INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or "Ottawa Convention") as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
LANDEMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim.

Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads and footpaths; in farmers’ fields; in forests and deserts; along borders; and in surrounding houses and schools, as well as other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. Mines and ERW deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to mine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering,
but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global mine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments that join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent future incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine; children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy; communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mine/ERW presence for decades to come; and the rights of survivors and persons with similar needs are protected.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network in more than 100 countries, working for the full universalization and implementation of the treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty. The campaign includes national and international organizations, as well as multisectoral expertise from the human rights, development, refugee, medical, and humanitarian relief fields. The ICBL works in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance. The campaign calls as well on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to abide by the norm against mine use.

The ICBL was founded in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These organizations witnessed the horrendous impact of landmines on the communities in which they were working across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and how mines hampered and prevented development efforts. The solution, they realized, was a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines. More than 30 years on from its founding, the ICBL continues to serve as a decisive and effective model of a civil society-led campaign for disarmament and peace. Its effort to ban landmines led to a whole new approach known as humanitarian disarmament.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign a multisectoral perspective and practical experience on the impact of landmines. These core members mobilized in short time a global network of NGOs engaged on this issue. Conferences and outreach events were initially organized worldwide to raise awareness on the global landmine problem and the need for a ban, as well as to provide training to partners for effective advocacy efforts. The call for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines quickly spread throughout the world, and among diverse partners.

Through sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL and effective partnerships with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments, the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada.
Once the goal of developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines was achieved, the attention of the ICBL shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

In line with the 2014 Maputo Declaration and the 2019 Oslo Action Plan, the ICBL urges States Parties to make all efforts toward completing major treaty obligations by 2025.

The ICBL’s success over three decades speaks to the campaign’s ability to evolve with changing circumstances. In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the CMC to become the ICBL-CMC.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL-CMC, on the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has become the de facto monitoring regime for both treaties, reporting on States Parties’ implementation and compliance, and more generally, assessing the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW.

The ICBL created Landmine Monitor in June 1998, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and annual reports. A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of the ICBL-CMC’s research and monitoring, including the Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. To prepare this report, an Editorial Team gathered information with the aid of a network comprised of more than a dozen researchers with the assistance of ICBL-CMC campaigners. Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this report were done by the Monitor.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information on all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail field missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

The Monitor complements transparency reporting required of states under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on issues related to landmines and cluster munitions, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of these weapons and the threat from other ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.
ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 25th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010.

Landmine Monitor 2023 covers mine ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally; assesses the impact of mine contamination and casualties; outlines progress made and improvement required in clearance, risk education, and victim assistance; and documents international assistance and national resources to support mine action efforts. This report focuses on calendar year 2022, with information included up to October 2023 where possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world contributed to this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors. Country-specific contributions were received from a network of at least 20 Monitor researchers covering more than 30 countries. Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website.

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their crucial assistance in the production, release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of six NGOs, as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were: Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Danish Refugee Council (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan), Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt), Monitor research team leaders (Ban Policy: Stephen Goose; and Impact: Loren Persi Vicentic), and senior ICBL-CMC staff (Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer and Tamar Gabelnick).

During 2022 and the first half of 2023, the Monitoring and Research Committee benefitted from the participation of Hector Guerra, Paul Hannon, and Marion Loddo.

From January to October 2023, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and drafted thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2023. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban policy**: Mark Hiznay, Susan Aboeid, Stephen Goose, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
- **Impact**: Loren Persi Vicentic, Katrin Atkins, Matthew Armstrong, and Audrey Torrecilla;
- **Support for mine action**: Ruth Bottomley.

This edition also builds on earlier contributions from Marion Loddo through August 2023.

Michael Hart (Publications Consultant) provided final editing in October and November 2023 with support from Tamar Gabelnick.

Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Michael Sherwin. Maps were created by Maria Angela Torri. Héliographie Girard printed the report in Switzerland.

The front cover photograph was provided by M. Simoncelli/HI, and the back cover photographs were provided by FSD and Marijn van Broekhoven/NPA. Additional photographs found within Landmine Monitor 2023 were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors. In 2023, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 1 November 2023):

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- Government of Austria
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- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of the United States of America*
- Holy See

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

*Specifically for research on contamination, casualties, clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and support for mine action.
### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>confirmed hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>disabled persons' organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EORE</td>
<td>explosive ordnance risk education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GiCHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Humanity &amp; Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People's Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
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GLOSSARY

Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is a ‘conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
Confirmed hazardous area (CHA) – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Diversity – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person’s social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Gender – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

Humanitarian mine action (HMA) – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes: survey and assessment, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An IED may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

Improvised mine, improvised landmine, and improvised antipersonnel landmine – An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

Intersectionality – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to create layers of inequality.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Non-state armed group (NSAG) – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.
Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victims – Individuals killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), their family, and community.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Key</th>
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<tr>
<td>States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 November 2023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 November 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 November 2023</td>
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- Argentina
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A remote-controlled machine works under power lines to prepare the ground in Kharkiv oblast, Ukraine, to speed up clearance and allow electrical repair teams to access the site.

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MAJOR FINDINGS

BAN POLICY

STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY

The Mine Ban Treaty has a total of 164 States Parties, while 33 states have not yet joined. The last countries to accede to the treaty were Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in 2017.

- In July 2023, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres published "A New Agenda for Peace," a policy brief urging UN member states to work to "achieve universality of treaties banning inhumane and indiscriminate weapons" including the Mine Ban Treaty.

MINE USE

Antipersonnel landmines were used by State Party Ukraine, and states not party Myanmar and Russia, in the reporting period (during 2022 and the first half of 2023).

- Ukrainian authorities are investigating the circumstances of its forces using antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Izium, in Kharkiv oblast, in 2022 when the city was under Russian control.
- Russia has used antipersonnel mines extensively in Ukraine since invading the country in February 2022, resulting in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.
- As in every year since it was first published in 1999, this annual report documents new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Myanmar.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in at least five states—Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Tunisia—also used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. Additionally, new use has been attributed to NSAGs in countries in or bordering the Sahel region of Africa.
PRODUCTION

The Monitor has added Armenia to its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines, bringing this list to a total of 12 states. All listed producers are states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

- Most of the states listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future. India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia appear most likely to be actively producing antipersonnel mines.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED

Of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 94 states have officially completed destruction of their stocks of antipersonnel mines, destroying a combined total of 55 million antipersonnel landmines. Sri Lanka was the last State Party to destroy its stocks, in October 2021.

- Another 67 States Parties have confirmed that they have never possessed antipersonnel mines. State Party Tuvalu must provide an Article 7 transparency report to confirm its status.

States Parties Greece and Ukraine both possess stocks of antipersonnel landmines, but did not destroy any during the reporting period. They remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines: Greece (1 March 2008), Ukraine (1 June 2010).

A total of 66 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes. Two of these states—Bangladesh and Finland—each retain more than 12,000 mines, while another 23 states retain more than 1,000 mines each. Angola and Peru consumed a collective total of 1,142 retained mines in 2022, decreasing their retained mines to under 1,000 respectively.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

All except one State Party—Tuvalu—has provided an initial Article 7 transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty, but less than half provide annual reports due by 30 April each year.

A total of 89 States Parties had not submitted a report for calendar year 2022, as of 15 October 2023. Most of these states have failed to provide an annual Article 7 report for two or more years. Only 75 States Parties have provided reports for 2022, reflecting a lower submission rate than in 2021.

THE IMPACT

CASUALTIES

In 2022, at least 4,710 casualties of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were recorded (1,661 killed and 3,015 injured). The survival status was unknown for 34 casualties.

- Civilians made up 85% of all recorded casualties, where the military or civilian status was known (4,341). Children accounted for half (49%, or 1,171) of civilian casualties, where the age was recorded.
- In 2022, mine/ERW casualties were identified in 49 states and two other areas. Of these, 37 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
- State not party Syria recorded the highest number of annual casualties (834) for the third consecutive year. State Party Ukraine recorded the second highest total (608) and saw a ten-fold increase in the number of civilian casualties compared to 2021.
- Ukraine was followed by State Party Yemen and state not party Myanmar, which each recorded more than 500 casualties in 2022.
CONTAMINATION

At least 60 states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

- This includes 33 States Parties with current clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, in addition to 22 states not party and five other areas.
- At least 24 States Parties are also believed or known to have contamination arising from improvised mines. Ten of these states have yet to clarify if this contamination includes victim-activated devices, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

CLEARANCE

States Parties reported clearing a total of 219.31km² of contaminated land in 2022, resulting in the destruction of 169,276 antipersonnel landmines.

- This represents an increase on clearance reported in 2021, when 132.52km² of land was cleared and 117,847 mines were destroyed.
- Cambodia and Croatia reported the largest clearance totals in 2022, clearing a combined total of more than 128.67km² of land and destroying 14,815 antipersonnel mines.
- Land release progress was negligible in many States Parties in 2022—with 12 clearing less than 1km², four not undertaking any clearance activities at all, and six not formally reporting on their Article 5 obligations. Twenty States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations before or no later than 2025, while 13 States Parties have deadlines after 2025. Very few appear to be on track to meet these deadlines.
- Cambodia and Zimbabwe may still have a chance of meeting their clearance deadlines, of 31 December 2025.
- Croatia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand may still be able to meet their respective clearance deadlines, which are beyond 2025.
- Eritrea remains in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty due to its failure to submit an Article 5 extension request after missing its clearance deadline in 2020.

RISK EDUCATION

Of the 33 States Parties with clearance obligations, 28 reported providing, or are known to have provided, risk education to populations at risk from antipersonnel mine contamination in 2022.

- At-risk groups included those that moved regularly between different locations, such as nomads, hunters, herders, shepherds, and agricultural workers. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) faced a similar threat.
- People seeking natural resources for their livelihoods, and people deliberately engaging with explosive ordnance—such as scrap metal collectors—were also at risk.
- Only 10 of the States Parties with clearance obligations that submitted an annual Article 7 report for 2022 provided detailed information on risk education, including beneficiary data disaggregated by sex and age. The only State Party that requested an extension to its clearance deadline in 2023, Ukraine, did not include a plan for risk education in its (draft) request.
- Children remained at high risk and were a key target group for risk education providers in 2022, comprising 47% of all beneficiaries reached.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE

In 2022, healthcare and rehabilitation services remained under-funded and faced increasing and multiple challenges in many states, including accessibility, expertise, and supply of materials.

- Several States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims in need of assistance experienced massive disruption—and in some cases damage and destruction—to their healthcare systems in 2022, including Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen.
- Despite progress in integrating physical rehabilitation into national healthcare systems in some states, improving the sustainability of services, Monitor findings indicate that rehabilitation has not been a priority in many affected States Parties.
- Major gaps remain in access to economic opportunities for mine and ERW survivors in many of the States Parties where livelihood support was most needed.
- Survivors were reported to be represented in coordination activities in at least 15 States Parties in 2022. Yet the results of their participation were rarely reported upon.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2022, global support for mine action totaled US$913.5 million, representing an increase of 52% ($314.5 million) from support provided in 2021. Of this total, $162.3 million went to activities in Ukraine.

- Seventeen affected states contributed a combined total of $115.1 million to their own national mine action programs, representing 13% of global funding.
- Thirty-five donors provided $798.4 million in international support to mine action. This represented a significant increase of 47% from total international contributions in 2021.
- The donor base remained largely unchanged from recent years—with the exception that Saudi Arabia entered the list of top 15 donors in 2022. These donors provided 97% of all international mine action funding, totaling $774.9 million.
- The United States (US) and the European Union (EU), the two largest donors in 2022, significantly increased their annual contributions.
- The top 10 recipients received $580.6 million and accounted for 73% of all international assistance. Ukraine headed the list of recipients in 2022, after Russia’s invasion.
- International assistance to international non-profit organizations accounted for 37% of total funding during 2022, with $295 million received. International assistance provided directly to national non-profit organizations accounted for less than 1% ($3.4 million).
- International support for victim assistance totaled $37.6 million, an increase of 47% on the 2021 total. However, this represented only 5% of total mine action funding. Half of all victim assistance support went to three states—Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen.
- States Parties with smaller mine contamination lacked support. Of the 12 States Parties with less than 5km² of contamination, only five—Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Palestine, Senegal, and Somalia—received funds for clearance in 2022.
Signs warn of the danger of landmines on agricultural land near the village of Vasylivka, in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv oblast. HALO Trust teams are working to make the land safe.

© Helen Broadbridge/HALO Trust, March 2023
BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty seeks to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel landmines. The treaty's 164 States Parties are currently half-way through the third decade of its implementation. While the prohibitions on antipersonnel mines enshrined in the Mine Ban Treaty remain fit for purpose, they are being tested from the inside and out.

The last accessions to the Mine Ban Treaty were more than five years ago, in 2017. There were few signs of progress toward more states joining the treaty in the reporting period, from mid-2022 through October 2023. However, universalization efforts received a high-level boost in July 2023, when United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres released “A New Agenda for Peace,” a policy brief urging UN member states to work to “achieve universality of treaties banning inhumane and indiscriminate weapons” including the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

As the Philippines noted at the treaty's intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2023, there is a need to pay attention to “universalizing the norms” established through the Mine Ban Treaty by promoting the stigma against any use of the weapon by any actor.

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since its all-out invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. This has resulted in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

The treaty's strict prohibition on use of antipersonnel mines has been violated by a State Party only twice: by Yemen in 2011–2012 at Bani Jarmooz, north of Sanaa, during the uprising that led to the ousting of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh; and by Ukraine, with evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces used rocket-delivered PFM antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when it was occupied by Russian forces.

As in every year since it was first published in 1999, this annual Landmine Monitor report documents continued use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar also used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. Use by NSAGs was also recorded in

State Party Colombia and state not party India. This new use mostly involved improvised antipersonnel mines, also known as victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The use of antipersonnel landmines in States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty highlights the importance of ensuring that appropriate national implementation measures, especially legislation, are in place to enforce the treaty’s provisions with penal sanctions and fines.

All except two States Parties (Greece and Ukraine) have now completed their stockpile destruction obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, destroying a combined total of 55 million antipersonnel landmines. No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by Greece or Ukraine in the reporting period. Greece told the treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2023 that it was transferring its remaining stocks to Croatia, where they would be destroyed over the next 18 months. Ukraine meanwhile reported that storage sites where its 3.3 million PFM-series antipersonnel mines were once held had come “under air and missile attack” by Russia or are located in territories currently under Russian control. Ukraine requested time to conduct audit and verification of the stocks.2

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continues its work to ensure the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, working in close partnership with its dedicated community of states, UN agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by State Party Ukraine and by states not party Myanmar and Russia during the reporting period, as detailed below.

NSAGs in at least five countries—Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Tunisia—also used antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period.3 Additionally, new landmine use has been attributed to some groups in countries in or bordering the Sahel region of Africa.4

USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES

UKRAINE

Ukraine is severely contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from the armed conflict that began in 2014 and escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022.3


4 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. The Monitor has chosen to group reported mine use in the Sahel region collectively due to a lack of reporting, the apparent sporadic and small-scale nature of the incidents, and access issues for independent verification.
Landmines have been documented in 11 of Ukraine’s 27 regions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia. Russian forces have used at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine since February 2022.

Use by Ukrainian forces

There is credible information that Ukrainian government forces used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when the city was under Russian control. In January 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that 9M27K3 Uragan rockets carrying PFM-series antipersonnel mines were fired into Russian-occupied areas near Russian military facilities in and around Izium during 2022, causing at least 11 civilian casualties.

In a report to the Human Rights Council in March 2023, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said that it “has found instances where Ukrainian armed forces likely used cluster munitions and rocket-delivered antipersonnel landmines to carry out attacks in Izium city, Kharkiv region, from March to September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian armed forces.” The commission reported that “Ukrainian armed forces were at that time stationed within striking distance of such rockets” and said that it “found it likely that Ukrainian armed forces have committed indiscriminate attacks, in violation of international humanitarian law.”

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Oleksandr Polishchuk responded in November 2022 to a request from HRW to confirm evidence that showed Ukraine’s use of PFM antipersonnel mines. He stated in a letter that Ukrainian authorities cannot comment on the types of weapons used during the armed conflict “before the end of the war and the restoration of our sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The deputy defense minister also stated that “Ukraine is a reliable member of the international community, and it fully commits to all international obligations in the sphere of mine usage. This includes the non-use of antipersonnel mines in the war.”

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5 ERW are defined as unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) by Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Ukraine is also affected by mine and ERW contamination remaining from World War II. The scale of mine/ERW contamination in Ukraine has yet to be fully surveyed or quantified, but the conflict with Russia appears to represent the most widespread antipersonnel mine use globally in decades.

6 Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used at least 13 types of antivehicle mines (also called antitank mines). The hand- or mechanically-emplaced TM-62 series antivehicle blast mine, equipped with an MVCh-62 pressure-activated fuze, appears to be the most common type of antivehicle mine used. These mines are often buried but have also been sighted laid on top of the ground. See, Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 13 June 2023, bit.ly/HRWLandmineUseUkraine13June2023.

7 The Russian military seized Izium and surrounding areas by 1 April 2022 and exercised full control there until early September 2022, when Ukrainian forces began a counter-offensive.

8 HRW conducted research in Izium from 19 September to 9 October 2022, interviewing over 100 people including witnesses to landmine use, victims of mines, first responders, doctors, and Ukrainian deminers. Every interviewee said they had seen mines on the ground, knew someone who was injured by a mine, or had been warned about their presence during Russia’s occupation of the area. See, HRW, “Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians,” 31 January 2023, bit.ly/HRWUkraineLandmines31Jan2023.


On 31 January 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the findings by HRW “will be duly studied by the competent authorities of Ukraine.” At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2023, Ukraine promised to examine reports that its forces had used antipersonnel mines. During the meeting, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) welcomed Ukraine’s commitment to launch an inquiry, provide regular updates, and engage with the Mine Ban Treaty president and members of its Committee on Cooperative Compliance.

In June 2023, HRW reported further evidence of Ukrainian use of PFM antipersonnel mines. In May 2023, an individual working in eastern Ukraine—where the Ukrainian government had restored control after Russian forces left—posted photographs online showing multiple remnants of artillery rockets recovered during clearance operations. After close inspection of the markings on the remnants, HRW identified two 9N128K3 warhead sections of 9M27K3 Uragan 220mm rockets, which each contain 9N223 “blocks,” or stacks, of 9N212 PFM-1S antipersonnel blast mines in cassettes. Analysis of handwriting on the side of one warhead section showed a first word in Ukrainian which translates as “from,” and a second word, written in Latin script, relating to an organization based in Kyiv.

A photograph posted on social media in August 2022 that bears the watermark of a Kyiv-based non-governmental organization (NGO)—posted by an individual thought to run the NGO, which had made a monetary donation to Ukraine’s war effort—showed the same warhead section of an Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket recovered from agricultural land. Markings specifying the batch, year, and factory, and the same handwriting and phrases, match those in the photographs assessed by HRW. The post also showed the warhead sections of two other Uragan 9M27K3 rockets with phrases written on them. In total, at least 15 photographs have been posted online of the Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rockets.

Use by Russian forces

Russia has used at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion of the country in February 2022. This is an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party, with the possible assistance of a neighboring State Party, Belarus.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian officials have alleged that Russia has used PFM antipersonnel mines. Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series mines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022. Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff

15 Each Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket is designed exclusively to carry and disperse 312 PFM-1S antipersonnel mines. The markings on all the photographs of rockets examined show that they were produced in 1986 (batch numbers 14 and 16) at the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) munitions factory designated #912. In addition, the GRAU Index numbers matched the warheads used to carry PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.
16 HRW identified, through a search of publicly available information, a person who said that they run the NGO. The individual had also made public posts on social media indicating that they had donated funds to the Ukrainian military in 2022 through a Kyiv-based NGO supporting Ukraine’s war effort. Another Ukraine-based group posted photographs showing similar messaging written in Ukrainian on an Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket.
17 There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in the conflict. The claims began during the first days of the invasion in late February 2022 and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made.
of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.\textsuperscript{19} Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft had scattered PFM mines in the Sumy region in March 2022.\textsuperscript{20} Similar reports surfaced in April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.\textsuperscript{21} The UK and the United States (US) have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.\textsuperscript{22}

In September–December 2022, HRW spoke with Ukrainian deminers in the Kharkiv region, including in Izium, and in parts of the Kherson region, after the retreat from those areas of Russian forces. The deminers identified numerous types of antipersonnel mines found in areas recently retaken by Ukraine, all of which are known to be in Russian stockpiles, including OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines and PMN-series blast mines (both PMN-2 and PMN-4).\textsuperscript{23}

Some mine types used in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly-seen MOB and older MON-series and OZM-72 mines.\textsuperscript{24} If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then such munitions are considered to be antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.\textsuperscript{25}

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps at positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Ukrainian deminers told HRW that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel mines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since 24 February 2022*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOB</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Multiple options</td>
<td>A modern hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mine, used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. This mine is only used by Russia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{21} Necro Mancer (666_mancer), “Russians fill residential areas of the city with mines-petals.” 4 April 2022, 17:36 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetNecroMancer4April2022.


<table>
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<th>Origin</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/Command</td>
<td>MON-series hand-emplaced directional multipurpose antipersonnel mines can be used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MON-90</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MON-100</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MON-200</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZM-72(^{27})</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/Command</td>
<td>A multipurpose bounding munition emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM-1/</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Blast</td>
<td>Pressure/self-destruct</td>
<td>Uniquely shaped and constructed, this plastic-cased mine can be scattered by mine-laying rockets and dispensers mounted on trucks or helicopters. It contains 37 grams of a liquid high explosive. Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile this mine type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM-1S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMN-2(^{28})</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Blast</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>A circular, plastic-cased mine. Ukraine destroyed its stockpile of this mine type in 2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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26 The numbers associated with each model of the MON family indicate the range, from 50 to 200 meters. Each model contains a specific number of pre-formed fragments that are projected horizontally. The MON-50 contains 540 ball bearings or 485 pieces of 5mm chopped steel rod, and the MON-100 contains 400 pieces of 10mm chopped steel rod. Colin King, *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 2008–2009* (Croydon: Jane's Information Group, 2008).

