Turkey

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003 and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation, but has indicated that its constitution, criminal code and directives of the army general staff give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.^[1] Turkey submitted its fourth Article 7 report on 23 April 2007, for calendar year 2006.^[2]

Turkey attended the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2006. It made statements on universalization, engaging non-state armed groups (NSAGs), stockpile destruction and mine clearance. It stated that “Turkey, with many of its neighbours not having acceded to the Convention thus far, expects more efforts to be exerted in geographic regions that lag behind…. Turkey will continue to play its part with a view to raising awareness on the Convention, including in her neighbourhood.”^[3]

For several years Turkey has expressed concern about what it characterizes as NGO activities to engage NSAGs deemed to be terrorist organizations in the effort to ban antipersonnel mines—without the knowledge or consent of the concerned State Party. Turkey cautioned States Parties to ensure “that work carried out in conjunction with the implementation of the Convention is not exploited for the purposes of terrorism.”^[4]

In July 2006 Geneva Call reported that the Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) and its armed wing, People’s Defense Forces (Hezen Parastina Gel, HPG), also known as the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.^[5] HPG Commander Fehman Hüseyin stated, “AP mines affect civilians and cause irreparable damage, often long after fighting is over. Our strategy is to employ discriminate weapons only. This is why we use command-detonated devices, no longer AP mines.”^[6]

Turkey stated that the “signing took place without the prior information and consent of the State Party concerned, the Republic of Turkey. Consequently, it contradicts the understanding of a number of States Parties, including Turkey…and, therefore, is inappropriate and unacceptable.”^[7]

Turkey attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2006 and April 2007. At the April meetings, it made statements on universalization, engagement of NSAGs and stockpile destruction. In its statement on non-state actors, Turkey repeated its position expressed at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties.^[8]

Turkey has expressed its position on some of the key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2. On Article 1 Turkey in October 2005 told Landmine Monitor, “With respect to joint military [operations], Turkey has committed herself to act in conformity with the spirit of the Ottawa Treaty, under all circumstances.”^[9] On Article 2 it stated, “Turkey does not use mines with sensitive fuses and/or anti-handling devices…. [B]earing in mind that some of Turkey’s neighbours have anti-vehicle mines placed on their border with Turkey, Turkey in principle, is in favour of a prohibition also of anti-vehicle mines, provided that these neighbours also share the same view.”^[10]

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Turkey attended the Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2006, and submitted its annual report required by Article 13 on 1 November 2006. Turkey is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Mayınsız Bir Türkiye Girişimi (Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey) organized a march, preceded by a press conference, in Istanbul on 4 April 2007, to promote its Platform for a Mine Free Turkey. The event drew significant media attention to the mine issue in Turkey.^[11] The Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey’s platform is supported by several prominent civil society organizations and has been endorsed by many more.^[12]

Production and Trade

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the sale and transfer of antipersonnel mines in January 1996.^[13] Turkey’s production facilities for antipersonnel mines were then gradually phased out of service.^[14] Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Turkey appears to have imported all of its mines from Germany (DM-11 mines) and the United States.

Stockpiling and Destruction

The deadline for Turkey to complete destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile is 1 March 2008. In April 2007 Turkey declared a stockpile of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines.^[15] This is 112,347 fewer mines than Turkey declared in April 2006.^[16] Turkey clarified that it destroyed 94,111 stockpiled mines in 2006—the first stockpiled mines that it has destroyed—and it is no longer counting 18,236 M18 Claymore mines as antipersonnel mines. Turkey said the “M18 Series APM were removed from destruction list, due to their specific technical features. Turkey has already declared that M18 series APMs will not be used as victim activated.”^[17]

At the end of 2006 the remaining stockpile consisted of these mines: 1,652,913 DM-11; 1,002,709 M14; 145,061 M² series; 43,347 M16; and 22,788 ADAM.^[18]

