



ICBL Lobbying Booklet

10th Meeting of the States Parties
29 November-3 December 2010
Geneva, Switzerland

Abbreviations:

APM: Antipersonnel mines
AVM: Antivehicle mines
CAP: Cartagena Action Plan
MBT: Mine Ban Treaty
MSP: Meeting of the States Parties
SCs: Standing Committees
SPs: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty
VA: Victim assistance

The use of the word “mines” in this booklet refers only to antipersonnel mines

More information on the 10MSP can be found at:

www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Annual-Meetings/10MSP
www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/10msp/

Where to find key documents:

Monitor Reports and Fact Sheets: www.the-monitor.org
Text of the Mine Ban Treaty: www.icbl.org/treaty/text
Cartagena Action Plan: www.icbl.org on the homepage under “Key issues and events”
Text of the Convention on Cluster Munitions:
www.icbl.org/treaties/ccm/text-in-many-languages

President of the 10MSP: Gazmend Turdiu, Albania

Mine Ban Treaty Co-Chairs & Co-Rapporteurs 2009-2010 (co-rapporteurs become co-chairs after the 10MSP):

General Status and Operation of the Convention: Co-Chairs: Ecuador & Slovenia;
Co-Rapporteurs: Canada & Thailand
Mine Clearance: Co-Chairs: Greece & Nigeria; Co-Rapporteurs: Colombia & Switzerland
Stockpile Destruction: Co-Chairs: Bulgaria & Indonesia; Co-Rapporteurs: Lithuania & Philippines
Victim Assistance: Co-Chairs: Peru & Turkey; Co-Rapporteurs: Australia & Uganda

Contact Group Chairs:

Article 7 Contact Group: Belgium
Linking Mine Action and Development Contact Group: Canada
Resource Utilization Contact Group: Norway
Universalization Contact Group: Canada

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ABOUT THE 10TH MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES

The 10th Meeting of the States Parties (10MSP) provides the first formal opportunity following the Second Review Conference for States Parties to demonstrate progress in implementing the Cartagena Action Plan 2010-2014. At the 10MSP States Parties will need to address major challenges on stockpile destruction, mine clearance, victim assistance, and continues to see a standstill on universalization.

At the 10MSP, the ICBL expects that:

- Turkey will provide an update on investigations it conducted about allegations of mine use by members of the Turkish Army, and other States Parties will express concern.
- The four States Parties that missed their stockpile destruction deadlines (Belarus, Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine) will provide a clear deadline for when they will finish, and all other States Parties will react firmly to these cases of non-compliance.
- States Parties come prepared to comment on the six requests for mine clearance deadline extensions by Chad, Colombia, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Zimbabwe. The decisions on the requests should highlight any concerns with requests and provide benchmarks for the states to meet during the course of the extension period.
- All other States Parties that are in the process of destroying stockpiled mines, clearing mined areas, assisting survivors or implementing other aspects of the treaty will provide updates on recent progress made and future plans.
- States Parties and others will actively participate in a special session on international cooperation and assistance, which will take place on Tuesday 30 November. States Parties will also decide whether to create a new standing committee on international cooperation and assistance in order to make sure regular, structured and effective discussions on this critical subject take place in Mine Ban Treaty meetings.
- States not party will provide updates on efforts they have undertaken to join the treaty and will pledge publicly to join within a specific timeframe.

At the 10MSP, the ICBL also calls on States Parties to keep showing high levels of enthusiasm and motivation until all stockpiled mines are destroyed, all mined areas are cleared, and all victims enjoy the rights and economic possibilities available to all others. In other words, we are counting on states to keep up the commitment, keep up the compassion, and **keep up the energy!**

How to use this booklet:

The booklet provides an overview of the key ICBL messages for campaigners to pass on to governments in Geneva and beyond. There is a short presentation of each key issue followed by a list of messages to governments. The relevant action points from the Cartagena Action Plan are listed at the bottom of each page. The goal is to give you a tool to use when lobbying governments – listing for you the main points to be made and the priority governments to speak with.

Most of the information comes from Landmine Monitor Report 2010 and subsequent updated information provided by states. Comments on and corrections to this booklet are very welcome.

A rticle 1: The Ban on Antipersonnel Mines

NO USE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AND NO ASSISTANCE TO OTHERS

Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, or transfer of antipersonnel mines. This year there were credible allegations of use by members of the armed forces of **Turkey**, which are being investigated by Turkish authorities. Turkey needs to make the findings of this investigation public, which it pledged to do. Other States Parties should express their deep concern over this possible violation of the mine ban.

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The ban on use also includes a ban on taking military advantage of *existing* mined areas, such as those along borders. But some countries are delaying the clearance of mined areas because they still are making use of them to protect security installations or prevent movement across borders.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES:

- SPs must clear *all* mined areas as soon as possible, even if they have strategic utility.
- Making use of emplaced mines is a violation of Article 1.

States that may be delaying clearance along borders or around security installations include:

Algeria, Cambodia, Croatia, Peru, and Venezuela

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Article 1 also bans States Parties from assisting, encouraging, or inducing “in any way, anyone” from engaging in an activity prohibited by the MBT.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES:

SPs should make known their views on Article 1 if they have not already done so. In particular, they should confirm that:

- SPs must not participate in planning for the use of antipersonnel mines, agree to rules of engagement permitting the use of AP mines, or participate in operations wherein direct military benefit is known by the SP to be derived from the use of AP mines
- SPs must not give support—either direct or indirect, military or otherwise—to any state or group that is using APM
- SPs must not train others to use AP mines or request others to use them
- SPs must not allow states not party to transit transfer or stockpile their AP mines through the State Party’s territory
- SPs should report on foreign stockpiles, even if they are not under their jurisdiction or control

States that have declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

States Parties that have APM stocks from a state not party, but argue that the stocks are not under their jurisdiction or control: Germany, Japan, Qatar, United Kingdom

Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare the number of antipersonnel mines (18,200) stockpiled by a state not party on its territory.