27 Trevor Kirton (TJK_EOD), “Today the @OfficialSOLI EOD team was able to remote pull a live OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mine from a marsh located close to a farming community. This will be destroyed so it no longer presents a danger.” 21 April 2023, 14:08 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TrevorKirtonTweet21April2023.

28 Maksim (kms_d4k), “In this footage, you can see why it is important not to touch any mines. These mines are set with a trap underneath. It is very dangerous to demine them, so the only way is to destroy them right away.” 6 February 2023, 13:32 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MaksimTweet6Feb2023.
<table>
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<th>Origin</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PMN-4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Blast</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>A modern circular, plastic-cased mine produced by Russia. First publicly displayed by Russia in 1993, it has never been stockpiled by Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM-2/</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/self-destruct</td>
<td>A metal-case bounding mine delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other means. POM-2 and POM-2R mines are stockpiled by Russia. Ukraine destroyed its stocks of this mine type in 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM-3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Seismic</td>
<td>Used only by Russia. POM-3 mines were first publicly displayed during military exercises in 2021. The POM-3 is scattered by rockets fired from truck-mounted launchers. Ukraine does not possess this mine type or its delivery system. Markings on an expended delivery canister photographed with POM-3 mines that failed to deploy properly indicate it was produced in 2021.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
*All of the mine types listed were manufactured in Russia or the Soviet Union.

Belarus, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, has provided various forms of military support to Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Monitor is not aware of Belarus providing assistance with Russia’s mine use, either directly or indirectly. However, Belarus should address these concerns with States Parties at a formal annual meeting or in its updated Article 7 transparency report.

As a State Party, Belarus must ensure that any joint military operations with Russia do not violate the prohibitions of the Mine Ban Treaty on assisting, encouraging, or inducing a state not party to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty.

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29 Mark Hiznay (MarkHiznay), "More PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being cleared. Since Ukraine never stockpiled this type, it doesn’t take much to figure out who did it. Now where? @minefreeworld." 20 April 2023, 17:42 UTC, Tweet, bit.ly/MarkHiznayTweet20April2023.
30 Stu M (SM_EOD), "More anti-personnel mines out of a field today. We have also come across more evidence of POM-2 use which adds another level of complexity to our work. onemineatatime minefre.ukraine eod demining StandWithUkraine." 21 April 2023, 09:58 UTC, Tweet, bit.ly/StuMEODTweet21April2023.
33 This means that it is prohibited for Belarus to: provide security, storage, transportation, or transit for antipersonnel mines; participate in planning for the use of antipersonnel mines; commit to rules of engagement that permit the use of antipersonnel mines; accept orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use antipersonnel mines; and knowingly derive military benefit from the use of antipersonnel mines by others.
International reaction

In terms of legal obligations on antipersonnel mines, Ukraine is bound by the Mine Ban Treaty, which comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices regardless of the technical features and predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (either improvised or factory-made). Russia is bound by a lower standard regulating antipersonnel mines via the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

The final report of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Geneva in November 2022, “condemned the use of anti-personnel mines anywhere, at any time, and by any actor.” Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 42 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, in addition to the European Union (EU).

Landmine use in Ukraine has been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents and the treaty’s special envoy for universalization. The ICBL has called on all parties to the conflict to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.

MYANMAR

Use by the Myanmar Armed Forces

The Myanmar Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines extensively during the reporting period. Previously, the Monitor has documented new use by Myanmar every year since the publication of the first annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999. There appears to have been a significant increase in new mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces since it seized power in a military coup on 1 February 2021. This has included the laying of mines around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that significant numbers of antipersonnel mines were captured by NSAGs from the Myanmar Armed Forces each month from January 2022 to September 2023, in almost every part of the country. In August 2023, antipersonnel landmines manufactured by the Myanmar Army and in the possession of Myanmar Armed

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34 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), “President of the Convention that bans landmines calls for immediate cease of use of this insidious weapon in Ukraine,” 5 April 2022, bit.ly/APMBCUkraine5April2022.
36 The Monitor found, from January 2022 to September 2023, in a non-exhaustive survey of media photographs, over 25 instances, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel mines of types MM1, MM2, MM5, and MM6 in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states and in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions. The mines were captured by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), or National Unity Government (NUG)-affiliated People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), in those areas after overrunning Myanmar Army outposts or capturing or ambushing a military patrol. The exiled opposition NUG is made up of elected parliamentarians unable to take up their roles after the military coup.
Forces soldiers were captured in the northwest and southwest of the country, indicating extensive mine use by the military.³⁷

Specific reports and allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period were recorded in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the regions of Bago and Tanintharyi. Examples of specific reports and allegations of use since mid-2022 are detailed below. In some instances, the Myanmar Armed Forces acknowledge use; while in others, mine use was attributed by villagers due to the proximity of a military outpost.

On 25 July 2023, four children were killed by a mine near In Pin Thar village in Phyu township, Bago region. Villagers claimed the mine was emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces.³⁸

After attacks from 5–10 April 2023 by the Myanmar Armed Forces on Si Maw village in Shwegu township, Kachin state, two children were injured when their oxcart ran over a mine. A local defense force subsequently found another landmine in the area.³⁹

On 1 March 2023, near Cedipyin village in Rathedaung township, Rakhine state, a man was seriously injured after stepping on a mine in a mountainous area. A Myanmar Army contingent was stationed nearby.⁴⁰

On 26 February 2023, three boys were wounded after stepping on a mine suspected to have been laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces between the villages of Numli Hka and Nwan Hka Zup in Waingmaw township, Kachin state.⁴¹

On 16 February 2023, during a change of units at the Yae Kin military camp, in Tima village in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state, two Myanmar Army soldiers stepped on mines that had been planted by the departing unit near the camp's fence.⁴²

On 14 February 2023, a man stepped on a mine allegedly planted by the Myanmar Armed Forces while searching for food near the Mungdung military camp, in Dawhpum Yang village in Momauk township, Kachin state.⁴³

On 27 January 2023, a man was killed by a landmine outside a Myanmar Armed Forces base near Pharpyo village in Minbya township, Rakhine state.\textsuperscript{44}

On 18 January 2023, a young man was seriously injured by a landmine near Panphetan village in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state, after walking past an area where a Myanmar Army battalion is stationed. The military had warned residents to stay away from the area.\textsuperscript{45}

On 13 January 2023, a woman from Than Moe Taung village tract in Taungoo township, Bago region, stepped on a landmine emplaced by the roadside. The victim died before she could be reached by villagers, who heard the explosion but could not enter the area due to restrictions imposed by the Myanmar Armed Forces. Soldiers later informed villagers that they had planted the mine following clashes in the area with a local anti-military People’s Defense Force (PDF) in November 2022.\textsuperscript{46} The military had previously notified villagers that landmines were laid on the Than Moe Taung road, and restricted access to it.\textsuperscript{47}

On 16 December 2022, a villager was seriously injured by a landmine emplaced by Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers in Saw Muh Plaw village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state.\textsuperscript{48}

On 21 November 2022, a man was injured by an MM6 mine emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces in Hkaw Poo village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state.\textsuperscript{49}

On 20 October 2022, a resident of Aung May K’Lar village in Kawkareik township, Kayin state, activated a tripwire landmine while making charcoal near a military camp. The mine was thought to have been planted by troops based at the nearby Aung May K’Lar military camp.\textsuperscript{50}

On 13 October 2022, a Rohingya woman and her infant son were injured by a tripwire landmine placed along the exterior fence of a Myanmar Armed Forces camp in Pa Laung village in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state, near the border with Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{51}

On 1 October 2022, a resident of Meh T’Raw Hta village tract in Dooplaya district, Kayin state, claimed that the Myanmar Armed Forces had planted a mine near his land.\textsuperscript{55} On the same day, an eight-year-old boy was killed by a landmine laid by retreating Myanmar


\textsuperscript{46} PDFs in Myanmar are local armed resistance groups opposed to the 2021 military coup. Most are affiliated with the exiled NUG. Some PDFs, however, may operate autonomously.

\textsuperscript{47} Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{52} KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023,” undated.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
Armed Forces troops outside his temporary school in Krok Khu village in Demoso township, Kayah state.

In September 2022, livestock near Noh T’Kaw village tract in Kyainseikgyi township, Kayin state, detonated landmines laid near a Myanmar Army camp. Villagers stated that the Myanmar Armed Forces had previously informed them of mines laid in the area. Later, in February 2023, the military repeated its warning to villagers that it had planted mines in the area.56

In September 2022, a local NSAG claimed that Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had emplaced antipersonnel mines around a church in Moybe village tract in Pekon township, Shan state.57

In 2022 and 2023, civilians continued to be injured due to antipersonnel landmines planted along Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh.58 Previously, in October 2020, Myanmar rejected reports that it had emplaced mines on the border, after Bangladesh had expressed concern at ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar in the area. Bangladesh stated that “unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.”59

USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Tunisia, and by some groups in or bordering the Sahel region—in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.60 The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. However, there were no new declarations by NSAGs from mid-2022 through October 2023.

COLOMBIA

In Colombia, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), dissident groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP or FARC), and other NSAGs continue to produce and use antipersonnel landmines.

In 2022, there were a total of 105 incidents of landmine use attributed to the ELN, 224 incidents attributed to FARC dissidents, and 26 incidents attributed to the GAO Clan del Golfo.61 This represents a 30% annual increase on incidents of reported mine use in 2021.

56 Ibid.
57 The Mobye PDF warned returning local people that they should avoid the grounds of the church as it had been mined. See, “Junta weapons seized from Catholic church in Shan State’s Mobye Township,” Mizzima, 15 September 2022, bit.ly/Mizzima15Sept2022.
60 Of these, 48 NSAGs have committed not to use mines through signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment; 20 by self-declaration; four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment); and two through a peace accord (in Colombia and Nepal).
In the first seven months of 2023, a total of 50 incidents of mine use were attributed to the ELN, while 241 were attributed to FARC dissidents and seven were attributed to the GAO Clan del Golfo.\(^{62}\)

In February 2023, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace stated that the departments of Chocó, Bolívar, Nariño, and Putumayo were seriously affected by antipersonnel mines, and called on all armed actors to halt use.\(^{63}\) There were reports in 2022 and in the first half of 2023 of both military and civilian landmine casualties in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Caucá, Chocó, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca. These are all regions where armed conflict was ongoing between the National Army of Colombia and NSAGs. It is difficult to determine precisely when these mines were laid.\(^{64}\)

**INDIA**

In India, several incidents involving use of pressure-plate antipersonnel mines by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), or its People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), were reported in 2022 and 2023.

In May 2023, a man foraging in Luiya forest in Chaibasa district, Jharkhand state, was killed by a mine reportedly laid by Maoist rebels. Several other villagers in Chaibasa district were reportedly killed in similar incidents earlier in the year.\(^{65}\) In January 2023, Maoist rebels had disseminated leaflets to villages in Kolhan division, Jharkhand state, warning that they had laid explosive devices in the area.\(^{66}\) In December 2022, a man collecting wood in Goilkera forest in West Singhbhum district, Jharkhand state, died after stepping on a landmine.\(^{67}\)

In September and November 2022, mines attributed to Maoist rebels were cleared by the military after livestock injuries in Kathagudem district, Telangana state.\(^{68}\)

**MYANMAR**

NSAGs have used antipersonnel landmines repeatedly in Myanmar since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. There were allegations of new use by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and other groups in early 2022.\(^{69}\)

Local media in Myanmar has reported the use of landmines by local anti-military militia groups established after the February 2021 coup, including by PDFs. These devices appear

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\(^{62}\) Ibid.


\(^{69}\) There were also allegations of use by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N), and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) in their operations against the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period.
primarily to be command-detonated roadside bombs, though some are victim-activated.\(^{70}\) Pro-military militia groups, such as Pyusawhti, also operate in several areas of Myanmar.\(^{71}\)

The Monitor has reviewed the following incidents attributed to NSAGs in Myanmar during the reporting period.

On 18 March 2023, two villagers were killed and two were injured by tripwire landmines set up by a PDF in Palaw township, Tanintharyi region. According to the PDF, the mines were emplaced to defend the area from the Myanmar Armed Forces.\(^{72}\)

On 13 March 2023, three people were seriously injured by a mine in Tedim township, Chin state, and were taken across the border to India for treatment. PDF rebels acknowledged responsibility for laying the mine.\(^{73}\)

On 27 February 2023, in Meh Way village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state, a child was killed and an adult was injured by a mine laid by the KNLA. The KNLA had previously warned villagers that it had planted mines in the area.\(^{74}\)

On 16 February 2023, two residents of Pweh Pah village in Hpapun township, Kayin state, stepped on mines laid by the KNLA near a Myanmar Armed Forces camp.\(^{75}\)

On 12 February 2023, two Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were injured after stepping on mines laid by an unknown group near the Paju crossroads in Kutkai township, Shan state.\(^{76}\)

On 2 February 2023, members of the Shanni Nationalities Army were injured after stepping on a mine laid by an unknown group near Na Kata village in Indaw township, Sagaing region.\(^{77}\) On the same day, a resident of Mone village tract in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, was injured by a landmine planted by the KNLA.\(^{78}\)

On 14–15 January 2023, two villagers in Nyaunglebin township, Bago region, stepped on mines planted by the KNLA. The mines were reportedly emplaced by the KNLA after Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had left the area, to prevent them from returning. The KNLA had issued a verbal warning of the danger to villagers.\(^{79}\)


\(^{71}\) It is often difficult to attribute responsibility for each mine incident in Myanmar to a specific armed group. In northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw are engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance: the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the TNLA. Armed conflict among NSAGs has also occurred in the area between the SSA-S, the TNLA, and the SSA-N. Casualties have occurred near to sites of conflict involving all of these groups, though locals were unsure which group(s) had emplaced the mines.

\(^{72}\) KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023," undated.


\(^{74}\) Ibid.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.


\(^{77}\) Ibid.

\(^{78}\) KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023," undated.

\(^{79}\) Ibid.
On 12 January 2023, a woman was injured and her daughter killed by a landmine planted by the Ja Htu Zup People's Militia Force near the Yuzana Factory, in Shar Du Zut village in Hpakant township, Kachin state.80

In December 2022, a PDF medic in Kale township, Sagaing region, laid mines around her house when she learned it would be raided by the military. Troops were later injured by the mines.81

On 12 October 2022, a PDF rebel was killed while maintaining a minefield in Khin-U township, Sagaing region.82

On 7 October 2022, a Rohingya civilian lost both legs to a landmine laid in his courtyard by the Arakan Army in Gudar Pyin village tract in Maungdaw township, Rakhine state.83

On 22 September 2022, a resident of Kone Nee village tract in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, was killed by a mine planted by an unknown group. Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers provided medical treatment but the man died from his wounds.84

On 9 September 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces troops stepped on two landmines in Yung Ngaw village in Kutkai township, Shan state, where KIA forces were positioned.85

In September 2022, villagers said that the Kamarmaung–Ka Taing Tee road in Hpapun township, Kayin state, had been mined by KNLA rebels, Border Guard Forces, and the Myanmar Army.86

On 29 August 2022, Myanmar Army soldiers were injured by mines that had been laid by a PDF in Taungjah village in Sagaing township, Sagaing region.87

On 13 July 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers stepped on two landmines at Nang Zaw Yang road junction in Waingmaw township, Kachin state, which were reportedly planted by the KIA.88

THAILAND

Pattani rebel groups in southern Thailand used improvised antipersonnel landmines sporadically in 2022 and 2023.89

In June 2023, a paramilitary officer was injured after stepping on a landmine while patrolling in Joh Ai Rong district, Narathiwat province.90

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81 "Scores of Myanmar Junta Troops Hit by Land Mines While Raiding Resistance Member's Home," The Irrawaddy, 8 December 2022, bit.ly/TheIrrawaddy8Dec2022.
83 The victim had fled their village at the start of armed conflict, but returned once the Myanmar Armed Forces had pushed the Arakan Army out. Upon return to check on their home after conflict halted, they stepped on the landmine and were subsequently treated for their injury at a military field hospital in the northern part of the village tract. See, M. S. Zaman, "Landmine explosion in Rohingya village; Rohingya man receives serious injury," Rohingya Khobar, 8 October 2022, bit.ly/RohingyaKhobar8Oct2022.
84 KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023," undated.
86 KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the ICBL: August 2022–August 2023," undated.
90 "One Ranger was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine in the area of Ai Rong, Narathiwat," The Reporters, 10 June 2023, bit.ly/TheReporters10June2023.
On 15 August 2022, a woman working at a rubber plantation in Sungai Padi district, Narathiwat province, was injured after stepping on a mine. A Royal Thai Army soldier was killed and six police officers were injured by a second mine that exploded near the site of the first incident.  

TUNISIA

In Tunisia, the Monitor has reported the use of victim-activated IEDs by Islamist groups based in the mountains of Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate for more than a decade. In April 2023, a shepherd was injured after stepping on a mine in a mountainous area of Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate, near the border with Algeria. It is unclear exactly when the mine was laid.

IMPROVISED ANTIPERSONNEL MINE USE IN THE SAHEL

Islamist NSAGs have used improvised antipersonnel landmines in at least eight States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in the Sahel region of Africa since mid-2022: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was reported to be responsible for mine use in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Togo. The Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP), or Boko Haram, was responsible for use in Niger and Nigeria. Mine use in Algeria was attributed to Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Islamist groups were also responsible for incidents in Egypt’s Sinai region. Specific examples include:

- In Algeria, on 13 January 2023, an IED presumably planted by AQIM killed four hunters in Boudkhar, in the commune of Babar, Khenchela.
- In Benin, on 23 December 2022, two young children were injured in an IED explosion in Kofounou. It is not known which group emplaced the device.
- In Burkina Faso, on 2 March 2023, a child riding a bicycle was seriously wounded after hitting an IED likely planted by JNIM militants in Koalou, Kompienga.
- In the DRC, on 2 December 2022, a man was killed by a landmine planted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Lumanza, North-Kivu province, as he was going to his field. The Monitor had previously reported on mine use by the ADF in 2021 and 2005.
- In Mali, on 6 February 2023, two farmers were killed in an IED explosion between Niono and Tiemaba, in the Segou region. The device was likely planted by JNIM militants.
- In Niger, on 16 October 2022, two pastoralist women were killed, and two others injured, by a roadside IED likely planted by ISWAP near Boulala Gana, in the Diffa region.
- In Nigeria, on 22 June 2022, an IED buried by Boko Haram rebels in Ngala, Borno state, exploded after it was stepped on by an internally displaced person (IDP). The victim, who was searching for firewood at the time of the blast, was killed instantly.
- In Togo, on 4 December 2022, two children were killed when their cart hit an IED likely planted by JNIM militants in the village of Kpembonle, Savanes.
- In Egypt, on 20 February 2022, an IED planted by the Islamic State in Sheikh Zuwayid, in the north Sinai, detonated, killing a young girl and injuring two other children.

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

There are a total of 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Of these, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.94 The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory. No states acceded to the treaty during the reporting period. The last to do so were Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in December 2017.

The administration of President Joe Biden realigned US policy with most core provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty in June 2022, and again set the goal of ultimately joining the treaty. Yet little public information is available on how this policy is being implemented.95 For the first time, there was open discussion in two States Parties in 2022–2023 about potentially withdrawing from the Mine Ban Treaty. Article 20 of the Mine Ban Treaty permits withdrawal according to specific procedures and with certain conditions, including that a State Party engaged in armed conflict is not allowed to withdraw from the treaty before the end of the conflict. The treaty is also not subject to reservations.

On 21 June 2023, Eritrea informed the UN Secretary-General in a letter of the government’s decision to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty. However, on 2 October 2023, Eritrea submitted a subsequent letter to the Treaty Section of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, rescinding its previous letter of withdrawal and committing to remain a State Party.96 In late 2022, in Estonia, the Conservative People’s Party proposed that Estonia withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty and acquire and use antipersonnel mines, given the threat posed by Russia. The party’s parliamentary motion failed. Estonia’s Ministry of Defence argued that antipersonnel mines would not provide a military advantage in deterring a potential attack, and would make it more difficult to cooperate with military allies.97

ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTION

Over the past 25 years, a key annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an opportunity to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian approach and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.98

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94 Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the treaty’s 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.


96 Letter from the State of Eritrea to the UN Secretary-General, 21 June 2023; and letter from the State of Eritrea to the Treaty Section of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, 2 October 2023.


98 This includes Belarus, Bhutan, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Türkiye.
On 7 December 2022, a total of 167 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 77/63, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. No state voted against the resolution, while 17 abstained.99

Support for the annual UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty fell slightly compared to 2021, which was the fourth consecutive year when 169 states voted in favor.


Several countries explained their vote, including South Korea, which reiterated that it "sincerely supports the objectives and purposes of the Ottawa Convention," while repeating its long-held position that "due to the unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula we are currently not a party to the Convention."100

A core of 13 states not party have consistently abstained from consecutive UNGA resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.101

PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states have produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.102 As many as 40 states have ceased production, including three states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.103

The Monitor has added Armenia to its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines, bringing the list to a total of 12 countries: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

Most of the countries listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.104 India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia appear most likely to be actively producing antipersonnel mines. The Monitor removed

99 “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” UNGA Resolution 77/63, 7 December 2022, bit.ly/UNGAResolutionMBT7Dec2022. The 17 states that abstained were: Central African Republic, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

100 South Korea Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.40, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 1 November 2022, p. 33, bit.ly/SouthKoreaVoteExplanation1Nov2022. In June 2022, an official told the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty that "the Republic of Korea, in light of the Korean Peninsula's unique security situation, is unable to accede to the convention at this juncture," but added, "we nevertheless, support the Ottawa Convention's objectives and purposes of the convention." See, statement of South Korea, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022, bit.ly/SouthKoreaStatementJune2022.

101 Of these states, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US are party to CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW Protocol II; and Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria remain outside of any treaty-based prohibition or regulation on antipersonnel mines.

102 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included within that list are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear whether Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.

