parties complete their clearance obligations as soon as possible, and within their original Article 4 deadlines. Only Somalia remains within its original deadline.

Germany, in 2019, justified its need for a five-year extension until 1 August 2025, citing slow clearance progress due to the high density of contamination and restrictions in the accessibility of the contaminated area, which is part of a natural reserve.<sup>114</sup> In March 2023, Germany reported that 52% (5.72km<sup>2</sup>) of the 11km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land has been cleared, leaving 5.28km<sup>2</sup> still to be cleared. To meet its 2025 clearance deadline, Germany will have to increase its annual clearance rate from the 1.34km<sup>2</sup> reported for 2022.<sup>115</sup>

Lao PDR indicated that completion of survey is its priority during its five-year extension period until 1 August 2025, with an expectation that additional time and international support will be needed.<sup>116</sup> Survey was ongoing in 2021 and 2022 and will form the basis for long-term planning and clearance prioritization.

Afghanistan had initially reported that it would meet its original clearance deadline of 1 March 2022, as there was a commitment from UNMAS and the US to financially support clearance operations for 10 areas.<sup>117</sup> However, the discovery of additional contamination and a change in donor priorities led Afghanistan to submit an extension request until March

<sup>112</sup> Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 11, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023).

<sup>113</sup> Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2020–2021), Form F, p. 6.

<sup>114</sup> Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 15 January 2019, [bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2019](https://bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2019); and statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, held virtually, 26 November 2020, [bit.ly/GermanyStatement26Nov2020](https://bit.ly/GermanyStatement26Nov2020).

<sup>115</sup> Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, pp. 16 and 18–19.

<sup>116</sup> Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, executive summary, 26 February 2019, [bit.ly/LaosExecutiveSummary2019](https://bit.ly/LaosExecutiveSummary2019).

<sup>117</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

2026, which was granted in 2021.<sup>118</sup> In May 2023, Afghanistan reported its “hope to release all cluster munitions sites before 1 March 2026” but said that completing clearance was dependent on funding.<sup>119</sup>

### Status of Article 4 progress to completion

State Party	Current deadline	Extension period (no. of request)	Original deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2026	4 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 March 2022	Unclear
BiH	1 September 2023	18 months (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 1 year (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	1 March 2021	On target
Chad	1 October 2024	13 months (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 September 2023	Likely to submit another extension request following survey in Tibesti
Chile	1 June 2026	1 year (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 1 year (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 3 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	1 June 2021	On target
Germany	1 August 2025	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 August 2020	Expects to complete in 2025
Iraq	1 November 2023	N/A	1 November 2023	Requested 5-year extension until 1 November 2028
Lao PDR	1 August 2025	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 August 2020	Behind target
Lebanon	1 May 2026	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 May 2021	On target*
Mauritania	1 August 2024	2 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 August 2022	Requested 2-year extension until 1 August 2026
Somalia	1 March 2026	N/A	1 March 2026	Unknown

Note: N/A=not applicable.

\*Lebanon reported that it was on target, but that an additional year may be required to complete clearance.

In 2021, Lebanon was granted an extension to complete clearance by 1 May 2026, but reported that a decrease in funding had reduced the number of teams working to clear cluster munition contaminated areas.<sup>120</sup> LMAC therefore planned to focus on technical survey to speed up task completion.<sup>121</sup> In April 2023, Lebanon reported that it was on target to meet its clearance deadline, but that it might require one extra year.<sup>122</sup>

<sup>118</sup> Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2021, [bit.ly/AfghanistanCCMArt4ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/AfghanistanCCMArt4ExtRequest2021); and email from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhail, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 17 July 2021.

<sup>119</sup> Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 18.

<sup>120</sup> Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 18.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., pp. 18–19; email from Southern Craib, Operations Manager, NPA Lebanon, 29 March 2022; LMAC, “Annual Report 2021,” undated, pp. 32–33, [bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2021](https://bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2021); and LMAC, “Annual Report 2022,” undated, p. 12, [bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2022](https://bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2022).

<sup>122</sup> Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 17; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023.

Chad reported in June 2021 that it would complete its clearance by the end of July 2021, ahead of its September 2023 deadline.<sup>123</sup> However, in 2022, Chad submitted an extension request until 1 October 2024 to conduct non-technical survey on 19.05km<sup>2</sup> of land in Tibesti province, which is suspected to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants. The extension request was granted during the convention's Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2022.<sup>124</sup>

Chile has not made progress clearing its contaminated areas despite becoming a State Party to the convention in December 2010. In January 2020, Chile sought an extension period of five years until 2026.<sup>125</sup> It revised the request to a one-year interim extension in June 2020 to enable technical survey before

submitting a second extension request with a clearance plan.<sup>126</sup> In June 2021, Chile submitted a second one-year extension request, without survey having taken place, citing a lack of resources and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>127</sup> Technical survey was undertaken in 2021, before Chile submitted its third extension request in April 2022 for a period of three years, to clear 30.77km<sup>2</sup> of CHA identified in the survey. Following a preparatory phase, Chile plans to begin clearance operations in 2023 and complete clearance by the 1 June 2026 deadline.<sup>128</sup>

Iraq reported in February 2022 that it would not be able to meet its original clearance deadline of 1 November 2023.<sup>129</sup> Challenges to clearance include the fact that new contaminated areas continue to be found through survey, particularly in the south.<sup>130</sup> In March 2023, Iraq submitted a five-year extension request until 1 November 2028.<sup>131</sup> The request will be considered at the convention's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2023.



Syrian children receive explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) from a Syria Civil Defence survey operator in the city of Azaz, Aleppo governorate, Syria.

© July 2022, Syria Civil Defence

<sup>123</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021; and email from Olivier Shu, Senior Technical Advisor, Swiss Foundation for Demining (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD), 19 June 2021.

<sup>124</sup> Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties," 19 September 2022, p. 4, [bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport](https://bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport).

<sup>125</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, January 2020, [bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJan2020](https://bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJan2020).

<sup>126</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 29 June 2020, pp. 5 and 7; [bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJune2020](https://bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJune2020).

<sup>127</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, [bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequest2021).

<sup>128</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 9 May 2022, pp. 15–18, [bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022](https://bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022).

<sup>129</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 24 February 2022; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 32.

<sup>130</sup> Iraq states that obtaining accurate information about the strike locations of US forces would help speed up the survey, planning, and clearance process. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, 24 February 2022 and 5 March 2021; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 47.

<sup>131</sup> Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Extension requests to be considered at the 11th Meeting of States Parties (11MSP)," undated, [bit.ly/CCMExtensionRequests11MSP](https://bit.ly/CCMExtensionRequests11MSP).

In 2021, Mauritania was granted an Article 4 extension to complete survey and clearance by 1 August 2024.<sup>132</sup> In March 2022, Mauritania reported that it still needed to determine the extent of contaminated areas to confirm if it could meet this deadline.<sup>133</sup> In March 2023, Mauritania submitted a request for a further two-year extension, to 1 August 2026.<sup>134</sup> The request will be considered at the convention's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2023.

It is unclear if Somalia will meet its clearance deadline of 1 March 2026, as it does not have an accurate picture of contamination. Somalia has no reported plan for clearance and did not report any clearance activities in 2021–2022.

## CLEARANCE IN SIGNATORY STATES, NON-SIGNATORY STATES, AND OTHER AREAS IN 2022

In 2022, clearance of cluster munition remnants was reported to the Monitor in signatory DRC, and in non-signatories Cambodia, Serbia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, and Vietnam, as well as in other area Kosovo. More information can be found in annual country profiles on the Monitor website.

## RISK EDUCATION

### OBLIGATIONS REGARDING RISK EDUCATION

Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions states that each State Party shall “conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.” Risk education involves interventions aimed at protecting civilian populations and individuals, at the time of cluster munition use, when they fail to function as intended, and when they have been abandoned.

### RISK EDUCATION FOR CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION

All contaminated States Parties reported conducting risk education in 2022 except for Chile and Germany, which do not regard such activities as necessary as their contaminated areas are inaccessible to the public.

In Lao PDR, risk education is specifically directed to address the risk behaviors associated with cluster munition remnants.

In other States Parties where cluster munition contamination is mixed with landmine or other ERW contamination, operators generally do not conduct risk education specific to the threat of cluster munition remnants. Chad and Somalia reported that cluster munition remnants were included in risk education materials on different types of explosive ordnance.<sup>135</sup>

### RISK EDUCATION TARGETING

The Lausanne Action Plan directs States Parties to implement context-specific, tailor-made risk education activities and interventions, which prioritize at-risk populations and are sensitive to gender, age, and disability, as well as the diversity of populations in affected communities.


<sup>132</sup> Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

<sup>133</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization (MIDEC), 21 March 2022.

<sup>134</sup> Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023.

<sup>135</sup> Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Julia Skinner, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 13 July 2023.

## Risk education beneficiaries in cluster munition affected States Parties by age and sex<sup>136</sup>



In most States Parties contaminated by cluster munitions, the remnants are found in rural areas and directly impact people who rely on the land and natural resources for their livelihoods. Men are a particularly high-risk group due to their participation in activities that take them into contaminated areas, such as the cultivation of land, the collection of firewood and other forest products, hunting and fishing, and herding animals.