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rticle 2: Defining Antipersonnel Mine

DESTROY ALL SENSITIVE FUZES AND ANTI-HANDLING DEVICES

Article 2 of the MBT defines antipersonnel mine for the purposes of the treaty. The ICBL and States Parties have affirmed that according to the treaty's definition, *any* mine equipped with a fuze or anti-handling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. This means that antivehicle mines equipped with trip wires, break wires, tilt rods, or highly sensitive anti-handling devices should be considered banned under treaty. Mines that can be set off either on command or by a trip wire (such as Claymore and OZM-72 mines) can only be considered legal when used in command-detonated mode.

But a small number of States Parties disagree. They believe that mines should be defined by name or design, not their actual function. The precise definition is obviously critical since the ban and destruction duties of the treaty only apply only to antipersonnel mines as defined by the treaty. Currently, some SPs are stockpiling mines that others consider banned and have destroyed.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES:

- Destroy all mines that function as antipersonnel mines regardless of what they are called
- Destroy all fuzes that can be attached to antivehicle mines to make them victim-activated
- Report clearly on the destruction of these mines and fuzes in Article 7 reports
- Make sure that mines with both command and person-activated fuzes are permanently modified so that they can only function as command-detonated munitions and that the country's armed forces are informed about their legal obligations
- Report on stockpiled Claymore-type and OZM-72 mines and steps taken to ensure their use in command-detonated mode only
- Make known your views on the subject if you have not already done so

States Parties that have publicly stated that the MBT's definition of antipersonnel mines does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, even if they are used with sensitive fuzes or anti-handling devices:

Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Japan and the United Kingdom

States Parties known to still stockpile antivehicle mines with trip wires or tilt rods:

Czech Republic, Sweden

States Parties that have destroyed sensitive fuzes or modified, retired, or destroyed antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes :

Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Mali, Slovakia, United Kingdom

States Parties that have ensured claymore-type mines cannot be used in victim activated mode:

Belarus, Denmark, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand, Sweden



Article 3: Retaining Mines for Training and Research

DESTROY ALL RETAINED MINES NOT ABSOLUTELY NEEDED FOR TRAINING

Article 3 of the MBT allows States Parties to keep or transfer mines for training and research in mine clearance, but this number should “not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary.” In fact, the ICBL encourages SPs to keep none at all since training and research do not necessarily depend on using live mines. As of October 2010, 77 SPs have reported they are retaining mines under Article 3. 78 States Parties declared that they do not retain any mines.

The ICBL encourages States Parties to regularly review the number of mines retained and to destroy any over the minimum number strictly necessary. In 2009, Cyprus, Indonesia, and Peru destroyed around 5,000 mines after a reevaluation of their requirements.

Many States Parties are still retaining mines, but apparently not using them for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same year after year, indicating none are consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, and no or few details are provided about how the mines are being used. Some States Parties retain mines even though they are not known to engage in any research or training activities.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES:

- Report on the intended purposes and actual uses of antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3 in the expanded format of Form D of the annual transparency report, during meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty and in communications with the Monitor
- Regularly evaluate the number of retained mines to ensure it is the minimum number absolutely needed for live mines in training and research activities. Destroy any mines above this number
- Do not retain any antipersonnel mines as a contingency for possible future needs, as opposed to demonstrated current needs
- Explore available alternatives to using live mines for training and research activities

States Parties retaining over 10,000 mines: Turkey (15,125), Bangladesh (12,500) and Brazil (10,051)

States Parties retaining between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Sweden (7,364), Australia (6,947), Greece (6,158), Belarus (6,030), Algeria (5,970), and Croatia (5,954)

13 countries have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since entry into force for that country: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo and Venezuela

Countries that have used the expanded voluntary Form D to report on the intended purposes and actual use of mines retained : Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

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rticle 4: Stockpile Destruction

DESTROY ALL STOCKPILES WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY

Article 4 requires States Parties to destroy their antipersonnel mines no later than four years after joining the treaty, and there is no possibility for an extension. Stockpile destruction is the most effective form of preventive mine action: destroyed mines will never claim any victims. It has also been the most successful provision of the treaty—so far 86 SPs have finished destroying their stockpiles, destroying over 45 million antipersonnel mines.

But **four states missed their stockpile destruction deadlines and are now in violation of the treaty**: **Belarus** (with a stockpile of 3.4 million mines), **Greece** (with 1.4 million mines at its deadline, now around 900,000), **Turkey** (2.6 million at its deadline, now around 23,000 ADAM mines), and **Ukraine** (over 6 million remaining). **Belarus** and **Ukraine** have PFM mines, which contain chemicals that make them difficult and expensive to destroy. The deadline for Belarus, Greece and Turkey was 1 March 2008, and the deadline for Ukraine was 1 June 2010.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES WITH REMAINING STOCKPILES:

- Destroy the stockpiles without further delay!
- Fix a target end date for destruction and report monthly on progress made towards that goal
- Hold public destruction events to promote transparency and regional confidence-building
- Report on and seek help in addressing any technical problems in destroying stockpiles

Iraq reported for the first time in 2010 that it has a small stockpile. Its deadline is 1 February 2012. **Equatorial Guinea** has not informed States Parties if it has stockpiled antipersonnel mines, though it is not believed to have any.