103 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BIH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Uganda, UK, and Zimbabwe.

the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines. 105

In September 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense released a statement, along with a video, claiming to have found 100 Armenian-made PMN-E antipersonnel mines, eight PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, and 10 antivehicle landmines. 106 Later that month, as hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan reignited, Azerbaijan claimed that Armenian forces had "mined the territories and supply roads" of Azerbaijani army units. 107 These initial claims of Armenian production of antipersonnel mines were difficult to confirm via non-Azerbaijani sources.

In August 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense claimed to have cleared a total of 1,318 PMN-E antipersonnel mines in the Lachin region. 108 Armenia denied these claims and stated in a letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), dated 13 September 2022, that Azerbaijan was "disseminating false information...in preparation for launching armed aggression." 109 However, since these allegations emerged, reputable technical sources have now listed the PMN-E antipersonnel mine and attributed its production to Armenia. 110 While many questions remain about the origin and specific production details of the PMN-E mine, the Monitor considers that "production" could also include modifying the original manufacturer's product for improved performance in combat and then re-loading, re-assembling, and re-packaging the items into a condition suitable for storage or use.

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. 111 Some of these new mine types were first seen publicly during annual military exercises in 2021, including POM-3 rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines, which had been unattributed in previous years.

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105 The US was previously removed from the list of producers in 2014, only to be added back on to the list in 2020 following a decision by the administration of President Donald Trump to roll-back the ban on US mine production.


109 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN, addressed to the President of the UNSC, 13 September 2022, bit.ly/ArmeniaLetterUNSC13Sept2022.


Russia also tested newly-developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine. Markings on some of the mines used by Russia in Ukraine in 2022–2023 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including the POM-3 antipersonnel mine. In October 2022, Ukrainian forces also displayed a new directional fragmentation Claymore-type mine, designated as MOB, which they claimed had been captured from Russian forces.

Production of antipersonnel mines has occurred in India since 2016. In December 2021, the first of 700,000 "Nipun" antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military as a replacement for the M-14 antipersonnel mine. At least two other mine types are reportedly under development, including "Ulka," a bounding antipersonnel fragmentation landmine, and "Parth," a directional antipersonnel landmine. A procurement announcement by the Indian government in August 2020 called for the domestic manufacture of an antipersonnel fragmentation mine. Previously, in 2019, the Ordnance Factory Board sent out a tender to local manufacturers for one million M-14 mines, to be delivered at a rate of 200,000 per year.

India also produces the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, with warheads that can lay antipersonnel landmines. In September 2022, it was reported that Armenia had ordered the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher from private companies in India, though it is not known if this order included the antipersonnel mine laying variant of the system.

NSAGs have produced improvised mines in Colombia, Egypt, India, Myanmar, and Thailand.
TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing the annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting antipersonnel mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary. 121

STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

STATES NOT PARTY

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines. 122 In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the collective total in the stocks of states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty may be less than 50 million. 123

It is unclear whether all 30 states not party thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines are currently doing so. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as part of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Mines stockpiled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>26.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6 million (estimated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4 – 5 million (estimated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>“less than” 5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>approximately 45 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

| Armenia | Azerbaijan | Bahrain | China | Cuba | Egypt | Georgia | India | Iran | Israel | Kazakhstan | Korea, North | Korea, South | Kyrgyzstan | Lao PDR | Lebanon | Libya | Mongolia | Morocco | Myanmar |
|---------|------------|---------|-------|------|-------|---------|-------|------|--------|------------|--------------|-------------|------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|

121 The Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that deminers in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to the Monitor by the HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining operators working in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

122 Three states not party, all in the Asia-Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga.

123 In 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile was “less than” five million, though there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated by the Monitor to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY STATES PARTIES

Of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 161 do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 94 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, and 67 which confirmed that they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except for, in some cases, for training in detection and clearance techniques).

States Parties have collectively destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. Sri Lanka was the last State Party to complete its obligation to destroy its stocks in October 2021.\(^\text{124}\)

Two States Parties possess a combined total of 3.7 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3,364,433) and Greece (343,413).

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had an initial deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine's deadline was 1 June 2010.\(^\text{125}\)

Greece did not destroy any stockpiled mines in 2020–2022. In June 2023, Greece announced that its remaining stocks of antipersonnel landmines would be transferred to Croatia, where they will be destroyed over the next 18 months.\(^\text{126}\)

Ukraine has destroyed 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date, constituting more than half of its total stocks.\(^\text{127}\) In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report covering 2022, Ukraine declared a stockpile 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprised of 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.\(^\text{128}\)

Ukraine reported in April 2023 that its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines are stored in military warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and “will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” However, Ukraine also noted that, “if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and [after] carrying out relevant inspections.”\(^\text{129}\) In June 2023, Ukraine told States Parties at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva that it needs time to audit and conduct verification of the stockpile.

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127 On 18 May 2010, Ukraine officially informed States Parties in a note verbale that “it will be unable to comply with its Article 4 obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines by 1 June 2010 deadline.” At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2010, after Ukraine missed its deadline, Ukraine’s representative noted that this is not “unexpected information to States Parties” and that “Ukraine remains open for the fruitful cooperation with States Parties and potential donors and hopes for the practical assistance to make Ukraine territory free from stockpiles of PFM-type as soon as possible.” See, statement of Amb. Oleksandr Nykonenko, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2010.

128 This quantity is the same amount reported to be in Ukraine’s stockpile in 2020. Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 25 April 2023, Forms B and G. The OZM-4 mines were stored in Crimea.

129 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 25 April 2023, Form B.
Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{130}

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which armed group had produced the mines.\textsuperscript{131}

**MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH**

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 66 States Parties retain antipersonnel landmines for training and research purposes. Twenty-five States Parties retain more than 1,000 mines each, including two (Bangladesh and Finland) that each retain more than 12,000 mines. Angola and Peru collectively used a total of 1,142 retained mines during 2022, decreasing their retained mines to under 1,000 respectively.\textsuperscript{132}

Forty-one States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines. Another 97 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 44 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past.\textsuperscript{133} Nigeria, which initially declared 3,364 retained mines in 2011, reported having no retained mines in 2022.\textsuperscript{134} Nicaragua and Portugal, which also previously reported 435 and 383 retained mines respectively, reported no retained mines in 2022 according to their Article 7 reports.

In addition to those listed in the following table, the 41 States Parties each retaining fewer than 1,000 mines collectively possess a total of 15,264 mines.\textsuperscript{135} The total increased by 1,091 on the previous year, with Angola and Peru added to this list in 2022. Thirteen of these states consumed a combined total of 2,259 retained antipersonnel mines in 2022.\textsuperscript{136} Twenty States Parties that retain under 1,000 mines have not yet submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2022.\textsuperscript{137}

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\textsuperscript{130} Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.


\textsuperscript{132} Angola retains 536 mines and Peru retains 956 mines. See, Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022); and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022).

\textsuperscript{133} Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report so is not reflected in these figures.

\textsuperscript{134} In May 2023, Nigeria reported that “Nigeria has destroyed all AP [antipersonnel] mines in the stockpile of the Nigerian Army. Nigeria currently has nil stock of AP mines and does not use AP mines.” See, Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022).

\textsuperscript{135} States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Spain (976), Belgium (958), Peru (956), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Honduras (826), BIH (817), Mauritania (728), Japan (617), Slovakia (590), Italy (563), South Africa (545), Angola (536), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Cyprus (410), Guyana (360), Republic of the Congo (322), Sudan (298), Côte d'Ivoire (290), Germany (271), Slovenia (229), Netherlands (204), Suriname (150), Bhutan (146), Cape Verde (120), Tajikistan (115), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100), Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Ireland (49), Benin (30), Denmark (28), Guinea-Bissau (9), South Sudan (8), Burundi (4), and DRC (2).

\textsuperscript{136} States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines and reported consumption of retained mines in 2022: Angola (768), Nicaragua (435), Portugal (383), Peru (375), Netherlands (66), Bhutan (65), Slovakia (60), Japan (46), Tajikistan (25), BIH (17), Belgium (9), Germany (8), and Ireland (2).

\textsuperscript{137} States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines that did not submit an Article 7 report for 2022, as of 5 October 2023: Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, and Togo.
The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that retain mines but are apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these states, the number of retained mines has stayed the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

Five States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

- Djibouti and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
- Burundi, Cape Verde, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last declared total (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Consumed during 2022</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Total quantity reduced as excess to need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15,665 (2022)</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,050 (2021)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>9,825 (2022)</td>
<td>21,153</td>
<td>4,664</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>5,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>5,728 (2022)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,527 (2022)</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,173 (2022)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,874 (2011)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4,489 (2022)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,320 (2022)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2020)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3,747 (2022)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,445 (2022)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,134 (2022)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2,102 (2022)</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,050 (2020)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,000 (2020)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1,836 (2022)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,770 (2022)</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,660 (2022)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,475 (2022)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2022</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1,298 (2022)</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>103,358</strong></td>
<td><strong>188,014</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,710</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,083</strong></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/R=not reported.

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that retain mines but are apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these states, the number of retained mines has stayed the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

Five States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

- Djibouti and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
- Burundi, Cape Verde, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).
The Oslo Action Plan requires each State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to "annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes," and to "destroy all antipersonnel mines that exceed that number."138

States Parties agreed to Action 49, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an "early warning mechanism." Action 49 states that "If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned."139

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.140

**TRANSPARENCY REPORTING**

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party "report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2023, only 75 States Parties (46%) had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2022.141 A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2022, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.142 The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2022 was less than that of 2021.

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139 Ibid., Action 49.

140 States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BIH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and UK.

141 The 75 States Parties that submitted an Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2022 (as of 15 October 2023): Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, BIH, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palestine, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, UK, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

142 The 89 States Parties that have not submitted Article 7 reports for calendar year 2022 (as of 15 October 2023); those that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, DDR, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, North Macedonia, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
Morocco, a state not party, has submitted 12 voluntary transparency reports since 2006.\textsuperscript{143} States not party Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR (2011), and Mongolia (2007) have also previously submitted voluntary reports. Palestine (2012–2013) and Sri Lanka (2005) also submitted voluntary reports prior to acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, which included information on contamination, clearance, casualties, and victim assistance in Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{144}


\textsuperscript{144} The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario). Polisario’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU) but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the UN, which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.
STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY

MAP KEY
- States Parties (164)
- Signatories (1)
- Non-signatories (32)

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
APOPO staff teach children to recognize, avoid, and report mine threats at Chilotlela Primary School in the district of Chiredzi, in Zimbabwe's Masvingo province.

© APOPO/Bad Rabbit Studio, February 2023
INTRODUCTION

This chapter highlights developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the negative impact caused by the use of antipersonnel landmines. It reflects on the progress of States Parties toward meeting their Mine Ban Treaty obligations and the objectives contained in the five-year Oslo Action Plan, adopted at the treaty’s Fourth Review Conference in November 2019.

The first part of this overview covers landmine contamination and casualties, while the second part focuses on efforts to address the impact of mine use through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. These make up three of the five core components or “pillars” of mine action.

In 2022, at least 4,710 people were killed or injured by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) globally. This represents a fall from 5,544 casualties recorded in 2021, and is primarily due to a significant decline in the number of reported casualties in Afghanistan, where the data collection system was under-resourced. Syria recorded the most mine/ERW casualties of any state in 2022, followed by Ukraine.

New casualties were recorded in 49 states in 2022, including 37 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. States Parties accounted for almost two-thirds of all annual casualties. Most casualties in 2022 occurred in conflict-affected countries that are contaminated by improvised mines.

Positive progress was reported, as 497.34km² of land known or suspected to be contaminated by antipersonnel landmines was released by States Parties with clearance obligations in 2022—almost double the area released in 2021, which totaled 276km². Of the land released in 2022, 219.31km² was cleared, while 121.11km² was reduced via technical survey and 156.92km² was canceled through non-technical survey. In total, 169,276 antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed during clearance activities in 2022.
Despite this progress, the outlook for meeting the aspirational goal set by States Parties in 2014 “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025,” looks unlikely to be met. In 2022, no State Party reported completing their obligation under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty to clear all contaminated areas. Four States Parties with clearance obligations did not undertake any clearance activities in 2022, while another six did not formally report on their Article 5 obligations. Twenty States Parties have deadlines to meet their obligations under Article 5 either before or during 2025, but very few appear on track to meet their deadline.

Ongoing armed conflict in some States Parties and the use of improvised mines is compounding the complexity of the challenge of survey and clearance. As of October 2023, at least 24 States Parties are believed or known to have improvised mine contamination.

Risk education on the threat from mines and ERW is a crucial intervention, as people continue to live and work in or near contaminated areas. Of the 33 States Parties with clearance obligations, 28 reported or are known to have provided risk education during 2022. These activities focused predominantly on rural communities in contaminated areas, as well as on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees. Children and men remained the primary at-risk groups. National capacity-building, often via training of trainers programs, and the integration of risk education into other humanitarian, development, and protection initiatives, took place in the majority of States Parties that reported carrying out risk education in 2022.

Victim assistance is an enduring obligation that requires sustained efforts, including by States Parties that have been declared mine-free as well as those that remain contaminated. At least 37 States Parties are recognized to have responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims. Broader disability rights frameworks, and a newly-updated International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) on victim assistance, aid victim assistance efforts in these states. Yet a lack of funding remained a major impediment to addressing victims’ needs, while health systems suffered from economic crises, armed conflict, and natural disasters in several countries. The work of States Parties, and their implementing partners, to meet the commitments made in the Oslo Action Plan to improve victim assistance—including emergency medical response, ongoing healthcare and rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and socio-economic inclusion—remains vital.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

The use of antipersonnel mines has caused widespread contamination globally. As of October 2023, at least 60 states and other areas are contaminated with antipersonnel mines. This includes 33 States Parties with current clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, in addition to 22 states not party and five other areas.

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

States Parties with Article 5 obligations

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties with contamination are required to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that country.

1 The 2025 goal for clearance was agreed by States Parties at the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014, and reaffirmed at the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in 2019.

2 Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.
As of October 2023, a total of 33 States Parties had current Article 5 clearance obligations, having reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control.

### States Parties with declared Article 5 obligations as of October 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Current Deadline</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Current Deadline</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2025</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2027</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 January 2025</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2027</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2026</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus**</td>
<td>1 July 2025</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2027</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea***</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>31 December 2026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 December 2023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2028</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2028</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>31 December 2026</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The United Kingdom (UK) also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory and completed mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

***Eritrea has been in non-compliance with the treaty since missing its Article 5 deadline in 2020.

Another ten States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, the Philippines, Togo, Tunisia, and Venezuela—may be contaminated by improvised landmines. These States Parties should provide information on whether the devices are victim-activated and, if so, clear them under Article 5. The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of how they were manufactured (improvised or factory-made).

### States Parties that have completed clearance

No States Parties reported completing clearance of antipersonnel mines in 2022. The last States Parties to do so were Chile and the United Kingdom (UK), in 2020. Since the treaty came into force on 1 March 1999, a total of 30 States Parties have reported clearance of all mined areas from their territory.³ State Party El Salvador completed mine clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force.

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³ Three additional States Parties reported completion of clearance: Guinea-Bissau (in 2012), Mauritania (in 2018), and Nigeria (in 2011). All have since reported newly-discovered mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and have been removed from this list.
### States Parties that have declared fulfillment of clearance obligations since 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Djibouti, Honduras</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Guatemala, Suriname</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Eswatini</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>France, Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Albania, Greece, Rwanda, Tunisia, Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Nicaragua*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Jordan, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Bhutan, Germany, Hungary, Venezuela*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Mozambique*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Algeria*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Chile, UK</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Algeria, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Tunisia have reported, or are suspected to have, residual contamination. Mozambique, Tunisia, and Venezuela are suspected to have improvised mine contamination. Several States Parties that had declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines later discovered previously unknown contamination or had to verify that areas had been cleared to humanitarian standards. Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Jordan each declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations several years after their initial declaration of completion.

Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria each reported discovering further contamination after declaring completion under Article 5, and submitted extension requests in 2020–2021.

### Extent of contamination in States Parties

Eight States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Türkiye, and Ukraine—have reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination (more than 100km²). The extent of contamination in Ethiopia and Ukraine cannot be reliably determined until survey has been conducted. In Ukraine, the ongoing conflict is adding to the contamination.

Large contamination by antipersonnel landmines (20–99km²) is reported in five States Parties: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Thailand, and Yemen.

Medium contamination (5–19km²) is reported in six States Parties: Mauritania, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe.

Twelve States Parties have reported less than 5km² of contamination: Colombia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and Somalia.

The extent of contamination in Nigeria is not known.

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**Footnotes:**


5. Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination from civilians living close to the areas.

6. African Union (AU), “Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF),” 2 November 2022, bit.ly/EthiopiaTPLF2Nov2022. In Ethiopia, it is expected that the contamination estimate will be significantly reduced after survey.
Estimated antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massive (more than 100km²)</th>
<th>Large (20–99km²)</th>
<th>Medium (5–19km²)</th>
<th>Small (less than 5km²)</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ethiopia and Ukraine have reported massive contamination, though this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.
**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

**Americas**

As of the end of 2022, Colombia reported 3.81km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, across 76 municipalities and 16 departments. The contamination, mostly from improvised landmines, covered 261 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 1.95km² and 312 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totaling 1.86km². Colombia reported that 80 new SHAs totaling 0.74km² and 93 CHAs totaling 0.61km² were identified in 2022. Eighteen municipalities were declared mine-free in 2022. A further 157 municipalities in Colombia were known or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel landmines, though the extent of their contamination remained unknown. This includes 122 municipalities that were not accessible for security reasons.⁷

Ecuador and Peru each have a very small amount of remaining mine contamination. As of the end of 2022, Ecuador had 0.04km² of contaminated land (0.03km² CHA and 0.01km² SHA), containing approximately 2,941 mines.⁸ Mine contamination in Peru totaled 0.34km² across 87 SHAs.⁹ Peru reported to have completed clearance in Tiwinza sector during 2022, with its remaining mine contamination located in the sectors of Achuime, Cenepa, and Santiago.¹⁰

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⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angela Patricia Cortes Sanchez, Advisor, AICMA, 24 May 2023.
⁹ Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, pp. 33 and 38–44. This included 12 municipalities that were prioritized but not yet assigned to operators, 23 for which contamination data was not reported, and 122 where contamination remained unknown due to inaccessibility.
¹¹ Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C, p. 5.
¹² Ibid.
East and South Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan reported antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 144.93km² (119.94km² CHA and 24.99km² SHA) as of the end of 2022. This included 51.14km² of improvised landmine contamination. In addition, Afghanistan reported 35.89km² of mixed contamination from antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW.13

As of the end of 2022, Cambodia reported 7,392 SHAs with landmine contamination totaling 681.28km².14 The northwest region bordering Thailand is heavily affected, while other parts of the country in the east and northeast are primarily affected by ERW, including cluster munition remnants. Much of the remaining mine contamination in Cambodia and Thailand is along their shared border; where despite improved cross-border cooperation between the two states, access remains a challenge due to a lack of border demarcation.15

Contamination in Sri Lanka remains in the Northern, Eastern, and North Central provinces, and has increased due to newly-identified, previously unknown mined areas.16 As of the end of 2022, Sri Lanka reported 15.43km² of contaminated land covering 534 CHAs (13.52km²) and 87 SHAs (1.91km²).17 The most significant mine contamination (14.58km²) is found in five districts of Northern province, which were the site of intense fighting during the civil war.18

Thailand reported 29.69km² of contamination across six provinces, with 18.13km² classified as CHA and 11.56km² as SHA.19 Some of this contamination is on the border with Cambodia, affecting land yet to be demarcated, though efforts were made in 2022 to strengthen bilateral cooperation on demining.20 Thailand has also experienced the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by insurgents in the south. Yet the extent of this contamination is unknown and has not been recorded by the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC).21

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

BiH reported extensive antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 869.61km² (18.17km² CHA and 851.44km² SHA) as of the end of 2022.22 This represented a decrease from the 922.37km² reported as of the end of 2021, primarily due to cancelation of SHA.23

As of the end of 2022, Croatia reported mine contamination totaling 149.7km² (99.4km² CHA and 50.3km² SHA) across six of its 21 counties, down from 204.4km² reported as of the end of 2021. An additional 19.8km³ of contaminated land in Croatia is under military

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16 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C, p. 5.
17 Ibid., p. 4.
18 The five districts are: Jaffna, Kilinochi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya.
19 The six provinces are: Buri Ram, Sa Kaeo, Si Sa Ket, Surin, Trat, and Ubon Ratchathani.
Most of the remaining contamination is reported to be in forested areas, where clearance projects are aligned with conservation and nature protection regulations.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Cyprus} is believed to have 1.24km\(^2\) of antipersonnel and antivehicle landmine contamination (0.43km\(^2\) CHA and 0.81km\(^2\) SHA) across 29 areas. Yet the contamination is reported to be only in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone, and not in territory under the effective control of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Serbia} reported 0.39km\(^2\) of mine contamination across three areas in Bujanovac municipality, all classified as SHA.\textsuperscript{27} Areas suspected to be contaminated after explosions caused by forest fires in Bujanovac in 2019 and 2021 have not yet been surveyed.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Tajikistan} reported 11.45km\(^2\) of antipersonnel mine contamination (6.95km\(^2\) CHA and 4.5km\(^2\) SHA) as of the end of 2022. The majority of the SHA is located on the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan border, covering 3.25km\(^2\) across 54 areas.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{Türkiye} reported 133.39km\(^2\) CHA, across 3,701 areas. Most contaminated areas are along its borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, whilst 918 of the areas are not in border regions.\textsuperscript{30} Türkiye began conducting non-technical survey in June 2021, and intends to complete survey of all contaminated areas by the end of 2023.\textsuperscript{31} In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, there is contamination from improvised mines and other explosive devices laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs).\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Ukraine} has experienced significant new contamination since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.\textsuperscript{33} As of March 2023, only 50km\(^2\) had been identified as contaminated by mines/ERW via non-technical survey, with clearance efforts mainly focused on critical infrastructure and population centers.\textsuperscript{24} In June 2023, the country's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) reported that 160,000km\(^2\) of Ukrainian territory had been exposed to conflict and would require survey.\textsuperscript{34} In contrast, in 2018, Ukraine provided an estimate of 7,000km\(^2\) of undifferentiated contamination, including by antipersonnel

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C, pp. 9–11.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Civil Protection Directorate (CPD), 16 March 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Emails from Mark Connelly, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 11 March, 18 May, and 28 May 2021; and UNMAS, "Where We Work: Cyprus," updated March 2023, bit.ly/UNMASCyprusMarch2023.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 7; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Sladana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 9 May 2023.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 7–8.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2021, p. 5, bit.ly/TurkiyeMBTArt5ExtRequest2021.
\item \textsuperscript{33} HRW, "Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine," 15 June 2022, bit.ly/HRWUkraineBriefing15June2022.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline extension request, 31 March 2023, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023.
\end{itemize}
mines, in government-controlled areas within the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and another 14,000km² in areas not controlled by the government.³⁶

**Middle East and North Africa**

**Iraq** is dealing with contamination by improvised landmines in areas liberated from the Islamic State—in addition to legacy mine contamination from the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by a United States (US)-led coalition. As of the end of 2022, Iraq reported 1,189.09km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, and an additional 550.8km² of contamination from IEDs, including improvised mines. Most of the contamination is located in territory under the government of Federal Iraq.³⁷

**Oman** reported that all mined areas were cleared before it joined the Mine Ban Treaty, but that the process is being "re-inspected" to address any residual risk.³⁸ In 2021, Oman developed a workplan to release its remaining 0.51km² of suspected mined areas by April 2024, without providing further details on this estimate.³⁹ As of October 2023, Oman had not submitted an Article 7 report to update on progress made in 2022.