According to data provided by States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia, men represented the largest number of direct beneficiaries of risk education in 2022.

In BiH, accidents are more common in spring and autumn during agricultural work, and when people go to the forest to collect firewood. Target groups for risk education in BiH include farmers, mountaineers, hunters, people collecting wood and other natural resources, as well as migrants traveling through BiH territory.<sup>137</sup>

In Afghanistan, communities living near contaminated areas were targeted for risk education, as were returnees and IDPs, nomads, scrap metal collectors, aid workers, and travelers.<sup>138</sup>

In Iraq, the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) implemented an intensive seasonal risk education campaign in 2022 aimed at Bedouin people in the southern governorate of

<sup>136</sup> This data is drawn from risk education beneficiary figures collected by States Parties and international operators. It covers seven cluster munition contaminated States Parties: Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia. In the seven countries, a total of 643,988 men, 237,177 women, 551,891 boys, and 390,060 girls benefited from risk education activities. Beneficiary data for Mauritania was not disaggregated by age, sex, or calendar year and therefore was not included in the chart. Beneficiary figures for Iraq were derived from DMA data, provided in Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022). See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/MBTArt7Database](https://bit.ly/MBTArt7Database). International operators collected data according to the Standard Beneficiary Definition guidelines. See, DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council, FSD, HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA, "Standardising Beneficiary Definitions in Humanitarian Mine Action: Second Edition," p. 9, October 2020, [bit.ly/StandardisingBeneficiaryDef](https://bit.ly/StandardisingBeneficiaryDef). Data in the chart reflects only "direct" beneficiaries of risk education, defined as those who receive safety messages through interpersonal risk education sessions, mass and digital media, and training of trainers programs. Beneficiary data for digital media was often not disaggregated and in these cases was not included in the overall Monitor figures.

<sup>137</sup> BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, May 2022, p. 8, [bit.ly/BihArt4ExtRequestMay2022](https://bit.ly/BihArt4ExtRequestMay2022).

<sup>138</sup> Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 19; response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Hamid Ibrahim, Acting Head of Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Department, DMAC, 20 February 2021; and email from Zareen Khan Mayar, Armed Violence Reduction Technical Advisor, HI, 17 March 2021.

Al-Muthanna, to address a rise in incidents related to livelihood activities in spring. Iraq also specifically undertook risk education in regions along the Syrian border.<sup>139</sup>

In Chad, nomadic communities have been identified as high-risk due to their transit through desert areas that may be contaminated.<sup>140</sup> Sudanese refugees in Chad were also targeted for risk education during the first half of 2023.<sup>141</sup>

In Lao PDR, men and boys are the most at-risk group, due to their participation in livelihood activities such as cultivation, the collection of forest products, and hunting and fishing.<sup>142</sup>

In Mauritania, schoolchildren, teachers, shepherds, nomads, and fisherfolk were all considered key groups for risk education.<sup>143</sup>

In both Lao PDR and Lebanon, economic hardship in recent years has encouraged greater risk-taking as people have tried to supplement diminishing livelihoods.<sup>144</sup> The collection of scrap metal and explosives remains a common practice in parts of Lao PDR and increased in Lebanon in 2022.<sup>145</sup>

In Lebanon, Syrian refugees remained a priority group for risk education during 2022. Several refugee camps and settlements are located close to contaminated areas, and refugees are reportedly less familiar with this contamination.<sup>146</sup>

In Somalia, IDPs, herders, and nomadic communities, as well as children, have been identified as at-risk groups. Herders were the primary recipients of risk education in 2022 as they moved to new pastures or areas frequently, and may therefore be unaware of contamination in their new surroundings. IDPs in Somalia were targeted for the same reason.<sup>147</sup>

Children, particularly boys, remain susceptible to the lure of cluster munition remnants. Living in contaminated areas, they often lack sufficient knowledge of the risks and are prone to pick up and play with explosive items. Children remained a key target group for all affected States Parties in 2022.

In Iraq, children frequently participate in livelihood activities such as shepherding, foraging, and scrap metal collection, which places them at risk.<sup>148</sup> Young adult men are likely to engage in risk-taking behaviors or be in high-risk occupations such as scrap metal

<sup>139</sup> Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 34; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, Head of Operations, RMAC South, 13 August 2020; and by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for the Mine Ban Treaty, DMA, 13 April 2021.

<sup>140</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Francesca Batault, Program Officer for the Lake Chad Basin, MAG, 13 July 2023; statement of Chad, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 8, [bit.ly/ChadStatement21June2023](https://bit.ly/ChadStatement21June2023); and International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Rising Needs at Chad-Sudan Border Amid Funding Gaps," 27 April 2023, [bit.ly/IOMChad27April2023](https://bit.ly/IOMChad27April2023).

<sup>141</sup> Statement of Chad, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 8, [bit.ly/ChadStatement21June2023](https://bit.ly/ChadStatement21June2023); and IOM, "Rising Needs at Chad-Sudan Border Amid Funding Gaps," 27 April 2023, [bit.ly/IOMChad27April2023](https://bit.ly/IOMChad27April2023).

<sup>142</sup> NRA, "NRA Dashboard," undated, [bit.ly/NRALaoPDRDashboard](https://bit.ly/NRALaoPDRDashboard); Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 18; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 27 June 2023.

<sup>143</sup> Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 24 March 2021, p. 8, [bit.ly/MauritaniaMBTA5Request2021](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaMBTA5Request2021).

<sup>144</sup> Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 17; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Megan MacMillan, Operations Officer, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and by Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, Risk Education Section Head, LMAC, 21 February 2022; and UNOCHA, "Increasing Humanitarian Needs in Lebanon," 14 April 2022, p. 7, [bit.ly/UNOCHALebanon14April2022](https://bit.ly/UNOCHALebanon14April2022).

<sup>145</sup> Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Megan MacMillan, Operations Officer, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and by Ali Shuaib, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 3 July 2023.

<sup>146</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, Risk Education Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023; and Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 19.

<sup>147</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Julia Skinner, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 13 July 2023.

<sup>148</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager and Team Leader, MAG, 6 April 2022.

collection, laboring, or agriculture. This group was reported to be the most difficult to reach through risk education sessions.<sup>149</sup> Adolescent boys were also cited as a difficult group to reach in Lao PDR.<sup>150</sup>

Risk education reached more women and girls in States Parties in 2022 than in 2021. Women and girls together accounted for 35% of all recorded beneficiaries across Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Somalia.

## RISK EDUCATION DELIVERY

Given the strong and recognized links between risk-taking behaviors, livelihoods, and vulnerability, it is vital to integrate risk education efforts into wider mine action, humanitarian, and development initiatives.

Mine action operators in Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia all reported that risk education was integrated with clearance and survey in 2022.

In Chad, operators reported that risk education was implemented through interpersonal face-to-face sessions and community focal points. Risk education activities were combined with or implemented in advance of mine action operations.<sup>151</sup>

Risk education was conducted in schools in Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia in 2022. In Lao PDR and Lebanon, risk education has been integrated in the school curriculum, while in Iraq the plan is for it to be integrated in 2023.

Teenagers, particularly adolescent boys, were seen as a challenging group to reach effectively through traditional risk education methodologies. World Education Laos (WEL) targeted out-of-school children, youths, and agricultural workers. It also reached speakers of ethnic minority languages via non-formal education centers, media platforms, and using youth volunteers.<sup>152</sup>



Children receive explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) from Humanity & Inclusion (HI) clearance team members in western Yemen.

© February 2023, Benoit Van Maele/HI

Training of local committees or community focal points in Iraq and Lao PDR has been used as a way to reach beneficiaries in remote communities, where local people may distrust outsiders and speak local languages.<sup>153</sup> The national radio station in Lao PDR continued to broadcast risk education messages in 2022.<sup>154</sup> The use of digital media for risk education continued to expand in Lao PDR, as well as in Iraq and Lebanon in 2022, with social media drama series, virtual reality, short videos, and text messaging among the methods used.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>149</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, DMA, 5 May 2023.

<sup>150</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Julien Kempeneers, Regional Armed Violence Reduction and Mine Action Specialist, HI, 6 April 2022.

<sup>151</sup> Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 17; UNOCHA, "Chad Humanitarian Response Plan 2023," 12 April 2023, p. 121, [bit.ly/ChadPlanUNOCHA2023](https://bit.ly/ChadPlanUNOCHA2023); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Francesca Batault, Program Officer for the Lake Chad Basin, MAG, 13 July 2023.

<sup>152</sup> Email from Sarah Bruinooge, Country Director, WEL, 4 March 2022.

<sup>153</sup> Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form G, p. 12; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 33.

<sup>154</sup> NRA, "Minutes of the meeting of MRE TWG Quarter 2: 17th May 2022," 26 March 2022, p. 3, [bit.ly/LaosREWorkingGroupMarch2022](https://bit.ly/LaosREWorkingGroupMarch2022).