Turkey did not explicitly list the types of mines that were destroyed in 2006, but a comparison of the 2007 and 2006 Article 7 reports shows the following 94,111 mines were destroyed: 88,951 DM-11; 1,821 M² series; 2,752 M14; 506 M16; and 81 unknown types.^[19] Turkey stated the mines from various locations were destroyed by open detonation following relevant safety, security and environmental standards.^[20]

Turkey first announced in 2005 that it would build a new facility to destroy stockpiled mines.^[21] Turkey’s April 2007 report provided this update: “The ‘Munitions De-militarization Facility’ (TUR-MDF) in Yahşihan (Kirikkale province) will become operational on the 4th of July 2007, and run at full capacity as of that date. At present, preparations are underway for the transfer of stockpiles APMs from their different locations to Yahşihan.”^[22] In mid-July 2007 Turkey informed Landmine Monitor that the facility was “finished as planned,” and that “qualification/certification activities are continuing.”^[23]

Turkey also reassured States Parties in April 2007 that “we are confident that we will be able to fulfill our obligation by destroying stockpiled APMs by 2008.”^[24]

Mines Retained for Research and Training

In its April 2007 Article 7 report Turkey indicated it was retaining 15,150 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes.^[25] This total is unchanged from the previous year.^[26] This constitutes the highest total of retained mines among States Parties. Initially, in 2004, Turkey reported that it would retain 16,000 antipersonnel mines.^[27] In 2006 Turkey reported the number of mines retained for training had decreased to 15,150 “because 850 mines have been used for mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction programmes carried out to train military personnel involved in mine action, as well as for related training at various military training institutions.”^[28] The types of mines retained by Turkey include DM-11, M², M14, M16, and M18 Claymore mines, but Turkey has not indicated the precise number of each in its last two Article 7 reports.

Turkey has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in November-December 2004. It did not utilize in its 2006 or 2007 Article 7 reports the new expanded Form D on retained mines agreed by States Parties at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November-December 2005.

In May 2006 Turkey said that “countries with varying geographies, incongruous terrain, different sizes of armed forces, more mines emplaced than others and countries that are simply in parts of the world where there are more anti-personnel mines, which would require more training, should not have artificial numbers or ceilings imposed on them for the number of mines to be retained under Article 3.”^[29] At the same time, Turkey also stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.”^[30] In June 2005 Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”^[31]

Use

The Chief of General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish Armed Forces on 26 January 1998.^[32] There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by Turkish forces since that time. In this reporting period, there were two media reports alleging mine use by Turkish forces.^[33] The government of Turkey dismissed these as “unfounded claims” and “mere terrorist propaganda.”^[34] At the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings Turkey stated that the PKK “when and if it finds the opportunity, continues to emplace several types of mines and other types of explosives to attack Turkish security forces. These attacks are also killing civilians.”^[35] In response to a Landmine Monitor request for specific information on recent PKK use of antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Turkey replied that the General Staff has reported that 35 antipersonnel mines laid by the PKK were detected and defused in the period from 1 January to 13 July 2007. It added, “Seizure and clearance of various types of mines laid by terrorists infiltrating from Turkey’s south-eastern borders are continuing.”^[36]

According to media reports, the PKK is regularly using powerful, command-detonated improvised explosive devices in attacks on security personnel. These explosive attacks have frequently been reported as “landmines” in the Turkish media. Some incidents reported in the media appear to have been the result of victim-activated antipersonnel mines or improvised explosive devices, but the date of their placement cannot be confirmed.