During 2022, **Palestine** made significant progress in understanding the type and extent of its landmine contamination. Palestine reported 0.32km² of mine contamination in total, of which 0.25km² was contaminated with antipersonnel mines and 0.07km² was mixed contamination, comprised of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.⁴⁰ Minefields located in Jenin and the Jordan Valley were pending clearance as of March 2023.⁴¹

Up to 2022, the scale and impact of conflict in **Yemen** had prevented a clear understanding of the level of mine contamination, which was estimated to be massive. However, as of the end of 2022, estimated contamination with antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines, had been reduced to 51.97km² (33.69km² CHA and 18.28km² SHA). This new calculation is based on information collected through a baseline survey that started in 2022. The baseline survey is expected to be completed in 2023.⁴²

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

As of the end of 2022, **Angola** reported total antipersonnel mine contamination of 68km² across 16 provinces and 1,142 areas. A total of 65.36km² was classified as CHA and 2.64km² as SHA. Cuando Cubango and Moxico are the most heavily contaminated provinces, with 16.8km² and 11.8km² respectively.⁴³

As of the end of 2022, **Chad** had identified a total of 120 hazardous areas, with 72 classified as CHA in the provinces of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti. Contamination was reported to be...
mixed including improvised mines, and covered a total area of 77.69km² (56.02km² CHA and 21.68km² SHA). Over half of Chad's contamination (43.24km²) was in Tibesti province.44

The remaining mine contamination in the DRC is small. In March 2022, after a national survey and clean-up of the national database, the DRC reported contamination totaling 0.4km² across 37 CHAs, but highlighted that it still had areas left to survey on the borders with South Sudan and Uganda.45 Improvised landmine contamination has been identified in Ituri and North-Kivu provinces.46 These improvised mines were reportedly emplaced on agricultural land, to prevent farmers working in their fields.47 As of October 2023, the DRC reported a total of 0.32km² of CHA contaminated with antipersonnel mines.48

Eritrea has not reported on the extent of its contamination since 2014, when it was estimated to have 33.5km² of contaminated land.49 Eritrea is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by virtue of its failure to submit an Article 5 extension request after missing its 2020 clearance deadline.

In June 2022, Ethiopia reported contamination of 726.07km² across 152 areas in six provinces; the same figure reported since April 2020. Of this, 29 areas were classified as CHA (3.52km²) and 123 areas as SHA (722.55km²).50 Most SHAs are located in the Somali region. It is believed that the baseline figure is an overestimate, and that only 2% of these areas contain landmines.51 The conflict in northern Ethiopia since late 2020 has resulted in contamination from explosive ordnance, though the extent and type is yet to be fully

48 Email from Elysee Kibiribiri, Advocacy and Victim Assistance Manager, Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL), 27 September 2023. Information collected from CCLAM by the CCBL.
established.\textsuperscript{52} Separate armed conflicts are ongoing in other regions of Ethiopia, such as Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia.\textsuperscript{53}

Guinea-Bissau declared fulfillment of its clearance obligations in December 2012, but in 2021 reported the presence of "previously unknown mined areas" containing antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW. A total of nine CHAs were reported across the northern provinces of Cacheu and Oio, and the southern provinces of Quebo and Tombali. An additional 43 areas were suspected to contain both mines and ERW. As of the end of 2022, Guinea-Bissau reported that the nine CHAs totaled 1.09km², with no further progress made on surveying 43 previously reported SHAs.\textsuperscript{54}

Mauritania declared clearance of all known contamination in 2018, but later identified new mined areas.\textsuperscript{55} As of the end of 2022, Mauritania reported 16km² of landmine contamination including at least 0.54km² contaminated by antivehicle mines.\textsuperscript{56}

In 2021, Niger reported 0.18km² of CHA, adjacent to a military post in Madama, in the Agadez region.\textsuperscript{57} This figure has not changed since its Article 5 extension request was granted in 2020. In 2022, Niger reported that it could not guarantee clearance would be completed by its 2024 deadline, due to challenges including weather conditions, lack of funding, and the threat posed by NSAGs.\textsuperscript{58} Niger is also contaminated by improvised mines.\textsuperscript{60}

In 2019, Nigeria reported improvised mine contamination.\textsuperscript{61} The contamination affects mainly the three northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.\textsuperscript{62} Nigeria was granted a second extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline in 2021. As of May 2023, Nigeria


\textsuperscript{55} Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, pp. 6, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022.

\textsuperscript{56} Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequest2020.

\textsuperscript{57} Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), p. 6.


had not yet been able to conduct a comprehensive survey to determine the full extent of contamination.65

Senegal reported that after non-technical survey undertaken in 2020, a total of 37 hazardous areas had been identified, covering 0.49km².64 As of the end of 2022, Senegal reported that 21 CHAs covering an area of 0.21km² remained to be addressed. Areas with known contamination were located in Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye, and Zinguinchor departments.65 In addition, 11 SHAs of unknown size were reported but had not yet been surveyed due to insecurity.66 Eight SHAs were located in Bignona and three in Goudomp. Another 116 localities also remained to be surveyed, including 101 areas in Bignona, 11 in Ziguinchor, and four in Oussouye.67

In September 2021, Somalia reported 6.1km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, within its total 161.8km² of mixed contamination, which included antivehicle landmines.68 Somalia has also reported increased use of improvised mines.69 In 2022, Somalia reported progress toward understanding the nature and extent of contamination, including in the states of Jubaland and Puntland. As of the end of 2022, Somalia reported a total of 124.23km² of mixed contamination including antipersonnel mines (55.47km² CHA and 68.76km² SHA). Of this, 0.56km² contains only antipersonnel mines.70 Some areas in Somalia remain unsurveyed due to conflict.71

South Sudan reported 5.41km² of landmine contamination as of May 2023, with 3.05km² CHA and 2.36km² SHA across eight states. The largest SHA, in Jonglei state, totaled 1.65km².72

As of the end of 2021, Sudan reported 13.28km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, with 3.32km² CHA and 9.96km² SHA across the states of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan.73 The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) reported the identification of 255 new SHAs and CHAs during 2022.74 However, as of March 2023, UNMAS reported that 138.09km² of the recorded 172km² of contaminated land had been released.75

As of the end of 2022, contamination in Zimbabwe totaled 18.31km². This contamination is all classified as CHA and is mostly located along Zimbabwe's border with Mozambique in four provinces, with one inland minefield in Matabeleland North province.76

65 Ibid., pp. 8–10.
66 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), pp. 3–4 and 8–10; and Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form D, p. 3.
71 Ibid., p. 16.
Suspected improvised (antipersonnel) mine contamination in States Parties

IEDs that are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.77

The Oslo Action Plan recognizes that the “new use of antipersonnel mines in recent conflicts, including those of an improvised nature, has added to the remaining challenge of some States Parties in fulfilling their commitments under Article 5.” Action 21 of the Oslo Action Plan lays out the commitment for States Parties affected by improvised mines to clear them under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and to provide regular information on the extent of contamination, disaggregated by type of mine, in their annual transparency reporting under Article 7.

As of October 2023, at least 24 States Parties are believed or known to have improvised mine contamination.78 Ten of these states have yet to clarify if any contamination with improvised mines includes victim-activated devices, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some of these states had not yet submitted an Article 7 report for calendar year 2022.

In Burkina Faso, IED use by NSAGs has been recorded since 2016. Pressure-plate improvised antivehicle mines have been increasingly used since 2018, due to the introduction of measures which block signals to command-detonated IEDs. Casualties from improvised landmines were recorded in 2020, 2021, and 2022 in Burkina Faso. Most incidents involved vehicles such as cars, carts, and bicycles, though some incidents involved people walking.79

Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, but since 2014, improvised mines used by Boko Haram have caused casualties, particularly in the north on the border with Nigeria.80 The IED trigger mechanisms used are reportedly diverse and include victim-activated devices.81 An increase in IED use was reported in the Far North region of Cameroon since 2021, targeting state security forces.82 The extent of contamination is unknown but thought to be small.

77 In Monitor reporting, improvised mines are synonymous with victim-activated IEDs. Improvised mines are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines or by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate or crush-wire IEDs.
78 Afghanistan, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.
79 Based on incident notes documented within ACLED data for conflict incidents in Burkina Faso in 2022.
Most incidents in past years involved people traveling by vehicle. In 2022, only one incident involving an improvised mine was recorded, when a device exploded as military personnel were attempting to defuse it.83

In the Central African Republic, conflict between government forces and rebel groups has escalated since 2020, with an increase in the use of improvised mines and IEDs, particularly in the west.84 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that antipersonnel mines were discovered for the first time in the country in April 2022, noting “an alarming rise” in civilian casualties from explosive devices.85 UNOCHA stated that while the devices were “mostly laid on the ground, they explode by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.”86 In February 2023, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) expressed concern that incidents involving landmines and other explosive devices had increased.87 The Central African Republic last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2004.

Mali has confirmed antivehicle landmine contamination, and since 2017 has seen a significant rise in incidents caused by IEDs in the center of the country.88 The Monitor recorded improvised mines and unspecified mine types in Mali in 2022, including in incidents resulting in casualties that were recorded by the National Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.89

Mexico used its Article 7 report to detail the use of IEDs and “artisanal mines” by cartels in the state of Michoacán de Ocampo during 2022. The nature of the fuzing of these devices was not known.90 Such devices appear to include primarily command-detonated roadside bombs and improvised antivehicle landmines.91 In February 2022, the Secretariat of National Defense deployed troops to the state to conduct clearance operations.92 Mexican soldiers were reported to have cleared more than 500 improvised mines between February and April 2022.93

Mozambique was declared mine-free in 2015. It faces a possible threat of contamination from improvised mines due to use of IEDs by insurgents in the northern province of Cabo

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83 Based on incident notes documented within ACLED data for conflict incidents in Cameroon in 2021–2022.
86 OCHA CAR (OCHA_CAR), “It’s getting worse. The #CARCrisis has been facing a new threat since last year, especially in the west: 29 civilians were killed and 29 injured by explosive devices in 60 incidents. Here is the story of Bashir, Saleh and Hortense. #MineAwarenessDay #IMAD2022 @UNMAS @OCHAROWCA.” 4 April 2022, 14:18 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/UNOCHACentralAfricanRepTweet4April2022.
89 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, National Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 26 April 2023.
91 There were at least two incidents in Mexico in 2021 and two in 2022 that resulted in casualties. See, John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn, “Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use,” Homeland Security Today, 8 November 2022, bit.ly/MexicoAVM8Nov2022.
Delgado. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported two IED incidents occurring in March 2023. The Philippines has reported that it has no remaining mined areas, yet risk education is still conducted due to ERW and IED contamination. Casualties from improvised mines continued to be reported in 2022. In November 2022, at the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, the Philippines reiterates that “landmines” are used in “sporadic attacks” by NSAGs including the New People’s Army. The use of improvised mines by other NSAGs has been documented on the southern island of Mindanao.

Togo last submitted an Article 7 report in 2003. It has not reported any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Yet improvised mine use by NSAGs has been reported since 2022 and incidents have caused military and civilian casualties, including children traveling by cart.

Tunisia declared completion of mine clearance in 2009. Yet there is known to be residual contamination. There have also been reports of both military and civilian casualties from new use of landmines—including improvised antipersonnel mines—in the last five years.

Venezuela reported meeting its Article 5 obligations in 2013. In August 2018, local media reports said that Venezuelan military personnel were wounded by an antipersonnel landmine in Catatumbo municipality, Zulia state, along the border with Colombia. Colombian NSAGs were reported in 2022 to be using improvised mines in the area. After a confrontation in March 2021 between Venezuelan troops and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in Victoria, Apure state, a Venezuelan non-governmental organization (NGO) stated that mines “similar to those used in Colombia” were found in the area. Mine contamination was later confirmed by a member of parliament and the Ministry of Defense.
would clear the area, but also requested UN support to clear mines from the border. The Monitor reported eight casualties caused by improvised mines in Venezuela in 2022.

**States Parties with residual contamination**

Five States Parties were known or suspected to have residual mine contamination in 2022.

**Algeria** declared fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations in December 2016, but continues to find and destroy antipersonnel mines. In 2022, Algeria reported clearance of 30.15km² along with the destruction of 1,247 antipersonnel mines; a decrease from 1,725 mines destroyed in 2021 and 8,813 in 2020. The mines were believed to have naturally migrated from areas where they were laid along the Challe and Morice Lines in the 1950s, on the borders of the country.

Mine/ERW casualties have been reported in **Kuwait** since 1990. New casualties were reported in 2022. In 2018, there were reports that torrential rain had unearthed landmines, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War. Landmines are believed to be present mainly on Kuwait’s borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in areas used by shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

**Mozambique** was declared mine-free in 2015 but has since reported residual and isolated mine contamination throughout the country. Four small suspected mined areas, totaling 1,881m², were reported in 2018 to be located underwater in Inhambane province. Mozambique stated that it would address this contamination once the water level had receded, allowing access. Mozambique has provided no further updates on progress in these areas since 2019.

**Nicaragua** declared completion of clearance under Article 5 in April 2010, but has since found residual contamination. Twenty-nine reports of ordnance from the public during 2022 resulted in the clearance of 1,337m² and the destruction of 17 antipersonnel mines and 412 ERW.

**Tunisia** reported in 2009 the clearance of all minefields laid in 1976 and 1980 along its borders with Algeria and Libya. Yet since then, it has reported a residual mine/ERW threat dating from World War II in El Hamma, Mareth, and Matmata in the south; Faiedh and Kasserine in the center of the country; Cap-Bon in the north; and other areas in the northwest. Tunisia has not provided updates on efforts to clear this residual contamination.

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109 Based on Monitor media monitoring of improvised mine incidents in Venezuela during 2022.


113 Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/StatementMozambiqueJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 20 April 2017–1 April 2018), Form F. Mozambique erroneously reported that the total of the areas was “18.888 square meters” in its statement at the intersessional meetings, and “1.118m²” across four tasks in its 2019 Article 7 transparency report. See, Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2018–31 March 2019), Form C, p. 4.


ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS

Twenty-two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas have, or are believed to have, land contaminated by antipersonnel mines on their territory.

States not party and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abkhazia</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: other areas are indicated in *italicics*.

States not party

The extent of contamination is unknown in most states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

The extent of mine contamination in Azerbaijan is not known. After the conflict with Armenia ended in September 2020, Azerbaijan gained control of areas along the former line of contact—an area heavily contaminated with mines/ERW. In 2023, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported that it would prioritize conducting systematic survey of suspected mined areas to gain a better understanding of the extent of contamination.118

In Georgia, five landmine contaminated areas remain in Tbilisi-administered territory, totaling 2.25km² (0.02km² contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 2.23km² of mixed contamination including antivehicle mines). The largest minefield (2.2km²) is known as the “Red Bridge”—a seven kilometer-long mine belt along Georgia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The full extent of contamination in these areas has yet to be confirmed as survey is ongoing.119

Israel reported some 90km² of contamination in 2017 (41.58km² CHA and 48.51km² SHA), including in areas in the West Bank.120 This did not include mined areas “deemed essential to Israel’s security.” No updates on contamination have been provided since 2017, though Israel reported progress in re-surveying mine-affected areas and clearance of 0.18km² in 2020, and 0.56km² in 2021.121 A total of 140 mines and ERW were reported cleared in 2021, with

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117 After the end of the conflict in 2020, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported that there were “obvious minefields” and that the entire region “will be surveyed to register the mine and ERW affected regions.” Due to changes in the affected territories, strategic and operational plans were under review in 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021.

118 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ramil Azizov, Head of International Relations, Risk Education and Media Department, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 17 May 2023.


120 Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), 26 May 2018.

2.7km² of land released in the Negev desert, along the border with Egypt. In January 2023, media reported on Israel's demining operations in the Golan Heights.

As of the end of 2022, Lebanon reported 16.91km² of CHA, including 0.16km² contaminated by improvised mines. Lebanon reported 0.015km² of newly-discovered antipersonnel mine contamination in 2022, and 0.025km² of newly-discovered improvised mine contamination.

In South Korea, the extent of contamination is unknown, but more than 1 million mines have been laid in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the border with North Korea. New casualties were reported in 2022, with one civilian killed and two soldiers injured.

Landmines are also known or suspected to be located along the borders of several other states not party, including Armenia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, North Korea, and Uzbekistan.

Ongoing armed conflict, insecurity, and improvised mine contamination also affects states not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

Other areas

Five other areas, unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status, are known to be contaminated.

As of the end of 2021, mine-affected areas in Kosovo totaled 0.58km², of which 0.21km² was CHA and 0.37km² was SHA. Kosovo reported an additional 0.42km² of mixed contamination (consisting of antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants).

Abkhazia reported to have cleared its remaining mined area totaling 0.01km². Some landmines continue to be scattered, along with ERW, around the site of a previous ammunition explosion at Primorsky, and will be addressed through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs.

Before the renewed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in September 2020, Nagorno-Karabakh was reported to have 6.75km² of contamination. This included 5.62km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, 0.23km² of antivehicle mine contamination, and 0.9km² of mixed contamination. The only demining operator in Nagorno-Karabakh, the HALO Trust, reported that its operational area had reduced by 60% after the conflict, with the presence of Russian peacekeepers resulting in access constraints. In May 2022, the HALO Trust completed clearance of all known contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh's capital city, Stepanakert. The Lachin corridor, which provided access between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, was under

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122 Israel CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, January 2022. In December 2021, a clearance operation saw 2.7km² released in the Negev desert. The duration of the operation was not provided, while it was not specified how much land was cleared and how much was released through survey. See, “Israel Defense Ministry completes demining operation near Egypt border,” Jewish News Syndicate, 16 December 2021, bit.ly/JewishNewsSyndicate16Dec2021.


125 Ibid.


127 Monitor media monitoring of landmine incidents in South Korea in 2021 – 2022.

128 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmet Sallova, Director, Kosovo Mine Action Center (KMAC), 24 April 2023.


130 Email from Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 20 July 2020.

a blockade as of December 2022, and a lack of access to fuel and essential supplies posed a major challenge to deminers.\textsuperscript{132} As this report went to print, Azerbaijan appeared to have regained control of Nagorno-Karabakh after a brief conflict on 19 September 2023.\textsuperscript{133}

Contamination in Somaliland totaled 3.4km\textsuperscript{2} (1.1km\textsuperscript{2} of antipersonnel mine contamination and 2.3km\textsuperscript{2} of mixed contamination).\textsuperscript{134} In September 2023, the HALO Trust reported that it was conducting a baseline assessment to obtain a more accurate estimate of contamination.\textsuperscript{135} Most of the mined areas in Somaliland are barrier or perimeter minefields around military bases.\textsuperscript{136}

Western Sahara's minefields lie east of the Berm, a 2,700km-long wall built during the 1975–1991 conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco in the west and the Polisario Front in the east. The contaminated area covers 211.72km\textsuperscript{2} (86.06km\textsuperscript{2} CHA and 125.66km\textsuperscript{2} SHA).\textsuperscript{137} These minefields are contaminated with antivehicle mines, though a small number of antipersonnel landmines have also been found.\textsuperscript{138} There have been no updates on the extent of contamination since most survey and clearance activities were suspended in 2021.\textsuperscript{139} UNMAS reported in April 2023 that, following a request from the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), its implementing partner SafeLane Global was preparing to resume humanitarian demining operations in Western Sahara in May 2023.\textsuperscript{140}

**MINE/ERW CASUALTIES**

Landmines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, remain a major threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm globally.\textsuperscript{141}

At least 4,710 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in 2022. Of that total, at least 1,661 were killed while 3,015 were injured. For 34 casualties, the survival outcome was not known.\textsuperscript{142} Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 49 countries and two other areas during 2022.


\textsuperscript{134} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Pantigoso Vargas, Somaliland Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 26 March 2022.

\textsuperscript{135} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Aislinn Redbond, Project Manager, HALO Trust, 31 July and 20 September 2023.

\textsuperscript{136} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Pantigoso Vargas, Somaliland Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 26 March 2022; and by Aislinn Redbond, Somaliland Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 31 July 2023.

\textsuperscript{137} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Acting Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 12 April 2022.

\textsuperscript{138} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Western Sahara Programme Manager, UNMAS, 4 March 2021.


\textsuperscript{140} LinkedIn post by UNMAS, 10 April 2023, bit.ly/UNMASLinkedInPost10April2023.

\textsuperscript{141} Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor's global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the Impact chapter of the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more detail on cluster munition casualties, see, ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2023), bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2023.

\textsuperscript{142} As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the number of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties, and this information was not included in the Monitor's casualty database.
States and areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia and the Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold. Other areas are indicated in italics.