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Countries that finished their formal stockpile destruction program still must report on and destroy any mines that are discovered, captured, seized or turned-in afterwards. Forms B and G of the Article 7 reports were amended at the 8MSP to include information on the discovery and destruction of additional stocks. A number of SPs are reported to have newly discovered stocks but have not reported on their discovery or destruction.

MESSAGE TO SPs THAT HAVE FINISHED THEIR OFFICIAL STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION PROGRAM:

- Use updated Forms B and G plus MBT meetings to report on the discovery and destruction of all stockpiles that were found, turned in, or seized after their stockpile destruction program ended

Countries that have discovered or captured new stockpiles in recent years, but have not reported on them in Article 7 reports, include: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Iraq, Kenya, Macedonia, Niger, Peru, the Philippines, and Turkey

Countries that have used modified Forms B and G to report on newly discovered mines in recent years include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Niger, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda.

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rticle 5: Mine Clearance

CLEAR ALL MINED AREAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

Article 5 states that States Parties must make every effort to identify all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and to destroy all antipersonnel mines within them as soon as possible, but no later than 10 years after joining the treaty. Yet many states are not respecting this duty to work quickly, and too many are missing their deadline. In addition, some SPs are still using terms like “mine-safe” and “impact-free” as an end goal, which is not consistent with treaty obligations.

MESSAGES TO MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES:

- Identify all remaining suspected or known mined areas
- Finish mine clearance *as soon as possible* and make every effort to meet their deadline
- Use the most efficient means to identify and clear mined areas, including land release through technical and non-technical means when appropriate
- Involve the local community at all stages of clearance
- Mobilize sufficient resources for demining until the job is complete. Make known to donors that mine action is a priority for funding through development or other relevant budgets.
- Destroy *all* APMs in *all* known or suspected mined areas. “Mine-safe” or “impact-free” is not enough!
- In case where a state may have mine contamination but it has not declared it, clarify whether there are mined areas or if clearance has been completed.

States Parties that have declared they are mine-affected and their deadline (new deadline after extension in parentheses):

Afghanistan, 1/3/2013	Denmark, 1/3/2009; (1/1/2011)	Senegal, 1/3/2009; (1/3/2016)
Algeria, 1/4/2012		Serbia, 1/3/2014
Angola, 1/1/2013	* Djibouti, 1/3/2009	Sudan, 1/4/2014
Argentina, 1/3/2010; (1/3/2020)	Ecuador, 1/10/2009; (1/10/2017)	Tajikistan, 1/4/2010 (1/4/2020)
Bhutan, 1/2/2016	Eritrea, 1/2/2012	Thailand, 1/5/2009; (1/11/2018)
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1/3/2009; (1/3/2019)	Ethiopia, 1/6/2015	Turkey, 1/3/2014
Burundi, 1/4/2014	Guinea-Bissau, 1/11/2011	Uganda, 1/8/2009 (1/8/2012)
Cambodia, 1/1/2010; (1/1/2020)	Iraq, 1/2/2018	United Kingdom, 1/3/2009; (1/3/2019)
Chad, 1/11/2009; (1/1/2011)	Jordan, 1/5/2009; (1/5/2012)	Venezuela, 1/10/2009; (1/10/2014)
Chile, 1/3/2012	Mauritania, 1/1/2011	Yemen, 1/3/2009; (1/3/2015)
Colombia, 1/3/2011	Montenegro, 1/4/2017	Zimbabwe, 1/3/2009 (1/1/2011)
Congo, DR, 1/11/2012	Mozambique, 1/3/2009; (1/3/2014)	
Croatia, 1/3/2009; (1/3/2019)	* Namibia, 1/3/2009	
Cyprus, 1/7/2013	Nigeria, 1/3/2012;	
	Peru, 1/3/2009; (1/3/2017)	

The precise extent to which **The Gambia, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Niger, the Philippines and the Republic of Congo** are mine-contaminated remained unclear as of November 2010.

* It is believed that both **Djibouti** and **Namibia** have completed mine clearance, but this has not been formally confirmed.

Article 5: Mine Clearance Extension Requests

FINISH CLEARING MINES BEFORE NEW DEADLINE

While all mine-affected states must do their best to respect their 10-year deadline, the treaty allows States Parties to request one or more extensions of their deadline for up to 10 years. This provision was supposed to be for states facing exceptional circumstances like ongoing conflict or very high levels of contamination. But in 2008, 15 countries requested an extension, much more than ever expected. Several requests would probably not have been needed if the countries had started the work earlier or had been more efficient. Funding shortfalls have been another major challenge. Another four SPs were granted extensions in 2009. Six more States Parties are asking for extensions at the 10MSP, though this is a second extension for three of them.

The following States Parties' were granted deadline extensions (number of years granted in parentheses): Argentina (10), Bosnia and Herzegovina (10), Cambodia (10), Chad (1.2), Croatia (10), Denmark (1.8), Ecuador (8), Jordan (3), Mozambique (5), Nicaragua (1), Peru (8), Senegal (7), Tajikistan (10), Thailand (9.5), Uganda (3), United Kingdom (10), Venezuela (5), Yemen (5) and Zimbabwe (1.8).