The PKK/Kongra Gel has previously admitted using command-detonated mines, but in a letter to Geneva Call in 2005 denied any use of mines or other explosive devices which can be activated by a person or a vehicle.^[37] In a June 2007 letter to Geneva Call, the HPG Commander in Chief again denied any use of antipersonnel mines.^[38]

The Turkish government reported that, in 2006, 24 military personnel and civilians were killed and 131 injured by landmines laid by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel. The report does not differentiate between casualties of antipersonnel and antivehicle IEDs/mines, nor between command-detonated IEDs/mines and victim-activated IEDs/mines.^[39]

Landmine and UXO Problem

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and IEDs.^[40] Mines were laid in 1956-1959 along 510 kilometers of the border with Syria and on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran and Iraq to prevent illegal border crossings, and around security installations.^[41] Turkey reported in 2007 that a total of 983,166 mines were emplaced on its territory, of which 164,497 were antivehicle mines laid along the border with Syria.^[42]

Landmines were also emplaced by government forces during the 1984-1999 conflict with the PKK “with the purpose of hindering terrorists from moving into central regions.”^[43] Mines are located in and around villages in the east and southeast of the country.^[44] Some degree of new contamination may result from reported or alleged use of mines and IEDs in 2006-2007.

Mine Action Program

In September 2006 and again in June 2007 Turkey stated that efforts were continuing to establish a national mine action authority and mine action center. It declared that they would be composed of representatives from relevant ministries and “delegates” from the Under Secretariat of Customs, the Administration of South-Eastern Anatolia Regional Development and the Turkish General Staff.^[45]

Turkey stated in 2005 that after the creation of the mine action center, national mine action standards would be adopted in compliance with international standards. No new legislation regarding mine action was passed in 2006 or in the first half of 2007.^[46]

Support to Mine Action

Turkey was the lead nation in a NATO Partnership for Peace project to clear mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from a former military base at Saloglu village in Agstafa district of Azerbaijan. Turkey contributed to the first phase of the project in 2006, budgeted at €1.16 million ($1,457,308), and was reported by Azerbaijan to have provided an additional €50,000 ($62,815) for the second phase of the project starting in April 2007.^[47] Turkey did not report these or other international contributions to mine action or national funding of its own mine action in its 2007 Article 7 report.

Strategic Mine Action Planning

In September 2006 Turkey stated that it had developed a mine action plan to meet its 2014 deadline for clearance of emplaced antipersonnel mines. The plan focuses on clearance of the minefield on the Syrian border under the management of the Ministry of Finance, with an allocation of US$17 million.^[48] Turkey issued two nationally-funded tenders between 2005 and 2007 for clearance of mined areas on the Syria border; they were offered in the form of farming rights on cleared land for 49 years, instead of cash payments; both tenders were cancelled.^[49]

Plans to clear the remaining mined areas containing antipersonnel mines, such as the borders with Iraq, Iran and Armenia, had not been revealed as of July 2007.

Demining

Mine clearance continued to be conducted by the specialized unit of the Turkish General Staff, using manual, canine and mechanical demining techniques. The destruction of cleared mines is conducted by detonation in situ and is said to be in accordance with applicable safety and environmental standards.^[50]

Marking and Fencing of Affected Areas

Turkey’s Article 7 reports have claimed that all known mined areas are marked and fenced.^[51] A number of independent reports, however, suggest that this is not so in every case. In 2007, for example, the mayor of Nusaybin district in Mardin province stated that a number of mined areas near populated places were unmarked and unfenced, particularly in mountainous areas; also, parts of the Turkey-Syria border minefield fencing were said to be broken, with people, particularly children, regularly entering the minefield to tend animals.^[52] The Hakkari Group, a local NGO, claimed that many other mined areas had no marking signs, were not fenced or were inadequately fenced. In addition, former military bases inside the town of Hakkari were said to be inadequately fenced.^[53]

In May 2007 Landmine Monitor researchers observed that a mined area of several hundred square meters around a former Gendarme (military police) base in Ovabağ village, Diyarbakır province was protected by only a single strand of barbwire that was often lying on the ground. There was only one mine warning sign on the perimeter. Local people have made a path to a pond in the middle of the minefield, which serves as a pumped water supply for three houses in the village. Dozens of sheep have reportedly been killed in the minefield.^[54]