<sup>155</sup> Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 19; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Maj. Ali Makki, Risk Education Section Head, LMAC, 9 April 2020 and 8 May 2023; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 33–34.

## IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

The longer-term social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to affect livelihoods and encourage risk-taking behaviors in affected states. The pandemic is also reported to have limited government funding available for risk education activities.

## RISK EDUCATION IN SIGNATORY AND NON-SIGNATORY STATES

Risk education was conducted in 2022 in signatory states Angola and the DRC, and in non-signatory states Armenia, Azerbaijan, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, as well as in other area Nagorno-Karabakh. Risk education addressed the threat posed by cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war and sought to alert communities to the danger of contamination from recent or ongoing conflict.

More information can be found in annual country profiles on the Monitor website.

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

### OBLIGATIONS REGARDING VICTIM ASSISTANCE

As stated in the preamble to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are determined “to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition victims and recognising their inherent dignity.” The convention requires that States Parties assist all cluster munition victims in areas under their jurisdiction, and report on progress.

Specific activities to ensure adequate assistance is provided under Article 5 include:

- Collecting data and assessing the needs of cluster munition victims;
- Coordinating victim assistance programs and developing a national plan;
- Actively involving cluster munition victims in all processes that affect them;
- Providing adequate and accessible assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support, and socio-economic inclusion;
- Providing assistance that is gender- and age-sensitive, and non-discriminatory.<sup>156</sup>

These activities must be implemented in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.

Thirteen States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have reported having responsibility for assisting cluster munition victims.

The Lausanne Action Plan’s commitments on victim assistance largely reflect the obligations enshrined in the convention.

Action 34 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits States Parties to provide first-aid and long-term medical care to cluster munition victims, as well as to ensure victims can access adequate rehabilitation, psychological, and psychosocial support services as part of a broader public health approach. Ideally, States Parties should have a national referral mechanism and a directory of services. Victim assistance should be provided in a non-discriminatory manner, and be sensitive to gender, age, and disability.

Action 35 requires States Parties to facilitate the educational and socio-economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such measures may take the form of employment referrals, access to micro-finance, livelihood support, and rural development and social protection programs.

Action 37 commits States Parties to endeavor to support the training, development, and official recognition of multidisciplinary, skilled, and qualified rehabilitation professionals.

<sup>156</sup> This obligation is understood to include measures promoting equality and non-discrimination and enjoyment of rights on an equal basis to others including disability sensitivity, diversity, and intersectionality.



## MEDICAL CARE

Medical responses for cluster munition victims include first-aid, field trauma response, emergency evacuation, transport, and immediate medical care, as well as addressing longer-term healthcare needs. However, in 2022, in many States Parties adequate medical care was not available to communities near areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

In Afghanistan, people living in remote areas face significant challenges accessing healthcare due to a lack of health facilities and hazardous road conditions.<sup>157</sup> A non-governmental organization (NGO) working in Afghanistan, EMERGENCY, maintained a network of first-aid posts and primary healthcare centers, and ran an ambulance service for isolated areas.<sup>158</sup>

In Lao PDR, the Ministry of Health, with support from partners WEL and the Quality of Life Association (QLA), provided medical treatment to cluster munition survivors. WEL partnered with the NRA to administer the War Victims Medical Fund, providing emergency assistance to survivors and their families, including medical expenses, transport, and funeral expenses.<sup>159</sup>

Lebanon is amidst a crisis in the provision of healthcare. In 2022, hospitals were forced to restrict essential health services and limit the distribution of medicine as the healthcare system deteriorated amid the ongoing economic crisis in the country.<sup>160</sup> The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to provide first-aid training and support public hospitals.<sup>161</sup>

Iraq reported that no emergency medical services are available in remote areas. People injured by cluster munition remnants are evacuated by others or receive first-aid from organizations working nearby.<sup>162</sup> In order to increase emergency preparedness, develop capacity and improve coordination among police, community leaders, and other key providers, the ICRC launched a nationwide pilot project on mass-casualty management in 2022.<sup>163</sup>

Mauritania reported that the government covers the costs of medical care for cluster munition survivors, though overall financial resources are limited.<sup>164</sup>

### States Parties that have reported responsibility for cluster munition victims

Afghanistan
Albania
BiH
Chad
Croatia
Guinea-Bissau
Iraq
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Mauritania
Montenegro
Sierra Leone
Somalia

<sup>157</sup> UNMAS, “UNMAS Afghanistan,” presentation at Mine Action Support Group meeting, 28 May 2021, [bit.ly/AfghanistanUNMAS2021](https://bit.ly/AfghanistanUNMAS2021).

<sup>158</sup> EMERGENCY, “Activity Report 1994–2022,” undated, [bit.ly/EMERGENCY1994-2022Report](https://bit.ly/EMERGENCY1994-2022Report).

<sup>159</sup> Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form H; and email from Sarah Bruinooge, Country Director, WEL, 4 March 2022.

<sup>160</sup> Hasan Ismail, “The changing face of healthcare in Lebanon: navigating an economic crisis,” *Peoples Dispatch*, 6 April 2023, [bit.ly/PeoplesDispatch6April2023](https://bit.ly/PeoplesDispatch6April2023); Elie Bou Sanayeh and Carolla El Chamieh, “The fragile healthcare system in Lebanon: sounding the alarm about its possible collapse,” *Health Economics Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, April 2023, [bit.ly/LebanonHealthcareApril2023](https://bit.ly/LebanonHealthcareApril2023); and Mohamad Fleifel and Khaled Abi Farraj, “The Lebanese Healthcare Crisis: An Infinite Calamity,” *Cureus*, Vol. 14, Issue 5, 26 May 2022, [bit.ly/LebanonHealthcareMay2022](https://bit.ly/LebanonHealthcareMay2022).

<sup>161</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, p. 439, [bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022](https://bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022).

<sup>162</sup> Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 67; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 12 April 2021.

<sup>163</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, p. 409, [bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022](https://bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022).

<sup>164</sup> Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019).

Access to healthcare in Sierra Leone is constrained by distance, cost, a lack of skilled medical staff, and poor quality services. Resources are unevenly distributed with the vast majority of referral hospitals concentrated in the urban area of the capital, Freetown.<sup>165</sup>

## PHYSICAL REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation services include physiotherapy and the provision of assistive devices such as prosthetics, orthotics, mobility aids, and wheelchairs.

In some States Parties, such as Afghanistan and Lebanon, systems that support rehabilitation have severely deteriorated due to broader national economic and political conditions. There remain significant challenges to providing adequate, accessible, and affordable rehabilitation.

In Afghanistan, the ICRC supports rehabilitation centers in seven provinces. It also provides materials, training, and technical assistance to six orthopedic workshops.<sup>166</sup> HI deployed an emergency mobile team in 2022 to deliver urgent physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support to persons with disabilities in rural areas of Kabul province. HI has also referred people to healthcare services.<sup>167</sup> The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) commenced a new rehabilitation program in Bamyan province in 2022 and continues to provide services.<sup>168</sup>



An orthopedic technician works on a new prosthesis at a Humanity & Inclusion (HI) rehabilitation center in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan.

© August 2022, Elise Blanchard/HI

In Albania, the Prosthetics Department within the Kukes Regional Hospital, located in a cluster munition contaminated area, suffers from a lack of funding, prosthetics, and staff capacity.<sup>169</sup>

In Chad, HI continued to partner with local rehabilitation centers to support referrals and services. Yet following the conclusion of a multi-year joint project, including HI, in 2022, rehabilitation costs were again covered by the patients themselves.<sup>170</sup>

In Guinea-Bissau, survivors were able to access free rehabilitation services in 2022 at the only national rehabilitation center, located in the capital, Bissau. The ICRC's role in training staff was limited as it scaled back its support for the center.<sup>171</sup>

Iraq needs to improve coordination of its 23 rehabilitation centers, while financial constraints and

165 Lina Magnusson, Ismaila Kebbie, and Victoria Jerwanska, "Access to health and rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities in Sierra Leone – focus group discussions with stakeholders," *BMC Health Services Research*, Vol. 22, Issue 1, August 2022, pp. 1–11, [bit.ly/SierraLeoneRehab2022](https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-022-02222-2); and Marta Caviglia, Marcelo Dell'Aringa, Giovanni Putoto, Riccardo Buson, Sara Pini, Daniel Youkee, Amara Jambai, Matthew Jusu Vandy, Paolo Rosi, Yves Hubloue, Francesco Della Corte, Luca Ragazzoni, and Francesco Barone-Adesi, "Improving Access to Healthcare in Sierra Leone: The Role of the Newly Developed National Emergency Medical Service," *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, Vol. 18, Issue 18, September 2021, [bit.ly/SierraLeoneHealthSept2021](https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph180918000).

166 The ICRC supported rehabilitation centers in Faizabad, Gulbar, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Lashkar Gah, and Mazar-i-Sharif provinces. It provided assistance to orthopedic workshops in Assadabad, Ghazni, Kandahar, Maimana, Pulikumri, and Taloqan. ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme in Afghanistan," 9 May 2022, [bit.ly/ICRCAfghanistanPRP9May2022](https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/physical-rehabilitation-programme-in-afghanistan-2022.pdf).