State not party Syria recorded the highest number of new mine/ERW casualties in 2022 for the third consecutive year. Casualties in Syria decreased from 1,227 in 2021 to 834 during 2022.

Ukraine recorded the second-highest total in 2022, replacing Afghanistan as having the highest number of annual casualties among States Parties. From the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022, to the end of the year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 608 civilian mine/ERW casualties in Ukraine. Whilst casualties in Ukraine are acknowledged to be under-reported, this represents more than a ten-fold increase, with 58 civilian casualties recorded in 2021. OHCHR reported that “on current trajectory,” the number of civilian mine/ERW casualties in Ukraine was expected to rise significantly in 2023.143

State Party Yemen recorded 582 casualties in 2022, up from 528 in 2021. During 2022, it was reported that violence in Yemen had reduced sharply since an October 2021 truce, but that “the number of people injured or killed by landmines and unexploded ordnance remained the same or higher, highlighting the dangers of these remnants of war even in peace time.”144


State not party Myanmar saw a significant rise in casualties, from 368 in 2021 to 545 in 2022. In 2022, for the first time, mine/ERW casualties were recorded in every state and region of the country, except Naypyidaw.\textsuperscript{145}

### Countries with over 500 mine/ERW casualties in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Casualties in 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**.

Many mine/ERW casualties go unrecorded each year globally, and therefore are not captured in the Monitor data. Some states do not have functional casualty surveillance systems in place, while other forms of reporting are often inadequate or lack disaggregation.

Afghanistan saw recorded casualties decrease from 1,074 in 2021 to 303 in 2022. Yet UNMAS noted that data for 2022 did not reflect all victims of mine/ERW incidents during the year.

### CASUALTIES AND MINE BAN TREATY STATUS IN 2022

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 37 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty during 2022, representing over two-thirds (65%, or 3,040) of all annual casualties. Eight States Parties each recorded more than 100 casualties.\textsuperscript{146}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Casualties in 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During 2022, the Monitor recorded a total of 1,632 mine/ERW casualties in 12 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, with just over half (51%) of those casualties recorded in Syria (834).\textsuperscript{147} For the fifth year running, Myanmar accounted for the next highest casualty total among states not party, with 545 casualties—a further increase from 368 in 2021 and 280 in 2020.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{145} Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), "Townships with Suspected Landmine/ERW Contamination (1999–2023) and Landmine/ERW Casualties in Myanmar (2022)," 8 September 2023, bit.ly/MIMUMineERWCasualties2022. The MIMU infographic uses data collected by the Monitor.

\textsuperscript{146} The 37 States Parties with casualties in 2022 were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, BIH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{147} Not including the occupied Golan Heights.

\textsuperscript{148} The 12 states not party with casualties in 2022 were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Syria.
In other areas Somaliland and Western Sahara, a combined 38 casualties were reported in 2022.

**CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS**

The devastating and disproportionate impact of mines and ERW on civilians is again reflected in the Monitor casualty statistics for 2022. Civilians made up 85% of all casualties recorded in 2022 where the civilian, deminer, or military status of the casualty was known.

There were at least 27 casualties among deminers in eight countries. The actual number was far higher, as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported that during the first seven weeks of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, there were 102 casualties among deminers (29 killed and 73 injured).

**Civilian status of mine/ERW casualties in 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>3,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deminer</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At least 1,171 child casualties were recorded in 2022. Children made up almost half (49%) of civilian casualties and just over one-third (35%) of all casualties in 2022, where the age group was known. Children were killed (386) or injured (782) by mines/ERW in 35 states and one other area. The survival outcome for three children was not reported. In 2022, as in previous years, the vast majority of child casualties were boys (79%) where the gender was recorded. ERW remained the item causing most child casualties (518, or 44%), followed by improvised mines (223, or 19%). Children made up three-quarters (518, or 66%) of ERW casualties.

Men and boys accounted for the majority of casualties in 2022, accounting for 2,095 (or 84%) where the sex was known (2,499). Women and girls accounted for 404 casualties (or 16%).

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149 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, and civilian/military/deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.

150 Deminer casualties were recorded in Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Thailand, Türkiye, and Ukraine.


152 The category "military" includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat, as well as members of NSAGs and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL), whereby "those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities." International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers," 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipation2009.

153 Child mine/ERW casualties are recorded when the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as a media report) as being a child.

154 Child casualties of mines/ERW were recorded in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, DRC, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, and Yemen, and other area Somaliland.

155 There were 449 boys and 149 girls recorded as casualties in 2022, while the sex of 573 child casualties was not recorded.

156 Other device types causing child casualties included, of the total child casualties: unspecified mine types (128 casualties), antipersonnel mines (90 casualties), antivehicle mines (7 casualties), cluster munition remnants (79 casualties), and undifferentiated mines/ERW (126 casualties).

157 The age group was not recorded for 160 ERW casualties.
CASUALTIES BY DEVICE TYPE

In 2022, improvised mines, most of which are believed to act as antipersonnel mines, accounted for the highest number of casualties for the seventh consecutive year.

Collectively, landmines of all types caused the majority of recorded casualties (2,751, or 58%) during 2022. This includes factory-made antipersonnel mines (628, or 13%), victim-activated improvised mines (1,517, or 32%), antivehicle mines (102, or 2%), and unspecified mine types (504, or 11%).

Most casualties attributed to unspecified mine types in 2022 were reported in Yemen (382).

Cluster munition remnants caused at least 194 casualties in 2022, while other ERW caused 946 casualties. A total of 819 casualties resulted from mines/ERW that were not disaggregated.

Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2022

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CLEARANCE

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2022

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel landmines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

States Parties with clearance obligations reported clearance totaling 219.31km² in 2022. At least 169,276 landmines were cleared and destroyed during the year.

Monitor data on clearance in States Parties is based on analysis of multiple sources, including reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 reports, and Article 5 extension requests. In cases where varying annual clearance data is reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website.
This represents a significant increase from the reported 132.52km² of land cleared in 2021.

Non-technical and technical survey also contribute to the overall amount of land that is released and returned to local populations for productive use. In 2022, a total of 497.34km² of land was released by States Parties with Article 5 obligations, of which 219.31km² was released through clearance operations, 121.11km² was reduced through technical survey, and 156.92km² was cancelled through non-technical survey.

**Land release by States Parties in 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cancelled</th>
<th>Cleared</th>
<th>Reduced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>219.31km²</td>
<td>(44%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121.11km²</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156.92km²</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2022, **Cambodia** cleared the most land (88.47km²), followed by **Croatia** (40.2km²). **Türkiye** cleared and destroyed the most landmines in 2022, clearing a total of 58,078 mines from only 1.29km² of land. **Thailand** and **Zimbabwe** also cleared a large number of antipersonnel mines from relatively small areas, indicating the density of mines laid in their contaminated border areas.

Twelve States Parties cleared under 1km² in 2022: BiH, Colombia, DRC, Ecuador, Mauritania, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand.

Four States Parties with Article 5 obligations did not report any clearance in 2022: Argentina, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, and Niger.

**Argentina** was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory, where it completed mine clearance in 2020. As of October 2023, Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.\(^{161}\)

**Cyprus** reported that it did not undertake clearance as no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remained under its control.\(^{162}\)

**Guinea-Bissau** reported that it was working to rebuild the capacity required to resume survey and clearance operations, following the discovery of new contamination in 2021.\(^{163}\)

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\(^{160}\) The chart does not include data from the following States Parties, as they did not report on land release activities in 2022: Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cyprus, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Oman, Philippines, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Venezuela.

\(^{161}\) Argentina Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 11.

\(^{162}\) Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C, p. 4.

\(^{163}\) Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, p. 6.
## Antipersonnel mine clearance in States Parties in 2021–2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2021 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>2022 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>17.69</td>
<td>7,652</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>5,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>3,617</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>3,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>3,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>43.73</td>
<td>6,087</td>
<td>88.47</td>
<td>13,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>34.49</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>1,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

164 Total figure reported for antipersonnel mines destroyed includes improvised mines. Clearance figures for 2022 are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2022) unless otherwise stated. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT. Afghanistan: clearance data includes 9.06km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land and 2.06km² of land cleared of improvised mines. A total of 2,432 antipersonnel mines and 3,032 improvised mines were destroyed during these tasks. Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS Afghanistan, 3 April 2023. Angola: data includes two improvised mines destroyed. Cambodia: responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ros Sophal, Database Unit Manager, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 25 May and 8 August 2023. Chad: Chad reported having released a total of 42.70km². Of that area, only 6.21km² was cleared, in East Ennedi, a province known or suspected to be contaminated by landmines. Chad did not report any landmines destroyed, but cleared 3,026 ERW in East Ennedi province in 2022. DRC: email from Elysee Kibiribi, Advocacy and Victim Assistance Manager, CCBL, 27 September 2023. Data collected from CCLAM by CCBL. Ecuador: presentation of Ecuador, Mine Ban Treaty Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 22 November 2022, p. 2, bit.ly/EcuadorPresentation22Nov2022. Iraq: reported clearance figure includes 3.17km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land and 8.06km² of IED contaminated land. Iraq also reported to have destroyed 10,577 IEDs, including improvised mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 5 May 2023. Palestine: response to Monitor questionnaire by Walaa Jarrar, International and External Relations Officer, PMAC, 16 May 2023. Serbia: response to Monitor questionnaire by Sladana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, SMAC, 9 May 2023. Somalia: data as of February 2023. Land release figures were calculated by subtracting total land release reported for 2021 from that reported for January 2021–February 2023. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, National Director General, Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA), 11 August 2022; and Somalia, "The Federal Republic of Somalia Work Plan for the period from October 2022 to October 2027," 30 April 2023, p. 12, bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023. South Sudan: response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 17 April 2023. Sri Lanka: for 2022, Sri Lanka only reported all-time figures for clearance and ordnance destroyed. The data in the table for 2022 was calculated based on these totals and data for 2021. The HALO Trust reported releasing 2.65km² of land (of which 2.64km² was cleared), destroying 12,351 antipersonnel mines (including 115 during EOD spot tasks) in addition to five antivehicle mines and 10,036 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nadine Lainer, Deputy Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 24 April 2023. Sudan: "Together for Sudan free of Mine," Brown Land News, 6 April 2023, bit.ly/BrownLandNews6April2023. Thailand: response to Monitor questionnaire by FIt.-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, TMAC, 19 June 2023. Ukraine: CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for calendar year 2021), pp. 4 and 9. In support of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine reported that in 2022, a total of 781.8km² was cleared and 315,068 items of ordnance destroyed, with a further 74.25km² cleared and 45,791 items of ordnance destroyed as of 9 May 2023. The figures are not included in the table, as it was not specified what type of contamination was cleared or what type of items were destroyed. Yemen: YEMAC reported 1.07km² cleared, while 17.84km² was cleared during emergency response tasks and 13km² via the Masam Project.The contamination was reported to be mixed or undifferentiated. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameen Saleh Alaajli, Director, YEMAC, 22 May 2023.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2021 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>2022 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>4,831</td>
<td>11.23</td>
<td>5,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td><em><strong>0.25</strong></em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td><em><strong>5.56</strong></em></td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>26,804</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>29,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>2,219</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>19,002</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>11,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>14,125</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>58,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td><em><strong>2.90</strong></em></td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>*<em><strong>4.49</strong></em></td>
<td>3,365</td>
<td><em><strong>31.91</strong></em></td>
<td>3,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>26,457</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>31,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>132.52</strong></td>
<td><strong>117,847</strong></td>
<td><strong>219.31</strong></td>
<td><strong>169,276</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; N/R=not reported; N/A=not applicable.
*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory, and completed mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.
**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
***Clearance of mixed/undifferentiated contamination that included antipersonnel mines.
****Land reported as cleared and reduced.

**Niger** did not conduct any clearance operations in 2022 due to challenging weather conditions, a lack of funding, insecurity, and a new priority to fight the proliferation of illicit weapons.165

As of October 2023, six States Parties with Article 5 obligations—the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, and Sudan—had not submitted updated Article 7 transparency reports to outline their progress on clearance.

In the **DRC**, from October 2021 to September 2022, the US Department of State reported that, through its implementing partners, 33,770m² of land had been cleared and 4,170m² had been released. During this period, 15 mines and 117 ERW were destroyed.166 As of October 2023, the DRC had not yet submitted its Article 7 report for calendar year 2022. However,

it reported to the Monitor that 27,318m² was cleared and four antipersonnel mines were
destroyed during 2022.167

Eritrea has not reported any clearance since it last submitted an updated Article 7
transparency report in 2014.168

Ethiopia has not provided any new figures for antipersonnel mine clearance since its
Article 7 report for January 2019–April 2020, when it reported 1.75km² cleared and 128
antipersonnel mines destroyed.169 As of March 2021, Ethiopia reported that it had cleared
0.05km² in Fiq district in the Somali region, clearing and destroying 46 antivehicle mines.170

Nigeria reported that no land release operations were conducted by humanitarian mine
action operators in 2022. The Nigerian Armed Forces conducted mine clearance activities for
military purposes, but no further information was shared.171

Oman reported the “re-clearance” of 0.08km² of land in 2018, but did not provide any
further details.172 In 2019, Oman reported re-clearance of 11 mined areas in Al-Mughsail, in
Dhofar governorate, totaling 0.13km², but no mines were found.173 In 2020, Oman reported
that no mine/ERW incidents had taken place in the country in 20 years, and that formerly
mined areas had been cleared, released, and were populated.174 As of October 2023, Oman
had not yet submitted Article 7 reports covering calendar years 2021–2022.

In 2021, Sudan reported clearing 0.03km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land,
destroying 17 antipersonnel mines and 57 antivehicle mines.175 In 2022, Sudan reported
that access to Blue Nile, Darfur, and South Kordofan had improved following the Juba
Agreement for Peace, enabling the assessment of roads for humanitarian assistance and
population movement.176 Yet Sudan also cited ongoing insecurity, a lack of funding, the COVID-19 pandemic,
and weather conditions as key challenges that have negatively impacted progress.177 As of October 2023,
Sudan had not yet submitted its Article 7 report for calendar year 2022. However, UNITAMS reported that
32 antipersonnel landmines, 14 antivehicle mines, and 2,347 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were
destroyed in 2022.178

Improvised mines were reported cleared in 2022 in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Iraq, Mali,
and Yemen.

In 2022, Afghanistan released 10.66km² (2.05km² cleared, 0.04km² reduced, and 8.57km² canceled)
of land contaminated with improvised mines, clearing 3,032 improvised mines.\textsuperscript{179} Angola destroyed two improvised mines.\textsuperscript{180} All mines cleared in Colombia were improvised mines.\textsuperscript{181} Iraq released 31.39km\textsuperscript{2} of land contaminated with IEDs—and reported to have destroyed a total of 10,577 IEDs—including improvised mines and other explosive devices.\textsuperscript{182} Mali destroyed 82 improvised mines.\textsuperscript{183} Yemen did not sufficiently disaggregate land release figures for improvised mines. For areas released with mixed or undifferentiated contamination, 23 antipersonnel/improvised mines were recorded as being destroyed along with 5,539 IEDs, without further specification.\textsuperscript{184}

Explosive ordnance cleared and destroyed by States Parties in 2022\textsuperscript{185}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\pie[text=	extcolor{white}{\%}, radius=1, sum=521717]{ERW=521717 (66.75\%), APM=165995 (21.24\%), CMR=16253 (2.08\%), AVM=74318 (9.51\%), Improvised mines=5281 (0.42\%)}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

### ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel landmines contaminating its territory within 10 years after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty for the country, it must request a deadline extension under Article 5 for a period of up to 10 years.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{179} Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS Afghanistan, 3 April 2023.
\textsuperscript{180} Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{181} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angela Patricia Cortes Sanchez, Advisor, AICMA, 24 May 2023.
\textsuperscript{182} Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C, p. 28; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, DMA, 5 May 2023. The 31.39km\textsuperscript{2} of land released by Iraq includes 8.06km\textsuperscript{2} cleared, 0.05km\textsuperscript{2} reduced, and 23.28km\textsuperscript{2} canceled.
\textsuperscript{183} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, National Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 26 April 2023.
\textsuperscript{184} Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, pp. 10–11; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameen Saleh Alaqili, Director, YEMAC, 22 May 2023.
\textsuperscript{185} The DRC, in its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report submitted in May 2022, reported that from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2021, a total of 572 cluster munition remnants had been “removed.” In September 2022, at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the DRC reported that, to date, more than 3,044 cluster munition remnants had been removed. This is likely to imply that between 1 January and 30 August 2022, the DRC destroyed another 2,472 cluster munition remnants, though the Monitor had not been able to confirm these numbers. In September 2023, CCLAM reported only three cluster munition remnants destroyed in 2022 to the Monitor. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM. These three cluster munition remnants are included in the chart. Iraq destroyed 10,577 IEDs including improvised mines. These are not included in the chart. Yemen reported the destruction of 5,539 IEDs potentially including improvised mines. This figure is not included in the chart. Furthermore, 23 of the antipersonnel mines reported as destroyed by Yemen may also include improvised mines. These are displayed as antipersonnel mines in the chart. States Parties Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Mozambique, Nigeria, Oman, the Philippines, Senegal, Sudan, Ukraine, and Venezuela did not provide any figures related to ordnance destroyed, and are not represented in the chart.
\textsuperscript{186} Mine Ban Treaty, Article 5.3, bit.ly/MineBanTreaty1997Text.
Clearance progress to 2025

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2014, States Parties agreed to intensify efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires. This included a commitment to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, but not later than 2025.187

As of October 2023, a total of 20 States Parties had current deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before or no later than 2025: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Cyprus, DRC, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Serbia, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. Eritrea’s clearance deadline expired in 2020 and it has not requested an extension, leaving it in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Thirteen States Parties have Article 5 deadlines later than 2025.

States Parties with clearance deadlines beyond 2025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clearance deadline</th>
<th>States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>Argentina, Croatia, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td>BiH, Somalia, Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2028</td>
<td>Iraq, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2022, four States Parties—Afghanistan, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, and Serbia—requested extensions to their clearance deadlines up to 2025. Another four States Parties—Argentina, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen—requested extensions beyond 2025. All requests were granted during the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in November 2022.188 In March 2023, Ukraine submitted its third extension request, for a 10-year extension until 1 December 2033.189 The request will be considered at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023.

Of those States Parties with Article 5 clearance deadlines in 2025 or earlier, it appears that very few could complete clearance within their deadlines. The table at the end of this section reviews the progress of all 33 States Parties with clearance obligations toward meeting their Article 5 deadlines.

The main purpose of the extension request submitted by Afghanistan in July 2022 was for additional time to understand how the demining sector in the country will develop. Based on this, Afghanistan planned to submit a further detailed extension request by 31 March 2024.190

Angola’s annual land release since 2019 has been below the projected annual land release of 17km² detailed in its 2019–2025 workplan.191 Angola has stated that it is undertaking every effort to meet its current Article 5 deadline of December 2025. However, it is believed that Angola will realistically be able to complete clearance of known minefields by 2028, with the possibility of extending its deadline to 2030 depending on the availability of funds.192

Cambodia has reported its commitment to meet its Article 5 deadline of 2025, and has started to raise additional funds to facilitate an increase in demining capacity. In May 2023, Cambodia submitted a revised workplan with projected release of 345.3 km² of mined areas in 2023, and 168 km² annually in both 2024 and 2025. Cambodia cited challenges to meeting its deadline as the lack of demarcated border areas with Thailand, and a potential shortfall in the required financial resources.

The annual clearance output in Chad increased significantly in 2022. Yet it is unclear if the reported land release includes areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines, due to a lack of data on the geographical areas cleared and types of ordnance present. Given the current clearance rate and due to limited funding, it is unlikely that Chad will meet its 2025 deadline.

The DRC reported that it is on track to meet its clearance deadline. Yet ongoing insecurity is a concern, and given the limited land release output in 2022 and in previous years, it is unlikely that the DRC will be able to meet its 2025 deadline.

Ecuador’s progress toward meeting its Article 5 deadline in December 2025 is uncertain. The rate of clearance has been slow over the past five years, despite the small extent of remaining contamination. Ecuador did not conduct any clearance in 2021 and does not appear to have met its annual target of 0.01 km² clearance for 2022, as projected in its fourth extension request.

In Ethiopia, there has been little progress on clearance and survey over the last two years, including since a November 2022 peace agreement. As of October 2023, Ethiopia had not submitted its Article 7 report for 2022. Ethiopia is unlikely to meet its December 2025 deadline.


195 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Report (for calendar year 2022), pp. 4 and 6.


197 In November 2022, Ecuador stated that it had resumed demining operations in August 2022 and cleared 1,860 m² and destroyed 17 antipersonnel mines, leading to a remaining CHA of 50,675 m² with an estimated 2,924 antipersonnel mines. As of August 2022, Ecuador had not submitted its Article 7 report for 2022 with an updated estimate of contamination, which is believed to have been further reduced between November and December 2022. See, presentation of Ecuador, Mine Ban Treaty Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 22 November 2022, bit.ly/EcuadorPresentation22Nov2022; and Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 17 August 2022, p. 32, bit.ly/EcuadorRevisedArt5ExtRequestAug2022.

In 2021, Guinea-Bissau reported suspected mine/ERW contamination and was granted an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline to 31 December 2022. Guinea-Bissau submitted another extension request in 2022 for two additional years, which was granted. The request projected a preparatory phase during 2022; an implementation phase in 2023 to conduct non-technical survey; and marking, emergency spot tasks, and clearance in 2023–2024. It is uncertain whether Guinea-Bissau will meet its December 2024 clearance deadline, as delays in the preparatory phase were reported in June 2023.

Niger did not conduct any clearance operations in 2021–2022, amid a lack of funding and ongoing insecurity. Despite having only small contamination (0.18km²), it is not expected that Niger will meet its Article 5 deadline in 2024.

Oman was thought to be on track to complete clearance, with a plan to re-clear seven areas from February 2021 to April 2024. Yet as of October 2023, Oman had not submitted an Article 7 report to update States Parties on its progress during calendar year 2022. Clearance output in Peru has been limited, but increased in 2022. At the current clearance rate, Peru would be on track to complete clearance of mined areas by its December 2024 deadline. Yet in September 2023, at an open consultation on the extension process, a representative of Peru stated that it would be requesting another extension to its Article 5 deadline.