Mine/UXO Clearance

Turkey’s 2007 Article 7 report stated that 19,033 mines were cleared in 2006. However, this may refer to cumulative clearance over several years (clearance operations started in 1998); in other statements Turkey has reported that in 2006 it cleared 1,147 mines; the locations and area cleared were not specified.^[55]

Turkey has also declared that from 15 October 2006 to 31 December 2006 its security forces found and defused 24 PKK/Kongra Gel improvised antipersonnel landmines and seven manufactured landmines; it also seized items used in the preparation of IEDs, including fuzes, explosive chains and explosives. From January to 14 May 2007 a further 66 PKK/Kongra Gel improvised antipersonnel landmines, 10 manufactured mines and items used in the preparation of IEDs were found and destroyed.^[56] A media report of 28 June 2007 quoted General Ozel’s declaration that the army had defused 70 percent of the PKK-laid landmines and IEDs.^[57]

The HPG stated to Geneva Call in 2005 that it has carried out some mine removal and accepts a duty to mark dangerous areas but that the HPG also lifts mines to obtain explosives or to undertake military actions.^[58]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2014. In September 2006 Turkey confirmed its commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty and informed States Parties that its mine action plan will allow it to meet the 2014 treaty deadline.^[59]

Mine Risk Education

Very limited mine risk education (MRE) was reported in Turkey in 2006, as in previous years. It was provided mainly by local NGOs in two small projects. There is no MRE coordinating body in Turkey.

In its 2007 Article 7 report Turkey stated that “Populations living in the vicinity of mined areas are warned of the existence of mines through local authorities. Various efforts are underway to increase mine awareness.”^[60] Local people interviewed in southeast Turkey by Landmine Monitor could not confirm any MRE activities provided by local authorities.^[61]

The Hakkari Anti-Landmine Awareness Campaign (also known as the Hakkari Group) undertook a survey of casualties and mine-affected areas in Hakkari province, in order to plan MRE activities. The provincial Gendarmerie provided a half hour training on mine/ERW risks to Hakkari Group members and survey interviewers. The group distributed MRE brochures and displayed posters in mosques, village houses, clinics and schools in the villages surveyed; brief MRE sessions were given for villagers, and village leaders were informed how to spread mine awareness messages. A similar project planned for Şırnak province was cancelled due to security concerns.^[62]

An MRE poster developed by Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey was delivered to elementary schools in 11 cities in mine-affected areas during 2006.^[63] Due to limited funding, the project did not include teacher training or instruction material.^[64] After several months most MRE posters were removed when the school term ended. Despite a request that the posters are displayed permanently, as of May 2007 only a few schools had displayed the posters again.^[65] In early 2007 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey reported that MRE messages would be broadcast on television in 2008.^[66]

An immediate need for expanded MRE in Turkey has been identified by local authorities and civil society groups. The most urgent need is in mine/UXO-affected areas where casualties occur; MRE is also needed for displaced people returning to post-conflict areas, and where entrances to minefields are inadequately fenced and marked. ^[67]

Landmine/UXO/IED Casualties

Analysis of media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey identified at least 73 new casualties due to mines, UXO and victim-activated IEDs, including 18 people killed and 55 injured. Three casualties were women and 31 were children; 52 were civilian (including 10 special security guards and “village guards”) and 21 were military. Incidents occurred in the provinces of Bingöl, Şırnak, Hakkari, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Tunceli, Ağrı, Siirt, Van, Sivas, and also in İzmir, which is not considered to be a mine-affected area. Ten of the civilian casualties occurred during animal herding (eight children); collecting wood/herbs and tampering were the other main activities at the time incidents occurred. In addition, the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey identified at least 72 casualties as a result of 15 incidents with command-detonated IEDs. Although this seems a significant decrease compared to 220 casualties recorded in 2005 (68 killed and 152 injured), the 2005 data included casualties from command-detonated as well as victim-activated devices. Media reports do not consistently report the method of detonation for explosive devices; in 2005, media reports indicated that at least 47 of 62 incidents, which caused 220 casualties, involved command-detonated devices.^[68] The number of child casualties increased from 22 in 2005 to 31 in 2006 and they were the majority of civilian casualties (60 percent). It is likely that there were more casualties, as many incidents are not reported in the media.