167 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2022," March 2023, p. 99, [bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2022](https://www.itf.ch/sites/default/files/2023-03/ITFAnnualReport2022.pdf).

168 "Rehabilitation programme for disabled persons launched in Bamyan," *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 16 June 2022, [bit.ly/PajhwokAfghanNewsJune2022](https://www.pajhwokafghan.com/news/16-june-2022/rehabilitation-programme-for-disabled-persons-launched-in-bamyan).

169 Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form H; and email from Izet Ademaj, Monitor Country Researcher, 9 June 2022.

170 HI, "Chad: portrait of Wilfred, physiotherapist with HI," 30 March 2023, [bit.ly/HIChad30March2023](https://www.hi.org/en/news/2023/03/30/portrait-of-wilfred-physiotherapist-with-hi); and HI, "Country sheet: Chad 2022," updated September 2022, pp. 8–10, [bit.ly/HiCountrySheetChad2022](https://www.hi.org/en/country-sheet/chad-2022).

171 ICRC, "Annual Report 2022," 29 June 2023, p. 100, [bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022](https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/annual-report-2022.pdf).

security issues have impeded the establishment of a national referral mechanism. Female staff are employed in rehabilitation centers to provide gender-sensitive services. The ICRC's outreach activities in Iraq have enabled victims in remote areas to obtain assistive devices and referrals for rehabilitation. The ICRC opened a physical rehabilitation center in Erbil in March 2022. It is the largest such facility in Iraq and will also service the needs of people from nearby governorates, as well as displaced persons and refugees, particularly those from Syria.<sup>172</sup>

There is a significant need for rehabilitation services in Lao PDR. During 2022, the Center for Medical Rehabilitation, operated jointly by the Ministry of Health and the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), provided physical rehabilitation to 135 survivors of cluster munitions and ERW.<sup>173</sup> This is a significant increase from the pandemic-affected years, with 43 survivors having received rehabilitation in 2021 and just six in 2020.<sup>174</sup> In 2022, the NRA and COPE signed an agreement to provide mobile rehabilitation services in Houaphanh and Xieng Khouang provinces.<sup>175</sup> HI supported the Ministry of Health to monitor implementation of the National Rehabilitation Action Plan.<sup>176</sup>

A training facility for health professionals in Lao PDR opened in 2022 with support from the Okard project. The training will improve the skills of 150 doctors, nurses, and physiotherapists at the Center for Medical Rehabilitation.<sup>177</sup> The five-year Okard project, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), was due to end in September 2022 but has been extended at no additional cost for an extra year through October 2023.<sup>178</sup>

Lebanon has identified a need to secure sustainable funding for victim assistance activities and the physical rehabilitation sector.<sup>179</sup> In 2022, the ICRC supported seven rehabilitation projects in Lebanon, including four physical rehabilitation centers, and provided assistive devices.<sup>180</sup>

In Mauritania, the government provided victim assistance grants to the National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) and the National Orthopedic and Functional Rehabilitation Center (Centre National d'Orthopédie et de Réhabilitation Fonctionnelle, CNORF), where survivors can also access psychological support services.<sup>181</sup>

In Sierra Leone, responsibility for rehabilitation services has been gradually handed over to the government from international NGOs, including HI and the Prosthetics Outreach Foundation. Progress has been hampered by a lack of funding, a lack of prioritization for rehabilitation, and limited coordination between providers. Subsidized services and greater

172 ICRC press release, "Erbil: A new glimpse of hope, ICRC opens the largest Physical Rehabilitation Centre in Iraq," 15 March 2022, [bit.ly/ICRC\\_Erbil15March2022](https://bit.ly/ICRC_Erbil15March2022); and ICRC press release, "Iraq: ICRC inaugurates its offices in Nasiriyah in South Iraq," 25 January 2023, [bit.ly/ICRC\\_Iraq25Jan2023](https://bit.ly/ICRC_Iraq25Jan2023).

173 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form H, p. 22.

174 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form H, p. 21; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form H, p. 17.

175 NRA, "On May 26, 2022, the signing ceremony between the office of the National Management Committee to solve the problem of unexploded ordnance remaining in the Lao PDR and the cooperation project on artificial intelligence and rescue equipment," 26 May 2022, [bit.ly/NRA\\_Laos26May2022](https://bit.ly/NRA_Laos26May2022).

176 HI, "Country Card: Lao PDR," updated September 2022, pp. 6–11, [bit.ly/HI\\_CountryCard\\_LaoPDR\\_Sept2022](https://bit.ly/HI_CountryCard_LaoPDR_Sept2022).

177 WEL, "Strengthening Rehabilitation Services in Laos," 5 May 2022, [bit.ly/Laos\\_Rehabilitation\\_5May2022](https://bit.ly/Laos_Rehabilitation_5May2022).

178 Facebook post by WEL, 17 November 2022, [bit.ly/WEL\\_FacebookPost\\_17Nov2022](https://bit.ly/WEL_FacebookPost_17Nov2022).

179 Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H; and Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form H.

180 ICRC, "Annual Report 2022," 29 June 2023, pp. 441–442, [bit.ly/ICRC\\_AnnualReport2022](https://bit.ly/ICRC_AnnualReport2022).

181 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 10–11.

outreach are needed to expand access.<sup>182</sup> The Ministry of Health and Sanitation adopted the Assistive Technology Policy and Strategic Plan 2021–2025, which has an objective to increase national rehabilitation capacity, covering physiotherapy and prosthetics.<sup>183</sup>

In Somalia, provision of rehabilitation services remained challenging amid ongoing insecurity. Physical rehabilitation centers run by the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) in Mogadishu and in Galkayo, Puntland were supported by the Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) and the ICRC.<sup>184</sup>

## PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

Psychological support includes counselling, individual peer-to-peer support, community-based support groups, and survivor networks. Peer-to-peer support was among the least supported victim assistance activities in 2022 despite being inclusive, targeted, cost-effective, and sustainable.

Afghanistan continued to face a severe lack of funding for all victim assistance activities, including psychological support and survivor peer-to-peer support.

BiH reported that psychological and psychosocial support were available, with Red Cross and Red Crescent social workers and volunteers trained to support persons with disabilities, including survivors.<sup>185</sup>

In Croatia, psychosocial assistance workshops were held for survivors of explosive weapons.<sup>186</sup>

In Lao PDR, psychosocial support was provided to survivors by WEL during 2022. Yet overall, psychological support services remained limited.

In Lebanon, LMAC facilitated psychological support sessions alongside ITF Enhancing Human Security.<sup>187</sup> The ICRC provided mental health support and referred survivors to social integration initiatives.<sup>188</sup>

In Iraq and Sierra Leone, HI provided mental health and psychosocial support services.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND EDUCATION

Economic inclusion via vocational training, micro-credit and income-generation projects, and employment programs remained an area of great need for cluster munition victims in 2022. Access to inclusive education, and social inclusion through sport, leisure, and cultural activities were also ongoing needs.

<sup>182</sup> Victoria Jerwanska, Ismaila Kebbie, and Lina Magnusson, “Coordination of health and rehabilitation services for person with disabilities in Sierra Leone – a stakeholders’ perspective,” *Disability and Rehabilitation*, Vol. 45, Issue 11, 22 May 2022, [bit.ly/SierraLeone22May2022](https://bit.ly/SierraLeone22May2022); and Archie P. T. Allen, William S. Bolton, Mohamed B. Jalloh, Stephen J. Halpin, David G. Jayne, and Julian D. A. Scott, “Barriers to accessing and providing rehabilitation after a lower limb amputation in Sierra Leone – a multidisciplinary patient and service provider perspective,” *Disability and Rehabilitation*, Vol. 44, Issue 11, 1 December 2020, [bit.ly/SierraLeoneRehab2020](https://bit.ly/SierraLeoneRehab2020).

<sup>183</sup> Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation, “Assistive Technology (AT): Policy and Strategic Plan 2021–2025,” 23 November 2021, [bit.ly/SierraLeonePlan2021-2025](https://bit.ly/SierraLeonePlan2021-2025).

<sup>184</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2021,” 27 July 2022, p. 212, [bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2021](https://bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2021); ICRC, “Somalia: Oldest physical rehabilitation centre continues to offer hope,” 3 December 2021, [bit.ly/ICRCSomalia3Dec2021](https://bit.ly/ICRCSomalia3Dec2021); and ICRC, “Mogadishu rehabilitation centre supports people with disabilities 38 years on,” 3 December 2020, [bit.ly/ICRCMogadishu2020](https://bit.ly/ICRCMogadishu2020).

<sup>185</sup> Committee on Victim Assistance, “Preliminary Mid-Term Assessment: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022, [bit.ly/MBTObservationsVABiHJun2022](https://bit.ly/MBTObservationsVABiHJun2022).

<sup>186</sup> Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form H.

<sup>187</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Pierre Faddoul, Victim Assistance Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023.

<sup>188</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 1 July 2022, p. 442, [bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022](https://bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022).