Six States Parties will request an extension in 2010 (the number of years requested in parentheses): Chad (3), Colombia (10), Denmark (1.5), Guinea-Bissau (2 months), Mauritania (5), and Zimbabwe (2).

MESSAGES TO MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES REQUESTING A DEADLINE EXTENSION:

- Explain the exceptional circumstances that required an extension
- Provide reliable information on how much land remains to be demined, with a clear plan and budget for clearing it as soon as possible
- Only request the minimum number of years strictly needed to complete Article 5 obligations

The other States Parties have to assess and decide on each request. An "analyzing group" (the MSP president and the co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the Standing Committees) prepares comments on each request to help the other SPs make their decisions. The decisions taken by SPs include not just a yes/no decision on each request, but also a set of comments, sometimes encouraging the state to finish earlier than the number of years granted.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES DECIDING ON EXTENSION REQUESTS:

- Review all of the requests, the analyzing group's comments and the ICBL's critiques
- Prepare comments and questions for requesting states when they present them at the 10MSP, especially when the current status or future plans presented in the request are unclear or do not show the state's ambition to clear the land "as soon as possible"
- Agree to a decision on each request that points out any concerns with the request and require reporting on how the state's plan is being implemented
- Ask requesting states to resubmit at a future MSP an updated work plan with a shorter timeline if significant new financial, material, or human resources become available
- Ask requesting states to submit a new work plan at a future MSP if significant new information on the amount of remaining contamination is gathered

CHANGE RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR

Mine Risk Education (MRE) seeks to reduce the risk of injury from mines/UXO by raising awareness and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison. MRE is mentioned in the Mine Ban Treaty in three places: Article 5 (SPs must “ensure the effective exclusion of civilians” from mined areas), Article 6 (SPs “shall provide assistance ... for mine awareness programs.”), and Article 7 (SPs shall report on “the measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population...” about mined areas.)

The ICBL emphasizes the importance of integrating MRE with other mine action activities. Mine clearance teams should have a community liaison component so that communities can provide critical information on mined areas, and they in turn can learn about the activities of clearance teams in their area. Liaison teams should also identify mine survivors and family members of mine casualties and refer them to available services if needed. In addition, the ICBL has found that community-based MRE, where local residents of mine-affected areas provide messages to their own communities, can enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of MRE. MRE should also include risk reduction components, including identifying concrete alternatives to risk-taking behavior.

MESSAGES TO MINE-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES:

- Integrate MRE programs into other mine action activities, including survey, marking, clearance and handover of land
- Include community liaison components in all mine action activities
- Develop alternatives to risk-taking behavior with local stakeholders, especially those targeted at people taking risks out of economic necessity
- Include members of mine-affected communities in the provision of MRE and train them to continue MRE on their own
- Design MRE programs that take into account age, gender, social, cultural, and political factors

The following states have no RE programs although contamination and casualty data indicate that there is probably a need: China, Republic of the Congo, India, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Philippines, Rwanda, and Turkey. In Myanmar, only limited RE activities have been undertaken due to the ongoing conflict.



Article 6: International Cooperation and Assistance

PROVIDE SUFFICIENT AND SUSTAINABLE FUNDING AND ENSURE EFFICIENT USE OF FUNDS

Article 6 states that all States Parties in a position to do so must provide support and technical assistance to other States Parties for stockpile destruction, mine action, victim assistance, and MRE. Although the main responsibility for ensuring that treaty obligations are met lays with the state itself, Article 6 recognizes that many SPs may need assistance to fulfill their duties. This assistance should be structured in a way that helps the state build its own capacity and finish its obligations as quickly and efficiently as possible.

There will be a decision at the 10MSP on whether to create a new Standing Committee on international cooperation and assistance. A new Standing Committee may be a useful way to exchange ideas on how to make international cooperation and assistance more efficient and effective, but States Parties must actively participate in discussions in order for them to make a difference.

MESSAGES TO DONOR STATES:

- Commit to maintaining high levels of multi-year assistance
- Coordinate funding to ensure all states in need receive assistance
- Ensure that funding going through intermediary agencies (such as trust funds) is delivered to the end-user without delays
- Communicate clearly how to access mine action funding to all actors when mainstreaming into development budgets
- Earmark adequate funds for victim assistance when included in larger mine action budgets
- Encourage recipient states to use the most cost-efficient means to identify mined areas and clear and destroy mines in mined areas
- Ensure that funding is efficiently and effectively dispersed for implementation, with a high degree of accountability and transparency by all concerned actors
- Report annually on international cooperation and assistance provided and regularly assess the impact of this aid
- Require results-based reporting from all actors, including international organizations, national authorities, and operators
- Develop mine action technology that is cost-efficient, affordable, effective, sustainable and appropriate to local conditions

MESSAGES TO MINE-AFFECTED STATES:

- Clearly present needs for international cooperation and assistance
- Actively participate in discussions on international cooperation and assistance by highlighting any challenges in receiving sufficient or efficiently-provided aid
- Offer cooperation and support to other affected states where possible

The biggest contributors to mine action in 2009 were (in millions of USD): USA (\$118.7), EC (\$48.1), Japan (\$48.0), Norway (\$35.7), Germany (\$23.7), Australia (\$19.4), Canada (\$18.8), Netherlands (\$18.4), United Kingdom (\$17.9), Switzerland (\$15.0), Sweden (\$14.9), Spain (\$14.6), Denmark (\$11.2), Belgium (\$10.4)

Cartagena Action Plan: International Cooperation and Assistance for Achieving the Convention's Aims, Actions # 34-51

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rticle 6.3: Victim Assistance

MEET VICTIMS' NEEDS AND PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS

Article 6.3 states that “each State Party in a position to do shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.” Since the Nairobi Summit in 2004, victim assistance has been understood to include emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social and economic inclusion. It is also understood that the term “victim” includes the injured persons, their family and the affected community. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on Cluster Munitions have given states additional guidance on how to implement VA.