Turkey’s Article 7 report for 2006 reported 155 military and civilian casualties (24 people killed and 131 injured) resulting from the “explosion of landmines emplaced by PKK/ KADEK/ KONGRA-GEL terrorist organization;” these “emplaced landmines” may have been improvised explosive devices or command-detonated devices in some cases. Only five of the casualties reported were civilian.^[69] This is a decrease from the 194 military casualties Turkey reported as occurring in 2005.^[70] No deminer casualties were reported by Turkey in 2006.

Incidents continued in 2007, with at least 51 mine/ERW/IED casualties reported as of June.^[71]

Data Collection

No comprehensive casualty data collection mechanism exists in Turkey. The government keeps records of military personnel injured and killed, and appears to have some information on civilian casualties. The Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) collects casualty information from media reports, and when possible verifies incident details by telephone. Media often provide insufficient detail on the type of device causing incidents, but in 2006, IMFT started differentiating casualties from mines, ERW, victim-activated and command-detonated devices more systematically. The IMTF, supported by German NGO Medico International, undertook a pilot survey in 2006 to identify casualties and the needs of survivors in selected districts of Diyarbakır, Mardin and Batman provinces.^[72] Originally, Siirt province was one of the three target areas, but as local Gendarmerie prevented the survey and informants feared for their safety, Batman was chosen as an alternative; cultural gender issues also were an obstacle.^[73] The survey recorded 38 people killed and 65 injured by mines and ERW. Only two casualties occurred prior to 1993 and 16 happened since 2004.^[74]

The Hakkari Group undertook a survey of injuries caused by explosive devices with funding from the Embassy of the Netherlands in 2006. The results had not been released as of May 2007. The survey is used to deliver ad hoc survivor assistance and plan further activities.^[75]

In 2006 the Ministry of Health started using international injury surveillance classifications under which mine/ERW incidents can be registered as a subcategory of explosive and fragment injuries.^[76]

The cumulative number of mine casualties in Turkey is unknown. Turkey has reported that between 1993 and 2003 landmines caused 2,905 casualties, including 588 people killed and 2,317 injured: 1,082 were civilians and 1,823 were military personnel. In its initial Article 7 report, Turkey reported 1,616 military mine casualties between 1984 and August 2004 (400 killed and 1,216 injured).^[77] It was reported that more than 3,000 people (mostly civilians) have been killed and another 7,000 injured by mines along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s.^[78] Local officials in the border areas confirmed these high numbers.^[79] However, it is difficult to accurately determine the number of survivors because of a lack of reporting mechanisms, survivor assistance programs and the reluctance of survivors to report mine-related injuries inside the minefields or off-limits military zones.^[80] Reportedly, people injured by mines inside border minefields have been imprisoned or faced prosecution for committing a criminal act.^[81]

Survivor Assistance

There are few resources and opportunities available to mine/ERW survivors or other people with physical disabilities in Turkey. Lack of data collection prevents a clear assessment of survivor needs. There is no survivor assistance action plan or strategic framework.^[82] The IMFT survey assessed the needs of 65 survivors. The most common needs were: financial assistance (19 percent), employment (15 percent) prosthetic devices (11 percent), education/vocational training (nine percent), physical rehabilitation and psychological support (eight percent each).^[83]

There are healthcare facilities in cities and most villages; emergency care is free but patients often have to pay for continuing care. Health insurance exists; however, the quality of services in government hospitals depends on the category of health insurance a patient has; all insured patients must pay for medicines and supplies. About one third of the population does not have health insurance. Emergency transport exists only in cities. Air evacuation is standard for military mine/ERW casualties and is sometimes made available for civilian casualties. Military casualties are evacuated to military medical facilities and civilians are taken to the nearest large hospital.^[84]