In BiH, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, survivors received vocational training and economic support through local organizations in 2022, with international assistance. In Croatia, survivors received assistance through training, counselling, and employability workshops.<sup>189</sup>

In Lao PDR, survivors received vocational training and economic support from the QLA.<sup>190</sup>

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN SIGNATORY STATES, NON-SIGNATORY STATES, AND OTHER AREAS

Other than in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, victim assistance services were available to some degree in most states and areas with cluster munition casualties. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Ukraine and Yemen, which both have commitments to assist victims, did not report on assistance to cluster munition victims specifically, despite the high numbers of recent recorded casualties. Cambodia and Vietnam, which have high numbers of historical cluster munition victims, did not highlight how their programs reach cluster munition victims specifically but updated information on services available to all survivors of mines/ERW. Ongoing conflict in cluster munition affected countries outside the convention, including Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, also impeded the delivery of vital victim assistance while contributing to the fragility of health systems.

More information can be found in annual country profiles on the Monitor website.

# MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

## COORDINATION, STRATEGIES, AND PLANNING

### CLEARANCE

Strong coordination is an important aspect of national ownership of mine action programs as it enables efficient and effective operations.

In 2022, clearance programs in eight States Parties with cluster munition contamination—Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia—were coordinated through national mine action centers. In Chile and Germany, the defense ministries are responsible for coordinating clearance as the contamination is on former military sites.

In Afghanistan, the international community has largely suspended its support to government institutions since the Taliban took power in August 2021. In February 2023, the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported that it was actively coordinating mine action in the country.<sup>191</sup> UNMAS supports the coordination of the humanitarian mine action sector.<sup>192</sup>

Action 19 of the Lausanne Action Plan requires States Parties to develop evidence-based, costed, and time-bound national strategies and workplans, as part of their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 commitments. As of the end of 2022, eight States Parties—Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia—had strategic plans in place. Germany had a workplan for its extension period to 2025, while Chile included a workplan for clearance in 2023–2026 in its Article 4 extension request.

<sup>189</sup> Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form H.

<sup>190</sup> Lao PDR, “Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Voluntary National Review),” July 2021, p. 12, [bit.ly/LaosSDGJuly2021](https://bit.ly/LaosSDGJuly2021).

<sup>191</sup> DMAC, “Good News,” undated, [bit.ly/AfghanistanDMAC](https://bit.ly/AfghanistanDMAC).

<sup>192</sup> UNMAS, “Where We Work: Afghanistan,” updated March 2023, [bit.ly/AfghanistanUNMAS](https://bit.ly/AfghanistanUNMAS).

In Iraq, the DMA and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) prepared the first integrated strategic plan for the mine action sector, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2022–2028, with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and UNMAS.<sup>193</sup> The plan was finalized and endorsed in May 2022.<sup>194</sup>

In Lao PDR, the national strategy, Safe Path Forward III, was updated for the period 2021–2030, and endorsed in July 2022.<sup>195</sup> The NRA developed a new multi-year workplan for the mine action sector covering 2022–2026.<sup>196</sup>

Mauritania reported in March 2023 that it has a workplan in place for 2023–2026 to fulfil its Article 4 clearance obligations.<sup>197</sup> Mauritania plans to strengthen the capacity of PNDHD by retraining operational staff and deminers, which will allow for the more effective conduct of non-technical and technical survey, risk education, and clearance.<sup>198</sup>

Three States Parties that submitted Article 4 deadline extension requests in 2022 are required, in line with Action 20 of the Lausanne Action Plan, to provide annual workplans which include projections of the amount of cluster munition contaminated land to be addressed annually.

BiH has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025, addressing contamination from both landmines and cluster munition remnants. In granting the Article 4 extension request submitted by BiH in 2022, States Parties requested a clear workplan, and information on the total extent of the contaminated area that still needs to be addressed.<sup>199</sup> BiH has not provided the requested workplan, as of 1 August 2023.

Chad did not include a detailed workplan in its Article 4 extension request for non-technical survey in Tibesti province.<sup>200</sup> States Parties granted an extension until 1 October 2024, on the expectation that a detailed workplan and budget would be provided in a subsequent extension request, if cluster munition remnants contamination is discovered.<sup>201</sup>

Chile included a detailed workplan for the clearance of cluster munition remnants in its Article 4 extension request, based on the findings of technical survey conducted in 2021.<sup>202</sup> Chile plans to begin clearance operations in 2023 and complete clearance in 2026.<sup>203</sup>

<sup>193</sup> Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form J, p. 40; and GICHD, “Iraq: Strategic Planning Collaboration Mission,” 6 July 2021, [bit.ly/IraqGICHD6July2021](https://bit.ly/IraqGICHD6July2021).

<sup>194</sup> Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form H, p. 38; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, DMA, 5 May 2023.

<sup>195</sup> Lao PDR, “The Safe Path Forward III: National Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2021–2030,” January 2023, [bit.ly/LaoPDRSafePathForwardIII](https://bit.ly/LaoPDRSafePathForwardIII); NRA, “Minutes: First UXO Sector Working Group Meeting 2022,” 16 September 2022, p. 4, [bit.ly/NRAMeeting16Sept2022](https://bit.ly/NRAMeeting16Sept2022); UNDP, “Background paper for UXO donor and media field visit,” 31 March–2 April 2021; and statement of Lao PDR, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2022, [bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement16June2022](https://bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement16June2022).

<sup>196</sup> UNDP, “Synthesis Report (2019–2022): Support for the Institutional Strengthening of the National Regulatory Authority for the UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR,” 30 June 2022, p. 14, [bit.ly/UNDPLaoPDR30June2022](https://bit.ly/UNDPLaoPDR30June2022).

<sup>197</sup> Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, pp. 13 and 17, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023).

<sup>198</sup> Email from Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDECE, 16 June 2022; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, pp. 13 and 17, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023).

<sup>199</sup> Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties,” 19 September 2022, [bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport](https://bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport).

<sup>200</sup> Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, [bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestApril2022](https://bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestApril2022).

<sup>201</sup> Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties,” 19 September 2022, p. 4, [bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport](https://bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport).

<sup>202</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 9 May 2022, [bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022](https://bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022).

<sup>203</sup> Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, pp. 3 and 5, [bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJune2021](https://bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJune2021).

## RISK EDUCATION

All States Parties with cluster munition contamination have a risk education mechanism in place except Chile and Germany, where the contaminated area is inaccessible to the public.<sup>204</sup>

In most of these States Parties, risk education programs are coordinated by the respective national mine action center. In Iraq and Lao PDR, the education ministry has a coordination role for school-based programs.<sup>205</sup>

Action 27 of the Lausanne Action Plan requires that States Parties develop national strategies and workplans for risk education, drawing on best practices and standards.

Risk education is included in the national mine action strategies of Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia.<sup>206</sup>

As part of their operational planning, States Parties should include detailed, costed, and multi-year plans for risk education in their Article 4 clearance deadline extension requests. There is much room for improvement in this regard. In 2022, neither BiH or Chad included risk education workplans or budgets in their extension requests. Chile did not include risk education in its extension request as its contamination is located in military areas that are inaccessible to the public. In 2023, Iraq submitted a plan with its Article 4 extension request for the distribution of risk education materials, and a multi-year workplan including a budget for 2024–2039.<sup>207</sup> Mauritania's extension request includes a budget for risk education but does not include a detailed workplan.<sup>208</sup>

Monitoring and evaluation of risk education activities was reported in several States Parties. In Afghanistan, initial assessment forms were used to measure beneficiaries' knowledge on risks after receiving safety messages.<sup>209</sup> In Iraq, quality assurance of activities was conducted by the DMA.<sup>210</sup> In Lao PDR, a Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices (KAP) survey was carried out in Xieng Khouang province in 2022.<sup>211</sup> In Lebanon, regular KAP surveys take



Local women receive explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) from Danish Refugee Council EORE team members in Kadugli, Sudan.

© February 2023, Danish Refugee Council

<sup>204</sup> Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 28 December 2018, p. 71, [bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2018](https://bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2018).

<sup>205</sup> Chile Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form J, p. 23; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Tamsin Haigh, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020; by Shajeevdhar Mahalingam, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 11 May 2020; and by Julien Kempeneers, Mine Action Coordinator, HI, 20 May 2020.

<sup>206</sup> Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information, DMA, 10 March 2022; and by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEDEC, 21 March 2022; UNDP, "Background paper for UXO donor and media field visit," 31 March–2 April 2021; and statement of Lao PDR, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2022, [bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement16June2022](https://bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement16June2022).

<sup>207</sup> Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 11 April 2023, p. 43, [bit.ly/IraqCCMArt4ExtRequest2023R](https://bit.ly/IraqCCMArt4ExtRequest2023R), and Annex B, pp. 11–13, [bit.ly/IraqExtRequestAnnexB2023](https://bit.ly/IraqExtRequestAnnexB2023).

<sup>208</sup> Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, pp. 13 and 17, [bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023).

<sup>209</sup> Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 19.

<sup>210</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, DMA, 5 May 2023.

