International Campaign to Ban Landmines Statement to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II

International Campaign to Ban Landmines Statement
to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II
of the Convention on Conventional Weapons
Geneva, Switzerland
15 December 1999

presented by
Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch
Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group

Mr. President, delegates, colleagues,

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) welcomes this opportunity to present its views to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The ICBL sees this Conference as another opportunity to move the world closer to the rapidly emerging international norm against any possession or use of antipersonnel mines. We thus renew our call to all governments to become party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which we believe to be the only real answer to the humanitarian crisis posed by antipersonnel mines.

Indeed, the Mine Ban Treaty grew out of the widespread belief that amended Protocol II, finalized on 3 May 1996 after two and a half years of review, would not significantly affect that humanitarian crisis. Today, the plain truth is that, with respect to antipersonnel mines, Protocol II is at best a half measure for those who believe they must continue to cling to this despicable weapon.

The Mine Ban Treaty, in just two years, has already been signed by 136 nations and ratified by 89; it became binding international law more quickly than any treaty in history. Through U.N. resolutions, virtually every country of the world has agreed that antipersonnel mines must be eliminated. Even many of those who haven't signed the ban treaty have stated their belief that it is the international instrument to accomplish that objective, including the United States and Russia who have said that they will join the ban treaty in the future (even if it is a much too distant future).

While it has often been argued that this protocol is more all-embracing of the international community, the facts prove otherwise. Not only does the Mine Ban Treaty have twice as many states parties as amended Protocol II, but of the forty-four states parties to the amended Protocol, only five have NOT signed the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, India, Pakistan and the United States. In a very real sense, with respect to antipersonnel mines, amended Protocol II binds just those five nations. Moreover, there are only another nine governments party to the original Landmines Protocol that have not joined the ban treaty: Belarus, Cuba, Georgia, Israel, Laos, Latvia, Mongolia, Russia, and Yugoslavia.

Both the original and amended Protocol II continue to have woefully little participation by developing nations, especially those most affected by antipersonnel mines, where mines have been used the most. Protocol II is not an inclusive instrument, but rather an extremely limited and ineffective one for those nations who continue to resist the new standard of behavior, those who put highly questionable military considerations above indisputable humanitarian realities.

At the same time, we recognize that we are here today -- despite the almost universal belief in the need to rid the world of antipersonnel landmines and despite the fact that 39 of the 44 parties to this amended protocol have already embraced the ban norm -- because some states have not yet been prepared to make that definitive step. While it is our view that the Protocol II approach on antipersonnel mines has been bypassed by the comprehensive ban, we encourage governments to think about this Conference in the context of the global ban. Because of the rather dramatic changes in the world relative to the landmine crisis since May of 1996, we would like to view Protocol II not as being in competition with or an alternative to the Mine Ban Treaty, but rather as a means to move closer to the universal ban. Thus, as governments contemplate possible changes to the amended protocol, the ICBL calls on them to do so with the aim of moving it closer to the Mine Ban Treaty.

As we all are aware, the Mine Ban Treaty bans the use, production, trade and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines. Unlike Protocol II, the treaty provides the framework for a world in which all can walk without fear through the requirements to remove emplaced mines and to assist mine victims. Its definitions, scope and compliance provisions are all much stronger than Protocol II.

The ICBL would like to associate itself with the remarks of the ICRC on antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. Both Mine Ban Treaty and Protocol II adherents must acknowledge that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that act like antipersonnel mines are antipersonnel mines and should be subject to restrictions under Protocol II and to a ban under the Mine Ban Treaty.

While the Ban Treaty does have weaknesses of its own, it is aimed at ridding the world of mines, not perpetuating them. At the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May, the ICBL and many governments strongly criticized Angola, a treaty signatory, for continuing to use mines. In the spirit of trying to make Protocol II as effective as possible, we hope that governments here will investigate possible transgressions and take meaningful steps to curb them.

Events since the amended Landmines Protocol was agreed to in May 1996 reveal the inadequacy of the "restrictions only" approach to solving the global landmines crisis, and the unwillingness of some of those who support it to live by its weak provisions. A few examples:

• Russia, a party to the original protocol, is dropping "Butterfly" antipersonnel mines in Chechnya prohibited by amended Protocol II. Russia has twice dropped mines on neighboring Georgia. Chechen fighters must also be condemned for using mines against the Russian military. Additionally, the hundreds of thousands of mines laid by both sides during the previous conflict (December 1994-August 1996) are believed to have already caused more than 1,000 civilian casualties.