Rehabilitation facilities in Turkey are insufficient.^[85] Upper limb prostheses are not available although a significant need exists, in particular amongst ERW survivors.^[86] There are seven Ministry of Health physiotherapy and rehabilitation centers, the Turkish Armed Forces Rehabilitation and Care Centers, government centers managed by the Social Services and Child Protection Agency and private centers.^[87] Access to prosthetics and rehabilitation is problematic for many mine survivors; an estimated 40-60 percent of people with disabilities in Turkey have never received rehabilitation.^[88] Some survivors have resorted to making their own prostheses.^[89]

There is limited capacity for psychological support in mine-affected regions of Turkey and it is not available for most survivors.^[90]

People with disabilities, including mine survivors, suffer from high unemployment (78 percent). They have limited access to job opportunities and training, though some short-term vocational training courses and workshops are available.^[91] The Administration for Disabled People, under the office of the Prime Minister, states that there is a “profound need for vocational rehabilitation in order to increase employment of persons with disabilities….” An employment quota stipulates that four percent of people in the public sector and three percent of employees in the private sector should be people with disabilities.^[92] In the private sector, this quota was not implemented; some improvement was seen in the public sector in 2006.^[93]

Mine/ERW survivors can obtain financial compensation, as a significant means of improving their living conditions under Law 5233 (on the Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts and the Measures Taken Against Terrorism).^[94]

Turkey’s Disability Law of July 2005 prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities, who can obtain interest-free housing credits and vocational training under the legislation.^[95] However, legislation was not enforced adequately and lacked necessary funds to be fully implemented in 2006.^[96] The Administration for Disabled People is responsible for protecting the rights of people with disabilities.

On 30 March 2007 Turkey signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol, which would allow the monitoring of disability initiatives.

Governmental Activities

According to Turkey’s Article 7 report for 2006, the 131 people injured by mines in 2006 received physical rehabilitation in military centers; this included the five civilian casualties. Of the military survivors, 122 received additional assistance.^[97]

The Gülhane Military Medical Academy and the Turkish Armed Forces Rehabilitation and Care Centre in Ankara provide specialized care to those injured by mines and explosives.^[98] Civilian mine survivors can receive treatment when they have an insurance “green card” which is only available to those below the national poverty level. The cost of travel to Ankara is not covered, and is beyond the financial means of many.^[99]

Physical rehabilitation services, including prosthetics for survivors, are primarily available at the Orthopedics and Traumatology Center at the Dicle University Research Hospital in Diyarbakır.^[100] It is the only center that can provide quality prostheses in mine-affected areas, but the center only manufactures lower leg prostheses.^[101] Many mine survivors are not aware that they can receive prosthetics at the center and others are not eligible for free services. In 2006, the Hakkari Group facilitated treatment for 28 mine survivors (including three women) from the Hakkari at the Dicle center.^[102]

Nongovernmental Activities

At least 46 mine/ERW survivors were assisted by NGOs in 2006.^[103]

The Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey and the Hakkari Group have both developed plans for survivor assistance, based on their 2006 needs assessments. However, no funding for these projects was available as of May 2007.^[104]

In 2006 the Diyarbakır Bar Association provided free legal assistance to 12 mine/ERW survivors, referred several survivors for medical treatment and assisted the application for treatment of two civilian mine survivors. The project ended in 2006. In April 2007 the Association established a mine survivor commission. ^[105]

The Human Rights Association of Diyarbakır also assists mine survivors with legal and other support.^[106] In Suruç in 2006 a mine survivors’ group was started to improve local access to healthcare, rehabilitation and prosthetics.^[107]

The Disabled People’s Association of Turkey is the largest organization assisting people with disabilities in mine-affected areas and has branches in Antakya, Gaziantep, Mardin and Suruç. Local associations of disabled people also exist in some mine-affected areas.^[108]