<sup>211</sup> NRA, "Minutes of the meeting of MRE TWG Quarter 1: 20th March 2023," 23 March 2023, p. 2, [bit.ly/NRAWorkingGroupMarch2023](https://bit.ly/NRAWorkingGroupMarch2023).

place.<sup>212</sup> In Somalia, operators used both assessment forms and KAP surveys to monitor and evaluate activities.<sup>213</sup>

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

States Parties with responsibility for cluster munition victims are obliged under the Convention on Cluster Munitions to develop a national plan and budget for victim assistance. Action 33 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits states to designate a national focal point, and to address the needs and rights of victims according to a measurable national plan. All States Parties with victims have a clearly designated victim assistance focal point except Croatia and Sierra Leone. In Afghanistan, the victim assistance coordination point role was divided across focal points in three relevant ministries: the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled Affairs, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Public Health.

Four States Parties which have reported responsibility for cluster munition victims did not have an active strategy or draft plan on victim assistance in 2022: Croatia, Mauritania, Montenegro, and Sierra Leone. Croatia reported that it envisaged a coordination body would be established, composed of representatives from the ministries for home affairs, healthcare, and war veterans.

## STANDARDS

### SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia all had national standards in place in 2022 that were consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).<sup>214</sup> Chad updated its national standards in 2021.<sup>215</sup> Chile uses IMAS along with a Joint Demining Manual for its armed forces, while clearance and survey in Germany are conducted according to federal legislation.

In 2020–2021, national mine action standards in Iraq were reviewed and updated with support from UNMAS.<sup>216</sup> During 2022, Iraq updated standards on medical support, victim assistance, training, mechanical clearance, and ground preparation.<sup>217</sup>

In Lao PDR, there are separate standards for UXO clearance and mine clearance operations.<sup>218</sup> The national standard on information management was reviewed in 2019 and is expected to be approved in 2023. Lao PDR plans to review its standards on risk education and environmental management.<sup>219</sup>

<sup>212</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maj. Ali Makki, Risk Education Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023.

<sup>213</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Julia Skinner, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 13 July 2023.

<sup>214</sup> The IMAS framework is a set of standards, guidelines, and technical notes developed by the UN together with global mine action sector representatives to ensure that activities are carried out safely and effectively.

<sup>215</sup> Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2022, Annex 1–9, [bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequestMay2022](https://bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequestMay2022).

<sup>216</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for the Mine Ban Treaty, DMA, 13 April 2021; Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, p. 27; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form A, p. 10.

<sup>217</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, DMA, 5 May 2022.

<sup>218</sup> NRA, “National Standards,” undated, [bit.ly/NRALaoPDRNationalStandards](https://bit.ly/NRALaoPDRNationalStandards).

<sup>219</sup> Email from Chomyaeng Phengthongsawat, Director-General, NRA, 26 June 2023; and NRA, “Minutes of the meeting of MRE TWG Quarter 1: 20th March 2023,” 23 March 2023, p. 2, [bit.ly/NRAWorkingGroupMarch2023](https://bit.ly/NRAWorkingGroupMarch2023).



Lebanon conducted a full review of its standards in 2020 and committed to review all standards again in 2023, to ensure ongoing compliance with IMAS.<sup>220</sup>

Mauritania reported that clearance operations in 2022 adhered to updated national standards in line with IMAS. Mauritania plans to further review its standards during the Article 4 extension period from 2022–2024.<sup>221</sup>

Somalia reported reviewing its national clearance standards in 2022, with operators working in the country aligning their standard operating procedures.<sup>222</sup>

## RISK EDUCATION

Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia all have national standards in place for risk education. BiH also has an accreditation guide for operators.<sup>223</sup>

Chad planned to update its national standard on risk education in 2022.<sup>224</sup> As of 1 August 2023, no update on progress was available.

In 2022, Iraq's risk education standard had been updated, in Arabic, in line with revised IMAS 12.10 on Risk Education, and was being translated into English by international operators.<sup>225</sup>

Since 2021, Lebanon and Mauritania have been in the process of updating their respective national standards on risk education in line with revised IMAS 12.10.

In 2022, Lao PDR reported that it planned to review its national standard on risk education.<sup>226</sup>

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Under Action 32 of the Lausanne Action Plan, States Parties committed to consider IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance when integrating victim assistance into broader strategies and plans. IMAS 13.10 reminds all actors that victim assistance is to be implemented as an equal pillar of mine action, and that the mine action sector is responsible for providing assistance or facilitating access to services. National mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating multisectoral efforts to address the needs of cluster munition survivors. National authorities should also assist with including survivors and indirect victims of cluster munitions, and their views, in the development of relevant national legislation and policies. IMAS 13.10 notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.

<sup>220</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2022," undated, p. 38, [bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2022](http://bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2022).

<sup>221</sup> Mauritania response to Observations and Comments of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Analysis Group, 27 July 2021, [bit.ly/MauritaniaResponse27July2021](http://bit.ly/MauritaniaResponse27July2021); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEK, 21 March 2022.

<sup>222</sup> Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Workplan (revised), 2 June 2023, pp. 26–31, [bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023](http://bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023).

<sup>223</sup> BHMAL, "Accreditation Guide for Mine Risk Education Organizations," undated.

<sup>224</sup> Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Jason Lufuluabo Mudingay, Chief of Operations, HI, 13 March 2021; and by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.

<sup>225</sup> Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mudhafar Aziz Hamad, Director of Risk Education and Victim Assistance, IKMAA, 1 April 2022; and by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazzaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust, 7 April 2022.

<sup>226</sup> Email from Chomyaeng Phengthongsawat, Director-General, NRA, 26 June 2023; and NRA, "Minutes of the meeting of MRE TWG Quarter 1: 20th March 2023," 23 March 2023, p. 2, [bit.ly/NRAWorkingGroupMarch2023](http://bit.ly/NRAWorkingGroupMarch2023).

In 2022, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon were reported to be working to update their respective national victim assistance standards in line with IMAS 13.10.<sup>227</sup>

## REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties with cluster munition contamination must report annually on the size and location of cluster munition contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control, and on the status and progress of clearance and the destruction of cluster munition remnants. States Parties must submit updated transparency reports by 30 April each year.

As of 1 August 2023, all States Parties with clearance obligations have submitted updated Article 7 reports for calendar year 2022 except Mauritania and Somalia.

States Parties also have an obligation to report on risk education.<sup>228</sup> Action 29 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits States Parties to provide data on beneficiaries disaggregated by gender, age, and disability in their transparency reports. In 2022, Iraq provided detailed disaggregated data; while Afghanistan, Lao PDR, and Lebanon provided a detailed but less comprehensive overview of risk education activities and beneficiaries.

BiH and Chad did not detail risk education activities or provide disaggregated beneficiary data for 2022. Chile and Germany reported that risk education was not needed as their cluster munition contamination is confined to military training areas.


States Parties must report their progress in implementing victim assistance under Article 5 of the convention. BiH, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Montenegro included information on victim assistance in their transparency reports for 2022.

As of 1 August 2023, States Parties Albania, Mauritania, and Somalia, which have responsibility for cluster munition victims, had not submitted their updated annual Article 7 reports covering activities in 2022. Sierra Leone has not submitted a transparency report since 2011.

<sup>227</sup> Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for the Mine Ban Treaty, DMA, 10 March 2022; by Reinier Carabain, Operations Manager, HI Lao PDR, 14 June 2021; by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2022; and by Col. Mansour Shtay, Victim Assistance Section Head, LMAC, 21 February 2022.

<sup>228</sup> Reporting on "measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control" is allocated to Form H of the Article 7 transparency report.

# CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION



## MAP KEY


- Massive contamination (more than 1,000km<sup>2</sup>)
- Large contamination (100–1,000km<sup>2</sup>)
- Medium contamination (10–99km<sup>2</sup>)
- Small contamination (less than 10km<sup>2</sup>)
- Extent of contamination unknown
- Clearance reported complete

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, **signatories** are underlined, **non-signatories** are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

## DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

# CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES



## MAP KEY

Cluster munition casualties recorded prior to 2022


Casualties recorded from cluster munitions in 2022

No recorded cluster munition casualties

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, signatories are underlined, non-signatories are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

## DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.





Afghan boys receive landmine and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) from a Danish Refugee Council EORE team member in Paghman province, Afghanistan.

©2022, Kern Hendricks/Danish Refugee Council

# STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

## 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 15, the convention was open for signature from 3 December 2008 until its entry into force, which was 1 August 2010. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the convention has entered into force, states may no longer sign—rather they may become bound through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16(2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a).

As of 3 August 2023 there were 112 States Parties and 12 signatories.

## STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 3 Dec 08; 8 Sep 11	Burkina Faso 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10
Albania 3 Dec 08; 16 Jun 09	Burundi 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
Andorra 9 Apr 13 (a)	Cameroon 15 Dec 09; 12 Jul 12
Antigua and Barbuda 16 Jul 10; 23 Aug 10	Canada 3 Dec 08; 16 Mar 15
Australia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 12	Cabo Verde 3 Dec 08; 19 Oct 10
Austria 3 Dec 08; 2 Apr 09	Chad 3 Dec 08; 26 Mar 13
Belgium 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09	Chile 3 Dec 08; 16 Dec 10
Belize 2 Sep 14 (a)	Colombia 3 Dec 08; 10 Sep 15
Benin 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 17	Comoros 3 Dec 08; 28 Jul 10
Bolivia 3 Dec 08; 30 Apr 13	Congo, Rep. 3 Dec 08; 2 Sep 14
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 08; 7 Sep 10	Cook Islands 3 Dec 08; 23 Aug 11
Botswana 3 Dec 08; 27 Jun 11	Costa Rica 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 11
Bulgaria 3 Dec 08; 6 Apr 11	Côte d'Ivoire 4 Dec 08; 12 Mar 12
	Croatia 3 Dec 08; 17 Aug 09

Cuba 6 Apr 16 (a)  
 Czech Republic 3 Dec 08; 22 Sep 11  
 Denmark 3 Dec 08; 12 Feb 10  
 Dominican Republic 10 Nov 09;  
 20 Dec 11  
 Ecuador 3 Dec 08; 11 May 10  
 El Salvador 3 Dec 08; 10 Jan 11  
 Eswatini 13 Sep 11 (a)  
 Fiji 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10  
 France 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09  
 Gambia 3 Dec 08; 11 Dec 18  
 Germany 3 Dec 08; 8 Jul 09  
 Ghana 3 Dec 08; 3 Feb 11  
 Grenada 29 Jun 11 (a)  
 Guatemala 3 Dec 08; 3 Nov 10  
 Guinea 3 Dec 08; 21 Oct 14  
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10  
 Guyana 31 Oct 14 (a)  
 Holy See 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08  
 Honduras 3 Dec 08; 21 Mar 12  
 Hungary 3 Dec 08; 3 Jul 12  
 Iceland 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 15  
 Iraq 12 Nov 09; 14 May 13  
 Ireland 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08  
 Italy 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 11  
 Japan 3 Dec 08; 14 Jul 09  
 Lao PDR 3 Dec 08; 18 Mar 09  
 Lebanon 3 Dec 08; 5 Nov 10  
 Lesotho 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10  
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 08; 4 Mar 13  
 Lithuania 3 Dec 08; 24 Mar 11  
 Luxembourg 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09  
 Madagascar 3 Dec 08; 20 May 17  
 Malawi 3 Dec 08; 7 Oct 09  
 Maldives 27 Sep 19 (a)  
 Mali 3 Dec 08; 30 Jun 10  
 Malta 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09  
 Mauritania 19 Apr 10; 1 Feb 12  
 Mauritius 1 Oct 15 (a)  
 Mexico 3 Dec 08; 6 May 09  
 Moldova 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10  
 Monaco 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 10  
 Montenegro 3 Dec 08; 25 Jan 10  
 Mozambique 3 Dec 08; 14 Mar 11  
 Namibia 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 18  
 Nauru 3 Dec 08; 4 Feb 13  
 Netherlands 3 Dec 08; 23 Feb 11  
 New Zealand 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09  
 Nicaragua 3 Dec 08; 2 Nov 09  
 Niger 3 Dec 08; 2 Jun 09  
 Nigeria 12 Jun 09; 28 Feb 23  
 Niue 6 Aug 20 (a)  
 North Macedonia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 09  
 Norway 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08  
 Palau 3 Dec 08; 19 Apr 16  
 Palestine 2 Jan 15 (a)  
 Panama 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10  
 Paraguay 3 Dec 08; 12 Mar 15  
 Peru 3 Dec 08; 26 Sep 12  
 Philippines 3 Dec 08; 3 Jan 19  
 Portugal 3 Dec 08; 9 Mar 11  
 Rwanda 3 Dec 08; 25 Aug 15  
 Saint Kitts and Nevis 13 Sep 13 (a)  
 Saint Lucia 15 Sep 20 (a)  
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  
 23 Sep 09; 29 Oct 10  
 Samoa 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 10  
 San Marino 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09  
 São Tomé & Príncipe 3 Dec 08; 27 Jan 20  
 Senegal 3 Dec 08; 3 Aug 11  
 Seychelles 13 Apr 10; 20 May 10  
 Sierra Leone 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08  
 Slovak Republic 24 Jul 15 (a)  
 Slovenia 3 Dec 08; 19 Aug 09  
 Somalia 3 Dec 08; 30 Sep 15  
 South Africa 3 Dec 08; 28 May 15  
 South Sudan 3 Aug 23 (a)  
 Spain 3 Dec 08; 17 Jun 09  
 Sri Lanka 1 Mar 2018 (a)  
 Sweden 3 Dec 08; 23 Apr 12  
 Switzerland 3 Dec 08; 17 Jul 12  
 Togo 3 Dec 08; 22 Jun 12  
 Trinidad and Tobago 21 Sep 11 (a)  
 Tunisia 12 Jan 09; 28 Sep 10  
 United Kingdom 3 Dec 08; 4 May 10  
 Uruguay 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09  
 Zambia 3 Dec 08; 12 Aug 09

## SIGNATORIES

Angola 3 Dec 08  
 Central African Republic 3 Dec 08  
 Congo, Dem. Rep. 18 Mar 09  
 Cyprus 23 Sep 09  
 Djibouti 30 Jul 10  
 Haiti 28 Oct 09  
 Indonesia 3 Dec 08  
 Jamaica 12 Jun 09  
 Kenya 3 Dec 08  
 Liberia 3 Dec 08  
 Tanzania 3 Dec 08  
 Uganda 3 Dec 08

## NON-SIGNATORIES

Algeria  
 Argentina  
 Armenia  
 Azerbaijan  
 Bahamas  
 Bahrain  
 Bangladesh  
 Barbados  
 Belarus  
 Bhutan  
 Brazil  
 Brunei Darussalam  
 Cambodia  
 China  
 Dominica  
 Egypt  
 Equatorial Guinea  
 Eritrea  
 Estonia  
 Ethiopia  
 Finland  
 Gabon  
 Georgia  
 Greece  
 India  
 Iran  
 Israel  
 Jordan  
 Kazakhstan  
 Kiribati  
 Korea, North  
 Korea, South  
 Kuwait  
 Kyrgyzstan  
 Latvia  
 Libya  
 Malaysia  
 Marshall Islands  
 Micronesia, Federated States of  
 Mongolia  
 Morocco  
 Myanmar/Burma  
 Nepal  
 Oman  
 Pakistan  
 Papua New Guinea  
 Poland  
 Qatar  
 Romania  
 Russian Federation  
 Saudi Arabia  
 Serbia  
 Singapore  
 Solomon Islands  
 Sudan  
 Suriname  
 Syria  
 Tajikistan  
 Thailand  
 Timor-Leste  
 Tonga  
 Türkiye  
 Turkmenistan  
 Tuvalu  
 Ukraine  
 United Arab Emirates  
 United States  
 Uzbekistan  
 Vanuatu  
 Venezuela  
 Vietnam  
 Yemen  
 Zimbabwe



# CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

## DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DUBLIN 19-30 MAY 2008

CCM/77

### CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

*Deeply concerned* that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict,

*Determined* to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned,

*Concerned* that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss of livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use,

*Deeply concerned* also at the dangers presented by the large national stockpiles of cluster munitions retained for operational use and *determined* to ensure their rapid destruction,

*Believing* it necessary to contribute effectively in an efficient, coordinated manner to resolving the challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located throughout the world, and to ensure their destruction,

*Determined* also to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition victims and *recognising* their inherent dignity,

*Resolved* to do their utmost in providing assistance to cluster munition victims, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as providing for their social and economic inclusion,

*Recognising* the need to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to cluster munition victims and to address the special needs of vulnerable groups,

*Bearing in mind* the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, *inter alia*, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability,

*Mindful* of the need to coordinate adequately efforts undertaken in various fora to address the rights and needs of victims of various types of weapons, and *resolved* to avoid discrimination among victims of various types of weapons,

*Reaffirming* that in cases not covered by this Convention or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law, derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,

*Resolved* also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party to this Convention,

*Welcoming* the very broad international support for the international norm prohibiting anti-personnel mines, enshrined in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,

*Welcoming* also the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its entry into force on 12 November 2006, and *wishing* to enhance the protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition remnants in post-conflict environments,

*Bearing in mind* also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 on children in armed conflict,

*Welcoming* further the steps taken nationally, regionally and globally in recent years aimed at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions,

*Stressing* the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the global call for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster munitions and *recognising* the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world,

*Reaffirming* the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by which, *inter alia*, States recognised the grave consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions and committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and would establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education and destruction of stockpiles,

*Emphasising* the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalisation and its full implementation,

*Basing* themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and the rules that the parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations against military objectives only, that in the conduct of military operations constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects and that the civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations,

**HAVE AGREED** as follows:

## ARTICLE 1

### General obligations and scope of application

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
  - a. Use cluster munitions;
  - b. Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;
  - c. Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to explosive bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to aircraft.
3. This Convention does not apply to mines.