Over the last five years, States Parties have worked on VA goals and plans, but according to landmine victims, there has been little positive impact on their lives in the past years. The ICBL encourages States Parties to fully implement the Cartagena Action Plan as a way to help make a real difference in the lives of survivors. The main areas of the CAP are listed below, with a few suggestions for measures States Parties should take in each category.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF VICTIMS:

Inclusion of landmine survivors: Ensure the active involvement of survivors in planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of VA related programs.

Coordination and focal point: Develop an inter-agency and inter-sectoral coordination mechanism with the active participation of all VA stakeholders, especially landmine survivors and their organizations, and assign a focal point to coordinate their efforts.

Data collection and analysis: Collect comprehensive and accurate data about the number, situation and needs of landmine survivors, availability of services in affected communities and share this data with all relevant stakeholders.

National laws and policies: Sign and ratify the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on Cluster Munitions without delay. Ensure laws and policies are aligned with the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Planning: Develop a SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound) national action plan in accordance with the Cartagena Action Plan, with a budget and timeline, that is informed by, and integrated with broader efforts in the areas of disability, development and human rights.

Monitoring, evaluation, and reporting: Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the CAP and provide measurable reports on progress and challenges to the States Parties every year. Donor states should also report on how they are contributing to victim assistance.

Involvement of survivors and other VA experts in MBT work: Continue to include health, rehabilitation, social services, education, employment, gender and disability rights experts, including landmine survivors, in all MBT-related activities.

National ownership and capacity: Mine-affected states should ensure there are adequate national funds for VA through VA-specific funding, as well as through development and poverty reduction programs. All states should contribute to enhancing the capacity of all VA actors, including implementing agencies, NGOs and other relevant actors.

Availability and accessibility of VA services:

- Provide emergency and continuing medical care as close as possible to mine-affected areas, so that new victims can survive.
- Ensure all landmine survivors and persons with disabilities receive adequate quality physical rehabilitation services including prostheses, orthotics and other mobility aids.
- Ensure all landmine survivors and persons with disabilities have equal access to education and vocational or professional training.
- Ensure that income generation projects, micro credits and other relevant initiatives to increase employment and self-employment are available to survivors and other persons with disabilities.
- Ensure that all public structures, especially those where services are provided, are physically accessible.
- Provide psychosocial support and encourage formation of peer support networks to all landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities.
- Locate VA services as close as possible to affected communities and ensure accessible transportation for those survivors that cannot reach them, especially those living in remote or rural areas and
- Make sure that VA services are free or affordable to all in need.

Standards, guidelines, and good practices: Create or disseminate existing standards, accessibility guidelines and information on good practices to ensure VA services of high quality are widely available.

Awareness-raising: Inform landmine survivors about their rights and the availability of services. Raise awareness within the general public about the need to combat stereotypes about survivors and other persons with disabilities.

States Parties with the highest number of landmine survivors:

Country	Estimated Total # of Survivors	Country	Estimated Total # of Survivors
Afghanistan	Unknown, 2006 estimate: 52,000–60,000	Jordan	779
Angola	Unknown but many thousands	Montenegro	At least 260
Bosnia-Herzegovina	At least 5,703	Nicaragua	1,181
Burundi	Estimated around 5,000	Peru	At least 395
Cambodia	At least 44,024	Rwanda	Estimated over 2,000
Chad	At least 1,633	Senegal	At least 331
Colombia	At least 6,478	Serbia	Estimated between 1,300 and 8,000
Croatia	At least 1,400	Sudan	At least 2,861
DRC	At least 1,333	Tajikistan	At least 448
El Salvador	Estimated 3,158	Thailand	Estimated 1,270
Eritrea	At least 2,700	Turkey	At least 5,091
Ethiopia	At least 7,399	Uganda	Approximately 865
Guinea-Bissau	At least 850	Yemen	At least 5,000 (2,244 registered)
Iraq	Unknown, but at least several thousand		

Article 7: Annual Transparency Reports

TURN IN TIMELY AND COMPLETE TRANSPARENCY REPORTS

Article 7 requires States Parties to provide a report to the United Nations no later than 180 days after the treaty comes into force for them on a number of issues related to implementation of the treaty including: national implementation measures, stockpiles, location of mined areas, types and numbers of mines retained under Article 3, status of former mine production facilities, status of mine destruction programs under Articles 4 and 5, types and quantities of destroyed mines, technical characteristics of past mines produced, and mine risk education measures. Annual updates for the previous calendar year (1 January–31 December) are due on 30 April from all States Parties.