• Pakistan, a party to the amended protocol, apparently used mines during its border conflict with India earlier this year. The ICBL is unaware of any effort to mark, fence, or monitor minefields as required by the Landmines Protocol.

• In early November 1999, the state-owned Pakistani Ordnance Factories (POF) allegedly offered antipersonnel mines for sale to a British television journalist posing as a representative of a private company operating in Sudan. The offer was made by an attaché to the Pakistan Embassy in London, and aired on the Channel Four Dispatches program 9 December 1999. The mines also were offered for sale in a faxed quotation from POF. Such a sale would appear to violate the Landmine Protocol, Pakistan's domestic law banning mine transfers, and the UK's domestic law prohibiting sale, or even the offer of a sale, of mines in the UK.

• Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was party to the original protocol) used antipersonnel mines extensively during the Kosovo conflict. There was a great deal of "nuisance" mining directed at civilians, and there was little effort to mark, fence or monitor minefields. The KLA also planted mines. More than two hundred civilians have been killed by mines and other unexploded ordnance since the end of the war.

• The United States, a party to the amended protocol, reserved the right to use antipersonnel landmines in the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, even though 17 of the other 18 NATO members have prohibited use, and even though the US criticized Serb forces for laying mines.

• Israel, a party to the original protocol, has continued to use antipersonnel mines in southern Lebanon.

• Georgian partisans, frequently alleged to have direct ties to government officials, have used mines often in raids into Abkhazia. Georgia is a party to the original protocol.

• The five amended protocol states parties that have not signed the Mine Ban Treaty are estimated to possess more than 125 million antipersonnel mines, and the nine states parties to the original protocol may possess another 100 million. They are believed to have destroyed more than 5 million mines in recent years, at least in part to comply with the protocol.
  • Of the sixteen nations that still produce antipersonnel mines, four (China, India, Pakistan, US) are states parties to the amended protocol, and three (Cuba, Russia, Yugoslavia) are parties to the original protocol. The protocol allows unlimited production of "dumb" and "smart" mines as long as they are detectable and meet certain technical specifications.
  Just this limited review of the "restrictions only" approach makes it painfully clear that the only meaningful way to tackle the humanitarian scourge of antipersonnel landmines is through an unambiguous ban. The Mine Ban Treaty provides a solid framework for the total elimination of landmines. Again, the ICBL calls upon all governments to join the Mine Ban Treaty forthwith, and failing that, or pending that, we ask the governments assembled here to move this Protocol as rapidly as possible toward the comprehensive ban.Mr. President, while we do not view Protocol II as an alternative to, or in competition with, the Mine Ban Treaty, we have been disturbed by the frequent references today to the "complementarity" of the two instruments. We understand this sentiment, especially in so far as it applies to antivehicle mines not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty. But those who truly support a global ban should be emphasizing the illegality of the weapon -- it is illegal under customary international humanitarian law because it is inherently indiscriminate and fails the proportionality test, and 136 nations have already outlawed its use. There should be outrage at any use, strong objections even to any contemplation or planning for future use; there should not be the benign acceptance heard too frequently today.In conclusion, we would make a further observation. In awarding the ICBL the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee was recognizing more than our work to help transform a mine ban from "a vision to a feasible reality." The Committee also sought to recognize the new model of diplomacy forged through the Ottawa Process, whereby civil society has worked in open partnership with governments to address a global crisis of concern to all.The ICBL has never sought to replace governments; but through the Ottawa Process, the contributions of civil society to the resolution of issues of concern have been rightly acknowledged. This openness and cooperation has carried over into issues such as child soldiers and small arms. Yet, in this forum, we again revert to an old model in which some governments wish to conduct the business of the people behind closed doors. The ICBL is invited to participate in this Conference only in the plenary sessions. Even though we are barred from other participation, we invite and strongly encourage delegations this week to meet with us to discuss why they must retain mines and to hear our views on how they can move forward to embrace the global norm to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.Thank you.