## ARTICLE 2

### Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. “**Cluster munition victims**” means all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment

of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities;

2. “**Cluster munition**” means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:
  - a. A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
  - b. A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects;
  - c. A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
    - i. Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
    - ii. Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
    - iii. Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object;
    - iv. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism;
    - v. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature.
3. “**Explosive submunition**” means a conventional munition that in order to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
4. “**Failed cluster munition**” means a cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so;
5. “**Unexploded submunition**” means an explosive submunition that has been dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and has failed to explode as intended;
6. “**Abandoned cluster munitions**” means cluster munitions or explosive submunitions that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. They may or may not have been prepared for use;
7. “**Cluster munition remnants**” means failed cluster munitions, abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets;
8. “**Transfer**” involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing cluster munition remnants;
9. “**Self-destruction mechanism**” means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated;
10. “**Self-deactivating**” means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition;
11. “**Cluster munition contaminated area**” means an area known or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants;
12. “**Mine**” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle;
13. “**Explosive bomblet**” means a conventional munition, weighing less than 20 kilograms, which is not self-propelled and which, in order to perform its task, is dispersed or released by a dispenser, and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
14. “**Dispenser**” means a container that is designed to disperse or release explosive bomblets and which is affixed to an aircraft at the time of dispersal or release;
15. “**Unexploded bomblet**” means an explosive bomblet that has been dispersed, released or otherwise separated from a dispenser and has failed to explode as intended.

## ARTICLE 3

### Storage and stockpile destruction

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to four years. A State Party may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. Each request for an extension shall set out:
  - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
  - b. A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional circumstances justifying it;
  - c. A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed;
  - d. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions held at the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional cluster munitions or explosive submunitions discovered after such entry into force;
  - e. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed during the period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; and
  - f. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions remaining to be destroyed during the proposed extension and the annual destruction rate expected to be achieved.
5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate. A request for an extension shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which it is to be considered.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the retention or acquisition of a limited number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for the development of and training in cluster munition and explosive submunition detection, clearance or destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster munition counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions retained or acquired shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer of cluster munitions to another State Party for the purpose of destruction, as well as for the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is permitted.
8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for the purposes described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and actual use of these cluster munitions and explosive submunitions and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions or explosive submunitions are transferred to another State Party for these purposes, the report shall include reference to the receiving party. Such a report shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party retained, acquired or transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 30 April of the following year.

## ARTICLE 4

### Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education

1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows:
  - a. Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date;
  - b. Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
  - c. Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and assistance:
  - a. Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
  - b. Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and methodologies;
  - c. Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking readily recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe;
  - d. Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and
  - e. Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.
3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, each State Party shall take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster munition remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
  - a. In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, *inter alia*, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants.

- b. Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.
5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. The requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.
6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is to be considered. Each request shall set out:
  - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
  - b. A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to and required by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants during the proposed extension;
  - c. The preparation of future work and the status of work already conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and any subsequent extensions;
  - d. The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force;
  - e. The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry into force of this Convention;
  - f. The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension;
  - g. The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability during the proposed extension;
  - h. The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the proposed extension; and
  - i. Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, inter alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants reported, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate.

Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon the submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken during the previous extension granted pursuant to this Article.

## ARTICLE 5

### Victim assistance

1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall:
  - a. Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;
  - b. Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and policies;
  - c. Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out these activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing national disability, development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and contribution of relevant actors;
  - d. Take steps to mobilise national and international resources;
  - e. Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between cluster munition victims and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes; differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic needs;
  - f. Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organisations;
  - g. Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and
  - h. Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including in the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as social and economic inclusion.

## ARTICLE 6

### International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance.
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision and receipt of clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 4 of this Convention, each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and information concerning various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and related activities.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and shall also provide assistance to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of marking, risk reduction education, protection of civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4 of this Convention.
6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, each State Party in a position to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected State Party.
7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on a bilateral basis.
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to contribute to the economic and social recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in affected States Parties.

9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds in order to facilitate the provision of assistance under this Article.
10. Each State Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all appropriate measures in order to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of this Convention, including facilitation of the entry and exit of personnel, materiel and equipment, in a manner consistent with national laws and regulations, taking into consideration international best practices.
11. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national action plan, request the United Nations system, regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions to assist its authorities to determine, inter alia:
  - a. The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
  - b. The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the plan;
  - c. The time estimated as necessary to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
  - d. Risk reduction education programmes and awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster munition remnants;
  - e. Assistance to cluster munition victims; and
  - f. The coordination relationship between the government of the State Party concerned and the relevant governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the plan.
12. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.

## ARTICLE 7

### Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, on:
  - a. The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this Convention;
  - b. The total of all cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Convention, to include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type;
  - c. The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition produced by that State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by it, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information that may facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants;
  - d. The status and progress of programmes for the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions;
  - e. The status and progress of programmes for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, with details of the methods that will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
  - f. The types and quantities of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, including details of the methods of destruction used, the location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards observed;
  - g. Stockpiles of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, discovered after reported completion of the programme referred to in sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, and plans for their destruction in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention;



- h. To the extent possible, the size and location of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant in each such area and when they were used;
  - i. The status and progress of programmes for the clearance and destruction of all types and quantities of cluster munition remnants cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 of this Convention, to include the size and location of the cluster munition contaminated area cleared and a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant cleared and destroyed;
  - j. The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
  - k. The status and progress of implementation of its obligations under Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender- sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims and to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims;
  - l. The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide information and to carry out the measures described in this paragraph;
  - m. The amount of national resources, including financial, material or in kind, allocated to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Convention; and
  - n. The amounts, types and destinations of international cooperation and assistance provided under Article 6 of this Convention.
2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the previous calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
  3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

## ARTICLE 8

### Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to a matter of compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information that would assist in clarifying the matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties shall first determine whether to consider that matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. If it does so determine, the Meeting of States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means further

to clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6 of this Convention.

6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties may decide to adopt such other general procedures or specific mechanisms for clarification of compliance, including facts, and resolution of instances of non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems appropriate.

## ARTICLE 9

### National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

## ARTICLE 10

### Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the States Parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of States Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

## ARTICLE 11

### Meetings of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
  - a. The operation and status of this Convention;
  - b. Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
  - c. International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention;
  - d. The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants;
  - e. Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and
  - f. Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

## ARTICLE 12

### Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  - a. To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  - b. To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this Convention; and
  - c. To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

## ARTICLE 13

### Amendments

1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to all States.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for States Parties that have accepted the amendment on the date of deposit of acceptances by a majority of the States which were Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

## ARTICLE 14

### Costs and administrative tasks

1. The costs of the Meetings of States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The performance by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of administrative tasks assigned to him or her under this Convention is subject to an appropriate United Nations mandate.

## ARTICLE 15

### Signature

This Convention, done at Dublin on 30 May 2008, shall be open for signature at Oslo by all States on 3 December 2008 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York until its entry into force.

## ARTICLE 16

### Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

## ARTICLE 17

### Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

## ARTICLE 18

### Provisional application

Any State may, at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force for that State.

## ARTICLE 19

### Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

## ARTICLE 20

### Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

## ARTICLE 21

### Relations with States not Party to this Convention

1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party:
  - a. To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions;
  - b. To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions;
  - c. To itself use cluster munitions; or
  - d. To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control.

## ARTICLE 22

### Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

## ARTICLE 23

### Authentic texts

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention shall be equally authentic.

# CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2023



*Cluster Munition Monitor 2023* examines how states are working to join and implement the ban on cluster munitions, ensure clearance of cluster munition remnants, provide risk education, and assist victims of these indiscriminate weapons. Using the Convention on Cluster Munitions as its principal frame of reference, the report focuses on calendar year 2022 with information included up to August 2023 where possible. It covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally, and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and the needs of survivors through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Profiles published online provide additional country-specific findings on these topics.

This report was prepared by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC).

**Front Cover:** Collected remnants of Russian cluster munition rockets that were used to attack the city of Kharkiv, at a storage area in Kharkiv, Ukraine, 22 December 2022. © 2022, Evgeniy Maloletka/AP

**Top left:** A clearance operator at a training camp run by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) in the village of El Bashir, Iraq where deminers practice in real conditions. © 2022, Sabrina Montanvert/HI

**Top middle:** The carrier section of an 9M27K-series Uragan rocket that landed outside the home of a woman living on the bank of the Siverskiy Donets River, when Russian forces occupied the area in 2022. © 2022, Private

**Top right:** An unexploded 9N235 fragmentation submunition found by the Syria Civil Defence (also known as White Helmets) during clearance operations after cluster munition attacks by the Syrian-Russian alliance on IDP camps west of Idlib governorate, Syria on 6 November 2022. © 2022, Syria Civil Defence

Printed and bound in Switzerland

Content produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee.

Research team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations comprise the committee:



Landmine & Cluster Munition  
**MONITOR**

[www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org)

ISBN 978-2-8399-4003-0



9 782839 940030