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES:

- Turn in initial reports on time
- Turn in detailed annual reports every year by 30 April (covering previous calendar year)
- Send in reports, preferably in electronic format, to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva at these addresses (an electronic version is preferred):
apl.c.article7report@unog.ch or APLC Secretariat
Fax: +41 22 917 0034 UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch)
Palais des Nations, Room C-113.1
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland
- Use revised Form D to report on the intended and actual use of mines retained under Art. 3
- Use amended Forms B and G to report on the discovery and destruction of antipersonnel mines after the completion of stockpile destruction programs
- Use voluntary Form J for reporting on:
 - Provision of victim assistance
 - Mine action funding
 - International cooperation and assistance
 - Steps taken to ensure claymore-type mines are used in command-detonated mode only
 - Foreign stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

Equatorial Guinea has still not turned in its initial report due by 28 August 1999

As of 23 November, these SPs had not turned in their 2009 reports (due 30 April 2010):

Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Rep. of), Cook Islands, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome e Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe.

A

rticle 8: Ensuring Compliance

RESPECT AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR ALL TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Article 8 of the Mine Ban Treaty calls for both informal and formal processes for the “facilitation and clarification of compliance” with the treaty. But so far States Parties have been reluctant to make use of this article, even the informal consultations called for in its first paragraph. Yet there are many potential compliance issues that need urgent attention, including:

- States Parties or members of their security forces suspected of laying antipersonnel mines
- States Parties suspected of transferring antipersonnel mines
- States Parties suspected of assisting or encouraging other states or non-state actors to use, transfer, or stockpile mines
- States Parties suspected of keeping operational stockpiles of APMs
- States Parties that continue to take active military advantage of mined areas along borders or surrounding security installations.
- States Parties that do not take responsibility for clearing mines in territory under their jurisdiction or control
- States Parties that do not clear known or suspected mined areas but fail to ask for an extension

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES:

- Elaborate on the fact-finding procedures in Art. 8 so that they can be invoked quickly if necessary (in areas such as sources of information and standards of evidence, financing and processes for special MSPs and fact-finding missions, the list of experts for fact-finding missions, and defining mandates for fact-finding missions).
- Take informal steps to address non-compliance, including seeking bilateral meetings with suspected or known treaty violators and trying to elicit an explanation or presentation of steps to address the issue from the SP at intersessionals or MSPs

The CAP calls on the current and incoming MSP or Review Conference presidents and the co-chairs of the relevant Standing Committee to take the initial steps upon allegations of non-compliance with the treaty. The goal of this action is to establish a clear way to address possible cases of non-compliance instead of the current *ad hoc* approach.

ICBL campaigners and Monitor researchers have a special role to play in compliance. Researchers can help establish the facts and establish credible evidence of a treaty breach. Campaigners can advocate for full compliance with the concerned state.



Article 9: National Implementation Legislation

ADOPT NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES WITH PENAL SANCTIONS

Under Article 9 of the MBT, States Parties are required to “take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. To date only 61 States Parties have passed domestic laws to implement the treaty. Some States Parties say that they do not believe an implementation law is required because, for example, they have never possessed or produced antipersonnel mines or because international treaties like the MBT are “self-enacting” under their domestic law. Yet ICBL believes all States Parties should pass national legislation that includes penal sanctions for potential future violations of the treaty and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

The following 14 SPs are in the process of developing national legislation, and should be encouraged to finish as soon as possible:

Bolivia, Dem. Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Palau, Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, Vanuatu, Tajikistan

The following 41 SPs have not shown any progress or given any information about enacting national legislation and should be asked to start the process immediately:

Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Comoros, Cote Ivoire, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Santa Lucia, Sao Tome e Principe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Timor Leste, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay.

The following 40 SPs have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty. They should be reminded about the need to impose penal sanctions for treaty violations and to ensure that *all* aspects of treaty implementation are covered by national laws:

Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belarus, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea Bissau, Holy See, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela.

The ICRC developed a kit for national legislation development to help SPs comply with Article 9, which is available on their website at:

<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jr2c.htm>

JOIN THE MINE BAN TREATY - NOW!

Universalization of the convention is key to ensure that the emerging international norm of a total ban on antipersonnel landmines continues to take hold and that lives continue to be saved. 80% of the world's states have now joined the Mine Ban Treaty. As of June 2010, there were 156 States Parties and 39 states not party, including two signatory states. In addition to calling on all states to join the treaty without further delay, the ICBL also wants to spread the norm of the treaty by encouraging states not party that are unable to join the treaty now to take interim steps toward a total ban, and non-state armed groups to accept the obligations of the treaty, especially stopping the use of mines and destroying stocks.

The following two states signed the treaty in 1997 and have not yet ratified. As treaty signatories they have a legal responsibility not to take actions that would violate the treaty:
Marshall Islands and Poland

MESSAGES TO ALL STATES NOT PARTY:

- Accede to / ratify (by two remaining signatories) the treaty without further delay

MESSAGES TO STATES NOT PARTY THAT ARE NOT LIKELY TO JOIN SOON:

- Adopt a moratorium on the use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines
- Plan for and begin destruction of stockpiles of antipersonnel mines
- Vote in favor of the annual United Nations General Assembly resolution on the treaty in 1st Committee (October) and the full General Assembly (December)*
- Submit a voluntary Article 7 (transparency) report with all relevant information**
- Provide information about antipersonnel mine stockpiles and start destroying them
- Assist landmine survivors, their families and communities
- Engage in mine clearance and mine risk education where it is needed
- Attend (as observers) Meetings of the States Parties and the Standing Committee meetings

MESSAGES TO STATES PARTIES:

- Promote ratification of/accession to the treaty, in particular in regions with low adherence
- Promote and encourage universal adherence to the norms of the treaty
- Condemn and discourage any production, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines
- Encourage states not party particularly to participate in the work of the treaty and to take interim steps toward joining.