In March 2022, Serbia requested a third extension, of 21 months, in order to undertake non-technical survey of newly-discovered SHA in Bujanovac municipality and create a workplan. The request was granted. It is expected that Serbia will submit another Article 5 extension request to clear any confirmed contamination after the completion of non-technical survey.

Tajikistan reported that current capacity would need to be increased to meet its deadline.

Türkiye cleared three times more mine-contaminated land in 2022 than in 2021, but still does not appear to be on target to meet its 2025 deadline.

Ongoing conflict and insecurity are likely to impact the ability of Colombia, Nigeria, and Ukraine to meet their Article 5 deadlines. Colombia reported that it will not meet its deadline due to ongoing use of improvised mines by NSAGs. In Nigeria, conflict in the northeast has hindered the mapping of contamination and restricted survey and clearance activities. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine did not have control...
of parts of the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which prevented it from clearing contaminated areas in these territories.\footnote{Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 June 2020, bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2020.} Ongoing hostilities in 2022 and 2023 have added to the extent of contamination and prevented access for survey and clearance operations. As a result, in March 2023, Ukraine submitted a 10-year extension request under Article 5.\footnote{Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2023, bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023.}

**Zimbabwe** is confident of meeting its deadline of December 2025, given the current capacity of demining operators and with only 5.7% of its contamination remaining.\footnote{Response to Monitor questionnaire by Capt. Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC), 24 April 2023.}

Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period (No. of request)</th>
<th>Current deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 2 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>1 March 2025</td>
<td>Expected to request another extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>5 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 8 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 3 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 3 years (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Has not acknowledged completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 2 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 6 years (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>1 March 2027</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 6 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>1 year and 2 months (1\textsuperscript{st}) 3 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 6 years (3\textsuperscript{rd}) 5 years (4\textsuperscript{th})</td>
<td>1 January 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 4 years and 10 months (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Expected to request another extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 7 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>3 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 3 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 3 years (3\textsuperscript{rd}) 3 years (4\textsuperscript{th})</td>
<td>1 July 2025</td>
<td>Expected to request another extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>2 years and 2 months (1\textsuperscript{st}) 6 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 1 year and 6 months (3\textsuperscript{rd}) 3 years and 6 months (4\textsuperscript{th})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party</td>
<td>Original deadline</td>
<td>Extension period (No. of request)</td>
<td>Current deadline</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 3 months (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 5 years (3\textsuperscript{rd}) 3 years (4\textsuperscript{th})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 5 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 11 months (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>In violation of the treaty by not requesting a new extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2015</td>
<td>5 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 5 years and 7 months (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>2 months (1\textsuperscript{st}) 1 year (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 2 years (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st})</td>
<td>1 February 2028</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 5 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 1 year (3\textsuperscript{rd}) 5 years (4\textsuperscript{th})</td>
<td>31 December 2026</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger**</td>
<td>1 September 2009</td>
<td>2 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 1 year (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 4 years (3\textsuperscript{rd}) 4 years (4\textsuperscript{th})</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria***</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>1 year (1\textsuperscript{st}) 4 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 7 years and 10 months (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Expected to request another extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 5 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 5 years (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>5 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 4 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 1 year and 10 months (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Expected to request another extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>5 years (1\textsuperscript{st})</td>
<td>1 October 2027</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>5 years (1\textsuperscript{st})</td>
<td>9 July 2026</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2014</td>
<td>5 years (1\textsuperscript{st}) 4 years (2\textsuperscript{nd}) 4 years (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>1 April 2027</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period (No. of request)</th>
<th>Current deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1st) 9 years and 9 months (2nd)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>9 years and 6 months (1st) 5 years (2nd) 3 years and 2 months (3rd)</td>
<td>31 December 2026</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>8 years (1st) 3 years and 10 months (2nd)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2016</td>
<td>5 years (1st) 2 years and 6 months (2nd)</td>
<td>1 December 2023</td>
<td>Requested extension until 1 December 2033 (10 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years (1st) 5 years (2nd) 3 years (3rd) 5 years (4th) 5 years (5th)</td>
<td>1 March 2028</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>1 year and 10 months (1st) 2 years (2nd) 2 years (3rd) 3 years (4th) 8 years (5th)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable.
*Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020, but Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.
**In 2008, Niger declared that there were no remaining areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. In May 2012, Niger informed States Parties of suspected and confirmed mined areas. Only in July 2013, Niger requested its first extension to the deadline that had already expired in 2009.
***In 2019, seven years after its initial deadline, Nigeria declared newly-mined areas and in 2020, submitted a first extension request to its initial, already-expired deadline.

EXTENSION REQUESTS SUBMITTED IN 2022–2023

In 2022, eight States Parties submitted requests to extend their Article 5 clearance deadlines: Afghanistan, Argentina, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. These requests were all granted during the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in November 2022.

On 4 July 2022, Afghanistan submitted a request to extend its clearance deadline for two years until March 2025. It was expected that a further detailed request would be submitted in March 2024. Due to the complexity of the political situation in the country, details on the remaining contamination or an accompanying workplan could not be included in the request.214

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Argentina was granted an extension of three years until 1 March 2026. Argentina has cited the need to verify clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, completed by the UK in 2020, to comply with its obligations under the treaty. 215

Ecuador was granted an extension of three years, until 31 December 2025, to clear remaining contamination of 0.04 km². The remaining contaminated areas are in high altitude locations with challenging climatic conditions. 216

Guinea-Bissau was granted a further extension to 31 December 2024 to conduct survey, as well as subsequent marking, risk education, and clearance as required. 217

Serbia was granted a third extension during 2022 and has committed to provide an updated workplan by the treaty’s Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023. 218

Sudan was granted a third Article 5 deadline extension in 2022, for four additional years until 1 April 2027. 219 As of December 2021, Sudan had identified 102 hazardous areas totaling 13.28 km². 220 As a result of the Juba Agreement for Peace, Sudan’s mine action program gained access to previously inaccessible areas, and expects to identify new hazardous areas close to the frontlines. However, Sudan did not provide an update on its progress in 2022.

Thailand was granted a third extension in 2022, until 31 December 2026. 221 While on target in terms of its survey and clearance plan, the lack of access to 14.31 km² of contaminated land on the border with Cambodia—which has not yet been demarcated—has caused delays. 222

Yemen was granted a fourth extension, for five years until March 2028, to continue with its baseline survey to determine the extent and impact of new mine contamination.

In March 2023, Ukraine submitted its third extension request, for 10 years, proposing a new deadline of 1 December 2033. 223 After submitting the request, Ukraine reported that the ongoing conflict has made it impossible to take measures sooner to ensure the clearance of all antipersonnel mines on territories under its jurisdiction and control. 224 Ukraine’s extension request will be considered at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023.

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RISK EDUCATION

Risk education is a core pillar of humanitarian mine action and a key legal obligation under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which requires States Parties to "provide an immediate and effective warning to the population" in all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

Risk education has often been omitted from Article 7 transparency reports or from updates provided by states at Mine Ban Treaty meetings. Yet delivery of risk education to affected populations is a primary and often cost-effective means of preventing injuries and saving lives.

The Oslo Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the treaty's Fourth Review Conference in 2019, contains five action points on risk education, contributing to renewed attention for this pillar in recent years. These actions include commitments on:

1. Integrating risk education within wider humanitarian, development, protection, and education efforts, and with other mine action activities;
2. Providing context-specific risk education to all affected populations and at-risk groups;
3. Prioritizing people most at risk through analysis of casualty and contamination data, and through an understanding of people's behavior and movements;
4. Building national capacity to deliver risk education, which can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and
5. Reporting on risk education in annual Article 7 transparency reports.

In addition, the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide detailed, costed, and multi-year plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities.

PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION IN 2022

Of the 33 States Parties with clearance obligations, 28 reported providing or are known to have provided risk education to populations at risk from antipersonnel landmine contamination in 2022. Argentina, Ecuador, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, and Oman did not report any risk education activities in 2022.

States Parties with clearance obligations that provided risk education in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Sri Lanka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Türkiye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Burkina Faso and Mali, which are both known to have improvised mine contamination, reported implementing risk education activities in 2022.

225 There is no separate agenda item on risk education at Meetings of States Parties.
**RISK EDUCATION REPORTING AND PLANNING**

In 2022, only 10 States Parties with clearance obligations that submitted an Article 7 report provided detailed updates on risk education, including beneficiary data disaggregated by sex and age: Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Palestine, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Türkiye provided gender-disaggregated beneficiary data for adults but not for children. The DRC provided the Monitor directly with disaggregated beneficiary data. Of the Article 5 extension requests submitted in 2022, only those submitted by Guinea-Bissau and Sudan contained detailed, costed, and multi-year plans for context-specific risk education. Ecuador, Serbia, Thailand, and Yemen confirmed that risk education would be conducted, but did not provide a budget or workplan for implementation. Afghanistan did not submit a detailed extension request. Risk education was not relevant to the extension request of Argentina, which requested time to verify clearance completed by the UK in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. Ukraine, in its extension request submitted in 2023, did not provide a detailed plan.

**TARGET AREAS AND AT-RISK GROUPS**

To be effective, risk education must be sensitive to gender, age, and disability, and take the diverse needs and experiences of people living in affected communities into account. The consideration of target areas, high-risk groups, and the activities and behaviors that place people at risk, is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

In most States Parties, risk education activities in 2022 were targeted predominantly at rural communities in areas affected by contamination. Populations identified as the most vulnerable included groups that moved regularly between different locations, such as nomadic communities, hunters, herders, shepherds, agricultural workers, and people collecting natural resources. Other specific at-risk groups included children and people deliberately engaging with explosive ordnance, such as scrap metal collectors.

In addition to providing risk education to local communities, Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen identified IDPs and returnees as specific at-risk groups and targeted them for risk education. In Chad, target groups included refugees fleeing violence in Sudan and crossing its eastern border.
Afghanistan also targeted health workers, while Chad additionally considered nomads, animal herders, goldminers, traditional guides, and trackers as high-risk groups due to their mobility in desert areas which may be contaminated. Chad, however, reported that these groups were challenging to reach. In Niger, risk education targeted shepherds, pastoral and nomadic communities, and IDPs.

Mali identified at-risk groups including IDPs, men and boys engaging in agricultural activities, and women and girls engaged in trading and domestic work and while washing clothes along rivers and streams. Talibé children, who move from town to town in northern Mali and engage in the collection and selling of scrap metal, were also identified as high-risk. Blacksmiths, and metal collectors searching for iron at military camps, firing ranges, and at the sites of car accidents were reported to be exposed to the risk of explosive ordnance.

In Colombia, risk education was focused on indigenous communities living in mountainous areas affected by mine contamination. Risk education targeted men engaging in agricultural work and mining, while children are considered an at-risk group as they often have to travel long distances by foot across contaminated land to get to school.

Croatia reported providing risk education to Ukrainian refugee children in 2022. In Cyprus, UN peacekeepers received risk education as part of their induction training. In Ethiopia, the HALO Trust targeted pastoral and nomadic communities in the Somali region. Mauritania, in addition to targeting at-risk communities, provided risk education for NGO staff and elected officials in 2022. Serbia provided construction workers with risk education training.

In Senegal, target groups included IDPs and returnees travelling through newly-contaminated areas or returning to their land after conflict subsided. Farmers, women

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232 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Francesca Batault, Programme Officer-Lake Chad Basin, MAG, 13 July 2023; by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023; and by Jason Lufuluabo Mudingay, Chief of Operations, HI, 13 March 2021.

233 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mahboob Rahman, Program Integration and Risk Education Coordinator, Danish Refugee Council, 25 June 2023; by Francesca Batault, Programme Officer-Lake Chad Basin, MAG, 13 July 2023; by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 8 May 2020; and by Jason Lufuluabo Mudingay, Chief of Operations, HI, 13 March 2021.


235 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023; and by David Wasolu Dijuma, EORE Technical Advisor, DanChurchAid (DCA), 19 July 2023.

236 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Kennett, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 23 June 2023.

237 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), p. 63; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leidy Yuilieth Vargas Barrera, EORE Coordinator, Danish Refugee Council, 30 June 2023; and by Sara Castillo, EORE and Support Officer, HALO Trust, 10 July 2023.

238 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form I, p. 32.


working in rice fields, and fruit pickers were also exposed to risk in rural parts of Sédhiou and Ziguinchor.\textsuperscript{242}

Sri Lanka reported that people from the south of the country visiting the north and east are at higher mine/ERW risk due to a lack of knowledge on contamination. Sri Lanka provided risk education to forest officers, resettled civilians, and people that participate in illegal explosives harvesting and sand mining. District and village administrative employees, police officers, and construction workers were also targeted.\textsuperscript{243}

Thailand targeted security staff working in the contaminated area along its eastern border with Cambodia. In addition, cross-border travelers and returnees, particularly along the border with Myanmar, received risk education.\textsuperscript{244}

In Ukraine, risk education focused on men involved in high-risk activities including farming, construction, and the repair of public utilities, particularly in newly-contaminated areas due to the ongoing conflict. Risk education activities were also implemented in neighboring countries with the aim of reaching Ukrainian refugees before they return home.\textsuperscript{245}

In Yemen, workers involved in rubble removal and construction were specifically targeted.\textsuperscript{246}

In Zimbabwe, young men were a target group due to the misconception that mines contain red mercury and can be sold for a profit, which has encouraged intentional risk-taking.\textsuperscript{247}

Risk education beneficiaries by age, gender, and disability

Children living in contaminated areas often lack knowledge of the risks. They remained a key target group for risk education in 2022, with data provided to the Monitor by 58 organizations across 25 States Parties showing that children comprised 47% of all beneficiaries reached.\textsuperscript{248}

Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all reported reaching more children than adults through risk education activities.

Working-age adult men were cited by most States Parties and operators as a high-risk group, primarily due to their economic responsibilities. Men were at risk due to livelihood activities in rural areas including cultivation, the collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending


\textsuperscript{244} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Flt.-Lt. Chotiboon Aukulvanich, Chief of Cooperation and Coordination Section, TMAC, 19 June 2023; and by Alexandra Letcher, Regional Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 14 July 2023.

\textsuperscript{245} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Parviz Mavlonkulov, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 23 June 2023; by Patrick Haigis, EORE Manager, HALO Trust, 30 June 2023; and by Nick Vovk, Programme Manager, Danish Refugee Council, 23 June 2023.


\textsuperscript{247} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Nokutenda Masiyanise, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 3 July 2023; and by Phillip Mwatsera, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG, 5 July 2023.

\textsuperscript{248} Data was received from Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This includes all beneficiary data provided by national mine action authorities and operators that was disaggregated by sex and age. It includes beneficiaries of interpersonal risk education, as well as those receiving risk education via digital/mass media and training of trainers programs.
animals. Men and boys were also reported to be more likely than other groups to take intentional risks due to economic necessity. In Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Thailand, men accounted for the highest proportion of beneficiaries. In BiH, Chad, Iraq, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yemen, boys were the main recipient of risk education.

Operators noted that, in general, women and girls were less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors or to travel as far from home as men and boys. Nevertheless, they remained an important target group due to their engagement in livelihood activities and as they can help promote safer behavior among men and boys. Women accounted for the highest number of beneficiaries in Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Niger, Nigeria, and Ukraine. In Angola, Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, and Zimbabwe, girls were the main recipient of risk education.

Risk education beneficiaries by gender and age in States Parties

While there have been efforts to better reach persons with disabilities with risk education, data is not systematically collected. Only 11 of 60 risk education operators or authorities working in affected States Parties collected data on beneficiaries with disabilities, while only eight provided data disaggregated by disability. A total of 8,970 persons with disabilities were reported to have received interpersonal risk education in States Parties during 2022.

RISK EDUCATION DELIVERY METHODS

All States Parties implementing risk education provided interpersonal sessions in 2022. Printed materials, such as leaflets and posters, were also distributed in communities and schools. Radio broadcasts, television spots, and interactive risk education approaches such as theatre performances and puppet shows were used to reach target groups.

The Oslo Action Plan recommends that States Parties integrate risk education into wider humanitarian and development efforts. It was often integrated with survey, clearance, and victim assistance, and provided in emergency contexts. The plan also refers to a need to build national capacity to deliver risk education. In many states, training of trainers programs with community focal points, security forces, emergency service personnel, teachers, and volunteers were implemented to enhance the reach and effectiveness of risk education.

Risk education is delivered to children in schools in many States Parties. In 2022, nine States Parties had integrated risk education into the school curriculum: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe. In 2022–2023, a risk education course was being incorporated into the school curriculum in Ukraine by the Ministry of Education and UNICEF.

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249 Beneficiary data provided to the Monitor by 58 organizations and authorities across 25 States Parties.

In BiH, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), in cooperation with the Border Police and risk education operators, held meetings to discuss how migrants passing through the country could best be reached and warned about the threat of mines/ERW.251

In Cambodia, as part of ongoing awareness-raising under the Village and Commune Safety Policy, the police informed the public about mine/ERW risks. Emergency risk education was provided by operators, local authorities, and the National Committee on Disaster Management in areas where incidents had occurred.252 The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) reported in 2022 that Cambodia started to work with local authorities and monks to include risk education messages in the Buddhist Preaching Education Program.253

In Iraq, religious leaders were trained to deliver risk education, raising awareness during Friday prayers and encouraging at-risk groups to adopt safer behavior.254

Colombia and Somalia used social media channels and text messaging to reach at-risk groups.255 Thailand established group chats for community leaders to report suspicious items. Mass media and online platforms were also used.256 Croatia developed a mobile application that warns of life-threatening danger when entering or approaching a hazardous area. It also allows the user to call for help and send photos of explosive items to the authorities.257 In Ukraine, since the February 2022 invasion by Russia, digital risk education, including chat boxes, has proven to be an effective means of reaching people quickly with safety messages.258

Senegal reported that tourist guides received specific risk education safety training.259 In South Sudan, risk education was conducted in the form of a “talent show,” encouraging participants to interact and take on board safety messages through drawing, singing, dancing, and acting.260

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252 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Annex I, pp. 18–19; and email from Ros Sophal, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 8 August 2023.
255 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sara Castillo, EORE and Support Officer, HALO Trust, 10 July 2023; and by Hamdi Hassan, Program Coordinator, MAG, 16 July 2023.
257 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form I, p. 32.
In Zimbabwe, since 2020, operators have partnered with local authorities through the "Happy Readers" initiative to integrate risk education into the literacy program in schools.261

In Mali, radio spots and interactive broadcasts were used as forums for discussion and information-sharing on explosive devices, with listeners actively contributing. It was reported that these broadcasts improved understanding among target groups, and helped to correct misinformation about explosive devices that had been circulating in communities.262

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The Mine Ban Treaty was the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty to commit States Parties to provide assistance to people harmed by a specific type of weapon.263 It initiated the creation of a strong emerging norm, which became a core binding legal obligation of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2008, a Plan of Action on Victim Assistance was adopted by the 2003 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW. A victim assistance standard was also adopted in the text of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.264 In November 2022, in Dublin, 83 countries adopted the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, referring to a need for victim assistance.265

Victim assistance is an ongoing responsibility in all States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with mine/ERW victims, including those that have fulfilled their Article 5 clearance obligations.

The components of victim assistance include, but are not restricted to: data collection and needs assessment; referral to emergency and ongoing medical care; physical rehabilitation including prosthetics and other assistive devices; psychological support; socio-economic inclusion; and the enactment of relevant laws and public policies.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION PLAN

The Oslo Action Plan reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to “ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination.” It commits States Parties to enhancing their implementation of victim assistance measures including through providing the following:

- An effective and efficient emergency medical response and ongoing medical care;
- Comprehensive rehabilitation and healthcare;
- Comprehensive psychological and psychosocial support services;
- Social and economic inclusion; and
- Inclusion and participation of mine victims and their representative organizations.266

261 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Delia Sandra Maphosa, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG Zimbabwe, 10 May 2020; by Nokutenda Matiyanise, Program Officer, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 3 July 2023; and Facebook post by Happy Readers Zimbabwe, 23 June 2023, bit.ly/HappyReadersFacebookPost23June2023.
262 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023.
STATES PARTIES WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF VICTIMS

At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in 2004, States Parties “indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors,” and agreed that states with victims had the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest need and expectations for assistance. According to the widely accepted understanding of the term, “victims” of mines include survivors, as well as affected families and communities.\(^{267}\)

The Monitor’s reporting on victim assistance focuses primarily on States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims.\(^{268}\) The victim assistance action points outlined in the Oslo Action Plan are addressed to States Parties with a significant number of victims.\(^{269}\) Yet it notes that, more broadly, all States Parties with victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control must “endeavour to do their utmost to provide appropriate, affordable and accessible services to mine victims, on an equal basis with others.”

ADOPTING STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Under Action 5 of the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties committed to update and adapt their national mine action standards in accordance with best practices and the latest version of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Adopted in 2021, IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance reminds all actors that victim assistance should be implemented as an equal pillar of mine action, and that the mine action sector is responsible for providing assistance or facilitating access to services. National mine action authorities and centers should play a role in monitoring and facilitating multisectoral efforts to address the needs of survivors. National authorities should also assist with including survivors and indirect victims of mines/ERW, and their views, in the development of relevant national legislation and policies. IMAS 13.10 notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.

In January 2023, Iraq became the first country to fully adapt IMAS 13.10 as national standards. Iraq’s National Standards on Victim Assistance in Mine Action were developed with the support of Humanity & Inclusion (HI) and adopted by both the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).\(^{270}\)

The Oslo Action Plan calls for States Parties with a significant number of victims to align their efforts with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).\(^{271}\) The CRPD provides an overarching mechanism for amending national laws and policies related

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\(^{267}\) The Monitor uses the definitions of victim and survivor as follows: the term ‘victim’ refers to all persons who have, either individually or collectively, suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights through acts or omissions related to mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. Victims include people injured and killed, their families, and communities affected by mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The term ‘survivor’ refers to a person who has been injured as a result of an incident caused by a mine, cluster munition, or ERW, and has survived.

\(^{268}\) A definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference, as “those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.” See, Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 9 February 2005, p. 27, bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport.

\(^{269}\) At the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to Mine Ban Treaty, 37 States Parties were recognized to have reported mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.


to persons with disabilities, and is legally binding. It also pertains to mine/ERW victims with disabilities. All except two States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with responsibility for significant numbers of victims are also party to the CRPD. Tajikistan has signed but not yet ratified the CRPD, while South Sudan took a major step toward ratifying the CRPD in early 2023.272

**EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE AND ONGOING MEDICAL CARE**

The Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide timely first-aid and emergency medical services. The initial response to mine casualties can include field trauma response, emergency evacuation and transport, and immediate medical care.

Healthcare systems in many States Parties with mine victims required significant additional resources, and training for staff and first responders. Infrastructure, materials, and medicine were lacking in many countries, particularly those experiencing conflict and economic crises.

In 2022–2023, several states, including Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen, experienced massive disruption—and in some cases damage and destruction—to their healthcare systems. Ukraine's healthcare system was reeling from the effects of conflict, with hundreds of attacks on health facilities reported.273 In June 2022, the WHO issued an urgent appeal for access to people injured during the war in Ukraine, including "hundreds" of mine and ERW victims.274

Delays in reaching health services in Yemen could lead to life-long complications, particularly for survivors with complex injuries.275

In eastern Türkiye, a massive earthquake in February 2023 damaged infrastructure including healthcare facilities and transport links. The epicenter, near the border with Syria, was in a region with a high number of mine/ERW survivors, including refugees.276 In the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties committed to protect mine victims in situations of risk including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters.277

In Colombia, access to health services was limited and medical follow-up was inadequate.278 To respond to needs, the Colombian Red Cross trained health workers in wound management and war surgery, and provided first-aid training in affected communities.279 The DRC lacks sufficient-quality health infrastructure, and access for mine/ERW survivors was limited.280

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In 2022, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided first-aid training to the Congolese Red Cross, as well as capacity-building in surgery to referral hospitals.\footnote{ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, p. 109, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022.}

In remote areas of Iraq, mine/ERW survivors are evacuated by locals or receive first-aid from organizations working nearby, due to the lack of emergency medical services.\footnote{Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 12 April 2021.} In order to increase preparedness and develop capacity, the ICRC launched a nationwide pilot project on mass-casualty management in 2022, involving police and community leaders.\footnote{ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, p. 409, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022.} Similarly, in many other states including Chad, the DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen, mine incidents often occurred in remote areas far from healthcare facilities.

## Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, aims to help victims regain or improve mobility, and engage in everyday activities. Rehabilitation requires a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach involving doctors, physiotherapists, prosthetists, social workers, and other specialists. Community-based rehabilitation is increasingly included in national rehabilitation programs.

Healthcare systems in many States Parties responsible for survivors are under-funded and lack accessibility, as well as the required infrastructure and expertise. Integrating rehabilitation into national healthcare systems, including by developing universal health coverage, is considered vital to the sustainability of services. Monitor findings indicate that, to date, rehabilitation has not been a priority in many affected States Parties.

In Afghanistan, HI opened a specialized unit at the Kandahar Rehabilitation Center to provide a transition from acute trauma care to rehabilitation services.\footnote{HI, “More than 130 people seen at the Kandahar Rehabilitation Centre each week,” undated, bit.ly/KandaharRehabCenterHI.} HI also deployed an emergency mobile team in 2022 to deliver urgent physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support to persons with disabilities in rural areas of Kabul province.\footnote{ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2022,” March 2023, p. 99, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2022.} The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) commenced a new rehabilitation program in Bamyan province in 2022.\footnote{“Rehabilitation programme for disabled persons launched in Bamyan,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 16 June 2022, bit.ly/PajhwokAfghanNewsJune2022.}

In Colombia, HI operated municipal physical training centers which provided rehabilitation where services were lacking.\footnote{Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI, 21 May 2021; HI, “Country Card: Colombia,” updated September 2022, pp. 6–7, bit.ly/HIColombiaSept2022; and Facebook post by Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra minas, CCCM), 9 June 2022, bit.ly/CCCMFacebookPost9June2022.} In Guinea-Bissau, mine survivors were able to access free rehabilitation services in 2022 at the only national rehabilitation center, in the capital, Bissau. The ICRC’s role in training staff was limited as it scaled back its support for the center.\footnote{ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, p. 100, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2022.}
Prosthetics centers in Albania, Angola, and Tajikistan lacked materials. Chad had only two functional rehabilitation centers, which operated without state support. Survivors lacked access to rehabilitation services outside of the capital, N’Djamena. When not financially supported by HI, patients were required to pay often prohibitive costs for services.

In Ethiopia, the Prosthetic and Orthotic Center in Addis Ababa merged with Gefersa Mental Rehabilitation Center during 2022 to create the Ethiopian Prosthetic Orthotic Service (EPOS), which operates a total of 19 rehabilitation facilities across the country.

The ICRC opened a physical rehabilitation center in Erbil, in Iraq, in March 2022, which will also serve Syrian refugees. HI provided physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support.

In Palestine, the ICRC partnered with the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center in Gaza to support physical rehabilitation. The center has lacked the capacity to meet demand in recent years.

In Somalia, provision of rehabilitation services remained challenging amid insecurity. Access to rehabilitation services remained extremely limited in South Sudan and Uganda. In South Sudan, resources were needed to fill gaps in making rehabilitation accessible.

In Uganda, the Learning, Acting and Building for Rehabilitation Systems (ReLAB-HS) project worked alongside the Ministry of Health to strengthen services, with initial target areas including formerly mine-impacted northern and eastern regions.

The need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services has increased massively in Ukraine since the Russian invasion of the country in February 2022. HI has worked in Ukrainian hospitals to support people with amputations.

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294 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information Department, DMA, 10 March 2022; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 45.


297 Email from Lillian Asiimwe, Program Support and Inclusion Officer, ReLAB-HS Uganda, 13 July 2022 and 31 March 2023.

In Yemen, the ICRC opened a new prosthetics center in Sa’ada in January 2023, after several new rehabilitation centers opened in 2021. The center is integrated into the healthcare system and will mostly be staffed by the Ministry of Public Health and Population.300

In Zimbabwe, rehabilitation services were not available in most mine-affected regions, and survivors in rural areas often could not afford to travel to access services or spend long periods away from home.301 In Angola and Zimbabwe, the HALO Trust supported delivery of prosthetics.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

Psychological and psychosocial support is one of the components of victim assistance with the greatest need for improvement. Activities in this area can include professional counselling, individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based support groups, survivor networks, associations of persons with disabilities, and sports and recreational activities.

In Afghanistan, psychosocial assistance was limited and peer-to-peer initiatives were not supported. HI provided psychosocial support to patients and caregivers at its rehabilitation center in Kandahar.302

Croatia provided psychosocial support workshops for survivors in 2022.303 Croatia also has psychosocial rehabilitation centers in all of its counties and in the capital, Zagreb.304

In Colombia, mental health care for mine/ERW survivors is provided through an insurance system. Colombia did not report whether peer-to-peer activities were compensated through this framework.

In Ethiopia, the Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRARO) provides socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion.305

In Iraq, every rehabilitation center is reported to have a psychological support unit.306

In Sri Lanka, most survivors were found to have experienced post-traumatic stress disorder. Psychosocial support from psychiatrists and mental health officers was reportedly available in all districts of Northern province, with additional support provided by NGOs.307

In Tajikistan, a victim assistance officer from the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) is qualified to provide psychological support, both in-person and remotely.308 Mine survivors in Tajikistan participated in a rehabilitation camp in 2022. Behavioral therapy, physiotherapy, art therapy, and adaptive leisure activities were organized in 2023 by TNMAC, with support from the OSCE.309

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

Ensuring the socio-economic inclusion of mine/ERW victims through education, sports and leisure, cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit and income-generation projects, and employment programs remained a significant area for improvement in most States

302 HI, “More than 130 people seen at the Kandahar Rehabilitation Centre each week,” undated, bit.ly/HIKandaharRehabilitation.
303 Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Forms H and J.
304 Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form H.
305 Email from Bekele Gonfa, Executive Director, SRARO, 5 September 2022.
306 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 13 April 2021.
308 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 20 April 2022.
Parties with victims. There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban widened the definition of social security pension beneficiaries beyond war victims to cover all persons with disabilities.\(^{310}\) However, a re-registration process for beneficiaries almost halved the number of persons identified as eligible for assistance.\(^{311}\) In response to the dire economic and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, the ICRC developed a safety net program to provide financial support to persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, who are breadwinners for their families with no source of income.\(^{312}\)

In Colombia, the national training service provided vocational counselling for mine survivors and their relatives, to adapt income-generation activities to their existing skills and market needs.\(^{313}\)

In Senegal, educational and professional training was free of charge for survivors, but transport and accommodation costs made access difficult.\(^{314}\)

**INCLUSION AND PARTICIPATION**

Ensuring the inclusion and participation of mine/ERW victims is a core aim of the Oslo Action Plan. The second Global Disability Summit, held virtually in 2022, noted that "meaningful participation" must involve consultation with groups "that represent persons with disabilities in all their diversities including...victims of landmines."\(^{315}\)

Mine survivors were reported to be represented in coordination activities in Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand in 2022. Their influence on processes, and specific outcomes related to this participation, were rarely reported upon.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has stated that mine and ERW survivors should be actively consulted and participate meaningfully in all decision-making processes that affect them, including the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects and programs. For effective responses, victims must be consulted and their views considered at all levels of decision-making.\(^{316}\)

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\(^{313}\) Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form G, p. 98.


ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE CONTAMINATION: 2022

MAP KEY
- Contaminated
- Residual contamination
- Suspected improvised mine contamination
- Clearance reported complete

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are *italics*.

*Algeria, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tunisia, and Venezuela have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines but are known or suspected to have residual and/or improvised mine contamination.

**Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The United Kingdom (UK) also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory and completed mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

***Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
LANDMINE/EXPLOSIVE REMNANT OF WAR CASUALTIES: 2022

MAP KEY

Number of recorded casualties in 2022

1–9
10–49
50–199
200–499
500 or more

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are italics.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
A deminer conducts survey and clearance in an area contaminated by improvised mines near the city of Rawa, in Anbar governorate, Iraq.

© Marijn van Broekhoven/NPA, March 2022
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

INTRODUCTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations. This provision on international cooperation and assistance has been crucial in supporting the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This chapter examines the financial response provided in 2022 by affected countries and international donors to support mine action efforts.

In 2022, global support for mine action increased by 52% (US$314.5 million) from 2021, with 35 donors and 17 affected states reporting a total of $913.5 million in international and national support for mine action. This is the highest level of annual funding recorded by the Monitor since it began reporting in 1999. Funding previously peaked at $696.3 million in 2017.

International support to mine action totaled $798.4 million in 2022. Of this, $162.3 million went to activities in Ukraine, representing 20% of the total. The remaining $636.1 million still represents a 17% increase from the $543.5 million received in 2021.

There were some changes in the donor base in 2022, with the addition of Saudi Arabia after it reported providing mine action funding for the first time since 2014. However, as in past years, a small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action support. The United States (US) remained the largest mine action donor, followed by the European Union (EU), with both significantly increasing their contributions in 2022. Some traditionally strong mine action funders reduced their contributions, notably the United

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1 Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize the fiscal year rather than the calendar year. In 2022, 14 of the 25 States Parties documented in this chapter reported disaggregated data on international funding for mine action in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports. Two reported fiscal year funding and two reported multi-year funding.

2 All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current US dollars. Annual reported contributions for the period from 1997 to 2006 may be conservative, due to variations in the level of detail provided by donors and/or time periods considered.
Kingdom (UK), which decreased spending in 2022 by 35% from its 2021 contribution.\(^3\) States Parties provided less than half of all international support ($328 million, or 41%), excluding EU funding.\(^4\)

Ukraine moved to the top of the list of countries receiving mine action assistance following large-scale support provided to the country following Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Yemen also climbed the list, partly due to Saudi Arabia’s $33 million contribution to fund mine clearance in Yemen through the King Salaman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center.

The top 10 recipients of mine action contributions received $580.6 million and accounted for 73% of all international assistance in 2022. Iraq and Lao PDR, while remaining among the top 10 recipient states, both experienced a decrease in mine action funding.

Most funding provided by donors in 2022 was spent on clearance and integrated clearance programs ($499.5 million, or 63% of total contributions). Integrated clearance programs included activities such as risk education, victim assistance, and capacity-building, although clearance accounted for the largest component of spending. A large proportion of clearance funding ($194.2 million, or 39%) went to States Parties with massive contamination (more than 100km\(^2\)). Of the 12 States Parties with less than 5km\(^2\) of contamination, only five—Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Palestine, Senegal, and Somalia—received funds for clearance, with two receiving 90% of the total (Colombia and Somalia).

Funding contributions for dedicated risk education and victim assistance increased in 2022, but represented only 1% and 5% respectively of overall funding. Support for capacity-building increased in 2022 (to $71.6 million, or 9% of total contributions), boosted by EU funding to support national mine action capacity in Ukraine. The remaining 22% of funding ($179.5 million) was either not disaggregated by donors, unearmarked, or used for capacity-building and advocacy.

Multilateral organizations, international non-profit organizations, and United Nations (UN) agencies received most of the funding in 2022. International assistance to international non-profit organizations accounted for 37% of total funding with at least $295 million received. By comparison, international assistance provided directly to national non-profit organizations accounted for less than 1% ($3.4 million) of total funding during 2022.

The Monitor identified 17 affected states that provided a total of $115.1 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, representing 13% of global funding. Tracking national financial commitments by affected States Parties remains challenging as a result of under-reporting. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports.\(^5\)

**INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2022**

International donors provided $798.4 million in 2022, a significant increase of $254.9 million (or 47%) from contributions in 2021. Of the total amount of spending, $162.3 million (or 20%) went to activities in Ukraine—with support for Ukraine in 2022 up $141.1 million from 2021. The remaining $636.1 million in international support still represents a 17% increase from the $543.5 million provided in 2021. The increase in international support to mine action in 2022 marks a positive change from the downward trajectory in annual mine action spending by international donors over the previous four years.

In 2022, as has been the case for the past two decades, the donor base remained largely unchanged, with the exception that Saudi Arabia was included within the pool of the 15

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3 Data on international support for mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, the ITF Enhancing Human Security and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) annual reports, media reporting, and answers from donors to Monitor questionnaires. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

4 All EU member states are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

5 Data on national support for mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting.
largest donors. The 15 largest donors provided almost all international mine action funding in 2022, with a combined total of $774.9 million (97% of all support). This represents an increase of 48% from the $524.5 million provided by the 15 largest donors in 2021.

The list of countries receiving international mine action support shifted to some extent in 2022. Ukraine moved to the top of the list of the top 10 recipients, reflecting the large-scale support provided to the country after Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Libya and Yemen moved into the list of the top 10 recipients in 2022, while Lebanon and Sri Lanka moved out of the top 10. The 10 largest recipients received $580.6 million and accounted for 73% of all international assistance. Since 2018, only 14 countries have appeared in this group of largest recipients, with six of them present every year over the five-year period: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Syria.

International support for mine action: 2013–2022

Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.

DONORS

In 2022, 26 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, four states not party, one other area, the EU, and four other institutions contributed a total of $798.4 million to mine action.

As in past years, a handful of donors provided the bulk of the international mine action support. Five donors—the US, the EU, Germany, Japan, and Norway—accounted for 76% of all international support in 2022, providing a combined total of $603.2 million.

In 2022, the US remained the largest mine action donor with a total contribution of $310.2 million, representing 39% of all international support. The EU ranked second, with $124.2 million, accounting for 15% of contributions. Both the US and EU contributions represented a significant increase from 2021—a respective 59% increase for the US and 229% for the EU. Germany provided the third-largest contribution of $78.8 million (10% of all support). Japan provided $45.3 million and Norway $44.7 million, each representing 6% of all support.

The UK, previously among the top five donors in 2021, dropped to eighth on the list, providing $24.7 million. This represents a decrease of 35% from the $38.2 million provided in 2021.

6 The 15 largest donors in 2022 were: the US, the EU, Germany, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, the UK, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, France, Denmark, Italy, and New Zealand.

7 The 14 countries appearing in the list of the 10 largest recipients of international support in 2018–2022 were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria, Türkiye, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.

8 In July 2021, the UK parliament endorsed the decision to cut the UK’s foreign aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of its national income due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2021, media reports estimated that UK funding for mine clearance in 2022–2024 could be reduced by at least 75%. Larisa Brown, “Foreign Office cuts cash for mine clearing by 75%,” *The Times*, 7 October 2021, bit.ly/TheTimes7Oct2021; and Andrew Mitchell, “Cutting aid for landmine clearance is crazy,” *The Telegraph*, 10 October 2021, bit.ly/TheTelegraph10Oct2021.
Despite variations in the level of support provided, the proportion of total assistance from the top five donors each year has remained constant over time. From 2018–2022, the combined annual contributions from the five major donors accounted for 70–78% of all international support. Only five countries—Germany, Japan, Norway, the UK, and the US—and the EU appeared in the group of five largest donors of international support in 2018–2022.

**Contributions by donors: 2018–2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>194.5</td>
<td>204.8</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>201.7</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors*</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>798.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>543.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>565.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>561.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>642.6</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,111</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

*Other donors in 2022 included: Andorra, Czech Republic, Estonia, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNMPTF), and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

Support from individual States Parties in 2022 accounted for less than half (41%) of all donor funding, with 26 countries providing $328 million. This represents a 6% increase from the $310 million provided in 2021. EU States Parties also provide support via EU funding, which totalled $124.2 million in 2022, or 16% of global contributions. States not party the US, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea accounted for $345 million or 43% of all donor funding.

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9 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. This data is drawn from information provided by donors in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as responses to Monitor questionnaires and other sources. In 2020, the total contributions of Denmark and the UK might have been slightly higher. For more information see, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2021* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2021), bit.ly/LM2021Report.

10 South Korea reported $1.6 million in contributions in 2022.
Overall, 14 donors contributed more in 2022 than they did in 2021, including a $115.7 million increase from the US (59%) and a $86.4 million increase from the EU (229%). This brought the EU contribution back to above its 2020 level of contribution, following a $52 million (58%) decrease in 2021. Germany also increased its contribution by $14 million (22%), Norway by $9.1 million (26%), and Canada by $6.3 million (39%). Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland also increased their contributions in 2022. It is likely that South Korea contributed more funding to mine action in 2022, although this was not recorded for the calendar year.11

Three donors provided new funding in 2022: Jersey, through Jersey Overseas Aid, the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNMPTF), and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Mine action funding from Saudi Arabia was recorded for the first time since 2014.

In 2022, 16 donors decreased their funding, with New Zealand down $5.2 million (53%) and the UK down $13.5 million (35%) from their 2021 contributions. Contributions were also reduced from Denmark (down $4.5 million, or 31%), Sweden (down $1.8 million, or 13%), and Australia (down $1.3 million, or 28%).12

Estonia provided the same contribution as in 2021. One donor, the United Nations Association-Sweden (UNA-Sweden), did not report any new contribution to mine action in 2022.

### Summary of changes in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Combined total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Andorra, Canada, EU, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland, US</td>
<td>$241.5 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>France, Japan, Netherlands</td>
<td>$7.8 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, New Zealand, Spain, UK, UNDP</td>
<td>$25 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, UNICEF</td>
<td>$3.3 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New donors in 2022</td>
<td>Jersey, UNMPTF, UNOPS</td>
<td>$0.5 million provided in 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newly reported in 2022</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$33.3 million provided in 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors from 2021 that did not report new funding in 2022</td>
<td>UNA-Sweden</td>
<td>$0.03 million provided in 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


12 New Zealand may have contributed more support in 2022, but provided figures for multi-year funded programs for Cambodia (2020–2025), Colombia (2022–2024), and Lao PDR (2017–2024). The figures were not disaggregated by year and so were not included, to avoid double-counting. New Zealand funds for humanitarian response in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were also not included in the Monitor database as the specific amount going towards mine action activities was not specified.
FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and ITF Enhancing Human Security. The VTF was established by the government of Slovenia and was formerly known as the International Trust Fund.

In 2022, UNMAS received $50.6 million in contributions from 23 donors. Several donors providing financial assistance of under $1 million used the VTF to contribute to mine action, including Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, and Spain, as well as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNMPTF, and UNOPS.

Six donor states reported allocating a combined total of $5.6 million for mine action programs in 2022 through ITF Enhancing Human Security.13

While donor funding is frequently used for national activities, implementation is often carried out by an array of partner institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trust funds, and UN agencies.

The implementing partners landscape has remained largely unchanged in recent years, with multilateral organizations, international non-profit organizations, and UN agencies receiving most of the funding. Overall, international assistance to international non-profit organizations accounted for 37% of total funding during 2022, with at least $295 million received.14

Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2022 included the HALO Trust ($64.6 million), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) ($34.4 million), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies ($29.4 million), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) ($28.6 million), Humanity & Inclusion (HI) ($21.4 million), the Danish Refugee Council ($19.2 million), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($14.1 million).

Allocation of mine action support across implementing partners in 2022 (in US$ million)15

Note: Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international support. NPO=non-profit organization.

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13 The six donors were: Austria, Czech Republic, Japan, Slovenia, South Korea, and the US. The US did not always disaggregate funding by recipient.
14 In comparison, international non-profit organizations received at least $202 million (37%) in 2021.
15 Some donors did not disaggregate the type of implementing partner. This has been represented within the “various” category, and mainly includes multilateral organizations, international and national non-profit organizations, and UN agencies.
International assistance provided directly to national non-profit organizations accounted for less than 1% ($3.4 million) of total funding during 2022, with four donors supporting organizations in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Colombia, Lao PDR, and Sri Lanka. Other funding went to national non-profit organizations in Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, but these figures were not disaggregated so the specific amounts could not be recorded.

RECIPIENTS

A total of 46 states and four other areas received $726.8 million from 32 donors in 2022. In addition, $5.6 million went to regional programs including in West Africa, East Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and Europe. Another $66 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. Three donors—Andorra, Estonia, and Liechtenstein—only reported contributions to “global” activities.

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—Ukraine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Lao PDR—received $434.1 million, or 54% of the total.