***The following states not party showed their support for the treaty by voting for the UN General Assembly Resolution on the implementation of the MBT in the UNGA First Committee in October 2010:** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates

**** Countries that have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports before becoming States Parties include:** Azerbaijan (2008 & 2009), Cameroon (2001), Gambia (2002), Lithuania (2002), Latvia (2003-05), Mongolia (2007), Morocco (2006, 2008, 2009 & 2010), Poland (since 2003), and Sri Lanka (2005)



RATIFY OR ACCEDE TO THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) comprehensively prohibits cluster munitions, requires destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years and clearance of contaminated land within 10 years, and recognises the rights of individuals and communities affected by the weapon to receive assistance. As of November 2010, a total of 108 states have signed the convention including stockpilers, former users and producers of the weapon, as well as affected countries around the world, and 46 countries have ratified . The CCM entered into force on 1 August 2010, so states that have not yet signed can now only join through accession.

The ICBL joins the CMC in encouraging all signatory states to ratify as soon as possible and all non-signatory states to accede to the Convention. Countries that are party to the Mine Ban Treaty but have not yet signed the CCM should join without further delay.

The following 108 states have signed the CCM. Countries in bold have also ratified (46):

Afghanistan, **Albania**, Angola, **Antigua & Barbuda**, Australia, **Austria**, **Belgium**, Benin, Bolivia, **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, Botswana, Bulgaria, **Burkina Faso**, **Burundi**, Cameroon, Canada, **Cape Verde**, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, **Comoros**, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte D’Ivoire, **Croatia**, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, **Fiji**, **France**, Gambia, **Germany**, Ghana, **Guatemala**, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, **the Holy See**, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, **Ireland**, Italy, Jamaica, **Japan**, Kenya, **Lao PDR**, **Lebanon**, **Lesotho**, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, **Luxembourg**, Madagascar, **Malawi**, **Mali**, **Malta**, Mauritania, Mexico, **Moldova**, Monaco, **Montenegro**, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, the Netherlands, **New Zealand**, Nicaragua, **Niger**, Nigeria, **Norway**, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, **Samoa**, **San Marino**, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, **St. Vincent and Grenadines**, Senegal, **Seychelles**, **Sierra Leone**, **Slovenia**, Somalia, South Africa, **Spain**, Sweden, Switzerland, **the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**, Togo, **Tunisia**, Uganda, **United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**, United Republic of Tanzania, **Uruguay**, **Zambia**.

The following 87 countries did not sign the CCM and must now join by accession (States Parties to the MBT are in bold):

Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, Korea, Republic of, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Niue, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, **Romania**, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Santa Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe



C luster Munitions

Non-signatory states must sign the convention as soon as possible

- Cluster munitions are widely recognised as indiscriminate weapons that have no place in the arsenal of modern militaries. The stigma established by the global ban means any future use of cluster munitions would result in international condemnation. With the market drying up, any future production or export of cluster munitions would not only be contrary to the emerging norm against the weapon, but commercially unviable.
- The humanitarian cost of cluster munitions far outweighs any military utility that cluster munitions may have.
- With every new country that joins the CCM, the global norm rejecting this weapon and requiring assistance to those affected is strengthened. It does not matter whether a country is big or small; affected, stockpiler, or neither. By joining the CCM each state gives one more voice in favour of the ban.
- By joining the CCM, states that may not be affected by cluster munitions today will strengthen the global stigmatization of the weapon and therefore help prevent further use which could affect them in the future.
- Joining the CCM should not be an onerous process, in particular for states with no stockpiles or affected communities.
- 34 former users, producers and stockpilers have banned this weapon, including key regional players as well as 20 out of 28 NATO members.
- The convention bans cluster munitions as an entire category. Weapons with submunitions outside the definition must not have the effects of cluster munitions.

States not prepared to sign the convention now should express their support for the objectives of the convention, and take interim steps such as a national ban on production and export, and a moratorium on use while a decision is being made on when the state can join.

Signatory states must work to ratify the convention as quickly as possible.

States should do all they can to promote additional signatures and ratifications to the convention, as obligated under Article 21 of the CCM. .

Signatory states should start to implement the convention now! The convention has entered into force and the clock is ticking to the deadlines for stockpile destruction and clearance. The obligation is to carry out this work 'as soon as possible' and experience in the Mine Ban Treaty shows that starting early is crucial. Several States Parties have already finished stockpile destruction and others have already begun. Planning for clearance and victim assistance should already begin to ensure both are carried out with the urgency and resources needed.

Signatory states should also develop and enact comprehensive national implementation legislation as soon as possible.

States Parties (156) to the Mine Ban Treaty and their entry into force dates:

Afghanistan, 1/3/2003	Costa Rica, 1/9/1999	Kuwait, 1/1/2008	St. Lucia, 1/10/1999
Albania, 1/8/2000	Cote D'Ivoire, 1/12/2000	Latvia, 1/1/2006	St. Vincent & the Grenadines, 1/2/2002
Algeria, 1/4/2002	Croatia, 1/3/1999	Lesotho, 1/6/1999	Samoa, 1/3/1999
Andorra, 1/3/1999	Cyprus, 1/7/2003	Liberia, 1/6/2000	San Marino, 1/3/1999
Angola, 1/1/2003	Czech Republic, 1/4/2000	Liechtenstein, 1/4/2000	Sao Tome and Principe, 1/9/2003
Antigua and Barbuda, 1/11/1999	Denmark, 1/3/1999	Lithuania, 1/11/2003	Senegal, 1/3/1999
Argentina, 1/3/2000	Djibouti, 1/3/1999	Luxembourg, 1/12/1999	Serbia, 1/3/2004
Australia, 1/7/1999	Dominica, 1/9/1999	Macedonia (FYR), 1/3/1999	Seychelles, 1/12/2000
Austria, 1/3/1999	Dominican Republic, 1/12/2000	Madagascar, 1/3/2000	Sierra Leone, 1/10/2001
Bahamas, 1/3/1999	Ecuador, 1/10/1999	Malawi, 1/3/1999	Slovakia, 1/8/1999
Bangladesh, 1/3/2001	El Salvador, 1/7/1999	Malaysia, 1/10/1999	Slovenia, 1/4/1999
Barbados, 1/7/1999	Equatorial Guinea, 1/3/1999	Maldives, 1/3/2001	Solomon Islands, 1/7/1999
Belarus, 1/3/2004	Eritrea, 1/2/2002	Mali, 1/3/1999	South Africa, 1/3/1999
Belgium, 1/3/1999	Estonia, 1/11/2004	Malta, 1/11/2001	Spain, 1/7/1999
Belize, 1/3/1999	Ethiopia, 1/6/2005	Mauritania, 1/1/2001	Sudan, 1/4/2004
Benin, 1/3/1999	Fiji, 1/3/1999	Mauritius, 1/3/1999	Suriname, 1/11/2002
Bhutan, 1/2/2006	France, 1/3/1999	Mexico, 1/3/1999	Swaziland, 1/6/1999
Bolivia, 1/3/1999	Gabon, 1/3/2001	Moldova, 1/3/2001	Sweden, 1/5/1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1/3/1999	Gambia, 1/3/2003	Monaco, 1/5/1999	Switzerland, 1/3/1999
Botswana, 1/9/2000	Germany, 1/3/1999	Montenegro, 1/4/07	Tajikistan, 1/4/2000
Brazil, 1/10/1999	Ghana, 1/12/2000	Mozambique, 1/3/1999	Tanzania, 1/5/2001
Brunei, 1/10/2006	Greece, 1/3/2004	Namibia, 1/3/1999	Thailand, 1/5/1999
Bulgaria, 1/3/1999	Grenada, 1/3/1999	Nauru, 1/2/2001	Timor Leste, 1/11/2003
Burkina Faso, 1/3/1999	Guatemala, 1/9/1999	Netherlands, 1/10/1999	Togo, 1/9/2000
Burundi, 1/4/2004	Guinea, 1/4/1999	New Zealand, 1/7/1999	Trinidad and Tobago, 1/3/1999
Cambodia, 1/1/2000	Guinea-Bissau, 1/11/2001	Nicaragua, 1/5/1999	Tunisia, 1/1/2000
Cameroon, 1/3/2003	Guyana, 1/2/2004	Niger, 1/9/1999	Turkey, 1/3/2004
Canada, 1/3/1999	Haiti, 1/8/2006	Nigeria, 1/3/2002	Turkmenistan, 1/3/1999
Cape Verde, 1/11/2001	Holy See, 1/3/1999	Niue, 1/3/1999	Uganda, 1/8/1999
Central African Republic, 1/5/2003	Honduras, 1/3/1999	Norway, 1/3/1999	Ukraine, 1/6/2006
Chad, 1/11/1999	Hungary, 1/3/1999	Palau, 1/5/2008	United Kingdom, 1/3/1999
Chile, 1/3/2002	Iceland, 1/11/1999	Panama, 1/4/1999	Uruguay, 1/12/2001
Colombia, 1/3/2001	Indonesia, 1/8/2007	Papua New Guinea, 1/12/2004	Vanuatu, 1/3/2006
Comoros, 1/3/2003	Iraq, 1/2/2008	Paraguay, 1/5/1999	Venezuela, 1/10/1999
Congo, Dem. Republic of, 1/11/2002	Ireland, 1/3/1999	Peru, 1/3/1999	Yemen, 1/3/1999
Congo, Republic of, 1/11/2001	Italy, 1/10/1999	Philippines, 1/8/2000	Zambia, 1/8/2001
Cook Islands, 1/9/2006	Jamaica, 1/3/1999	Portugal, 1/8/1999	Zimbabwe, 1/3/1999
	Japan, 1/3/1999	Qatar, 1/4/1999	
	Jordan, 1/5/1999	Romania, 1/5/2001	
	Kenya, 1/7/2001	Rwanda, 1/12/2000	
	Kiribati, 1/3/2001	St. Kitts and Nevis, 1/6/1999	

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty (39). The signatory states (2) are in italics, with their date of signature in parentheses.

Armenia	India	Lebanon	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Azerbaijan	Iran	Libya	Oman	Syria
Bahrain	Israel	<i>Marshall Islands</i>	Pakistan	Tonga
China	Kazakhstan	(4/12/1997)	<i>Poland</i> (4/12/1997)	Tuvalu
Cuba	Korea, North	Micronesia	Russia	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Korea, South	Mongolia	Saudi Arabia	United States
Finland	Kyrgyzstan	Morocco	Singapore	Uzbekistan
Georgia	Lao PDR	Myanmar	Somalia	Vietnam