From 2016 until 2021, Iraq was the largest recipient of mine action assistance. In 2022, Ukraine became the largest recipient, receiving 20% of all international support from 17 donors, while Iraq received 11% of all international support from 14 donors. Thirteen states and two other areas had only one donor each.

In 2022, a total of 31 recipient states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2021, including 21 that received more support and 10 that received less support. Two recipients from 2021 received no support in 2022: Nepal and Somaliland. Five recipient states that did not receive support in 2021 received support in 2022: Cameroon, Mauritania, Moldova, the Philippines, and Rwanda. Funding for the DRC remained the same as in 2021.

Ukraine received a large increase in funding in 2022, receiving just over $141 million more than in 2021. This was primarily due to many donors directing funds to Ukraine after Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Other affected countries with a significant increase in international assistance received were Afghanistan ($16.9 million more), Azerbaijan ($9 million more), Libya ($7.5 million more), Syria ($9.5 million more), Thailand ($2.4 million more), and Yemen ($56 million more). Yemen’s increase was in large part due to the reporting by Saudi Arabia of its financial contribution, but even without the $33.3 million that this represented, Yemen still received another $31.1 million in 2022, an increase of $22.7 million from the $8.4 million received in 2021. Syria saw its mine action funding increase for the first time in three years, by $9.5 million, following decreases in 2021 (down $1.9 million), 2020 (down $16.4 million), and 2019 (down $24.2 million).

16 National non-profit organizations received at least $7.9 million (1%) in 2021. Donors supporting national non-profit organizations in 2022 were Germany, Ireland, Japan, and Norway.
17 The US supported national non-profit organizations (NPOs) in these states, but did not disaggregate figures for the amounts provided to national NPOs, international NPOs, commercial companies, and the UN.
18 Of the 10 countries that received the most mine action funding in 2022, eight were in the top 10 in 2021: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Syria, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
19 Recipients with one donor (in brackets) included: Abkhazia (UK), Cameroon (UK), Chad (UK), Croatia (EU), Georgia (Switzerland), Kosovo (US), Mauritania (France), Moldova (Slovenia), Niger (Italy), Pakistan (UK), Philippines (Australia), Rwanda (US), Senegal (EU), Serbia (EU), and Türkiye (EU).
20 It is likely that some of the support reported by donors for Somalia, a total of $12.7 million from eight donors, contributed to mine action activities in Somaliland, although it was not reported as such.
### International support recipients in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>162.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>51.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkei</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>Abkhazia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>798.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.

*Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Iraq and Lebanon saw a decrease in funding in 2022. Iraq received $5.9 million less than in 2021, while Lebanon received $3.6 million less. BiH, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and South Sudan also saw decreases in funding in 2022: BiH received $1.9 million less than in 2021, Lao PDR received $2.4 million less, Myanmar received $1 million less, and South Sudan received $2 million less.
Summary of changes in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Combined total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Georgia, Jordan, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, Western Sahara, Yemen</td>
<td>$256.3 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>Cambodia, Colombia, Vietnam, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$5.7 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Abkhazia, Benin, BiH, Chad, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nigeria, Palau, Serbia, Tajikistan</td>
<td>$9.5 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Senegal, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Türkiye</td>
<td>$13.9 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients from 2021 that did not receive new support in 2022</td>
<td>Nepal, Somaliland</td>
<td>$2.4 million received in 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recipients in 2022</td>
<td>Cameroon, Mauritania, Moldova, Philippines, Rwanda</td>
<td>$3.4 million received in 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR**

In 2022, 63% of international mine action funding supported clearance and integrated clearance programs. Capacity-building programs represented 9% of all international mine action support, while victim assistance represented 5% and risk education represented 1%. Contributions for advocacy accounted for less than 1% of funding. “Various” funding represented 22% of all international mine action support. This includes contributions not disaggregated by donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any particular sector.

Contributions by thematic sector in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of total contribution</th>
<th>No. of donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance and integrated clearance programs</td>
<td>499.5</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>175.4</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>798.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable.

21 In 2021, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education ($317.4 million, or 58% of total international support), victim assistance ($25.6 million, or 5%), capacity-building ($20.5 million, or 4%), advocacy ($4.7 million, or 1%), and various activities ($175.3 million, or 32%).
CLEARANCE AND INTEGRATED CLEARANCE PROGRAMS

In 2022, $499.5 million, or more than half (63%) of all support went toward clearance and integrated clearance programs, which include clearance combined with risk education, victim assistance, capacity-building, and other activities such as information management and gender mainstreaming. This represents an increase of almost $182 million (or 57%) from 2021.

A total of 27 donors reported contributions to clearance and integrated clearance programs in 2022. Five donors—the EU, Germany, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the US—provided the majority ($376.9 million, or 75%), with the US contributing over half of this amount ($203 million).

Many donors reported clearance with other activities as a combined figure. Contributions for clearance and integrated clearance programs were provided across 33 affected countries and four other areas. Eighteen donors indicated contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of $120.1 million (15% of total contributions).

Clearance support by extent of mine contamination in States Parties: 2020–2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination Level</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massive contamination</td>
<td>179.9</td>
<td>194.2</td>
<td>145.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large contamination</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium contamination</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small contamination</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures above each bar indicate the combined total of clearance and integrated clearance program support.

About $194.2 million (39%) of international support for clearance and integrated clearance programs was spent in seven States Parties with massive landmine contamination.

---

22 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Palau, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

States not party that received international assistance for clearance were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.

23 This included mine, ERW, and cluster munition remnant clearance. The 18 donors were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, France, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US.

24 Recipients of international support for clearance with massive contamination (more than 100km²) included: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Türkiye, and Ukraine. Recipients with large contamination (20–99km²) included: Angola, Thailand, and Yemen. Recipients with medium contamination (5–19km²) included: South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe. Recipients with small contamination (less than 5km²) included: Colombia, DRC, Palestine, Senegal, and Somalia.

25 Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Türkiye, and Ukraine. No funding for clearance was reported by donors for Ethiopia.
As illustrated in the graph, States Parties with smaller contamination have tended to receive less financial support to implement their clearance obligations, although could potentially complete clearance within a few years with targeted funding. Of the 12 States Parties with less than 5km² of landmine contamination, only five—Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, Senegal, and Somalia—received funds for clearance in 2022, with Colombia and Somalia receiving 90% ($42.2 million) of the total $47.1 million (Colombia received $30.7 million and Somalia $11.5 million).

Ten mine-affected States Parties did not receive new external support to carry out clearance or integrated clearance projects in 2022. For some of them, this has been the case for years.

RISK EDUCATION

In 2022, thirteen donors reported contributions totaling $10.1 million for risk education projects across 15 states and one other area, and at a global and regional level. Some of the projects were combined with risk education capacity-building or gender mainstreaming. Denmark, Germany, Japan, and the UK provided the largest contributions to risk education dedicated support, with a combined contribution of $7.2 million (71% of the total).

Recipients of risk education dedicated support: 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>&gt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>&gt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>&gt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>&gt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold, and other areas in italics.

*Lao PDR is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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27 States Parties Chad, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Peru, and Serbia did not receive funding for clearance in 2022. Ecuador (last received international support for clearance in 2012), Eritrea (in 2010), Ethiopia (in 2012), Guinea-Bissau (in 2010), Niger (in 2011), Peru (in 2016), and Serbia (in 2020).
28 Donors of international assistance for risk education were: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. In comparison, nine donors reported contributing a total of $6.7 million for risk education projects in 2021.
29 In cases where it was not clear if funding for capacity-building was related to the risk education activities, these contributions were not included within the risk education dedicated support.
30 This table includes recipients of specific risk education funding only. In addition to the recipients listed in the table, 16 states and one other area received support for risk education combined with other mine action activities, such as clearance or victim assistance (the specific amount going to each sector could not be disaggregated): Angola, Benin, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, DRC, Lebanon, Mauritania, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, and other area Abkhazia.
Clearance and risk education support: 2018–2022

Between 2018 and 2022, approximately two-thirds of international support went to clearance (including integrated clearance projects) and risk education activities (62%, or $1.9 billion). Risk education-specific funding represented just 1.5% of all dedicated support, totaling $48.7 million. However, this is a significant increase on the $27.3 million for risk education recorded in the previous five-year period from 2013–2017. The increase may be due to better disaggregation of funding data, the renewed focus on this life-saving pillar of mine action since 2019, and the increased need for risk education for populations in conflict-affected areas.

Clearance and risk education dedicated international support: 2018–2022

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated clearance and risk education funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Based on data available as of October 2023, direct international support for victim assistance activities in 2022 totaled $37.6 million, an increase of 47% from the 2021 figure of $25.6 million. While this represents a welcome increase as a proportion of all international support, the contribution to victim assistance, at 5% of total contributions, remains within the 4–8% range observed since 2017. Fourteen donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 14 States Parties, six states not party, and one other area.31 The EU was the largest contributor to victim assistance in 2022, providing $11.7 million, or 31% of the total. Germany, Japan, and Italy also provided large contributions to victim assistance, with a combined total of $20.7 million, or 55% of the total. It is likely that state not party South

31 Victim assistance donors in 2022 were: EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland, and US. States Parties recipients of international funding for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Moldova, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Rwanda, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen. The states not party recipients were: Armenia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, and Syria. The other area recipient was Nagorno-Karabakh.
Korea contributed more to victim assistance programs in Southeast Asia, although the annual funding figures for 2022 were not recorded.\(^{32}\)

**Victim assistance dedicated international support: 2018–2022**

![Bar chart showing victim assistance funding from 2018 to 2022](image)

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. As observed in 2018–2021, a large proportion of the victim assistance contributions in 2022 resulted from support within the context of emergency operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East. During 2022, half of all victim assistance support went to three countries—Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen—receiving a combined total of $18.9 million.

The remaining $18.7 million went to victim assistance activities in 16 other countries (including 11 States Parties) and one other area, and to activities at a global level.

As in previous years, a large number of States Parties in which there were significant numbers of mine/ERW victims received little or no victim assistance support, despite needs remaining great and available resources limited. Of the 37 States Parties identified at the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in 2022 to have landmine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control, only nine received dedicated victim assistance support. Five others were reported to have received victim assistance contributions as part of integrated clearance programs.\(^{33}\)

Funding for victim assistance remains difficult to track, as many donors report that they support victims via more general programs for development and the rights of persons with disabilities, and are not able to detail specific victim assistance funding. However, the Monitor’s annual estimate still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation.

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\(^{33}\) The States Parties with significant numbers of survivors receiving victim assistance contributions in 2022 were: Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen. States Parties Cambodia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe received victim assistance contributions as part of integrated clearance programs.
ADVOCACY AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

In 2022, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities ($4.2 million). Of the 35 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, eight reported supporting advocacy activities.

Twenty donors collectively provided $71.6 million—representing 9% of international support in 2022—for capacity-building activities in 19 countries, and at a regional and global level. This is a 249% increase from the level of funding for capacity-building reported in 2021 ($20.5 million) and almost ten times the 2019 level ($7.4 million). It is the highest annual total support allocated to this sector ever recorded by the Monitor. While the increase reflects better reporting on capacity-building initiatives and a growing interest from donors in strengthening local capacity for effective and sustainable mine action, in 2022 it was also driven by the need to support the Ukrainian authorities to enhance their mine action capabilities.

Advocacy and capacity-building dedicated international support: 2018–2022

Ukraine received the highest portion of recorded international funding for capacity-building in 2022, with $28 million (39% of the total contribution). The EU was the largest donor to capacity-building in Ukraine, allocating $25 million, or 89% of the overall support to

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34 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to: contributions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty implementation support units, GICHD, Geneva Call, the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) Mine Action Review, and other operators and NGOs.

35 Advocacy donors in 2022 included: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland.

36 Capacity-building donors in 2022 included: Canada, Denmark, EU, France, Japan, Jersey, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, UK, US, UNDP, UNICEF, UNMPTF, and UNOPS. Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building were: Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, and Ukraine. Capacity-building was also included within many of the integrated clearance programs.

Ukraine. Cambodia received $18.6 million (26% of international capacity-building support), which was allocated by Japan through the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS).

**NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>115.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

*Germany, Lao PDR, and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

National contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 transparency reports. As in previous years, a dozen affected states indicated contributing to their own national mine action programs, but details on their level of contribution were either unavailable or only partially available. In most of these states, national contributions were limited to covering the running costs of their respective mine action authorities.

In 2022, the Monitor found that at least 17 affected states provided a combined total of $115.1 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets. 38

**Angola** did not provide any information on its national contribution for 2022, although it financially supports the National Agency for Action Against Mines (Agência Nacional de Ação contra Minas, ANAM). The government of Angola is also the largest donor to the HALO Trust program in the country, financially supporting clearance in protected areas along the Okavango Delta, in Cuando Cubango province. 39

**Cambodia** reported a national contribution of $10.1 million in 2022, of which $75,000 was a contribution to the UNDP Clearing for Results program. 40 During 2022, Cambodia raised funds through the Mine-Free Village program, and via a funding appeal to the private sector backed by then-Prime Minister Hun Sen. Cambodia stated that it will contribute $30 million towards its mine clearance efforts in 2023, and similar amounts annually in 2024 and 2025. 41

**Croatia** reported that its national contribution in 2022 represented 68% of the total mine action budget for the country, though it did not report the amount. 42 In 2021, Croatia reported a state contribution of $15 million.

**Germany** has been funding clearance of cluster munition remnants from a former military training area in Wittstock, spending a total of €89.1 million ($93.9 million) since 2017. 43

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38 Data on national support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.


40 Email from H.E. Ly Panha Rith, Secretary General, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 8 September 2023.


42 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C.

As in 2020–2021, Lebanon was unable to allocate national resources to conduct clearance operations as planned in 2022 due to political instability and the national economic crisis. The government contribution of $9 million supported the operations of the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), and risk education and victim assistance training of trainers programs.44

Somalia remained reliant on international funding for mine action due to a lack of government budget.45 Yemen reported a significant decrease in the annual state commitment of $3 million to its mine action program, with the ongoing armed conflict placing a strain on finances. Yemen did not specify the amount provided in 2022. Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) staff were reported to have been paid intermittently, and had no insurance or pension plan.46

OSLO ACTION PLAN AND SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

At the Oslo Review Conference in November 2019, States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to complete their respective time-bound obligations by 2025, and to ensure sustainable and integrated support for victims. The Oslo Action Plan contains six action points along with a series of specific indicators aimed at tracking progress toward enhancing international cooperation and assistance. These indicators include, among others: the level of national funding; the provision of assistance by States Parties; regular reporting on challenges and needs for assistance; the existence of coordinating mechanisms; and the facilitation of dialogue and information exchange among affected states, the donor community, and relevant stakeholders. A number of these points are tracked by the Monitor.


In terms of the provision of assistance by and to States Parties, in the last decade, a total of 32 States Parties reported contributing some $1.9 billion in mine action support to 49 affected States Parties. This does not include EU contributions. In 2022, a total of 22 States Parties provided $216.8 million in mine action support to 31 States Parties. This represents

44 Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form I.
a 10% increase from the $196.3 million provided by and to States Parties in 2021, and it is the first time that funding has risen above $200 million since 2019. However, it represents a decrease in the proportion of overall mine action funding, representing 27% of the total (down from 36% in 2021). The need to secure adequate resources for the effective and timely implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty’s obligations remains of the upmost importance.

Cumulative figures remain just one aspect of the story. The distribution of support among affected states and territories, as well as the sustainability of assistance, are also key factors.

Tracking national financial commitments by affected States Parties has proven more difficult as a result of under-reporting. Since 2010, the Monitor has recorded a total of $1.8 billion provided by affected states to their own mine action efforts.

In 2022, of the 33 States Parties with Article 5 obligations, 14 reported on their financial contributions. Reported national support had remained below $100 million annually for six consecutive years, before rising to $115.1 million in 2022. Affected states do not all provide the same level of information regarding national resources allocated to mine action activities, and some have never done so.

FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION 2018–2022

Over the past five years (2018–2022), total support to mine action amounted to $3.5 billion, an average of $700 million per year. This is $400 million more than the total support provided in the previous five-year period from 2013–2017, constituting a 13% increase.

Although data on national support for mine action remains incomplete, such support accounted for at least 11% of mine action funding from 2018–2022, totaling approximately $395 million. International support over the period totaled $3.1 billion, averaging some $620 million per year and representing 89% of all support.

From 2018–2022, the US contributed $1.1 billion, representing 35% of all international support during the five-year period. Together with the EU ($435.8 million) and Germany ($279.1 million), these three donors contributed $1.8 billion, or more than half of total international support (58%). Three other donors—the UK, Japan, and Norway—contributed more than $200 million each; while Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland ranked among the top 10 mine action donors during the five-year period.

Support from States Parties accounted for almost half (49%) of all international funding provided in 2018–2022, with a combined contribution of $1.5 billion. In percentage terms, this is similar to support from States Parties in 2013–2017, when $1.2 billion was provided, representing 53% of all international funding during the period.

This shows that historically, States Parties have been a stable and consistent contributor to mine action, despite variations in budget allocations and changes in situations or contexts observed over the past decade. One of the main challenges to improve efficiency in international support remains greater coordination among donors for a better geographical
distribution of financial resources, in order to address both legacy and new contamination, as well as all sectors of mine action, from clearance to risk education and victim assistance.

**Summary of contributions: 2018–2022**

While there has been an overall increase in support provided in 2018–2022 compared to the previous five-year period, in 2018 and 2019 international support declined, before flattening in 2020 and 2021. This was due to some donors reducing funding contributions (the UK and Australia), while others increased support (the US and Germany). The COVID-19 pandemic impacted mine action operations on the ground, yet globally there were very few reported instances of major diversion of mine action funding to address COVID-19 issues. The increase in support seen in 2022 was largely driven by the large contributions from the US and the EU, with a combined total increase of $202 million. New Saudi Arabian funding for mine action was also reported in 2022, while overall national contributions to mine action increased.

**Summary of changes: top 10 recipients of mine action support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>501.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>386.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>289.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>273.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>258.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>174.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>232.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+558%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>193.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>128.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>168.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>138.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+400%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>100.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,118</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,415.5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>+49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; N/A=not applicable.

*Lao PDR is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.*
In 2018–2022, the 10 largest recipients of mine action support received the majority of available funding, totaling over $2 billion; this represents, on average, more than two-thirds (68%) of total international contributions annually. Of these 10 recipient states, three are in the Middle East and North Africa region, four in the Asia-Pacific, two in Europe, and one in the Americas.

No country from Sub-Saharan Africa was among the top 10 recipients. Two affected states from Sub-Saharan Africa were among the 15 largest recipients of mine action support in 2018–2022: Somalia ranked fourteenth ($58.5 million) and Angola ranked fifteenth ($54.9 million).

From 2018 to 2022, the composition of the top 10 group of recipients remained relatively similar from one year to another. There were some variations in the contributions received by each recipient from one year to the next, illustrating changes in circumstances globally and/or nationally, as well as shifts in funding approaches, priorities, and focus. Overall, the top 10 recipients saw a collective increase in funding in 2018–2022 compared to the previous five-year period from 2013–2017, with support for Ukraine and Yemen rising significantly. Only Cambodia saw a slight decrease in funding compared to the previous five-year period.
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION: 2022

MAP KEY

International contributions (in US$)
- More than $100 million
- Between $40–$100 million
- Between $10–$39.9 million
- Between $1–$9.9 million
- Less than $1 million

National contributions (in US$)
- More than $10 million
- Between $1–$10 million
- Less than $1 million

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are italics.

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
RECEPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION SUPPORT: 2022

MAP KEY

Total amount received (in US$)
- More than $60 million
- Between $30-59.9 million
- Between $10-29.9 million
- Between $1-9.9 million
- Less than $1 million

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are *italics*.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
A nine-year-old mine survivor after receiving physical rehabilitation at a HI-run center in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He can now run and play with his friends again.

© E. Blanchard/HI, August 2022
## STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

### 1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the Mine Ban Treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, on 1 March 1999. In the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Since the treaty entered into force, states can no longer sign it but can join through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the Mine Ban Treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated with (s).

As of 1 November 2023, there were 164 States Parties.

### STATES PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
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Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00  
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Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05  
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99  
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98  
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01  
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

SIGNATORY
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

NON-SIGNATORIES
Armenia  
Azerbaijan  
Bahrain  
China  
Cuba  
Egypt  
Georgia  
India  
Iran  
Israel  
Kazakhstan  
Korea, North  
Korea, South  
Kyrgyzstan  
Lao PDR  
Lebanon  
Libya  
Micronesia, Federated States of  
Mongolia  
Morocco  
Myanmar  
Nepal  
Pakistan  
Russia  
Saudi Arabia  
Singapore  
Syria  
Tonga  
United Arab Emirates  
United States  
Uzbekistan  
Vietnam
MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE 1**

**General obligations**

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

**ARTICLE 2**

**Definitions**

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

**ARTICLE 3**

**Exceptions**

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
ARTICLE 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   e) Assistance to mine victims;
   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.
ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
   h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
   i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes
1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years.
All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.

2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.

3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Landmine Monitor 2023 provides a global overview of efforts to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Focusing on calendar year 2022 with information included up to October 2023 where possible, the report documents recent landmine use and covers mine ban policy, production, trade, and stockpiling globally. The report also outlines developments and challenges in addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance of mined areas, delivery of risk education to affected communities, and provision of assistance to victims of these weapons, before reviewing global trends in support for mine action.

This report was prepared by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). The Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Cover: A deminer working in the Ziguinchor region in Casamance, Senegal, where HI restarted demining operations in 2022. © M. Simoncelli/HI, December 2022

Top left: An FSD team marks a contaminated area pending clearance by deminers in Kharkiv oblast, Ukraine. © FSD, November 2022

Top right: A deminer works in an area contaminated by improvised mines in Ana, Iraq. Clearance enabled the reconstruction of roads and the maintenance of power lines in the area. © Marijn van Broekhoven/NPA, March 2022

Content produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC. The committee’s members include Monitor editorial team leaders, senior ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, DanChurchAid, Danish Refugee Council, Human Rights Watch, Humanity & Inclusion, and Mines Action Canada.